《出卖中国—中国官场贪腐分析报告》- 裴敏欣 - 第6章 与黑道共枕──执法人员与黑社会的勾结[莫寂读书]

Pei Minxin, author of the report on the corruption analysis of the Chinese officialdom in China. The sixth chapter is about the collusion of law enforcement officers and the black community with the black community. In addition to traditional crimes, good-relationship gangs can expand to more profitable new areas. These gangs usually set up large groups to control China's major economic activities, and put their feet deep into real estate, transportation and mining. Local officials will also use the black community to engage in the most notorious forced demolition in China. The Chinese media often calls these people who are forced to live and move away from the peasantry as the masterminds. From the case files of the leaders and cadres revealed in the past few years and recently, we can see that their crimes are very serious and the amount of the cases is huge. They are all full-fledged transactions. Full-fledged transactions have reached the point where they are in a hurry to get married. On April 19, 2013, Chinese leaders are now used to seeing officials and cadres like Xi Jinping who have lost their morality. However, it is not surprising that the cadres of the party state are so greedy and lawless, because they are too easy to exchange power for money. Since it is so good to have a relationship with government officials, the black community will of course intervene. In a socialist society, criminal organizations are generally protected by politics. In other words, criminal organizations colluding with government officials, especially law enforcement officers, is one of the characteristics of authoritarianism. In the era of the day after tomorrow, China's rapid economic development and all kinds of changes have given a great opportunity to underground criminal organizations. With the development of the economy, not only have the traditional industries of the black community, such as gambling, trading and drug trafficking, they have also turned their attention to high-profit and fast-paying industries, such as real estate, mining, engineering and transportation. But no matter what you do, the protection of local officials, especially law enforcement officers, is indispensable. It is not difficult for the black gang bosses in China to find accomplices from law enforcement officers, because these people also want to be rich and corrupt. In this chapter, we will analyze the cases of the black community, which has been highly reported by the media, and examine the collusion between criminal organizations and law enforcement officers. We will try to understand the darkest corner of China's authoritarian capitalism, and find out to what extent the key law enforcement agencies in the party-state system have fallen. We need to further prove that authoritarian capitalism has made government agencies hit hard. Although the Chinese government is strong on the outside, it is actually weak. The corruption of law enforcement agencies and the infiltration of the black trafficking are public facts. The degree of corruption depends on how many high-ranking police officers have been arrested and prosecuted, including murderers and cover-up criminal organizations. According to incomplete information, as early as November 2011, 197 high-ranking law enforcement officers were arrested, prosecuted and sentenced. This includes a deputy minister of the Ministry of Public Security, a assistant minister of the Ministry of Public Security, a director of the Ministry of Public Security, seven provincial police chiefs, nine provincial police deputy chiefs, 99 police chiefs of Hexian Public Security Bureau, and 76 deputy police chiefs of Hexian Public Security Bureau. The chiefs of the main cities and provincial councils have also been arrested, such as Tianjin, Shenyang, Qingdao, Taiyuan, Nanchang, Fuzhou, and so on. Judging by the length of the sentence, it can be seen how serious their crimes are. Of the cases that have been declared as suspicious, 14 people were sentenced to death, 9 people were sentenced to death, 10 people were sentenced to life imprisonment, and 5 people committed suicide. Of the 197 high-ranking police officers arrested, 39 people accounted for 20% of the black society. It is not difficult to understand the collusion between law enforcement officers and the black society. Although the boss of the gang is good at committing violent crimes, just as businessmen want to collude with government officials, the black society wants to collude with the police. One of the benefits is that it can reduce uncertainty. If a businessman can successfully bribe government officials, he is sure to get a government contract. If the boss of the gang can bribe the police, there is no need to worry that gambling and prostitution will be confiscated. Another benefit is to reduce competition. Businessmen, especially those who want to buy state-owned assets at a low price, can exclude their opponents in the bidding process by bribing government officials. Similarly, as long as the boss of the gang can bribe the local police chief, he can drive other black societies out of his own territory. The third benefit is that the boss of the gang has a good relationship with politicians, which is to gain political and social status. For example, he can become a local representative of the National People's Congress or a member of the CPPCC. This status can not only be considered legal but also illegal, and it can also build political connections and expand criminal activities. In the 50 cases in the sample, one-fourth of the 13 bosses of the gang are local representatives of the National People's Congress or members of the CPPCC. Four of them are representatives of the National People's Congress, Li Zhenggang, Oujian, Lan Linyan, Xie Wensheng, Zhang Zhixin, Chen Kai, and Xie Xun of Fuzhou, Chen Kai of Fuzhou, Xiong Xinxin of Fuzhou, Liao Fudong of Wuxuan, and Jiang Qixin of Dong'an. Two of them are Zhang Wei of the CPPCC, Yao Zhihong of Shaoyang, and Zhang Wei of Wenling. One of them is Liu Yong of Shenyang, a member of the CPPCC and a member of the National People's Congress. These people are one level higher than other gangs in terms of business scale and personal wealth. They operate real estate, mining, and raise interest rates and sell drinks. They have the money to bribe local government officials to help them become representatives of the National People's Congress and members of the CPPCC. These two positions provide additional political insurance for their huge illegal business. The biggest benefit that the CPPCC can get from the cover-up of law enforcement officers is to obtain land and mining rights at a very low price in order to commit violence. But unlike ordinary businessmen who only commit bribery, the CPPCC not only commits bribery, but also uses intimidation and violence. According to Chinese media reports, the CPPCC will use violence and murder to drive away competitors