Rommel causes a British Command Crisis 1942! BATTLESTORM North Africa

Last time, link in the description, we saw Rommel attack the British 1st Armoured Division and almost trap them in a pocket in the Agedabia area. Now, embroiled in a tank fight with the 21st Panzer Division, could they escape through the gap in the north? Let's find out. In the middle of a brawl with the 2nd Armoured Brigade, Butcher, with just 20 panzers, called for support from the stronger 15th Panzer Division, currently on its way towards Gf 15th Panzer Division couldn't just pull out of this engagement and go help 21st Panzer, so they asked Crüwell what to do. Crüwell denied permission for them to go north, and so 21st Panzer Division was left to deal with the British alone. But in almost total confusion, the 1st Support Group were chased north, and Valentin only got his unit in order a few miles south of Zaunu in the evening. At the same time, the 9th Lancers fell back to the village as well, with the German panzers arriving there too. The 21st Battery of the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment fired point-blank at the 8th Panzer Regiment. The latter, supported by Pak anti-tank guns and artillery, bought. The South Africans were overrun. The 10th Hussars received support from the South African 19th Field Battery and a Jock Column from the 1st Support Group, and also went into action. The 10th Hussars had to close within 500 yards of the German panzers to make effective use of their 2-pounder and 37mm cannon. Well, despite the use of smoke, the German panzers and anti-tank guns knocked them out on the way, as the Panzer IVs hammered their artillery with their long-range 75mm guns. In other words, the British and South Africans were at a severe disadvantage. After suffering heavy losses, all the units of the British Division fell back in confusion to the Massus Tracts in the north. While the bulk of the Support Group and the 200th Guards Brigade had got out relatively intact, the 2nd Armoured Brigade had by this point lost 70 of its 154 tanks. It was therefore no longer a viable fighting force. The 21st Panzer Division, on the other hand, had lost 10 of its original 20 panzers, while the 15th Panzer Division had lost roughly 19 of its 80. Thus, the British had lost almost 70 tanks, and the Germans had lost about 29. The only hope now for the British was to bring up reinforcements, but the only unit on its way was the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had left Tobruk and was heading for Bas. Tucker wanted this brigade to take over the defence of Benghazi so that the 7th Brigade could strike south. The problem was, was that this was far too little, and far too late. Yet, General Ritchie was still positive that he had everything in hand, and told Auchinleck exactly that. He said that they would soon defeat the enemy columns, since they couldn't be supported so far forward, and then go on the offensive. In other words, Ritchie was completely out Italian General Bastico had given permission for spoiling attacks and a reconnaissance-in-force, but nothing like the sort of offensive Rommel was now pursuing. Worse, Rommel hadn't told his superiors that he was going to attack, so when Mussolini was informed, he sent Ugo Cavallero along with Bastico and Albert Kesselring to see Rommel. Cavallero had in his hand a directive from Mussolini stating that no more supplies or reinforcements were coming across the Mediterranean because of the British interdiction campaign, and that Rommel should maintain a defensive position in the Merse-Brega area. Convinced that Rommel would run out of supplies and subsequently face disaster, and with Mussolini's letter backing him up, Cavallero demanded that Rommel call off his offensive and withdraw. However, Rommel's Chief of Staff, Alfred Gauser, had just come back from visiting the Führer, and Rommel knew that Hitler supported him. Therefore, Rommel responded by saying he would continue for as long as he could, and that only an order from the Führer would stop him now, since most of the fighting would be done by Germans anyway, not the Italians. When Kesselring said that a withdrawal might be best, Rommel replied that his experience as an airman made his opinions irrelevant. Rommel noted in his diary that after Kesselring had made some attempts to back up Cavallero, the latter went off growling. Nonetheless, Cavallero removed parts of the Italian Corps from Rommel's command and held them back in the Merse-Brega and Ajdabia area. In the short term, this wasn't that bad because Rommel believed that some more British units were in the pocket he had created. Thus, he sent his forces southeast to devour a prey that had already gotten away, wasting the whole day and a lot of petrol