Why Germany Lost the Battle of the Bulge (4K WW2 Documentary).

Early on December 16, 1944, three German armies of more than 200,000 men launch a surprise counterattack on the thinly held Allied line in the Ardennes Forest. Their goal is to turn the tide of the war in Europe. The Battle of the Bulge sees a month of some of the bitterest fighting of the war before the Allies can stop the Germans. But could the outcome have been different? In the second half of 1944, Nazi Germany's overall strategic and military situation has seriously worsened after the Allied landings in Normandy and the Soviet summer offensive. The liberation of so many occupied territories also means that German war industry has lost valuable resources. Reich Minister for Armament and Munition Albert Speer calculates in September 1944 that Germany only has enough resources for one more year of war. In the face of this catastrophic situation, a group of officers try to assassinate Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944, but he narrowly escapes. Hitler decides that in order to regain domestic control and the military initiative at the front, he has to launch a successful counterattack in the west. Meanwhile, the Western Allies are troubled by logistical problems after their quick advance through Western Europe. They decide to temporarily pause offensive operations and reorganize and resupply. On the Eastern Front, the Soviets cross the German border for the first time in October, but the Germans manage to stop them. Now they're preparing a winter offensive to break through the German defenses in Poland. In Germany, radical measures and maximum mobilization of the population as part of the total war program enable the Nazi regime to build up its last new reserves in autumn. This is a last-ditch effort, but even so, German factories produce more tanks and guns in 1944 than ever before in spite of Allied bombing. On the downside, from the German point of view, the morale and training level of the new units are usually low. Veteran instructor Günther Koschorek complains to his diary on October 9, The rabble to be trained in our company consists of a mix of older East Europeans of German ethnic descent and naval personnel, who because of the shortage of ships, are to be retrained as tank infantry. Manpower shortages mean the new German divisions have a low combat strength. Whereas the average US division has more than 13,000 men, the average German division in late 1944 is down to only 9,000. The equipment is mostly obsolete and inadequate, and the artillery uses a ragtag assortment of mostly Soviet-captured guns. Even though these desperation reserves are of low quality and the last that Germany has, for the moment they do give the Wehrmacht commanders the necessary breathing space to make concrete plans for Hitler's offensive. By September 1944, Hitler is determined to attack, and on the 16th he discusses it with his generals for the first time. He eventually decides in favor of a so-called Big Solution against the advice of most of Hitler's plan envisions a major operation through the Ardennes forest to cut off all Allied forces in western Germany and the Netherlands and capture the important port city of Antwerp. The German planners choose the Ardennes not only because few American troops are stationed there, but also because the Wehrmacht has already managed to surprise the French with a successful breakthrough there back in 1940. Phase one of the operation is the crossing of the Meuse River, followed by a strike towards the north leading to the capture of Antwerp. It's telling that the plans for the second phase of the attack remain very vague, and there are no plans whatsoever for the time after the German units seize the city. Hitler hopes that the offensive will break Allied morale and allow Germany to conclude a compromise peace with the British and Americans, after which all German forces can be redeployed to the east. Most of his generals are skeptical about the operation. Gerd von Rundstedt writes of his doubts after the war, "...if we had reached the Meuse, we should have got down on our knees and thanked God, let alone try to reach Antwerp." Because the plan is made in a hurry, German Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl has no time to provide a proper analysis of American forces in the area, leading to a severe underestimation of enemy strength. And although many of the German units only have enough fuel for 30 or 40 km, Jodl expects his armoured spearheads to cross the almost 200 km to the Meuse in a single day. This means they absolutely must capture Allied supply depots for the plan to have any chance. Another important factor in the German considerations is the weather. The success of the operation depends on bad weather, which would stop the Allies from using their crushing superiority in air power. Three German armies take part in the attack. Sepp Dietrich's 6th SS-Panzerarmee is the strongest, with all the remaining SS-Panzer divisions, 500 tanks, and more than 1,000 guns. It is to cross the Meuse and take Antwerp. Hasso von Mannteufel commands the 5th Panzerarmee with 400 tanks and he has orders to establish a front line around Brussels. Finally, Erich Brandenberger's 7th Army will take on the southern sector. His army is by far the weakest of the three, being mostly unmotorized and without any tanks. Its task is to advance into Luxembourg and southern Belgium and set up defenses to prepare for the expected counterattack from George Patton's 3rd US Army. The weakness of the 7th