after bribing officials to obtain land and mining rights. After they obtain these assets, they will continue to bribe law enforcement officers, which is equivalent to hiring them. However, the CPPCC bosses and businessmen are a little different. Businessmen must bribe many government officials because each unit has the right to overlap and intersperse on the approval of state-owned assets and the implementation of laws. The CPPCC bosses usually only need to bribe one unit, and the public security department is enough. Unless the criminal plan has expanded to finance, transportation, and real estate, it is not necessary to bribe many units. In the case of the sample, only a few CPPCC bosses can build a complex criminal empire, and most people's criminal profits are not great. Because traditional illegal industries such as gambling, selling money, etc. lack a large-scale economy, they are far less than the real estate, mining, and construction projects carried out by businessmen and government officials. As shown in Table A4, this economic reality forces the CPPCC bosses to only ask for an effective bribe of some people, and the bribery amount is also much smaller than that of businessmen. But just a small amount of bribery is enough for the police to act as a protection umbrella for the CPPCC, because only the CPPCC needs them to cover up, so they have no other market demand. Businessmen do not need to bribe the police, because their business does not need police assistance in normal circumstances, so the police can only accept the price of a single buyer. But in addition to this difference, the collusion between the CPPCC and the police and the collusion between businessmen and government officials have many similarities, both of which are deep in Chinese society. The reason why the collusion between the CPPCC and the police is becoming more and more common is obviously because the CPPCC has appeared like a spring rain since the 1990s. In the 1980s, organized crime was not yet a social phenomenon. If you search for the word CPPCC in the Chinese knowledge resource headquarters of all Chinese newspapers and magazines, it first appeared in 1990. Since then, the number has increased dramatically, and there are 1,000 articles in 2010. The academic world has done a lot of research on this development, mainly to pay attention to the relationship between the Chinese black society and the international population trade and drug trafficking. There is little research on the development and influence of the Chinese black society in the foreign academic world, and fewer scholars pay attention to the phenomenon of the collusion between the CPPCC and the police that appeared only after 1989. The media reports and data collected by the CPPCC show that the phenomenon of the collusion between the CPPCC and the police is not only widely distributed in geography, but also has no effect on the government. The central source shows that this phenomenon occurs in most provinces in China. The 50 cases in the central source are divided into 18 provinces. There are 9 cases in Hunan, 5 cases in Liaoning, 4 cases in Jilin and Guangxi, 3 cases in Fujian, Jiangxi, Shaanxi and Shanxi, 2 cases in Henan and Zhejiang, 1 case in Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan and Yunnan. Due to the lack of the central source, it is impossible to see which province is the most seriously colluded with the CPPCC. But more than half of the provinces in China have this phenomenon, which is obviously quite common. It is worth noting that no matter how developed the social and economic development of each province is, there will always be black and white collusion. Whether it is the more developed coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang and Fujian, or the rural provinces with more natural resources such as Shaanxi, Shanxi, Hunan, Henan, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou, or Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin, where state-owned enterprises occupy the majority, or Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian, where private enterprises and foreign enterprises are more developed, however, due to the fact that the black community always looks for profitable places, it can be seen that they have two survival models. In provinces with more natural resources, the black community is more likely to engage in mining. The black gang leader Feng Yongqiang, who is in the same position as Shaanxi, is the one who opens the gold mine. The black gang leader Liu Junyong, who is the new black gang leader in Hunan, also opens the gold mine. The family of the resident of Jiangxi Yanshan is also. Dongbao Jun, the black gang leader of Jinzhou, operates the wood mine. Zhang Xiuwu of Liaoning Lingyuan occupies the iron mine in the local area. Lan Linyan of Hengfeng, Jiangxi, Xie Wensheng of Heyang, Hunan and Song Kuixiang of Gaoping, Shanxi all operate coal mines. In comparison, the black community in the rural areas prefer to open real estate companies, transportation companies, storage and logistics companies, or comprehensive enterprise groups. Violent intimidation makes them very competitive in these industries. The black gang leader of Shenyang, Hou Wanchun, during the crime period 2000 to 2006, and his good friend, the deputy director of the Shenyang Municipal Public Security Bureau, Zhang Jianmin, opened a real estate company. Zhang Zhixin of Heilongjiang Qiqihar, during the crime period 1993 to 2003, he also opened many car companies through the silver industry. Nie Lei, who was covered by the deputy director of the Qingdao Municipal Public Security Bureau, during the crime period 2000 to 2010, he also tampered with the operation of real estate companies, illegal casinos and brothels. Li Zhengang, the black gang leader of Guangdao, during the crime period 2001 to 2010, he operated underground casinos and high-profile units. Song Pengfei, the black gang leader of Shenyang, during the crime period 1995 to 2006, he operated the warehouse logistics industry, and he was very important in the delivery industry of Shenyang, Changchun and Harbin in Zhejiang. Chen Kai, the black gang leader of Fuzhou, was the most complicated, during the crime period 1991 to 2003, his Fujian Kaixuan Group not only had brothels and casinos, but also money laundering and drug trafficking. In addition, he also owned several hotel real estate companies, and used hotels as the main source of gambling and selling money. Hao Weicheng, the black gang leader of Changchun, during the crime period 1990 to 2010, he was involved in violent extortion, real estate, architectural engineering and violent demolition. He was sentenced to 20 years in 2010, and the court confiscated his personal assets worth 40 million yuan. Jia Jianjun, the black gang leader of Zhejiang, during the crime period 1993 to 2001, he monopolized the local delivery industry, and his company's assets amounted to nearly 100 million yuan. Ou Jian, from Hunan, during