before it was realized what had happened. For the first time in the battle, the RAF finally got their act together and managed to stop the Stukas from striking their forces, which were currently reorganizing near Massus. The Tank Delivery Squadron brought up 13 replacement tanks, but this nowhere made up for the losses. Godwin-Austen therefore told Ritchie that they had done little damage to the Germans, that the Axis was stronger than they had realized, and that the remnants of the 1st Armoured Division had no strength to counterattack, nor protect the desert flank, nor stop the Axis from taking Massus, nor prevent the Axis from moving up the coast road. Since Rommel could strike in any one or more of these directions, Godwin-Austen thought that it was best to withdraw and asked Ritchie for permission to fall back towards Mechili. At first, Ritchie expressed the view that Rommel might be near his limits, and said that Godwin-Austen should concentrate around Massus and south of Benghazi in preparation for a counterattack. He didn't think that Rommel would be able to deal with two attacks at once, and would be compelled to fall back the next day. Just in case things went wrong though, he did order the preparation for the demolition of facilities and supplies at Benghazi, and did grant Godwin-Austen the right to withdraw if he felt it necessary. Upon hearing this, Godwin-Austen issued the necessary orders, telling Tucker of 4th Indian Division to stop the enemy advance along the coast road and prepare to evacuate Benghazi. The 7th Indian Infantry Brigade therefore drove about a dozen miles south of the city in order to fulfill this request. Godwin-Austen also told Masservi to hold at Massus if possible, but to withdraw to Mechili if things got out of hand. And Air Vice-Marshal Cunningham decided to prepare for the worst case, and ordered a withdrawal of all his rear service units. Fighters would remain behind to cover the retreat, but would move to Mechili now, then to Gazala and Gambut if the situation required it. In turn, Ritchie informed Auchinleck what was happening, but in the meantime, the Royal Navy had reported to Churchill that preparations had been started for the withdrawal from Benghazi. Churchill sent an angry telegram to Auchinleck, who then ordered Ritchie to stop Godwin-Austen from destroying the port facilities, which Ritchie had just given the orders to destroy. Well, on the 25th of January 1942, the Deutsche Afrika Korps struck Masservi's 1st Armoured Division near Massus, smashed it, broke them, and chased them northwards. Massus airfield fell into German hands, and they captured 12 aircraft on the runway. But because they hadn't found any fuel at Massus, Rommel was forced to stop, while the British fled back to Cheruba that evening. As Rommel paused to replenish his fuel stocks and consider his next move, Godwin-Austen realized that the 1st Armoured Division was in a bad state, and had nothing to stop the Afrika Korps from driving on Benghazi and capturing the Indian Brigade there. He therefore ordered the 4th Indian Division and all ships to withdraw from Benghazi and started to move the 1st Armoured Division towards Mechili. He was acting with the permission that Ritchie had granted him the previous day. However, Ritchie then informed Godwin-Austen of Auchinleck's views, and ordered him to slow the withdrawal, and at midnight ordered him to stop it altogether. Ritchie believed that the Axis were struggling with their logistics, so he wanted the 4th Indian Division to strike into the Axis lines of communication north-east of Ajdabia. At the same time, 1st Armoured Division would stop what was thought to be the main advance towards Cheruba, and protect the left flank of 4th Indian Division by placing itself between Cheruba and El-Abiar. Via radio, Godwin-Austen formally objected to the change of plan. He said that the 1st Armoured Division only had 40 operational tanks, and this wouldn't be enough to support the Indians or stop the Axis. But Ritchie overruled him and insisted on the plan. Godwin-Austen of course protested. He told Ritchie that the alteration of orders was causing confusion among the troops, and indicated a lack of confidence from Ritchie in Godwin-Austen himself, which both his men and immediate subordinates had picked up upon. And he reiterated that he didn't think 1st Armoured Division had the strength to defend the area it was in, whilst at the same time help the 7th Indian Brigade at Benghazi. "...though I will do anything to help, you are placing me in very false situation by throwing on me the whole responsibility for ensuring, with insufficient means, security of force directed by yourself on what I consider an unsound enterprise." Worse, Tucker also told Ritchie