Army is a flaw in the plan, because it means that the left flank of the entire operation is vulnerable from the very start. A defeat here runs the risk of undoing all the potential successes further north. German commanders know this, but they don't have the necessary reserves to alleviate the risk. In total, the Wehrmacht assembles more than 200,000 men in 29 divisions, 9 of which are panzer divisions. But even the Wehrmacht's own internal assessments admit that most of these divisions have a low combat readiness. Opposing the German strike force are the US 1st Army's 5th Corps under Leonard Garrow and the US 3rd Army's 8th Corps under Troy Middleton. Allied forces in the region are facing problems of their own. To strengthen their attack against the Ruhr River dams by 1st Army and the 3rd Army's planned strike towards the Saar region, General Omar Bradley has stretched US forces in the Ardennes sector extremely thinly. Another issue is that the troops in the Ardennes include many cavalry groups – light and flexible formations ideally suited to pursue a fleeing enemy, but less capable in static defense or battles in forests. The US Army has not yet adequately converted its order of battle from the quick summer advances to the more static situation set in during the fall. All in all, roughly 80,000 American soldiers are in the Ardennes sector. So three German armies are ready to fall upon two unsuspecting American corps, and when the weather forecast calls for bad weather, the Germans put their plan into motion. The Germans deploy their troops in great secrecy in November and early December, moving men and supplies at night. There are no cooking fires or movement during the daylight hours. German reconnaissance airplanes fly at low altitude over the deployment area at night to check progress and detect forbidden lights, but also to drown out the noise of vehicle engines. Even though the Allied reconnaissance detects some signs of a German build-up, these are either not transmitted in time or not taken seriously, leaving US forces unprepared. The deployment phase brings yet more problems for the Germans. For fear of discovery, much of the materiel is unloaded too far away. The fact that Hitler and his generals take security concerns more seriously than logistical needs leads to unnecessary supply difficulties. When the offensive begins, the Germans only have around 15,000 tons of artillery ammunition even though they need 1,200 per day, so the operation will run short after just 10 days. There are also problems with a lack of motorization. 17-year-old gunner Emil Frieh, part of a rocket launcher battery, later recalls, It often happened that one truck towed three launchers. Sometimes the VW Kübelwagen used by the unit commander was also hitched on behind. The whole train then looked more like a circus than a dangerous military unit. Meanwhile on the other side of the front line, American soldiers are resting, Lt. Col. Daniel B. Strickler remembers. It was supposed to be a quiet sector, as no aggressive fighting by either side had taken place in that area since the initial push to the German border in September. But some of the soldiers did notice strange occurrences, and one GI reports, We're constantly being hit by reconnaissance patrols. All night long, the minute it gets dark, they start shooting to cover the rumble of heavy equipment. There are tanks moving around in position. Something is going on. But there is to be no quiet time for the Americans, as German units get their orders December 15. Friedrich Schmeichke, a 17-year-old former Navy soldier, remembers that night, The peaceful silence of the bunker was now replaced by restless muttering. There were even comrades who broke out in wild euphoria. Then we had a hot meal, which some ghoulishly called our hangman's meal. Some of the men turned to the liquor rationed to raise their spirits. Hand grenades, Panzerfausts, and extra small arms ammunition was passed out and we had to lie down and rest while fully dressed. We were to be awakened at 4 o'clock a.m., but that didn't prove necessary since nobody slept. The morning of December 16, German artillery batteries begin a heavy bombardment in preparation for the assault. Then the German infantry charges forward to clear a path for the tanks. US soldier Charlie Hogg witnesses it all. We experienced what was perhaps the biggest hair-raising scare of our entire army career. Out of the darkness came the awfulest screaming and yelling you'd ever want to hear. The Germans were coming. They were screaming like a bunch of wild Indians. In the northern sector, the Germans immediately run into problems. Despite their four panzer divisions, they don't even achieve the first objective of taking Elsenborn Ridge. Since the forest is extremely thick, the Germans can use only a few narrow roads, resulting in a traffic jam. Then they send in the reserves too early in order to try to force a breakthrough, which only made things worse. In the central sector, the Germans have more success on the first day. US troops are stretched out extremely thinly, and von Mannteufel's panzers break through almost everywhere. In the southern sector, the first day brings mixed results. 