the crime period 1989 to 2010, he ran a casino, and placed high interest loans and confiscated logistics. The media reported that he was illegally profiting from business. In the social and economic sciences that collude with the black gang, although the black society uses violence, it is essentially a business. The economic logic of the Chinese black society is the same as that of legal businessmen. Legal businessmen rely on higher-quality products, management and efficiency to make money. The black society also relies on its own interests to make money, that is, to use violence to drive away competitors or to seize assets. We can see from the official documents the social and economic logic of the Chinese black society. The Chinese law enforcement agencies often launch the black action against the black society. When launching the black action, the public security officers will usually identify some areas as key targets. For example, in June 2008, the Liaoning Provincial Public Security Bureau to launch the black action before the Beijing Olympics, first listed the targets and cooperation. The Public Security Bureau stipulates that each city's public security agency must eliminate a black gang organization, and each county and river area's public security agency must eliminate five black gang organizations. It also specifically lists five types of key strikes. First, the key strikes are violent monopolies, illegal mining, oil fields, coastal landfills, coastal areas, river banks and other watersheds, and the evil forces that crazyly seize national resources. Second, the key strikes are forcibly monopolizing transportation, logistics, wholesale, construction and other industries, as well as violent demolition, disrupting the market, and disrupting the economic order of the market. Third, the key strikes are for manipulating elections, fighting, maintaining the grassroots regime, or interfering in the internal conflicts of the people, creating trouble, and damaging the image of the party and the government. Fourth, the key strikes are for the black forces to spread rumors, cover up crimes, obstruct legal proceedings, even collude with the authorities, be a scapegoat, and act as national workers who protect the umbrella. The key strikes are for setting up gambling dens, drug trafficking, drug trafficking, and the black forces that have been in power for generations. It is worth noting that among the five key strikes in the Liaoning Provincial Public Security Bureau, there are three that are similar in other provinces, and belong to the economic nature. It shows that the black society is already widely involved in political and economic activities. The government is also particularly worried that the black society is endangering the law enforcement mechanisms, and is in control of the grassroots regime, natural resources, construction, transportation, logistics, and other important economic departments. The case in the sample also proves that the government's concern is not unreasonable. Of the 50 cases of the black society, 16 are related to mining, 6 are related to real estate, 12 are related to logistics, construction, transportation, seafood distribution, violence, and debt collection, etc. In summary, of the 50 groups of the black society, there are 34 that, in addition to traditional extortion, gambling, trafficking, and drug trafficking, also engage in other businesses. Therefore, the black society needs the protection umbrella of local government officials and law enforcement personnel on both sides. Traditional criminal activities require a protective umbrella, but more profitable businesses also need a protective umbrella, because these businesses have fixed assets, especially hotels, mining, and fixed income. Legal companies will compete, and other black societies will also watch, let alone be swept away by the police. In order to obtain public security protection, the black society must establish a long-term relationship with them. There are many ways to do this. Just like businessmen will use the gift culture of the Chinese to lure officials, the black society will also give some gifts to the public security. This is not difficult in terms of technology, because most of the black gang bosses will disguise themselves as legal businessmen. Yang Weizhong, the director of the Public Security Bureau of Wenling City, was hooked like this. In 1996, he rented a hotel run by a black society group, and a black society boss, Wang Xiufang, came to establish a relationship with him as a group manager. He first sent a basket of fruits to thank the director for his care and support, and a set of high-end suits and shoes a few days later. Six months later, Wang Xiufang took a 50,000 yuan red envelope to Yang Weizhong's room, saying that this was the encouragement bonus the company gave to Yang Weizhong. Although Yang Weizhong didn't want to take it at first, he took it in the end. After that, he began to provide protection for Wang Xiufang. Shenyang gang boss Hao Wanchun thought of a way to make friends with Zhang Jianming, the rising star of the Public Security Bureau. In 2002, Hao Wanchun heard that Zhang Jianming was about to be promoted, so he gave him two brand watches. Hao Wanchun also said that he had a good relationship with the leader, and that he could help Zhang Jianming become an official. In addition to giving gifts, the gang boss was also very good at using China's eating culture and public security relations. Xiong Xinxin, the gang boss of Jiangxi Fuzhou, and Xu Xiaogang, the director of the Jiangxi Provincial Public Security Bureau, first appeared when Xiong Xinxin invited him to a five-star hotel in Nanchang, the provincial assembly in 2002. Xiong Xinxin is both a successful businessman and a local political commissioner. Liu Zhiduo, the director of the Jiangxi Provincial Public Security Bureau, and Zhang Xilai, the secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, also started dating in 1995 when he was invited to dinner by a female member of the Black Society. The woman later became his mistress. In the dark of the night in Shanxi, the gang boss Song Kuixiang and the secretary of the Municipal Party Committee Zhang Xilai became friends. The relationship between the two also began when Song Kuixiang invited Zhang Xilai to dinner at his hotel in 1995. Zhang Xilai promised to help Song Kuixiang get rid of the sentence of labor education for the case of Ou Dou. For the gang bosses, the most effective way to maintain a long-term relationship with officials and public security is to provide hospitality. For example, Zhang Zhixin, the gang boss of Heilongjiang, sent a gold card to Wang Rui, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Qiqihar, in 1993-2003 during the crime period, asking him to go to his hotel and San Wennuan for free and provide free hospitality. Zhang Zhixin also used this method to make friends with many law enforcement officers and local officials and recorded