The mission of the Foreign Press Centers is to assist foreign media in their coverage of the United States by providing firsthand access to both government and non-government experts to gain a deeper understanding of U.S. politics, history, values, and culture. The views expressed by briefers not affiliated with the Department of State or U.S. government are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. government. Participation in Foreign Press Center programming by briefers not affiliated with the Department of State or U.S. government does not imply endorsement, approval, or recommendation of their views. ---------- Under the leadership of the President and Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of State leads America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity. On behalf of the American people we promote and demonstrate democratic values and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.
The Secretary of State, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is the President's chief foreign affairs adviser. The Secretary carries out the President's foreign policies through the State Department, which includes the Foreign Service, Civil Service and U.S. Agency for International Development.
MODERATOR: Well, welcome to the New York Foreign Press Center.
We’re glad you’re here. Thank you to those joining online. We are honored
to have Major General Armagost here, who will give opening remarks shortly,
but let’s begin with a mission video that he’s provided for us. It should display.
(A video was played.)
Great. Thank you so much. Let me just give a quick, brief introduction for the general.
Major General Jason Armagost is Commander of the Eighth Air Force and Commander of the
Joint-Global Strike Operations Center located at Barksdale Air Force Base,
which is in the state of Louisiana. He’s with us today to discuss strategic deterrence and
the U.S. Air Force bomber force. My name is Melissa Waheibi; I’ll be your moderator
today. So the general will give opening remarks, and then I will moderate the Q&A,
which we will have for both those in the room and those online. Sir, thank you for being here.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Thanks, Melissa. And I appreciate you all in person and on Zoom,
so greetings to you all. Thanks for taking the time to be with me today. So the video actually
does a really good job of representing what it is I command day in and day out. It’s about 24,000
airmen working, ultimately globally, to provide that on-call strategic deterrent force that
is intercontinentally capable, often postured around the world either in Europe, the – into
Indo-Pacific, sometimes Central Command, but always within that environment touching all of
the combatant commands as defined by our Unified Command Plan at the – through the President.
And so about 60 percent of last year, we had our forces outside of the continental
United States acting primarily, again, in Europe and the Indo-Pacific but then also,
again, in the Central Command area and with what we call CONUS-to-CONUS flights
into Africa and South America and other regions of the world. So it really kind of points at the
inherent traits and characteristics of long-range airpower and how we manage it, how we allocate
it to the different commanders around the world, and how they then subsequently use global strike
forces to stabilize or provide on-call support for whatever activities they have going on.
So really, that’s kind of how I wanted to open it
up and then it open it up to you all for questions and interaction. So —
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you very much.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: All right.
MODERATOR: So this is time for Q&A. This is on the record. Transcription
will be available at the end. So when you do ask your question,
please state your name and organization. We’ll go – go ahead. We’ll begin with you.
QUESTION: Hi, Troi Santos, Philippine BusinessMirror. So the Philippines.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yes. QUESTION: What kind of deterrence plans do you
have for the hotspot area of the Philippine Sea and Taiwan?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: So the Western Pacific, obviously, there’s – it’s a very dynamic place,
always has been a very dynamic place. We have routinely kind of operated out
of Guam recently in support and around the Philippines islands. So I – when I
was a colonel – this was in 2013 to ’14 – I was stationed at Anderson Air Force Base
in Guam. And even then – so 12 to 15 years ago, we flew routine missions in and around
the Philippine islands with the bombers and other aircraft we had around there.
So I would say that that routine interaction and integration is kind of how we define what
it is we do with others. We don’t act in isolation. We act with partners and allies,
and we integrate with other military forces to include not just air power
but naval power as well, particularly in the watery regions of the world. And so that’s
kind of a routine thing that takes place. So what results from that, I would argue,
is that habitual interaction drives us to learn from each other but also to interact and plan to
integrate in ways that help us integrate better actually as we go forward. It’s changed a lot
since I was stationed there, and the habitual relationships are stronger, I would say, today.
Yeah.
MODERATOR: I see we have a question online from Mr. Song from Yonhap. You
can enable your camera and your microphone and ask your question.
QUESTION: Thank you for doing this, General. Sangho Song from Yonhap News, South Korea.
And as you know very well, South Korea and the United States have been seeking CNI initiative,
which is a conventional and nuclear integration in which South Korea supports U.S. nuclear
operations for integrated deterrence efforts. So can you give us some similar examples like
South Korean fighters escorting U.S. nuclear bombers and so on? And what
kind of specific CNI cooperation have the two sides been discussing or putting in practice?