7th Army spearheads attack across the Uhr and Sauer rivers in assault boats, suffering only light casualties. But due to a lack of bridging equipment and precise US artillery fire, most of the 7th Army remains stuck on the eastern banks of the rivers. As the fighting on the first day finally ends, a GI describes the aftermath in a letter home. Everywhere, there's a tangle of shell-shot tree trunks and a litter of prolonged fighting at close quarters. Bits of broken rifles, bayonets, shattered helmets, unexploded hand grenades, fragments of shell, displaced sandbags, broken stretchers, boots and gloves, not quite empty, and shreds of uniform and equipment. At the end of December 16, Allied headquarters still thinks the attack is a limited operation. The scale becomes apparent the next day, though, when the Wehrmacht launches two special operations. The first is Operation Stößer, an airborne operation to secure important road junctions and bridges ahead of the main advance. But it suffers from insufficient coordination with the ground forces and little preparation time, and in the end, only about 300 German paratroopers make it to the target zone. They hide in the woods for three days with limited food and water supplies, waiting in vain for support. Survivors then split up and sneak back across the line on the 20th. The second operation, codenamed Operation Greif, is led by Otto Skorzeny. His unit filters through the front line in American uniforms and tries to cause chaos by swapping street signs and cutting telephone lines. But the Americans catch most of the teams quickly, and shoot nearly all Skorzeny's men upon capture. German lawyers had assured Skorzeny beforehand that wearing foreign uniforms was legal if no weapons were used. But that was in theory. In reality, shooting enemies who are wearing friendly uniforms is common practice in all armies during the war. Operation Greif officially ends in the evening of December 17, when a frustrated Skorzeny receives permission to use the rest of his unit as a regular brigade instead. So the Germans have launched their desperation offensive. So far, the military results are mixed, and where the Germans do advance, they commit war crimes. The most infamous unit in the offensive is Kampfgruppe Peiper. Its commander, Joachim Peiper, is furious because his unit is behind schedule, and the result is a series of massacres. The men of Kampfgruppe Peiper shoot 19 prisoners at Honsfeld, 59 at Böllingen, 44 at Stumont, and 58 more at Lingeville. Finally on December 17 near Malmedy, they murder nearly 100 American prisoners just so they don't have to escort those prisoners to the rear. The civilian population also fears the return of the Germans. People in German-speaking eastern Belgium had enthusiastically supported reunification with Nazi Germany back in 1940. But being treated as second-class citizens, people have grown increasingly weary of German rule as the war drags on. Nevertheless, there is still some pro-German sentiment in 1944. There are even reports about local Germans helping the advancing Wehrmacht on the battlefield. Not so in Luxembourg. The discontent with German occupation explodes when the Germans introduce conscription and forced labor in 1942. By 1944, many Luxembourgers have joined the resistance and using their German language skills gather information which they then pass on to the Americans. In French-speaking Belgium, the people wholeheartedly welcome the Allies in September 1944. As vengeful members of the German security services return in December, many families flee to the west. With Belgian refugees on the move, Allied commanders hold a crisis meeting on December 20. They decide to transfer American forces north of the German breakthrough to British control, under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group. US 12th Army Group commander Omar Bradley is extremely frustrated, but grudgingly accepts his orders. Overall, the change allows the Allies to get reinforcements to the battlefield faster and more efficiently. Within a week, 250,000 American soldiers and some British units from XXX Corps arrive in the threatened sector. By December 23, the German advance has slowed down as the element of surprise wears off. The Wehrmacht lacks the logistics and motorization to carry enough materiel forward on lengthening supply lines. German propaganda film shows a disproportionate number of tanks to mask this problem, but in the Ardennes their army uses 40 times as many horses as it does tanks. Things get worse for the Germans when the sky turns clear for the first time on December 23. Allied fighter-bombers immediately wreak havoc on the advancing German columns, forcing them to move troops only at night and depriving them of mobility and tactical flexibility. As the poorly equipped German infantry suffers high casualties from American artillery fire, the tanks often have to attack towns alone – a task which they're not suited for. Christmas Eve turns out to be the high-water mark of the whole German attack. Although the German advance starts to grind to a halt on December 24, the Battle of the Bulge is far from over. Back on the 20th, German troops surrounded the important Belgian transport hub of Bastogne, along with roughly 15,000 US troops. American Private Joseph Sayek is caught in the trap. Early Tuesday morning we were surrounded and the Germans began to close in on us. As the day rolled on, the enemy showered us with mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire. Men were going mad. There was no organization, there was nowhere to go, we were all scared. The Germans plan to take the town in a quick surprise attack, but this fails since US command also realizes its strategic importance, and they immediately activate the 101st Airborne Division, evidence of US tactical flexibility. The orders go out on December 17, and within two days more than 