the behavior of sexual intercourse. Li Yangye, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Huainan City, Jiangsu, often paid attention to the grudges of gang bosses during the crime period 1992-2001. Several public security officers also often went to the brothel for free, one of whom went there 10 times. Xu Jie, the gang boss of Fujian Shunchang County for 20 years, not only sent a lover to the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau during the crime period 1991-2001, but also invited the deputy secretary of the Party Committee in charge of law enforcement and a group of public security officers to hang out in a luxurious hotel in Fuzhou. Ou Jian, the gangster brother of Hunan Xiangtan, provided prostitutes and drugs during the crime period 1989-2010 to establish a relationship with his main protector, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau. Yao Zhihong, the boss of Henan Shaoyang Gang, ran a large sauna center during the crime period 1994-2002. He also provided hospitality to government officials and public security officers in order to seek protection. Another way to maintain a long-term relationship is to let the public security officers divide the money among the criminals. Feng Yongqiang, the gangster boss of Jingkuan in Tongguan County, Shaanxi Province, gave the public security officers a hard time during the crime period 1998-2007. Tian Pingli, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Tongguan County, had shares in both Jingkuan and Jingkuan. Xiong Jinxiang, the secretary of Tongguan County, was also a partner of Feng Yongxiang's Jingkuan Company. Liu Junyong, the gangster boss of Hunan Xinhua, ran Jingkuan and construction companies during the crime period 1995-2005, and asked the local police station director Hu Tongxi to invest 80,000 yuan. Chen Kai, the gangster boss of Fuzhou, was the son of Xu Congrong, the director of the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau in the early 1990s. Later, he became Xu Congrong's godson. Xu Li later became the vice chairman of Chen Kai Group. Giving money to local officials on time is also one of the ways to get a long-term protection umbrella. Wang Zhenzhong, the deputy director of the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau, is in charge of the entertainment industry. He charged Chen Kai monthly, allowing Chen Kai to operate gambling, gambling and prostitution in hotels and nightclubs. The strangest case is the sexual assault scene where Yao Zhihong, the gangster boss of Shaoyang, and the municipal government unit co-operated. In 1997, with the help of Li Yong, the director of the Shaoyang People's Procuratorate, and Tan Yaxiong, the deputy director of the Shaoyang Procuratorate, Yao Zhihong actually co-operated with the insurance company of the Xiaqi Xia of the Public Security Bureau to open a sauna center. A similar case also occurred in Hunan Rucheng County in 1999. The local gangster boss Ou Tao and the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau, Deng Xiaohui, the secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Zhu Kai, and the director of the Sanjiangkou Public Security Commission, Tan Zhicheng, jointly opened an entertainment city and agreed to pay 30,000 to 50,000 yuan to the Public Security Bureau every month. Liu Guoqing, the secretary of the Henan Zhumadian Municipal Municipal Party Committee, entered the biggest sexual assault scene in Henan Province, Huangjia No. 1, and closed the door in 2013. In 1998, the deputy secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of Chenzhou City, Xie Kongbin, also operated a mine in the gangster gang. If the gangster boss himself is a public security officer, it is easier for the family or local officials who are local politicians to obtain a protective umbrella. It is quite easy for a gangster boss who has been a public security officer to be covered up by his old colleagues and commit a crime. They are very familiar with the investigation methods of the law enforcement departments and it is easy to cover up the case and it is not easy to be caught. Unlike ordinary gangsters, gangsters in the public security department can disguise criminal activities as the police in the law enforcement department. They use the internal connections of the public security department and senior officials as protective umbrellas, and there is also a way to get information about life and death. There are three such cases. Guan Jianjun was originally a patrol officer in Yangquan City, Shanxi Province. In 1999, he set up a gangster gang and occupied several local coal mines. His father was the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau. Wang Yufan, who was arrested in 2009, was the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Jilin Tonghua City, and was also a gangster boss. The driver in the Public Security Bureau was his closest criminal accomplice. The gangster boss Long Jiefeng, who was the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Jilin Tonghua City, was a member of the Guangdong Zhaoqing Society between 1999 and 2005, until he was shot by the enemy gang. There are several gangsters in the sample who are the families of local politicians or are local officials themselves. Their background is in the connections of government agencies, so that they have political and social capital that is protected by the authorities. Liu Yong, the father of Liu Yong, the gangster boss in Shenyang, is the director of the Shenyang People's Court. Liu Yong's most important protective umbrella is the director and deputy director of the Shenyang People's Court. Tang Hong, the gangster boss in Suining, Hunan, was the director of the Suining People's Committee of his father, Tang Dingzhong, from 1993 to 2000. Tang Hong was also a cadre of the Suining Tax Bureau. His brother, Tang Ning, was also a gangster boss, and was also a cadre of the Suining Industrial and Commercial Bureau. Tian Bo, the gangster boss in Jilin Meihekou, was the deputy mayor's father from 1995 to 1999. All the officials he promoted became Tian Bo's protective umbrellas. Zhu Haiquan, the head of the Zhujia Gang in Jiangxi Yanshan from 1989 to 2001, was the secretary of the Wutong Township Party Committee in Yanshan County. Lin Yan, the gangster boss in Hengfeng, Jiangxi, was the secretary of the Village Party Department and was also the representative of the Jiangxi Provincial People's Congress. The other boss in his gang was the representative of the County People's Congress, and the other two were members of the County Government Association. Tan Heping, the gangster boss in Lianyuan, Hunan, was the deputy director of the Lianyuan Rural Trust Association. Zeng Shaolin, the gangster boss in Fushun, Sichuan, was the deputy director of the Fushun Precinct Bureau for more than 30 gangsters from 1997 to 2001. An interesting social problem is how local officials and law enforcement officers cooperate and build trust when colluding with the underworld. The