NATO should stop 'obsessing' over Trump: Ben Hodges on what comes next for the alliance

The NATO summit in Ankara is over, but the big questions remain. Did Allies strengthen deterrence or simply buy time? What did Putin take away from the meeting? And what should Europe prepare for over the next two years? Former US Army Europe Commander Ben Hodges looks beyond the headlines, offering broader context on what comes next for NATO and Europe's security. Ben Hodges, if you were sitting in the Kremlin today, would you feel better or worse after the NATO summit? I would feel much worse. Even though we were all holding our breath before the summit about what would President Trump do, the fact is, when it was all said and done at the end, the summit had achieved what's always priority number one, is this perception of unity. That despite all the debates and the arguments, and even despite President Trump being so harsh in his language towards Spain, for example, and of course, bringing up this ridiculous thing about Greenland, at the end of the summit, I mean, it felt much better than it did two days before. And then, of course, the other two reasons that the Kremlin will not be very happy with this is that, you know, a very clear statement of support for Ukraine by the alliance, and especially by President Trump with this, you know, he said that he would allow Ukraine to have the license to produce their own Patriot interceptor missiles. Let's see if that happens. But I mean, that's a positive thing. And then there was the third thing was this display of defense investment by everybody from Canada to, you know, all over the alliance. Significant. So these were things, and I have to give credit to the Secretary General Rutte. I mean, he managed to get all the cats in one place. So, Ben, let's stay with Ukraine for a moment. President Trump appeared unusually warm towards President Zelensky and also promised support for Ukraine. How significant are those signals, and should Kyiv see them as a genuine commitment, or is it rather more like tactical diplomacy? I would say we have to watch and see what actually happens. I mean, you know, how many times have we heard the president talk about sanctions on Russia, then they didn't happen, and then this, and then, I mean, it's over and over and over. So the Ukrainians are probably going to have a degree of skepticism about what actually will happen. So for me, as happy as I am to hear this kind of language, you know, what matters is, does the process start for Lockheed or whoever is a part of this for Ukraine to begin to get people trained, to get the supply chain, to start getting the stuff, to have a place where they can do this? This will probably happen faster in Ukraine than it would happen anywhere else, to include getting people trained to make these things. But I'd be looking for evidence that that's actually happening. And I would also be looking for evidence of, you know, sanctions. Is the president, are all the sanctions in place, the ones that were waived a while back? The Ukrainians are not going to take their foot off the gas when it comes to their attacks on Russia's oil and gas infrastructure. I think this is going to continue. It has to continue. What they have done just in the last, I think, four days, they've hit dozens of fuel vessels in the Azov Sea and in the Black Sea that were trying to get gasoline or diesel to Crimea. I mean, they're hammering that. So I think we're going to continue to see this parallel effort, long range strikes against oil and gas infrastructure, which I think is going to be the key to victory, by the way, to make it difficult for Russia to be even able to pay for this war. And then the mid-range strikes, which are wrecking the Russian logistics in and around Crimea. On the other hand, I think we should also be watching for, is Russia, are they changing? You know, just the other day, you saw, of course, that Mr. Peshkov used the word, we're at war. And a year or two ago, he said that it was like, it was a faux pas, and he withdrew it. Now, this sounded very deliberate. And the Russians just closed several border crossings, and their border with Finland and Estonia, and I think Lithuania, and then their border with Kazakhstan and Georgia and Azerbaijan. Almost as if they're preparing to make sure people cannot leave, because maybe they finally are going to have to declare a full mobilization. And I don't know that. But these are the kind of things, you know, you try to connect the dots a little bit. You know, what do they mean? And as General Sierski said, you know, if the Russians do a full mobilization, then that really is it. I mean, they have nothing left after that. You mentioned full mobilization. What would that actually mean for Ukraine, but also for Russia itself? From a military standpoint, of course, you would have tens of thousands of soldiers, new soldiers, that were probably barely trained and equipped, and then sent in to, you know, reinforce their attacks across Ukraine, or maybe to try and create a new front somewhere just to threaten anything for Russia that changes this momentum, which right now is in favor of Ukraine, something to change the momentum, and to regain the initiative. So I would be looking for that. But I also would be looking for what happens inside of Russia when they, you know, when families in Moscow and St. Petersburg start seeing their little Ivan sent off to the army somewhere. On top of gasoline shortages, you know, throughout Russia, on top of seeing the smoke from burning refineries in Moscow and St. Petersburg, then the Russians will know that this war has come to their front door. Let's turn to Iran. What are you hearing from your military contacts following the US strikes? I have a feeling that the department is bringing together more capability, as if they are preparing, not that they're going to, but that they are preparing to give the president the option for a significant increase in use of force. Whether that means something to force the strait open, I don't know. But, you know, that would require a lot. And so there was a report of another marine expeditionary unit that was on its way from the Pacific coming in. I would