"The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides Book I Chapter II "

The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides If you are returning to the Classic Masterworks channel, welcome back. If you are new, please don't forget to like and subscribe and hit the bell notification so that you will be made aware of our latest content. And now, on with the story. Chapter 2, Causes of the War, The Affair of The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Tuncians, an Illyrian people. The place is a colony from Corsura, founded by Phalleus, son of Heraclides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians and others of the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous, but falling a prey to factions arising, it is said, from a war with her neighbors the Barbarians, she became much enfeebled and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The exiled party joined the Barbarians and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land, and the Epidamnians, finding themselves hard-pressed, sent ambassadors to Corsura beseeching their mother country not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the Barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera's suppliants and made the above requests to the Corsurians, but the Corsurians refused to accept their supplication and they were dismissed without having affected anything. When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corsura, they were in a strait what to do next, so they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians and endeavor to obtain some assistance from their founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth and revealed the answer of the god, and they begged them not to allow them to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the Corsurians, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their protection. Besides, they hated the Corsurians for their contempt of the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honors accorded to the parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with contempt by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with any even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great military strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the high naval position of an island whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the Thetians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished on their fleet, which became very efficient, indeed they began the war with a force of 120 galleys. All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force of Ambrassots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being avoided from fear of Corsairian interruption. When the Corsairians heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire, instantly putting to sea with five and twenty ships, which were quickly followed by others. They insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back the banished nobles. It must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corsaira and, pointing to the sepullas of their ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to restore them, and to dismiss the Corinthian garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Corsairians commenced operations against them with a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the exiles, with a view to their restoration, and also secured the services of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued a proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that chose, and the foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being treated as enemies. On their refusal the Corsairians proceeded to besiege the city, which stands on an isthmus, and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus, got together an armament and proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go. Any who were not prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this proclamation, some being ready to start directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being disputed by the Corsairians, several cities were asked to lend them a convoy, Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Palenchef or Onia with four, Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, Troas and two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Therbans and Fleasians were asked for money, the Eleans for hulls as well, while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy infantry. When the Corsairians heard of their preparations, they came to Corinth with envoys from Lasteman and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to make, they were willing to submit the matter to the arbitration of such of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement, and that the colony should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to refer the matter to the Oracle at Delphi, if, in defiance of their protestations, war was appealed to, they should be themselves compelled by this violence to seek friends in quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and to make even old ties give way to the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was that, if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible, but, while the town was still being besieged, going before arbitrators was out of the question. The Corsairians retorted that if Corinth would withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being concluded till judgment could be given. Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them to declare war and, getting underway with 75 ships and 2,000 heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corsairians. The fleet was under the command of Orestias, son of Pelicus, Caligrates, son of Corias, and Temenna, son of Temens, the troops under that of Artemus, son of Eurytemus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corsairians sent on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man their ships, all of which had been equipped for action, the old vessels being underjerded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the herald without any peaceful answer from the Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of 80 sail, 40 were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, formed line, and went into action, and gained a decisive victory, and destroyed 15 of the Corinthian vessels. The same day had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate, the conditions being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as prisoners of war till their fate should be otherwise decided. After the engagement the Corsairians set up a trophy on Leuchim, a headland of Corsaira, and slew all their captives except the Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians and their allies repaired home, and left the Corsairians masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to Leuchas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt Cyrene, the harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the battle they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were harassed by Corsairian cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in Thespotis, for the protection of Leuchas and the rest of the friendly cities. The Corsairians on their part formed a similar station on Leuchim. Neither party made any movement, but they remained confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at hand before either of them returned home. Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corsairians, spent the whole of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet, rose being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of large bounties. The Corsairians, alarmed at the news of their preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas, for they had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lastimonian confederacy, decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into alliance and to endeavor to procure support from her. Corinth also, hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the Corsairian navy being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of ordering the war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared. The Corsairians spoke as follows. Athenians, when a people that have not rendered any important service or support to their neighbors in times past, for which they might claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first, that it is expedient or at least safe to grant their request, next, that they will retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet with a rebuff. Now the Corsairians believe that with their petition for assistance they can also give you a satisfactory answer on these points, and they have therefore dispatched us hither. It has so happened that our policy as regards you with respect to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests, to be at the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a power which has never in the whole of her past history been willing to ally herself with any of her neighbors, is now found asking them to ally themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war with Corinth it has left us in a position of entire isolation, and what once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true that in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our shores single-handed, but they have now got together a still larger armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, and we, seeing our utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment. Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you. First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which, per self-inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves accepted, we are the greatest naval power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and moral strength should present herself self-invited, should deliver herself into your hands without danger and without expense, and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You may search all history without finding many instances of a people gaining all these advantages at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honor as she will receive. But it will be urged that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To this we answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Last Amon regards you with jealousy and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there, the same, remember, that is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you, and this she does to prevent our becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both on her hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two ways, either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own. Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her, that is, for Corcyra to make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it, in fact, we ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she forms against us. If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated honors its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamus to arbitration, they chose to prosecute their complaints war other than by a fair trial. And let their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests. Concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more strictly they are avoided the greater will be the chance of security. If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the treaty existing between you and Lastaemon, the answer is that we are a neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of the treaty is that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also from the rest of Hellas. No small number being furnished by your own subjects, while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left open to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other quarters. And you are to be accused of political immorality if you comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater cause to complain of you if you do not comply with it, if we, who are in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet with a repulse at your hands. While Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies. This ought not to be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions, or you should lend us to what help you may think advisable. But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish defection, and there is a wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first endeavor should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval power except your own, failing this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your antagonists. On the other, whatever the confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision is for Athens no less than Corsera, and that you are not making the best provision for her interests. If at a time when you are anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval reinforcements from Vence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither, and it is in other respects a most desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of Remember that there are but three considerable naval powers in Hellas, Athens, Corsera, and Corinth, and that if you allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corsera and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the struggle. Such were the words of the Corserians. After they had finished, the Corinthians spoke as follows. These Corserians in the speech we have just heard do not confine themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have good cause to reject their petition. According to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for good. Indeed their conduct is such as to make them by no means desirous of having allies present to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence. Besides, their geographical situation makes them independent of others, and consequently the decision in cases where they endure any lies not with judges appointed by a mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, while they seldom make voyages to their neighbors, they are constantly being visited by foreign vessels which are compelled to put into Corsera. In short, the object that they propose to themselves, in their specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves, the license of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they were the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have put their honesty by giving and taking what was just. But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of estrangement and is now one of hostility, for, say they, we were not sent out to be ill-treated. We rejoin that we did not found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head and At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we are much beloved by our colonists, and clearly, if the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in making war against them, nor are we making war against them without having received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would be honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their moderation, but in the pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to relieve it, was by them seized, and is now held by force of arms. As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious word arbitration, and not satisfied with their own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in peril, nor yet at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your protection those who never admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose offenses you had no hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they asked you to share your fortunes with them. So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to receive them war instead of peace, which will be the case with you if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain our friend, if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the contrary join us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you, with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection of the Sarmians record our vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether they should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has a right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less heavily on us than on yourselves. This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But we have also advised to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since our friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture, when you were in want of ships of war for the war against the Egyptians. Before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Sarmian question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises, when, if ever, men are wound in their efforts against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a friend, indeed they allow their ill interests to suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle. Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have done unto you, and let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say, but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war, not only is the straightest path generally speaking the wisest, but the coming of the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worthwhile to be carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which your conduct to Megara has created, for kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case may warrant, and do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid down at Lastaemon, that every power has a right to punish her own allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against your rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this is that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a foe, and for these Corcyraeans neither receive them into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult your own interests. Such were the words of the Corinthians. When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth. In the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance with Corcyrae was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese. Athens could not be required to but each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyrae sacrificed to Corinth, though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time, the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens received Corcyrae into alliance and, on the departure of the Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were commanded by Lastimonius, the son of Simon, Teutomus, the son of Strombictus, and Protes, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyrae and threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to prevent it, these instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty. Meanwhile, the Corinthians completed their preparations and sailed for Corcyrae with 150 ships, of these Elis furnished ten, Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, and Actorium one, and Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Corinthian being under the command of Cenoclides, son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the part of the continent opposite Corcyrae. They anchored in the harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotus, above which, at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephia, in the Eleene district. By this city the Achaeusian lake bores its waters into the sea. It gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotus and falls into the lake. There also the river Thiamis flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotus and Kestrine, and between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships, commanded by Micaeids, Aesimides, and Euryabates, and stationed themselves at one of the Cibota Isles, the ten Athenian ships being present. On Pointleuchem they posted their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come from Zacintus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of theirs. When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days' provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action. Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed an order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as follows, on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambrassat ships, in the center the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of the best sailors in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing. The sea fight was an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science, indeed it was more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get loose. Besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The maneuver of breaking the line was not tried, in short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion, meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided success, the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the Corcyraeans hard-pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging any ships, but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other. After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing for the number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and the conquered, this battle proving far greater than any before it, any at least between Helens, for the number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to Sibota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies. Sibota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thespotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships were thus seen by the They suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there were more behind, they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing from a point which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the Corinthians were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also retired, for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were in their camp at Leuchim, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Legoras, and Andesides, son of Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp, not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans feared that they might be hostile vessels, but they soon knew them, and the ships came to anchor. The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea, but beyond this made no further movement, having no intention of assuming the offensive, for they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on board and the want of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be affected. They feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was dissolved by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure. Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having done so, they spoke as follows, You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you placing yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your intentions are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish, and if you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat us as enemies. Such was what they said, and all the Corcyrian armament that were within hearing immediately called out to take them and kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows, Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty, but these Corcyrians are our allies, and we are come to help them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way, but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her possessions, we shall do our best to stop you. Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Cybota, on the continent, while the Corcyrians took up the wrecks and air that had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose in the night and scattered them in all directions, and set up that trophy in Cybota, on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had for claiming the victory were these, the Corinthians had been victorious in the sea fight until night, and having thus been enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The Corcyrians had destroyed about thirty ships, and after the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side, they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before them, backing water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the Athenians refused to sail out against them from Cybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory. The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anaktorium, which stands at the mouth of the Ambration Gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being common ground to the Corcyrians and After establishing Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the Corcyrians were slaves. These they sold, two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope that they might bring over their country to Corinth on their return, most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians, this, that they had fought against them with the Corcyrians in time of treaty. Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility. The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Palene, being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raise the wall looking towards Palene, to give hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidaeans were taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm, he had sent Delastemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of Potidaea. He also made overtures to the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Botiaeans, to persuade them to join in the revolt, for he thought that if these places on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to carry on the war with their cooperation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand heavy infantry for his country under the command of Archostratus, son of Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the captains to take hostages of the Potidaeans, to raise the wall, and to be on their guard against the revolt of the neighbouring cities. Meanwhile, the Potidaeans sent envoys to Athens and the chance of persuading them to take no new steps in their matters. They also went to Delastemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need. Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory from the Athenians, being unable, for all they could say, to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against them, and receiving from the Delastemonian government a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidaea, the Potidaeans, thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the Chilcideans and Potidaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chilcideans to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard and, settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place. Meanwhile, to those who followed his advice he gave a part of his territory in Megidonia round Lake Bulba as a place of abode while the war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished their towns, removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidaea and the rest in revolt, their commanders, considering it to be quite impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas, and with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original destination, and, having established themselves there, carried on war in co-operation with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the interior. Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the Athenian ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth and mercenaries from the to the number of 1600 heavy infantry in all, and 400 light troops. Orestias, son of Adamantus, who was always a steady friend to the Potidaeans, took command of the expedition, and it was principally for love of him that most of the men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty days after the revolt of Potidaea. The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the cities. On being informed that Orestias and his reinforcements were on their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of Corleas, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been first sent out, just become masters of Thurman besieging Pydna. Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced alliance with Perdiccas. Hastened by the calls of Potidaea and by the arrival of Orestias at that place, they withdrew from Macedonia, going to Baria and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land their march to Potidaea with three thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy ships along the coast, advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Orestias were encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside the city. The allies had chosen Orestias general of all the infantry, while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the Potidaeans, having deputed Aeolus as his general. The plan of Orestias was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the Athenians, leaving the Chilcideans and the allies outside the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against While Corius the Athenian general and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made from the quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched against Potidaea. After they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon afterwards engaged. The wing of Orestias, with the Corinthians and other picked troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and followed for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge within the fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Orestias perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to Potidaea, he at last determined to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidaea, not without difficulty, through a storm of missiles. He passed along by the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe, though a few were lost. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans from Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of Potidaea, when the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to render assistance, and the Macedonian horse formed against them to prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall, and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidaeans under truce. The Potidaeans and their allies had close upon three hundred killed, the Athenians a hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Corleas their general. The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised against had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong enough at once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to Palene and raise works there. They were afraid that the Potidaeans and their allies might take advantage of their division to attack them. Meanwhile, the Athenians at home learning that there were no works at Palene, sometime afterwards sent off sixteen hundred heavy infantry of their own citizens under the command of Formio, son of Aesopius. Arrived at Palene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphitis, and led his army against Potidaea by short marches, ravaging the country as he advanced. No one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works against the wall on the side of So at length Potidaea was strongly invested on either side, and from the sea by the ships co-operating in the blockade. Aristias, seeing its investment complete, and having no hope of its salvation, except in the event of some movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable contingency, advised all except five hundred to watch for a wind and sail out of the place, in order that their provisions might last the longer. He was willing to be himself one of those who remained. Unable to persuade them, and desirous of acting on the next alternative, and of having things outside in the best posture possible, he eluded the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out. Remaining among the Chilcideans, he continued to carry on the war, in particular he laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sarmelians, and cut off many of them, he also communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to contrive some method by which help might be brought. Meanwhile, after the completion of the investment of Potidaea, Formio next employed his sixteen hundred men in ravaging Chilcidas and Potica, some of the towns also were taken by him. Thank you for watching, we hope you will join us again soon for more of the history of the Peloponnesian War here at the Classic Masterworks channel. Goodbye.