official information of the Chinese government rarely mentions how local officials and law enforcement officers collude with each other, and more often focuses on how they are seduced and corrupt by the gangster boss. But the media sometimes reveals some information that makes us wonder. One of the mechanisms for local officials and law enforcement officers to build trust and cooperation is through buy-and-sell. We have seen that buy-and-sell is a very critical mechanism for the collusion between local officials and businessmen and between state-owned enterprises and cadres. In local law enforcement agencies, buy-and-sell also plays the function of corrupting public security. The chief of public security who buys-and-sells is corrupt. Of course, he is easily seduced by the underworld, and the public security officers who buy-and-sell him become the umbrella of the underworld. In the same way, public security officers who make a living by bribery are more likely to receive money from the underworld because they have to earn back the money they invested. Several public security officials in the sample are controlled to buy-and-sell. Yang Qiang, the police chief of Maogang District, Maoming, Guangdong, collected 3.45 million yuan from 36 police officers between 2004 and 2009. Liu Zhiduo, the chief of the Public Security Bureau, also bought-and-sells to multiple departments between 1996 and 2001. One of them is Deputy Director Wu Xinhua. He and Liu Zhiduo covered the same gang leader. Zhou Tingxin, the deputy director of Henan Zhengzhou Public Security Bureau, also bought-and-sells because she was arrested by the gang in 2014. Li Jian, the secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of Shunchang County, also bought-and-sells to multiple departments. Among the buyers, more than ten people participated in the cover-up of Xu Jie, the gang leader, between 1991 and 2001. Cai Yabin, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau, also bought-and-sells to the gang leader of Hunan Xiangtan City. Huang Guisheng, the chief of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, also bought-and-sells for 70,000 yuan. Huang Guisheng was also controlled to collect money from the department and buy-and-sell drugs between 2002 and 2009. Officials can also establish mutual trust when they commit a crime together. Xu Jie, the gang leader of Shunchang County, Fujian, also bought-and-sells to several departments and bought-and-sells together with a group of public security officers to a high-end hotel in Fuzhou. Li Yang, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Huaiyin, Jiangsu, also bought-and-sells to the gang leader of Sichuan Hai, and also bought-and-sells to several public security officers in Sichuan Hai during 2000 to 2001. There are also two cases of government officials, law enforcement officers, and the gang discussing how to collect protection fees. Li Yong, the deputy director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the People's Procuratorate of Shaoyang City, Hunan, and Tan Yaxiong, the deputy director of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of Shaoyang City, discussed with the gang leader, Yao Zhihong, and signed a joint agreement with the Sangna Center set up by the security company under the Public Security Bureau of Shaoyang City and Yao Zhihong, and each of them earned 50%. Deng Xiaohui, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Hunan, and Zhu Kai, the secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, also held a meeting with the gang leader, Ou Tao, and discussed how much protection fees should be paid to the Public Security Bureau every month. After building a long-term relationship with the collusion of economics, law enforcement officers can give the gang leader a lot of benefits. The most basic benefit is to cover up the profits of the traditional black society, such as gambling, selling drugs, and drug trafficking. For the police, as long as they can cover their eyes, they don't have to pay any cost. In comparison, it is more complicated to cover up violent crimes or murder cases, and may leave evidence. However, law enforcement officers who collude with the gang still have a way to get them out of the net. In Tongguan, Shaanxi, the secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Xiong Jinxiang, in order to help the gang leader, Feng Yongqiang, covered up the crimes, and instructed several public security officers to fake them, which led to the death of Huang Fengshou, which has been unsolvable for eight years. Yang Weizhong, the deputy director of the Wenling Public Security Bureau in Zhejiang, in 1998, ordered the deployment of gang members who were involved in three violent cases, and released the suspects who were killed by the hide-and-seek. The public security also often informs the gang members, so that they can avoid being searched and arrested. In 2006, the deputy director of the Shenyang Municipal Public Security Bureau, Zhang Jianming, told the gang leader, Hao Wanchun, that he would go out to avoid the trouble, and that he would go abroad several times. Xie Donggen, a brother of Lei Yangxie, who is one of the gang members in Hunan, attempted to escape in September 2006, because a police officer informed him. Local officials who have nothing to do with law enforcement can help the gang get bank loans, government contracts, and land. Many gang members have their own companies, and local officials treat these companies like businessmen. According to media reports, this phenomenon is particularly serious in the real estate industry. Liao Fudong, the boss of the gang in Wuxuan County, Guangxi, embezzled 40,000 RMB from the party secretary Li Qiliang in 2006, and with the help of Li Qiliang, he got a loan of 6 million yuan from the local branch of the Chinese Agricultural Bank. He also embezzled 50,000 yuan from the director of the Land Resource Bureau to get mining permits at a low price. Hu Chundong, the deputy secretary of the Hunan Dong'an County Committee, issued a package to the National Road Improvement Project, but he was not qualified to prove it. The gang members who did not meet the conditions of the project gave up their trust, so that the project could not be accepted. With the help of Liao Ninglingyuan Mining Company Wang Changren, who has a relationship with the gang, he bought most of the land in Lingyuan at a price of 20 million yuan in 2006. Chen Kai, the boss of the gang in Fuzhou, embezzled 100,000 yuan from the party secretary Fang Changming, to get a piece of land at a price lower than 6 million yuan. From Liu Yong, the boss of the gang in Shenyang in the late 1990s, we can see how the gang colluded with local officials to commit violence. Liu Yong embezzled government contracts and state-owned land from several local officials of the Beikong Association. Through the help of Gao Mingxian, the deputy director of the Labor Bureau in Heping District, Shenyang, and Yiling Dexiu, the director, Liu