it was impossible for him to strike south against Rommel, since he only had one brigade, and no help from the tanks. Well, Ritchie overruled him as well, stating that they needed to prepare for their own attack, which was set to begin on the 29th. And because communication between himself and Tucker was better than Godwin-Austen's to Tucker, Ritchie then started issuing orders directly to the 4th Indian Division, bypassing Godwin-Austen. There were local difficulties of communication that made this a reasonable decision, but it did not find favour with Godwin-Austen. Godwin-Austen allowed the transfer, but sent a formal letter to Ritchie protesting everything. In addition, when Godwin-Austen gave Ritchie's new orders to Masservi, Masservi also complained directly to Ritchie, telling him that the 1st Armoured Division was on its last legs. "...Ritchie was all haywire back then, all for counterattacking in this direction one day and another the next. Optimistic and trying not to believe that we had taken a knock, when I reported the state of 1st Armoured Division to him at a time when he was planning to use it for a counterattack, he fled to see me and almost took the view that I was being subversive. Even then he insisted on his plan, saying that the counterattack should be launched on the 29th. It was Ritchie's first battle crisis, and it had occurred only a month after he had been pitchforked into his first command for twenty years. He was not properly equipped to cope with it." After hearing what was happening at the front, that evening, Auchinleck and Tedder flew to Ritchie's headquarters. But instead of taking a realistic assessment of the situation, Auchinleck and Tedder sided with Ritchie, and they all believed that Rommel's unexpected success could easily be driven back. Of course, their views may have been influenced by someone on a different continent. Behind both Auchinleck and Ritchie was the hot breath of Churchill, whose ill-judged pressure for Akrobat was the real problem. Luckily for the British, sandstorms on the 26th of January prevented most movement anyway, so the action was paused for a while. Rommel though had intercepted British radio traffic, and knew that the British commanders were in the middle of a heated disagreement. He therefore decided not to strike towards Cheruba in case the British struck south from Benghazi and cut off his supply lines. Instead, he ordered Crüwell to head towards Mechili as a feint attack, while the rest of his forces headed towards Benghazi. Cavallero then met with Rommel again at Massus and tried to get him to stop, but Mussolini called Rommel that evening to congratulate him on his success and gave him permission to continue, undermining Cavallero's attempt to control Rommel. On the 27th of January, sandstorms grounded the bombers again, but two reconnaissance planes from the 250th South African Squadron spotted Crüwell's divisions moving towards Mechili. Even though the British knew that the Axis were also heading towards Benghazi, Ritchie was convinced that the thrust towards Mechili was the main one. So he ordered the 1st Armoured Division to strike into the rear of the enemy force advancing east of Mechili, and the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade would tackle the force moving towards Benghazi. The enemy has divided his forces and is weaker than we are in both areas. The key word is offensive action everywhere. Thus, on the 28th of January 1942, Mussolini set off from Cheruba towards the south-east as ordered, effectively splitting the British in two, leaving the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade on its own. Meanwhile, in the pouring rain, Rommel led the Marx Group towards Rejima, and at noon, Tucker reported that two enemy columns with 47 tanks were coming straight towards him, one approaching Skelodema and the other Saluk. This was, in fact, the Italian 20th Corps, but he had also identified troops from both the 21st Panzer and African Divisions, and advised Ritchie that Benghazi should be evacuated at once unless he could get air and tank support. Ritchie informed him that the 1st Armoured Division couldn't help him, and so gave permission for Tucker to evacuate Benghazi and withdraw. Tucker ordered the demolitions to begin, and ordered Brig's 7th Indian Infantry Brigade Group to get out of there. And as this was happening, Churchill sent this message to Auchinleck. "...you have no doubt seen most secret stuff about Rommel's presumed intentions, namely clearing up triangle Benghazi-Masus-Machili, and then withdrawing to waiting line about Agheila. This seems to reinforce importance of our holding on." Again, completely out of touch with reality. That afternoon, the 20th Corps overran a detachment of