U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was on a diplomatic visit to Uzbekistan from Oct. 18-20 to strengthen economic and strategic ties with the nations of Central Asia. The visit led to the signing of $12 billion worth of U.S.–Uzbekistan economic agreements and proposed projects.
Uzbekistan also became the 77th country on Monday (Oct. 20) to sign the Artemis Accords with the Trump administration. The Accords are a U.S.-led international framework for peaceful and responsible space exploration and were signed between Rubio and Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov.
Rubio also met his counterparts from five Central Asian nations in Samarkand — Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — on Monday which according to Reuters was projected by U.S. officials as an opportunity to project its soft power in the region.
“I mean, look, it’s competition,” Rubio told journalists after a walk through the Registan Square that boasts of three massive, blue-tiled madrassas that date to the Timurid Empire. “We have products, we have companies, they make things, and we just want fair competition and an opportunity.”
Vision Times reporter Venus Upadhayaya talked about Rubio’s recent Central Asian visit with Syrian born Dr. Waiel Awwad, a Senior International Journalist and Political Analyst who has served in several global media houses including in senior roles in Al Arabiya and Middle East Broadcasting Center [MBC].
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Dr. Awwad highlighted the trip as a “renewed” effort by the U.S. to increase its strategic interests in a region geopolitically saddled between Russia and China.
Dr. Waiel Awwad: The USA has been eying CIS countries for decades. In fact, even the war on Afghanistan was part of the American strategy to gain access to CIS and use corridors for transferring of oil and gas from these rich countries.
Let us remember that American interest in Central Asia did not begin with Marco Rubio’s visit. It goes back to the 1990s, when Washington was already pursuing energy corridors designed to connect Caspian oil and gas to global markets while reducing dependence on routes controlled by Russia and avoiding Iran. The proposed Unocal pipeline through Afghanistan was part of that strategic and commercial landscape.
After 2001, the war created a new military and logistical dimension to America’s presence, while subsequent transport initiatives demonstrated the wider strategic importance of regional connectivity. We should be careful, however, not to claim that pipelines alone caused the invasion; the publicly documented reasons for the war centred on al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s provision of sanctuary to it.
So, Rubio’s engagement is not a new American discovery of Central Asia. It represents a renewed effort to secure commercial access, diversify critical-mineral supplies, develop transport corridors and maintain a strategic presence in a region where Russia and China already have substantial interests. What has changed is not Washington’s interest in Central Asia, but the intensity of the competition and the importance of critical minerals alongside oil, gas and transit routes.
Dr. Waiel Awwad: I see critical minerals becoming one of the main pillars of U.S. engagement with Central Asia over the next five years. The competition is not simply about extracting minerals; it is about controlling more of the supply chain, from exploration and mining to processing, refining and advanced manufacturing.
Uzbekistan and its neighbours possess deposits of minerals that may be important for batteries, electronics, renewable energy, aerospace and defence industries. For Washington, developing alternative sources of supply is also a way to reduce vulnerabilities associated with concentrated global processing and supply networks.
But the outcome will depend on whether U.S. companies are prepared to make long-term investments in infrastructure, technology transfer and local processing, rather than simply securing access to raw materials. Central Asian governments will want employment, industrial development, technical expertise and a larger share of the value generated from their resources.
Over the next five years, I expect stronger competition among American, Chinese, European, Russian, and other investors. Uzbekistan could emerge as an important hub, but geological potential alone does not guarantee commercial success. Water and energy availability, transport infrastructure, regulatory predictability and environmental standards will all matter.
The real question is whether Central Asia will remain a supplier of raw materials or become a centre for processing and higher-value industries. That distinction will determine how much lasting economic benefit the region gains from the critical-minerals race.
Dr. Waiel Awwad: This is a significant signal that Washington wants to move its relationship with Central Asia beyond diplomacy and security into the realm of long-term commercial engagement. The scale of the business delegation suggests that the United States sees opportunities in critical minerals, energy, aviation, agriculture, technology and transport infrastructure. The October 2026 C5+1 discussions also highlighted the Trans-Caspian trade corridor and industrial cooperation
Washington wants its companies to become long-term economic stakeholders in Central Asia. The countries of the region should welcome genuine investment, but evaluate every proposal on commercial viability, local benefits, technology transfer and the extent to which it strengthens their own productive capacity.
The objective should not be to replace one external dependency with another. It should be to create more choices.
Dr. Waiel Awwad: That narrative can appeal to regional governments, but its credibility will depend on American behaviour. If Washington respects their independent choices and delivers commercially attractive partnerships, its message will carry weight. If economic cooperation becomes conditional on political alignment, the promise of strategic choice will become harder to sustain.
Central Asia’s response should be pragmatic: cooperate with Washington, maintain relations with Moscow and Beijing, and develop partnerships with Europe, India, Japan, South Korea and other interested economies.
For these countries, strategic autonomy is not about remaining equidistant from every power. It is about retaining the freedom to make decisions according to their national interests.
Dr. Waiel Awwad: Central Asia is attracting attention because several strategic developments are converging. It is rich in natural resources, occupies a pivotal position between Europe and Asia, and is increasingly important to the diversification of energy and mineral supply chains. Its transport corridors can connect markets across the Caspian region, while its growing economies offer opportunities in infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and technology.
The region also borders Russia, China, Afghanistan, and Iran, placing it at the intersection of several major security and economic questions. For Washington, engagement with Central Asia is therefore about more than bilateral commerce: it concerns the broader balance of influence across Eurasia.
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