Yong bought the commercial property of the bureau. Later, with the help of Jiang Xinben, the director of the Labor Bureau, he turned the commercial property into a private enterprise and got the business property of the commercial property. The deputy mayor of Shenyang, Ma Xiangdong, approved the purchase of the commercial property of Liu Yong, and exempted him from the cost of the comprehensive subsidy and state-owned land tax. Yang Liwei, the vice general manager of the branch of Liaoning Provincial Bank of China, also embezzled 20 million yuan from public funds to buy the property of Liu Yong. The police can also use their power to help the underworld to gain a foothold in the commercial dispute, or simply help to be the leader. The case of Guangdong Mao Ming is a typical example. In 2005, the police branch of Guangdong Mao Ming Trade Port District arrested a businessman who owed him 20.48 million RMB. Yang Qiang sent his subordinates to drive Li Zhenggang's Binshi repair train from Guangdong to Jiangsu to arrest him. Li Zhenggang gave Yang Qiang 430,000 yuan as a thank-you gift. In 2005, the deputy director of the Shenyang Public Security Bureau, Zhang Jianming, accused a businessman of his black society friend, so he filed a case against the businessman and accused him of fraud. The judge also took the bribe to make a judgment in favor of the black society. Li Zhenggang, the boss of Guangdong Mao Ming Trade Port District, forged the evidence of high-profile victims to appeal to the court. The judge, Wang Fa, who took the bribe, asked the victim to pay off the debt with the building he owned. Li Zhenggang won 28 million yuan. In 1999, Liu Yong, the boss of Shenyang Trade Port District, met the deputy director of the Shenyang Municipal People's Court, and paid Li Zhenggang 200,000 yuan as a thank-you gift to appeal the case against Liu Yong. There are not many black law enforcement officers in Section A4, but they are usually police chiefs or high-ranking officials who have enough power to cover up the black society. Among the 50 cases of the black society, 16 people are police chiefs, 17 people are deputy chiefs, 5 people are other law enforcement officers, judges, prosecutors and political commissars of the Public Security Bureau, 12 people are local party leaders, 5 people are party secretary, 4 people are political and legal secretary or deputy secretary. In terms of level, there are two provincial cadres, 15 municipal cadres, and 22 county cadres. Most of the people who collude with the black society are middle-level law enforcement officers, 38 out of 50 people. This is economic calculation. Due to the low profit of traditional criminal career, the black gang bosses have limited ability to commit crimes, and they are unable to bribe high-priced provincial officials. But as long as they bribe a few law enforcement officers in the place, they can get enough protection. The upper and lower layers of the law enforcement agencies make it easy for the gang to collude. As long as the black gang bosses bribe a few key people, it's enough. So the average number of black law enforcement officers in the sample is only 5 people, and the average number of cases of various officials is 10 people. These people are almost all senior officials such as police chiefs and deputy chiefs. The protective umbrella they provide is quite reliable. There are three cases in the sample. Liu Junyong, the boss of the Hunan Xinhua gang, committed gambling, murder, and coal mining between 1995 and 2005 during the crime. There are four police officers who are his protective umbrellas. One is the deputy chief of the County Public Security Bureau, two are the chiefs of the County Public Security Bureau and the deputy chiefs, and one is the head of the police station in the village of Liu Junyong. The protective umbrella that was arrested in 2010 and led to the destruction of the boss of the gang is even more amazing. Among the eight police officers in the case, one is the deputy chief of the Public Security Bureau and the deputy secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee, three are the chiefs of the District Public Security Bureau, one is the secretary of the Public Security Bureau Regulatory Commission, one is the deputy captain of the Special Police Brigade of the Public Security Bureau, and the second is the captain of the Criminal Police Brigade of the District. Zhang Wei, the boss of the Hunan Xinhua gang in Zhejiang, was a protective umbrella for 66 officials from 1995 to 2000 during the crime, including the mayor, the police chief, and 13 law enforcement officers. He hired so many people for business purposes. Zhang Wei's criminal empire continued to expand. Financial fraud, tax fraud, extortion, kidnapping, real estate, he did everything. Zhang Wei served as the chairman of the Donghai Group in Zhejiang, and the Donghai Group covered his illegal business. Because his business was too big, he had to seek protection from the government departments. And he made a lot of money, and he was subtracted 500 million yuan from his assets, which was more than enough to pay the bribe. Zhang Wei had met many times with the director of the Wenling Municipal Public Security Bureau, the deputy director of the Fujian Provincial Cultural Center, and received a total of 470,000 yuan. Chen Kai, the boss of the Hunan Xinhua gang in Fuzhou, had a bigger corporate career during the crime from 1991 to 2003. His business was very profitable, and he made a lot of money when he was in charge of the officials. According to media reports, Chen Kai had a total of about 10 million yuan. His first protective umbrella was the director of the Fuzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, and he received a total of 6 million yuan. The deputy director of the Fujian Provincial Cultural Center received 470,000 yuan from him, and the director of the Bank of China in Fuzhou also received 700,000 yuan to get him a bank loan. What's even more rare is that Chen Kai also met with the Fujian Provincial Public Security Bureau, which is equivalent to more than 100,000 yuan for China's KGB deputy director system. In comparison, the gang, which has a smaller scale of illegal business, is not so generous when they meet. Dong Tianyun, a man from Shaanxi, took control of the highway rest stop, and forcibly collected the tolls between the illegal merchants and the land owners who transported the oil in the past. He received a total of 4 million yuan in illegal gains between 1995 and 2001, and he bribed 5 public security officers for only 132,800 yuan. Although the director of the County Public Security Bureau, Ding Shuliang, only received 30,000 yuan, he was sentenced to 7 years in prison for this case. Duan Kailin, the deputy director of the Yunnan Xishuangbanna Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau, covered up the smuggling of cigarettes and gambling in the gang. He received more money, but he only received 120,000 yuan for four