3,000 trucks bring 12,000 US troops and supplies to Bastogne. The Germans' first probing attacks on the town fail, so they make the fateful decision to split up. While two panzer divisions continue their advance to the west, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division stays behind to continue the siege. Panzerlehrdivision commander Fritz Beierlein regrets this move after the war. It was one of the greatest mistakes that Bastogne, on failure of the coup, was not immediately captured by a concentrated attack of all our forces. If this had been done, it would have certainly fallen. Because the Germans don't have enough artillery ammunition to destroy the US defenders, the Germans decide to try a bluff on December 22. They demand that the encircled US forces surrender, but US commander Anthony McAuliffe famously rejects this ultimatum with a single word – nuts. The same day that McAuliffe tells off the Germans at Bastogne, Patton's 3rd Army starts to move north towards the besieged town, but it remains unclear exactly when they'll be able to help. The first relief for the defenders appears on December 23, when 240 Douglas C-47 transport planes drop more than 230 tons of supplies into the town. In the following days, the Germans launch increasingly desperate but futile attacks to take the town, while Patton's relief force works its way closer and closer. Patton's army finally lifts the siege on the 27th, when they smash through the disintegrating and starving 5th Fallschirmjäger Division. The US tanks roll right through the German positions, all guns blazing, and establish contact with the encircled US paratroopers. The Wehrmacht launches counterattacks against the small relief corridor, but they fail. 3rd US Army pushes on past Bastogne and links up with 1st Army forces coming from the north at Ruffalies on January 16, marking the end of the Battle for Bastogne. 20,000 Americans, including 4,500 from the 101st Airborne alone, and 25,000 Germans die in a battle fought for a town with a peacetime population of just 4,000 people at the junction of seven roads. But of course, the Battle of the Bulge extends far beyond the dramatic siege at Bastogne. With strategic initiative back with the Allies, the Americans strike back to regain their lost positions. And they have a lot of firepower. Artillery and fighter-bombers systematically bomb German-held villages to the ground, before combined-arms US forces clear them of any resistance. German morale starts to crumble under the relentless pounding. Those who continue to fight are increasingly desperate, sometimes forcing civilians or prisoners to help them dig trenches or prepare defenses. In the midst of the fighting, on January 1, 1945, US forces commit a war crime after storming the heavily defended hamlet of Chenogne. Sergeant John Faig describes the events, "...I know some of our boys were lining up German prisoners in the fields on both sides of the road. They must have been 25 or 30 German boys in each group. These boys were to be machine-gunned and murdered. We were committing the same crimes we were now accusing the Japs and Germans of doing. I turned my back on the scene and walked on up the hill." – John Faig The same day, the Germans launch yet another special operation, Operation Bodenplatte, this time by the Luftwaffe. All operational fighter planes on the Western Front are to take off simultaneously, attack Allied airfields, and destroy all enemy aircraft on the ground. Shortly after daybreak, about 1,000 German airplanes take to the air. The pilots are excited by the magnitude of it all. "...I was amazed myself. The sky was full of machines. The civilians stood there frozen. When we flew over the front, the soldiers also stood there and marveled. We were all flying low." – John Faig The excitement amongst the German pilots is short-lived, as Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring issues brutal orders. "...Whoever returns without having effectively attacked the enemy airfield, or whoever fails to find it, shall immediately take off again and fly another attack." – Hermann Göring This is a disastrous order, since German pilots making a second run no longer have the element of surprise. Another problem is coordination with ground forces, which results in a number of friendly fire incidents. Fuel shortages, made worse by long approach distances, also hamper the success of the operation. In total, the Germans lose more than 300 aircraft. The Allies lose 260 planes, but they can replace their losses quickly, while the Germans cannot replace theirs at all. The fighting continues in the first weeks of January, as the Allies slowly push forward against stubborn German resistance. The Germans finally acknowledge their defeat on January 10, when German high command pulls three panzer divisions out of the front line to send them east to Hungary. Starting on the 12th, when the Red Army launches its winter offensive on the Vistula River, Wehrmacht forces in the Ardennes are weakened even further. The Germans divert all available reserves to the east, which stabilizes just 70 km from Berlin when the Soviets outrun their supply lines. From now on, the remaining German forces in the Bulge are reduced to rearguard actions alone. On January 28, the US Army officially declares the Battle of the Bulge to be over. The Ardennes Campaign costs the Americans about 8,600 dead, 21,000 missing, and 47,000 wounded, plus 20,000 cases of non-battle casualties like frostbite and trench foot. The Germans lose about 15,500 men killed, 27,500 