the Welsh Regiment at Skelodema, then moved to Saluk. The Marx Group crossed over bad terrain in both the dark and the rain, and reached Erejima, where Rommel joined them. The 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion then moved towards Benghazi, while the 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion went to Kofia, arriving there at 1800 hours and cutting off the coast road. The last action of one of the British quartermasters had been to put a match to 7 million cigarettes and to organize the evacuation of 12 lorry loads of rum, but the fire went out and some of the lorries broke down long before they were clear of the hills. Briggs realized that he couldn't break out to the east, and so decided to send his brigade towards Saluk, Antelat and Zanu, right through the enemy rear. Somehow, in the bad weather, they managed to get out of the trap, and after several enemy encounters, they even captured some German and Italian prisoners along the way. They did have to abandon a lot of equipment, but they reached Mechili, where they joined the remnants of the 1st Armoured Division. As Rommel triumphantly entered Benghazi at 1000 hours on the 29th of January 1942, he received a message from Mussolini authorizing him to advance to it. The Marx Group had lost one man killed and 13 men wounded over the span of three days, while the Afrika Korps had suffered just 5 men killed and 10 wounded. The Ariete Division arrived in the evening, and Bastico sent his congratulations to Rommel. Rommel also discovered that he had been promoted to the rank of Panzer General by Hitler, and that he had received an upgrade to his Knight's Cross, this time with the swords and oak leaves. Inside Benghazi was a wealth of supplies. Artillery trucks, fuel, rations, uniforms, boots, all of which found new homes with the men of the Afrika Korps. Rommel told Bastico that in order to hold the ground they had taken, he would need to occupy the area up to Gazala. So he decided to pursue the British and Indians in their retreat, although the lack of fuel prevented him from harassing them too closely. And even as late as the 30th of January, Ritchie believed that Rommel's advance would stall, and still hoped that the British could launch their own offensive to drive the Axis out of North Africa. But General Masservi informed him that his division couldn't deal with an attack by more than 25 panzers, finally forcing Ritchie to accept the reality of the situation, and Ritchie ordered a general retreat to the Gazala positions. The Italian divisions stayed behind in Benghazi and Antelad, but Tobruk was now just 35 miles away and a tempting target for Rommel. As this withdrawal was all happening on the 2nd of February 1942, Godwin-Austen formally requested that he be relieved of his command. To Auchinleck, he stated that Ritchie had shown no confidence in him, and that his staff and subordinates had come to the same conclusion based on Ritchie's actions. Ritchie, he said, wouldn't listen to him, and had taken command of the 4th Indian Division by bypassing the chain of command. Auchinleck accepted Godwin-Austen's resignation, and General Tucker later expressed that this move was another blow to the troops' confidence in their leadership. He said that they had lost the wrong man. "...for a general in command and on active service in the face of the enemy, to resign was a step almost without precedent in the British service. It was an extraordinary situation. To give context to this, in case you haven't waded through my 9 hour Operation Crusader documentary, Ritchie had taken over command during Operation Crusader, which was a necessary move in those circumstances. However, it was seen as a temporary measure until another senior corps commander could take over. Yet, despite the lull in the fighting between Crusader and this latest retreat, Ritchie had remained in command, even though Godwin-Austen was technically his senior. So why wasn't Godwin-Austen given command? Well, the immediate reason might be that Auchinleck was loyal to his friends, including Ritchie. Auchinleck also backed Ritchie's decisions, meaning that, if Auchinleck sacked Ritchie, it would be However, the reason may have been deeper than this. It's not stated in the books, but this probably had a lot to do with the fact that Godwin-Austen had been the guy in charge of the British forces in British Somaliland, which was overrun by the Italians in 1940. Churchill had been outraged at Godwin-Austen's actions, thinking that the general had just abandoned the area without putting up much of a fight. But that wasn't true. The British had been vastly outnumbered, and Godwin-Austen had successfully got them out alive while putting up stiff resistance in the retreat. What