times. In the case, the amount of corruption in the gang is not large. Of the 31 people who have been charged with corruption, the average amount of corruption is 2.15 million yuan, which is 660,000 yuan in the central number. It is far less than the local officials who engage in commercial collusion. The 3.1 and 2 are even less than the state-owned cadres. This is mainly because the law enforcement officers do not have economic power, and most law enforcement officers have very low positions in the party-state system. The director of the Public Security Bureau is usually just a deputy chief cadre, which is one level lower than the party secretary. Of the 15 people whose amount of corruption is less than the central number, eight are the director of the Public Security Bureau or the deputy director, and four are the director of the Public Security Bureau or the deputy director. In addition to receiving from the gang and the department, they rarely have other resources. In comparison, the amount of corruption in the number of people above the central number is more diversified. There are five county secretaries who receive from the gang and the general businessmen at the same time. The amount of corruption of the four is between 1.08 million and 1.8 million yuan. The two most corrupt officers are considered special. Among the four, the most corrupt officer is Wang Yufan, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Jilin Tonghua City, with 18.1 million yuan. He himself is the boss of the gang, opening a coal mine, selling drugs and selling drugs. But half of his amount of corruption comes from two cases. In 2009, he colluded with a businessman to embezzle 2.4 million yuan and 7 million yuan from the development project of the Public Security Bureau to the developers. The amount of corruption of Yang Qiang, the director of the Public Security Branch of Guangdong Maomingshimaogang District, is 14.19 million yuan. Among them, 3.45 million yuan is to deploy to sell officials and bribes. More than 9 million yuan belongs to the unknown source of property. 1.18 million yuan comes from a gang boss who runs 40 casinos in the Yangqiang Gorge District. If Yang Qiang's unknown property is not from the gang, then Yang Qiang has 12.45 million yuan from other resources that have nothing to do with the underworld. Under the protection of the high-level of law enforcement, the criminal period of the gang can be as long as 10 years, on average 8 years, and on average 9 years. If the gangs in China can operate for as long as 10 years, it is hard to estimate the harm to society. As the case in the sample shows, these gangs have done everything to break the law. They not only break the law, but also harm ordinary people. Fortunately, although the corruption of the grassroots law enforcement officers has reached its peak, the central government still has a way to deal with these people. Since the law enforcement officers are an important tool to maintain the party-state system, the central government of course has to find a way to clear the phenomenon of black and white collusion. The Chinese government often initiates blackmail. This cycle of blackmail may not be able to completely clear the gang, nor can it change the political environment in which the gang thrives. But at least it has some effect to get rid of some particularly powerful and particularly arrogant organizations. In addition to being arrested during the blackmail, the gang leaders in China will also be arrested for the following reasons. First, the report of the people and the victim's family may cause the higher-level units to start an investigation. In the case of Zhang Wei, the leader of the gang in Wenling, Zhejiang, there was an ordinary citizen who kept reporting to the higher-level units at the end of the 1990s. With the help of several retired public security officers, he reported directly to the Beijing Public Security Department, so that the law enforcement officers who had nothing to do with the local public security would notice Zhang Wei. Then the central government directly ordered the Zhejiang Provincial Public Security Bureau to conduct an investigation. The victim's family will also provide clues. In 2003, the leader of the Hunan Xinhua gang, Liu Junyong, killed a farmer. His family reported to the Beijing Public Security Department, and then started an investigation to crack down on Liu Junyong's criminal organization. Second, the members of the gang will also recruit other members. When the law enforcement officers catch the gang's little brother, the little brother may recruit the boss and the umbrella. Xiao Qiang, the director of the Hunan Leiyang Municipal Public Security Bureau, fell off the horse like this. Xiao Qiang's gang was caught by a member of the gang, and provided a lot of clues. Then the police caught the two bosses and Xiao Qiang himself on the spot. Some cases are that the boss of the gang himself offered an umbrella to ask for a reduction. After Li Manlin, the leader of the Shanxi Taiyuan gang, was sentenced to death, he offered the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau, Shao Jianwei, to provide protection for him for many years. Shao Jianwei was arrested. In order to ask for a reduction, Shao Jianwei also offered him a bribe of 100,000 yuan to buy officials from Hou Wujie, the secretary of the Political and Legal Commission of Shanxi Province. Hou Wujie was later arrested. Third, when investigating the fraud case of the gang, clues will also be found by chance. This is how the leader of the gang, Xiong Xinxing, in Jiangxi Fuzhou, collapsed. At first, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection investigated a large-scale financial fraud case in 2004. Xiong Xinxing's company was involved, and then initiated a series of special investigations. In the end, Xiong Xinxing was arrested in 2005. Fourth, if the gang's violent crime is particularly arrogant and is concerned by the media and provokes public anger, it will also force senior leaders to take action to combat the crime. In 2010, the subordinates of Nie Lei, the boss of the Qingdao gang, killed a hotel manager at the Qingdao Crown Holiday Hotel. On the night of the incident, the senior leaders of Qingdao City were inviting diving athletes from home and abroad to the hotel. This incident was reported by local media. Three months later, Nie Lei was sentenced to prison. Fifth, senior law enforcement agencies may also launch an investigation on their sources of information. In this case, usually the boss of the gang and his protective umbrella are the subjects of the investigation. In the case of Li Zhengang, an anonymous gang member in Guangdong, the People's Procuratorate of Guangdong Province ordered the People's Procuratorate of Guangzhou to conduct a case investigation on Li Zhengang's criminal organization. The People's Procuratorate of Guangzhou sent people to investigate the anonymous case for six months and opened Li Zhengang's