watch, you know, do you start to see more aerial refuelers coming in to be positioned somewhere, or the buildup of logistics? Those are the kind of things that I'm going to be looking for over the next few days. Now, again, even if they are doing this, and I don't know that they are, but even if they are, that doesn't mean that there will be an escalation. But, you know, they have to give the president some options. He may use that as more leverage on the Iranians. I don't know. But I think the last few days have demonstrated that you cannot bomb the Iranians out of existence. I mean, with drones and the other things. Who is really shaping this policy at this point, Ben? Is it the president or the Pentagon? I don't know. For me, what's needed is a lot more diplomacy that's backed up by this kind of military power and doing it with our allies. What we should have done from the very beginning is working with our European allies, but also with China to put pressure on Tehran. Many observers say, Ben, that President Trump has seemed more unpredictable and erratic than ever. How does that affect allies and, after all, military planning? Well, you know, millions of people have tried to do their own psychoanalysis of President Trump. I see all the time people expressing concern or pointing or thinking it's funny that he does not seem altogether. I mean, it's more than just typical old man forgetting somebody's name or mispronouncing something. It seems more than that. I think it looks to me that European leaders have decided almost not to ignore it, but just accept, you know, to go about their own business, I guess is what I'm saying, and not make decisions on what's Trump going to do or say, but what's in the best interest of my country, whether it's Germany, Poland, Finland, UK, which is exactly what they should do. President Trump suggested he may lift CAATSU sanctions and allow Turkey back into the F-35 program. Would that be strategical sound? And, Ben, can the president actually do that alone? No. I mean, the law was passed. So this would be, you know, to do something that is literally against the law, the president would have to get permission, a waiver or something to get the permission to allow Turkey to re-enter the F-35 program. Remember, they were part of the F-35 program until they made a terrible decision to purchase this Russian S-400 air defense system. The reason that was a problem was because the radar on the S-400 system, you know, that's, they could use that to figure out how to identify F-35. I mean, part of what makes the F-35 so effective is its stealth technology, that it's not easy to pick up on radar. But if you can train your radar, I mean, if you have both, if you have an S-400 and you have F-35s, you could imagine that that could be something that would be done. And I think there is clearly enormous concern that that would end up in Russian hands and other potential adversaries. So that's a real problem. And that's why Congress stepped in and said, okay, Turkey, sorry, you cannot be a part of the program anymore. So I think that this would be a huge mistake and illegal for the president to go against that. Now, if Turkey gets rid of the S-400, especially the radar, gets rid of that, then it's a different story. Of course, the Greeks are not happy about this, that their NATO ally Turkey might have F-35s. But that's a different argument. There have been concerns about the proposed Qatari Boeing 747 as a possible Air Force One replacement. How serious are those concerns? It looks to me that the Secret Service and the Air Force finally were able to persuade the White House that this is unsafe, that there is a real problem. Now, of course, should not say nobody, but I don't think many people bought the cover story that the president really just wanted all the airmen in the UK to see this big, beautiful new plane. I mean, give me a break. I mean, that's nonsense. So they're doing that, though, to cover up that they're probably going there to see if they can, in fact, make the new Qatari sourced Air Force One to give it all of the capabilities that it needs to have for survivability, to avoid jamming, to aerial refueling, all these things. That's what they got to do. They must have really gotten some sense of the danger, I mean, to be willing to do that. Plus, this is pretty expensive, and it's humiliating. It's what people, experts have been saying, this is ridiculous. But here we are. Then finally, what's next for NATO? I mean, we are looking ahead of the US midterm elections by the end of this year. What should allies be preparing for over the next two years regarding President Trump and the United States? I think allies should quit thinking about President Trump all the time. I mean, I know they do. And he loves that. But I mean, now, let's focus on readiness, on Einsatzbereitschaft. It's not just about new equipment. It's are you prepared to do your job, whether you're on an U-boat or F-35 or tank unit or whatever. Are you ready to do your job? Do you have enough women and men in uniform in your formations? Are you trained? Do you have the spare parts, the ammunition, the fuel, all of these things? That's job one for every military in NATO. So I hope that the alliance can now focus on these things. And of course, the likelihood that we will see some sort of reduction of US capability in Europe. I mean, it seems more likely now than before. What are the implications for NATO? I think the alliance is working on filling whatever those gaps might be or what they might soon be. That's what they should be. I think that's what they should be focused on. And learning as much as we possibly can from Ukraine. I mean, I still don't feel that sense of urgency that we have got to figure out how to do it. And then finally, I would say, Enos, we've got to come up with a solution to these Russian gray zone operations, the use of hybrid tactics to scare our populations, sabotage, infrastructure attacks, disinformation, assassination, Shatterfleet vessels. If we can't come up with a way to inflict consequences on the Russians for those, then I think they will keep pushing the limits there. Ben Hodges, as always, thank you so much. Thank you for the privilege.