mattered though, was that Churchill didn't like Godwin-Austen, which was why, after his resignation, Churchill refused to find him another position in the military. After Cabinet, Grigg and I tackled the Prime Minister again about Cunningham and Godwin-Austen, but without any luck. I cannot make out his attitude about it. The moment their names are mentioned, one might imagine they are criminals of the worst order. According to him, these officers had failed in action, had proved themselves deficient of offensive spirit, should never be employed again, and could indeed consider themselves lucky they were not being made a public example of, as in the case of Admiral Bing. Admiral Bing was a British commander who was executed by firing squad in the 1700's for failing to relieve a British garrison besieged by the French. Godwin-Austen was replaced by Gott, who was made commander of the 13th Corps, bearing in mind that Gott was already an acting Major General, and was now made an acting Lieutenant General. In 42 months, Gott had advanced five ranks from Major to Lieutenant General. There are very few who have enjoyed such a meteoric rise. But, surprisingly, the British casualties between the 21st of January and the 6th of February 1942 were relatively light. Only about 1,390 officers and men had been killed, wounded or missing. About 70 tanks and 40 field guns were lost, either destroyed or abandoned, and 45 aircraft. At least 1st Armoured Division had not fallen apart, as 2nd Armoured Division did the previous year when Rommel first struck, in remarkably similar circumstances. It's not clear exactly how many men the Germans and Italians lost, but they did lose about 29 panzers. The Germans also lost 19 aircraft, and the Italians lost a similar number. It's fair to say though that the air forces on both sides had been grounded for much of the battle, and didn't play a major role in it. Still, due to logistical and political reasons, Rommel couldn't maintain more than a small German and Italian force at Gazala, and had no choice but to wait and build up his strength. The defeat also surprised London, and Auchinleck had to make his excuses to Churchill, stating that the men were losing confidence in their equipment, especially their tanks and two-pounder anti-tank guns. He did not, however, add that they were also losing confidence in their leadership, perhaps because he was not aware of it. But the fact remains that the troops were beginning to look askance at their officers at many levels, and were assessing their abilities with growing scepticism. In fact, the British troops were beginning to admire their opponent, Rommel. The origins of the Rommel myth can be found in this time period. The reality is though that, unlike the British generals, Rommel led from the front. His army was better trained, and had better tanks and guns, and had better doctrines like combined-arms warfare. And Rommel was daring and willing to break the rules and ignore his superiors. While this did annoy a lot on his own side, it surprised his opponents, and allowed him to retake most of the ground he had lost during Operation Crusader. It's no wonder that morale was sinking on the British side. They faced a superior opponent. And while all that is true, the fact remains that the British had simply repeated many of the same mistakes they had made at the end of Operation Compass. They had, once again, overreached themselves, diluted their forces, and gave Rommel the opportunity to strike a decisive blow. Rommel did deceive them and had outmaneuvered them, but he was only able to do all that because the British had weakened themselves and lacked effective leadership. "...I was told that my role was to reconnoitre and make every sort of preparation possible for a further major offensive. General Headquarters wouldn't believe that there were large German tank reinforcements, which infuriated the forward troops who had actually seen them. That was why we were on the wrong foot when he advanced." Ritchie and Auchinleck let optimism blind them, and Churchill pressured them into the idea of an offensive that simply had no chance of being executed. While some have blamed Ritchie, Auchinleck, and even Godwin-Austen for the failure, and they certainly take some of the responsibility, ultimately the fault lies with Churchill for letting politics dictate military ventures. He was doing it again immediately after the defeat, telling Auchinleck to attack and recapture Cyrenaica in order to relieve pressure on Malta. That's all well and good, but it wasn't the British who would launch the next attack. It was Rommel. The Battle of Gazala was on the horizon, and we'll be covering that in the future, so be ready for that. Thanks for watching, bye for now.