NATO Secretary-General, US War Secretary Deliver Remarks at NATO Defense Ministers Meeting

Good morning, all of you. I really want to welcome Pete Hexet, Secretary of War to NATO. It's great that you're here, Pete, at this important meeting. It's the last big meeting we'll have before the Ankara Summit, and the Ankara Summit will be all about implementation. What we are seeing now is that NATO 3.0 is really happening. A stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. Your first visit to NATO was in February last year, and you gave a very strong speech about spending more, getting the production up, but also to make sure that it's a fair deal with the United States. You said, we are committed to NATO, but we also have an expectation. The expectation is that Europeans will at least equalize with what the U.S. is spending. And they had to, not only because you were asking, but also because we got to keep ourselves safe. And these are the capability targets we need to deliver. And we committed to this in The Hague, but now it's coming on. It's happening. So almost $100 billion, over $90 billion more in 2025. Almost 20% increase in Canada and in Europe. So thank you for your guidance last year and your spirited speech. But also thank you for what you were doing when it comes to the defence industrial base. It's crucial. We need to produce more, both in the U.S. and in Europe, to keep ourselves safe. And this is a big priority of you and the team and the President, opening up the defence industrial base in the U.S. We are doing the same in Europe and Canada, because we have to not only keep up, we have to do better than China, Russia and others, who are at this moment rapidly expanding their defence industrial output. So for all these reasons, thank you for what you are doing, for your leadership, your commitment, and thank you for being here today. Thank you, Mark. Thank you very much. Secretary General has done a fantastic job leading the way, working with us, working with President Trump, working with NATO to get to NATO 3.0. NATO 3.0 is post-Cold War recognition that needs to go back to a real hardline military alliance that has real military capabilities capable of deterring right here on the continent and taking the lead for the conventional defence of Europe, which you have led on and other nations are stepping up to do. So a lot of commitments made at the Hague Summit, many countries following through, some that still need to do more. And we will be candid about that, both in private and in public. I think that's important. Friends being honest with friends, making sure that they can step up. But I appreciate you noting what the United States is doing as well through the leadership of President Trump. This is not just something we're saying, it's something we're doing through the way we act as well. A $1.5 trillion investment in our defence in FY27 is a message to the world. And we're so personally invested, I'll be up on Capitol Hill for weeks making the case, whether it's reconciliation or the supplemental or the base budget, how important these investments are to our capabilities, our defence industrial base in building the arsenal of freedom that first and foremost protects America and American interests, but also backstops the strength of NATO and our allies. So it all fits together and all sends the right message to the world that we understand the threats of this moment and that we can't just talk about them. We have to be willing to stand up and do something in a strong way about it. And so that'll be my message to privately and publicly today. We appreciate you having us and look forward to Ankara and the great things that President Trump, the other leaders will be able to do for NATO going forward. You got it. Thank you. Appreciate it. Thank you. Good morning and welcome to this meeting of NATO defence ministers. This is the last milestone before our summit in Ankara in just three weeks. Today we will address how European allies and Canada are taking more responsibility for their conventional defence to rebalance our security for the better. We are building a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. That means allies demonstrating clear progress and a credible path towards investing 5% of GDP on defence and turning that increased spending into combat ready forces and capabilities. Now, we are already seeing truly impressive progress. In 2025, European allies and Canada invested over $90 billion more than the year before. That's an increase of nearly 20% in a single year. And we are already seeing further increases when it comes to the books for 2026. To accelerate defence production and innovation in Europe and North America, it is vital that we also turbocharge transatlantic defence cooperation. There's no other way. We will also discuss issues outside of Europe that very much affect our security. Allies have long agreed that Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. And today, as a result of U.S. action, they are further from that than at any time in recent memory. We all are heartened by the prospects for peace following the U.S.-Iran agreement. Pete, this is truly a remarkable achievement. Thank you. And of course, thank the President for this. Restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is vital for the global economy. So we will have the opportunity today to address allies' concrete contributions to international efforts to support freedom of navigation. On Ukraine, I expect further pledges of support to be made at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group later today, because we must continue to step up and sustain our support so that Russia's brutal war ends. It is important that every ally does their fair share, particularly through NATO's Pearl Initiative, given its effectiveness at providing crucial air defence which only the United States can deliver. But before we begin our closed session, my dear friend Pete, the U.S. Secretary of War has asked for the floor. So Pete, the floor is yours. Well, Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your leadership throughout and for this forum. And as I said at my first NATO Defence Ministerial last February, and as the Trump administration has said again and again in the last year and a half, our allies must step up. President Trump has been very clear on this point for many years in over two administrations. And for too long, NATO has been a paper tiger and a one-way street. No more. And that's what the Hague Summit is all about. That's what defence spending commitments are all about, transforming NATO back into a real military alliance that's focused on hard power and real deterrence, a NATO 3.0, modelled on the NATO 1.0 that won the Cold War, with our allies actually taking the lead in Europe's conventional defence. And that's what NATO was always supposed to be and what its framers like President Eisenhower always expected. Europe was not supposed to be a dependency of the United States. That's not what Winston Churchill or Charles de Gaulle or Konrad Adenauer wanted or expected. No, Europe was supposed to be a military power allied with a strong America. This is the essence of NATO 1.0. As Dwight Eisenhower himself said as early as 1951, if in 10 years all American troops stationed in Europe for national defence purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole process will have failed. Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander then, not yet our nation's 34th President. But he and his allied counterparts, all of them still living in the shadow of World War II, understood that NATO's power did not come from committees or from meetings or from small flags on fancy tables. It came from warriors. And for Europe's defence, it had come from NATO allies. That was NATO 1.0, a hard-edged warfighting organisation focused on Europe's defence. But that spirit faded after the Cold War ended. No longer focused on defending Europe, NATO 2.0 drifted toward out-of-area operations and things that had nothing to do with warfighting at all. Instead of tanks and fighters and air defences, the focus has been on gender equity and climate change and defence austerity. Europe's borders flew wide open. Welfare states expanded. Defence budgets cratered, along with Europe's belief in itself and its civilisation. NATO lost its way. NATO 2.0 was an era of distraction, de-industrialisation and de-militarisation. It was an era of free-riding. And those were lost years that we're not going back to. And that's why at the Department of War we've been so clear and so candid to restore NATO's core military role and character. And that's why we've returned US troop levels in Europe to pre-2022 levels with the redeployment of a brigade combat team last year and further reduction of 5,000 forces earlier this year. At the same time, it's why we've engaged with our allies so consistently. And it's why we've grown our own defence industrial base and encouraged to turn NATO 3.0 into reality. To return the alliance to its roots as a military alliance and ensure that it has the European strength required to sustainably deter aggression and, if need be, make good on Article 5. Some of our allies have gotten the message and stepped up. You know who you are and we very much appreciate it. Last year, under President Trump's leadership, NATO set the new global standard for allied defence spending, 5% of GDP all in on defence. It's historic and it's transformational. And some allies are already well on their way to meeting this ambitious target and, in some cases, ahead of schedule. And as you've seen over the last six months, President Trump is also committed to the United States' defence spending, more than $1 trillion in 2026 and a commitment of $1.5 trillion in 2027. We will lead and exceed our own NATO spending standards. And I'm personally on Capitol Hill in order to make sure we do it. It's not due as I say, it's due as we do. Some allies are also getting serious about how they're spending on their defence. In May, the Department of War told allies that we're reducing our contributions to the NATO force model. We also explained how allies can and should backfill those changes. General Brinkowitz reports that some allies have stepped up accordingly, and it's a good start. At the same time, just last month, a small group of strong allies gathered at Bergen for a conversation about focused allied defence spending, on the capabilities required to defend Europe, even in the event of simultaneous conflicts worldwide. Again, more serious progress. On Ukraine as well, progress. Through President Trump's Pearl Initiative, allies have taken the lead in funding support for Ukraine's defence. Ukrainians are holding their lines even in the face of sustained Russian assaults. We said it could be done, that our allies could lead, and that it would be consistent with Ukraine's defence. It is happening. And it's a validation of President Trump's approach, an approach that will set the table for peace. Yet for all these early steps in the right direction, there have also been real setbacks that we cannot ignore. For all of our clarity, too many allied capitals seem to still miss something in translation. Too many allies still don't recognise the historic need that President Trump has made clear to them and to NATO itself, to reforge a relevant, powerful military alliance. As President Trump put it, and rightfully so, he gave our allies a test, to support America when we asked for their help. And too many failed it. The United States has defended Europe for generations. And the President said, all he said was that our jets would need to take off from bases in Europe, or our ships from ports, to strike targets in the Middle East. Iranian targets that threaten European interests even more directly than they threaten us. But too many of our allies said no, or tried to drown us in arcane legal debates, or criticised us publicly for doing what they aren't prepared or able to do themselves. It was shameful. These allies, they put America's sons and daughters, our sons and daughters, at risk by denying them the predictable access, basing and overflight that never should have been in question at all. In some cases, we had to shift capabilities from one country to another, out of NATO-allied countries altogether. There's no excuse for that. And that's not to mention the fact that some countries have yet to show a credible path to meeting their Hague commitments. Too much talk. Some of NATO's largest economies, some of our richest countries, allies that are happiest to go on about the rules-based international order and middle powers banding together, still seem to think the era of free-riding is here. Eisenhower and Trump disagree. This isn't what the President or America expects from this alliance. This is not what any reasonable person would expect. And it's not going to cut it anymore. And so we're doubling down on our effort to make NATO what it always was supposed to be, a balanced alliance with Europe in the lead for its own defense, NATO 3.0. And to make that a reality, I'm announcing today a six-month Department of War review that will examine America's force posture and basing in Europe. Up to six months, could be less. Let's call it the NATO 3.0 review. This review will be conducted with the benefit of inputs from the United States military, from European command. It will involve consultations with the U.S. Congress and with our allies. But make no mistake about it, this will be a real review. It will be designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe-leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe, stepping up to ensure our forces are postured for America's global needs, and stepping up to make sure that our access, basing and overflight are clearly delineated and assured. Any other country would do the same. At the same time, going forward, our annual NATO dues will be contingent on other countries meeting their defense spending targets. Where other allies do not spend with urgency, our dues contributions will go down. NATO will be a two-way street. It's only common sense. America cannot care for or pay more for Europe's defense than our allies do. And this review will think outside the box. Our National Defense Strategy states clearly that we're going to incentivize and enable our allies to step up and do their part. So we're going to keep a close eye on allies who are not doing that and who say no or maybe or wait and see what matters most. It's a review that some countries will fail and others will pass with flying colors. In the end, the review is intended to both improve U.S. force posture and basing and strengthen NATO 3.0. It's intended to be constructive, as we have always been. There are no strategic surprises here. There haven't been. I've been clear with all of you since my first remarks to this body in February of 2025, President Trump has always done the same. Our direction of travel is and has been clear. This is the right thing to do by the American people. It's the right thing to do by this alliance. Europe can and must take primary responsibility for its conventional defense as it plagues at the Hague Summit, and in the process, safeguarding Europe's defense for generations to come. We know our allies can do it. And it's time. Thank you. Thank you very much, Secretary Haxson. Dear Pete, there's much to discuss and decide today to further strengthen our deterrence and defense. And with that, I want to thank the media for joining us, and we will now continue shortly.