protective umbrella first. The case of Chen Kai in Fuzhou is more special. In 2003, the Central Public Security Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Investigation found in the joint investigation of drug illegal transactions that the drug trafficking group used Chen Kai's company to launder money and Chen fell into the trap. Contrary to popular belief, the law enforcement officers who colluded with the gang were not sentenced to high sentences, but the boss of the gang was sentenced to life imprisonment. For example, among the 50 convicted gang bosses, 21 of them were sentenced to death and executed immediately, 3 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 7 were sentenced to life imprisonment, and 14 were sentenced to 20 years in prison. This clearly shows that the Chinese government wants to undermine the underworld. The underworld is considered a major threat to social stability and public safety, so it uses heavy sentences to undermine it. Of course, the boss of the gang was also severely convicted of murder and drug trafficking. In contrast, the law enforcement officers who provided the protective umbrella for the underworld were all released. Among the 36 convicted gang members, Wang Yufan, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Four people were sentenced to life imprisonment. One of them was Xu Xiaogang, the deputy director of the Public Security Bureau of Jiangxi Province. He was sentenced to life imprisonment because of his high rank, because the Chinese government is particularly concerned about the problem of the underworld infiltrating law enforcement officials. Yang Qiang, the director of the Public Security Bureau of Maogang District, Maoming County, Guangdong Province, was also sentenced to life imprisonment, probably because of his large amount of corruption, 14.19 million yuan. Among the 31 sentenced to life imprisonment, the average sentence is 8.5 years, and the average sentence is 8 years. The government is so generous to those who cover up the underworld, which is quite surprising. This may be because they were mainly sentenced to life imprisonment and life imprisonment. Life imprisonment is usually a light sentence, and if the amount of money collected is small, the sentence of life imprisonment is also not heavy. In most cases, the amount of money the law enforcement officers collected from the gang was not large enough to be sentenced to life imprisonment. According to the evaluation of the sample, the collusion between the underworld and the underworld has seriously infringed on the ability of the Chinese government to maintain the rule of law in most areas. In areas where collusion is rampant, the performance of local governments is seriously weakened. Not only gambling, selling drugs, blackmailing and drug trafficking, the underworld also penetrates into important social and economic activities. Although we do not have enough data to judge the extent of the underworld's infiltration into local politics, but we can draw some temporary conclusions based on existing evidence. The broadness and longevity of the underworld, the cover-up of law enforcement officers, allows the underworld to carry out various criminal activities. In addition to traditional crimes, good-relationship gangs can expand to more profitable new areas. These gangs usually set up large groups to control the main economic activities of China, and put their feet deep into real estate, transportation and mining. The most successful criminal organizations in the sample are those gangs with multiple resources and the ability to buy through many local officials. Chen Kai in Fuzhou, Zhang Zhixin and Zhang Wei in Qiqihar, their large criminal organizations have controlled many high-profit industries and assets. Some of the leaders of the gangs also enter local political institutions by bribery. Zhang Zhixin, Zhang Wei, Chen Kai and Xiong Xinxin in Fuzhou, Jiangxi, are all local political commissars, and mix with local politicians and business elites. Local officials will also use the underworld to engage in the most notorious forced demolition in China. The Chinese media usually calls these people who force residents and farmers to leave as the leaders. There are two gangs in the sample that involve violent demolition. Although the relevant reports do not mention the details, it is reasonable to speculate that these must be local governments and developers. The two are the second-class customers who force demolition services and hire gangs to deal with residents who refuse to move. The case in the sample also shows that the underworld is active in small-scale mining, real estate, local transportation, including taxi, wholesale and warehouse logistics. Although it is difficult to estimate the extent of the underworld's infiltration into these industries, the impact on these industries may not be great, but it is obviously a threat to the public order and the economic life of ordinary people. What is more worrying is that these gangs can operate for a long time under the protection of law enforcement officers, and can easily bribe local officials and infiltrate local governments with their crimes. The impact on the country's governance efficiency is a great threat to the local government of the underworld. In the long run, the collusion between the underworld and the two is a greater threat to the Chinese country's governance efficiency. This kind of collusion has clearly harmed the country's law enforcement and administrative capabilities. The underworld continues to expand, and the gang boss is willing to bribe any officials who help him in his criminal career. Now even some key departments are also blacklisted, including China's secret police department, the National Security Department, and several senior officials have been blacklisted. The most subtle impact of the black and white collusion on local governments is the illegal privatization of national power. The law enforcement officers who act as black society protection umbrellas take public power for their own gain. Their nature is the same as the party committee secretary's privatization of state power for the purpose of selling human rights. This concept includes the two forms of collusion between officials and officials colluding with the underworld. The culture of buying and selling officials within the Chinese party-state system allows the underworld to expand its political influence. There are several cases in the sample where law enforcement officers bribe the gang boss to buy officials. Although we can't tell how much influence the underworld has on human rights, the phenomenon of Chinese law enforcement officers competing to buy officials is particularly worrisome. Because these people usually only have two resources, either to deploy or to bribe the underworld. If they bribe the underworld, they will not only have to bribe people in the future, but even officials will be involved and easily blacklisted by the underworld.