The Unrealized Potential of the MiG-29

Military Fighter Aircraft
2 followers
In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union would develop a new fighter aircraft which, for a time,
rivaled the F-16 as the best dogfighter in the sky. The MiG-29 Fulcrum, as it became known,
was a great design. As time has gone on, the aircraft has remained a part of Russia's inventory,
although outclassed by the newer Flanker variants and new models of the original western rivals,
like the Viper and Eagle. In this video, we will look at the classic Cold War fighter,
the Fulcrum, which, despite its public reputation, was sadly overlooked for sustained development.
For over two decades, it has arguably never reached its full potential.
In the late 1960s, the MiG-25 Foxbat gained international prominence.
Very modern-looking for its time, the aircraft was largely a mystery in the West.
Washington believed it may be an air superiority fighter, fast and highly agile. It was very fast,
but not agile. The MiG-25 was primarily an interceptor, made to hunt intruders like the SR-71.
Whilst it was good propaganda for the Soviets that the West believed the Foxbat was an air
superiority fighter, designers in the USSR knew that the Americans would respond with an aircraft
to match what they thought the Soviets had. They were correct. Designers were hard at work on two
new designs, the F-15 for air superiority, to supersede the F-4 Phantom, and the F-16 in a
close defence role, basically replacing the F-5. In the early 70s, Sukhoi had been tasked with
developing a new aircraft as part of the Soviet Advanced Frontline Fighter program, and then a
second, the Advanced Tactical Lightweight Fighter program, with Mikoyan tasked with developing a
A concept, codenamed Project 9, came out of these efforts, and by 1974, development had begun.
In 1977, the new fighter aircraft would take its maiden flight, the Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum. It was
small and agile, Mach 2 capable, easy to operate, and technically advanced. With everything looking
good, in 1983, the Fulcrum would officially enter service with the Soviet Air Force.
From the beginning, the true rival to the Fulcrum was the F-16. Both were medium to short range,
lightly armed, fast, agile fighters. Likewise, the initial versions of both aircraft had a strong
emphasis on dominating within visual range combat. It is claimed that in the years just after the
fall of the Soviet Union, German pilots, who had the opportunity to try both aircraft in training
missions, reported a number of things. Firstly, that the MiG-29 was a more touchy aircraft,
maybe because of the ability to toggle flight control systems. Secondly, it had strong haptic
feedback through the stick and throttle, resulting in a more raw flying experience.
The flight control systems made this MiG a dangerous and unstable aircraft in the wrong hands,
which for new pilots would be a distinct disadvantage, creating a steeper learning
curve. On the other hand, with an experienced pilot in the cockpit, this high level of
sensitivity would be beneficial. As with other Soviet jets from the 70s and 80s, it came with
options to expand the pilot's control over his jet, notably the ability to switch off the automatic
flight control systems, which would bypass any limits and essentially route all movement to the
joystick alone, much like a World War II fighter. Again, very dangerous in the wrong hands, but with
experience a tactic which could provide an edge. This attribute is noteworthy for the time. During
the 60s and 70s, as fly-by-wire systems and flight computers improved, it divided pilots.
Older pilots would sometimes claim that they preferred older flight controls,
which allowed them to feel the subtleties of the aircraft better. This complaint was echoed
by some Israeli pilots who moved from older Phantoms or Mirage 3s to the F-16, which had a
far smoother digital control system. It all came down to preference. The Fulcrum has long been
claimed to have an instantaneous turn rate at optimal speed of between 24 to 26 degrees per
second, with some claims going as high as 28 degrees. With a light loadout and correct fuel
quantity, this could hypothetically be true in a significant claim. Modern F-16s can optimally
pull an instantaneous turn rate of 22 to 24 degrees per second, whilst the old F-16A could
reportedly go up to 26 degrees, with its legacy loadout of wingtip sidewinders and no drop tanks.
In terms of sustained turn rate, it was also close. At around 10,000 feet and with roughly
half a tank of fuel, the F-16A could hold a sustained turn rate of 19 degrees per second
in a level turn, reaching peak performance at around Mach 0.73. The Fulcrum, on the other hand,
according to declassified Air Command and Staff College documentation, as well as the Luftwaffe
manual, is capable of a sustained turn rate of 16.6 degrees per second, albeit at a different
stated altitude of 5,000 feet, at around Mach 0.55, with full air-to-air loadout.