missing or captured, and 42,000 wounded. More than 2,500 Belgian and 500 Luxembourg civilians also perish. Most are shot by pillaging German soldiers or by the German security services, but about 1,000 die as a consequence of Allied air raids on German-held villages. The towns and villages of the region are devastated, and it takes years to rebuild the infrastructure, recover the bodies of the fallen soldiers, and clear unexploded ordnance. The Ardennes Offensive ends in a clear German defeat after a month of hard fighting. But was there ever a chance for the German battle plan to succeed? The German offensive suffered from severe structural weaknesses. Supplies were insufficient and unloaded too far away from the front. Most of the units involved were only told about the attack the night before it started, so they had no chance to conduct a proper reconnaissance of terrain and enemy strength, and they attacked blindly. These two factors show the German leadership's increasing paranoia, prioritizing secrecy over proper preparation. Another mistake was that the best German units were assigned to Dietrich's SS Panzer Army in the northern sector, even though that's where they expected the strongest Allied resistance. This is contrary to common military wisdom, according to which the units that face the least resistance should be the ones that are reinforced. This can allow one to expand a breakthrough at a weaker point and achieve an encirclement of the enemy without having to expose your own soldiers to attrition. The reasons for this German mistake were in part political – Hitler had lost confidence in the regular army after the assassination attempt against him, and instead relied heavily on the Waffen-SS. But the Waffen-SS suffered from a lack of planning efficiency and ideology-driven presumptions, so its troops were not used efficiently. But even if the Waffen-SS units had fought smarter, the success of the operation also relied on factors that were out of German control, like bad weather and capturing enemy fuel depots. It remains unclear how the Germans planned to outmaneuver the Americans to reach the depots before them, despite being far less motorized. By late 1944, the German army was no match for its enemies. It was mostly last-ditch levies equipped with outdated weaponry and lacking logistics. It could not stand a prolonged offensive, since the German war industry was running out of resources and could not supply the German army with the material needed to replace its own losses. One of the most decisive factors was the complete Allied air superiority once the weather cleared, which cut German supply lines and logistical hubs, and provided fire support for Allied ground troops. Hitler's political objectives for the offensive were also doomed to fail. There could be no compromise peace with the Western Allies, since they'd already agreed with the Soviets on a post-war plan for Germany and not to sign a separate peace. Given all these factors, the German offensive was doomed from the start and never had a chance of success. The Battle of the Bulge was a total German defeat on the tactical, strategic, and political levels. The Nazis severely underestimated both American strength and will to fight, and overestimated the Wehrmacht's capabilities. The Ardennes Offensive and the waste of Germany's last reserves only ensured that the war would drag on for a little longer and quicken the Red Army's advance on Berlin. After the Battle of the Bulge, the Western Allies regroup and strike into the industrial heartland of Germany in February and March 1945, in the last set-piece battle on the Western front of World War II, the Rhineland Campaign. In the Battle for the Rhine, a combined British and American force would fight their way across the German border towards the mighty Rhine River. To cross this last big natural obstacle before the German heartland, the Allies combined a huge amphibious crossing with the biggest single-day airborne operation of the entire war. If you want to learn more about this often-overlooked campaign, you can watch Rhineland 45, our five-part, three-and-a-half-hour documentary series on the offensive. Filmed on the former battlefields using detailed maps and animations, together with expert guests like Christoph Bergs or David Willey from the Tank Museum, and featuring a veteran interview, Rhineland 45 is the most detailed documentary about the Rhineland Campaign. Because we show the war as it really happened, this series is not available on YouTube, because it would get immediately demonetized. Instead, Rhineland 45 is available on Nebula, a streaming platform we built together with other creators where we don't have to worry about YouTube's content restrictions. If you go to nebula.tv and sign up, you can get Nebula and save 40%. For just $3 a month or $30 a year, you can watch our videos and Nebula Originals, or other smart creators like Mustard or Real Engineering, and all of that ad-free and earlier than on YouTube, while you also support us directly. That's nebula.tv slash realtimehistory. We want to thank David Lang for his help with this episode. If you're watching this video on Patreon or Nebula, thank you so much for the support. We couldn't produce videos like this without you. If you want to watch another video about a dramatic late WWII battle, you can also check out our YouTube video about the Battle of Iwo Jima. I'm Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only YouTube history channel that won't fall on its knees when reaching the Meuse River.