And secondly, I’m also wondering your thought about whether under the Trump Administration
the nuclear deterrence exercises or operations will continue given that, during the first term,
President Trump called the exercise with South Korea very expensive and costly. Thank you.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay, yeah, so I think I can almost answer both of your questions by kind of
answering it with a single answer almost, which is: So conventional-nuclear integration, I would
categorize that as just good military practice. So in other words, when you – when you develop
and plan for and then train and exercise for an operation, you build it comprehensively. You don’t
build each piece and part in isolation. And so that’s what I – I guess when I talk about habitual
training and planning and exercise relationships, what we see is the ability to seamlessly integrate
those operations across the spectrum of conflict, right? So all the way from competition activities
through crisis and conflict, that relationship of working together, planning together,
and operating militarily together is an extremely powerful thing to practice and to conduct.
And so that translates all the way up into – from conventional operations to nuclear operations. And
so I think that’s – that kind of answers both of the questions. Obviously, politically there’s –
there will be decisions made about how to allocate decisions of where we train and everything. So
that’s not – it wouldn’t be my area. But when I talked about the habitual relationships that
are gained from working with and through partners and allies, it’s very powerful.
QUESTION: And can you give us some examples about the CNI cooperation? I gave you one example,
like South Korean fighter jets, like, supporting the bomber operations,
but I think there should be some other examples so – I mean, if you can tell us.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Well, so the way we treat readiness in my command with bombers is that
I look at it as an ecosystem of capability that by demonstrating
the ability to generate aircraft, to train crews, to have those crews interoperable with others,
inside of the continental United States and internationally, what that does is it drives
us to a higher state of readiness. So whatever an operation looks like,
it can be additive to readiness to conduct operations at any level.
So the specific examples kind of – it’s a good one that you give, but even when we meet,
for example, for a photo – a photo opportunity over a remote area, a part of the world with
three or four different countries all at once to get on the wing of a bomber,
the complexity of that environment, the complexity of planning and executing that
actually makes us more capable militarily. So that’s probably kind of a long way
to answer your question, but I think the habitual relationships really matter a lot.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MODERATOR: Any other questions?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MODERATOR: Manik. GENERAL ARMAGOST: Sir.
MODERATOR: Please state your name and org.
QUESTION: Manik Mehta; I’m a syndicated journalist.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay.
QUESTION: I was studying the speech made by the Japanese prime minister – he was in D.C.
recently – and one of the things he mentioned was about expanding security cooperation with the U.S.
But many of the Japanese reps who were there, they were talking about expanding the Quad alliance.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: And how realistic is it when you can – when you expand Quad,
what candidates do you have in mind? Would it be South Korea or would it be the Philippines?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: So I – I’m not privy to those discussions and I don’t – I wouldn’t speculate
on them, actually. But again, what we often see when we work with bombers all around the
world is we’ll have kind of bilateral activity and then we’ll have multilateral activity. And
I think what you’re kind of describing is a multilateral activity that I don’t know
if it is going to be kind of self-forming, or whatever the Quad was and what it might become
would be a political question, and it would be an agreement amongst nations that decide to do that.
And so what we do inside of that is we take every
opportunity we can to work under the guidance of the combatant commander in whose theater
we’re operating to interact with partners that they choose for us and then also plan
with them as well. And so I would say it would play out through – through us,
but we wouldn’t be part of that discussion as to how it would form. Does that make sense?
QUESTION: I have another question related to this. (Laughter.)
The difference between AUKUS and Quad is almost blurred.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah.
QUESTION: Both (inaudible) public perception, they see that one of the organizations,
one of the alliances is superfluous or rather it overlaps each other.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah.
QUESTION: Could you – could you please explain to us —
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Well, so one of the things I would give you an example back from the military
to civilians, is we are very much guilty – probably I would guess internationally
the same thing happens – we have kind of our own language about how we talk about things, and we
have many acronyms. So I apologize ahead of time if I use some acronyms or some jargon language.
But I would say that some of that plays out too with regards to how we perceive allies
and partners and what we call them. And so from – again, from a military perspective,
I say that we interact with all of those different potential players from a – certainly from a
bilateral perspective under the guidance of the combatant commander. But then what
it becomes when it’s multilateral I guess history will kind of tell us or show us.
QUESTION: Hi, it’s Eric Peters with Kyodo News;
it’s a Japanese news agency. So my question is on North Korea/DPRK. Do you have any
concerns over DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and if so, what are they?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah. So from a force-on-force perspective,
militarily we – so I – when I was a brand new lieutenant flying F-16s in Japan,
we were kind of relentlessly focused in that area at that time on North Korea in the ‘90s,
in the mid-‘90s, when they were under different leadership and had different objectives. They
were clearly driving towards a nuclear capability at that time, and obviously there were many good
reasons for the people in the region that they didn’t want North Korea to have that.
And so now we live in different time, but a lot of those same concerns are now – are still there. And
militarily, obviously, we approach things to solve the military problems in support of a political
objective. And so what I see in North Korea as far as their weapons capabilities, their demonstrated
capability of using them, the systems that they may or may not employ in a dynamic environment,
that we study that very closely. And then we – again, under the guidance of a combatant
commander – would present capabilities in competition, in crisis, and in conflict,
potentially, in different ways. And so yeah, we pay very close attention to all of that.