So, we could say that despite the differences in measurement and altitude, speed and loadout,
if both sides were sending their best, it would have been a near-even fight during the early
years of the Fulcrum, coming down to pilot skill and perhaps only outdone by slight advantages the
Viper may have held after a sustained fight. However, the Fulcrum did hold one noteworthy
advantage in that pilots could use the Schell 3UM helmet-mounted display, giving them the ability
to acquire targets within a wider envelope. From 1984 onwards, this system also allowed
employment of the R-73 short-range air-to-air missile. The F-16 would have been limited to
boresight acquisition at that time. Thus, it is possible that at one point in the mid-1980s,
the Fulcrum may have been the deadliest dogfighter in the skies.
In beyond-visual-range combat, however, it was a different story.
As time went on, the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker slowly adopted the technologies which gave
the Fulcrum an edge in the dogfight. The Flanker was already a highly agile aircraft,
despite its massive size. In a drawn-out dogfight, the Fulcrum may have had an edge,
with its slightly higher consistent turn rate and lower drag. However, a good pilot in the Flanker
could end a dogfight quickly, using high angle-of-attack manoeuvres. The adoption of similar
helmet-mounted target acquisition systems gave Flanker pilots the same ability that was once
the exclusive advantage of the Fulcrum. The Flanker already had better range, a better radar,
considerably larger weapons stores capacity, and superior beyond-visual-range capabilities.
The Flanker would be able to track, lock, and destroy a Fulcrum before the two ever even
entered a merge. Unless, of course, the Fulcrum addressed its weaknesses.
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Federation was in economic
disarray. This likely played into the decision to dedicate resources for Flanker development
over the Fulcrum. Modern combat was favouring the ability of the Flanker over the Fulcrum,
dogfights were less likely, and more powerful radars meant longer-range missions were almost
a given. If Russia was to have one aircraft to lead the fleet, all signs pointed to the Sukhoi
design. While Mikoyan's Fulcrum would never be completely abandoned, it would essentially lose
priority as the years went by. The advantages it held earlier on slowly became outclassed by
newer developments. The Flanker surged ahead in development, and the performance gap between the
MiG-29 and rivals like the Viper or Eagle just kept getting wider in air-to-air combat. Mikoyan
reorientated the Fulcrum towards air-to-ground tasking. It also received R-77 compatibility,
a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, but it's unclear if these upgrades elevated its
capabilities close to that of the Sukhoi's Flanker. While the Flanker may have been comparable to the
F-15, the Fulcrum, much like the F-16, would have to be adapted to fit into a role it was
never clearly intended to fill. At the core of the Fulcrum design was agility, short-range combat,
with a specific focus on dogfighting, just like the F-16A. We could speculate that if a MiG-29
upgrade program had received higher priority, the Fulcrum may have followed in the footsteps of
later F-16 variants, adopting a far better radar, improved beyond-visual-range capabilities,
newer engines, advanced internal systems, and so on. Just maybe, like the Viper,
its high speed and agility could have made it a deadly opponent both within and beyond visual range.
To the credit of the Fulcrum modification programs that were done, the aircraft was
improved, but these improvements were nowhere near the upgrade programs of its rival, the F-16,
which went on to produce cutting-edge variants with over 2,000 aircraft still in service today.
After two decades of retaining Soviet-era technology, the Fulcrum finally underwent a
large-scale modernization program in the mid-2000s. This program took the aircraft
out of the Soviet era and introduced a variety of newer systems, like glass cockpits,
an improved HOTAS, improved helmet-mounted system, and so forth. This resulted in the
MiG-29M and M-2 and the carrier-based MiG-29K. This program, despite being more limited in scope
than those seen on the Sukhoi fighters, proved the sound airframe design had unique strengths
and could still be a worthy platform for development. This was followed by a second
major improvement program, producing the MiG-35 Fulcrum F by 2017 and limited production and
trials by 2021. Touted as a 4++ generation fighter, this is what Mikoyan needed to keep
the Fulcrum concept alive. With a handful of interested foreign customers and two dozen on
order for the Russian Aerospace Forces, we may see the Fulcrum employed again as the MiG-35.
In fact, according to Russian media, the MiG-35 may have already been tested in the
While anything could hypothetically happen to the huge number of Fulcrums
from the early 2000s onwards, the focus has been to maximize the capabilities
of the Irkut-manufactured Su-30 variants, which have become Russia's most marketable
export aircraft and its most versatile domestic multirole aircraft. The role of frontline air
superiority has largely been handed off to the NAPO-built Su-35S and likely to continue into
foreseeable future. The story of the MiG-29 is an interesting one. In the short term,
it was a serious adversary to the Viper, but as time went on, the Fulcrum slowly faded into
the background as Sukhoi's designs took center stage. This was likely due to Russia's economic
problems in the 1990s, something the United States didn't have to deal with at that time,
and severely limited the Fulcrum's sustained development. Hope now lies with the new MiG-35
program for any significant future for this Mikoyan design.