QUESTION: Arul Louis from Indo-Asian News Service. Recently, when they had the Aero India show in
Bengaluru, you had one of the units from the 34th Expeditionary bomber unit participate in
that. In that context, how do you see the – there is talk of interoperability and
integration with the air forces of the U.S. and India. How do you see that going forward?
And also, do you see – how do you locate India in your order of global mission?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah. So that’s a great example, and it just very recently happened within,
I think, a week, week and a half ago, maybe even a little less. And so no, it’s a great
– it’s almost a perfect example of everything I just described about interoperability and how we
habitually work with other partner nations in going forward. It’s a – as you might imagine,
it’s a very complicated thing to take a bomber aircraft and move it to different places that
require certain types of fuel, they require certain load-bearing capacities on taxiways,
and runway lengths and runway widths and all the – all the details that go into doing that.
And so by conducting that activity, we learn a lot from each other, and we integrate better
as a – just merely as a result of doing it. And so going forward we are – again,
under the guidance of the combatant commander – always interested in exploring and expanding
how we learn about how to best operate in the world. So India’s part of that.
QUESTION: And how do you specifically see these things going forward with
India? Because you also have the Tiger TRIUMPH coming up soon.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: I – well, so I don’t – again, the combatant commander of the region would know
specifically how to answer that, because they work together, they plan with Indian armed services;
they understand what’s possible and what their ultimate objectives are from a
military-to-military perspective. And so I – answering that specifically gets tricky,
but again, we learned a lot from Aero India. We had gone, I think, two years prior to that,
I think 2023 or 2024 – ‘23, yeah. So 2023 we had also done an air show there in India.
And so we learn more every time. I think we did it better this time because we did that
one in 2023. And so that – those kind of relationships build over time. Yeah.
MODERATOR: Go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. I’m Jukka Lehtinen, and I’m from news (inaudible) Kauppalehti. And
I would like to ask the – just recently, we – a few years that Sweden and Finland joined the
NATO. What kind of operations have changed after that, your operation in that area?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah. QUESTION: And also, is there something
started to go or something happening in Arctic area what you are doing?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah. I think you’re seeing a lot of attention in the Arctic regions right now,
the Nordic countries and the Baltic countries as well. And so there’s a
lot of attention on that. One of the things I think is most interesting and
I’m most proud of in my time in this job, actually, is when Sweden and Finland came
into NATO in – I think it was in March of last year, or maybe it was February —
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah. So we did a – we did a CONUS-to-CONUS mission from two aircraft. So a B-1
and a B-52 flew from the United States, met and flew over Stockholm for the accession into NATO.
And so – and then flew back to the United States. And so that’s kind of a really good example,
I think, of through those relationships with those countries and in the capacity of NATO
in this case, they conducted those global missions for – to great effect. I think it
got some crazy amount of views on YouTube in Sweden in a very short period of time. But I
would say that the same things are happening with Finland in that regard as well from our – from our
global power forces. And there is – there’s a – there’s very much an interest in the
Arctic right now – militarily, economically, all of the reasons why – politically, so.
Yes, sir.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) Anadolu News Agency, headquartered in Türkiye. I would like
to sort of follow up the last question and bringing the topic to Europe and Middle East,
if possible. In terms of your activities, would you expect any change if Russia and
Ukraine war comes to the end? And also, with the new current administration,
would you have any different activities in terms of the Iran nuclear deterrent?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Those are all things we look at and we continue to plan with and around,
depending on what’s going on in the world. Again, with the global forces we have,
we’re on call for literally every part of the world, every corner of the world, at any given
time. And so the decision about how to allocate where we go and who we interact with happens
at a very high level. Like, for example, in the last year we did a – the B-1s flew to Türkiye at
Incirlik and did a hot pit – we call it a hot pit refueling, where they land, they keep the
aircraft running and they simultaneously refuel it with gas. And then – so they don’t shut it off,
and then they take off and fly again. And so that was just done last year at Incirlik.
And so obviously the Black Sea region and with Iran, Türkiye, and Romania, Bulgaria,
and Ukraine, there’s a – that’s a very strategic area and it always has been,
and I’m sure geopolitically it always will continue to be that. And so the – to your point,
though, I think it’s a very good point. The European commander – command commander and the
Central Command commander both interact on a daily basis because of that seam
or that intersection of those two combatant commands. And so – I think we pay very close
attention to all of that, and we are ready for whatever we’re asked to do on that, so.
QUESTION: I have a question. GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah.
QUESTION: So New START is set to expire in less
than a year. How would the – that affect your operations?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: So I would say that from a treaty compliance perspective,
we have been compliant and remain compliant with New START despite the – kind of what I’d call the
drama around it in the last couple of years. But I think – it seems to me that all parties
are interested in some kind of a – an agreement going forward, and what form that takes will be
determined by politicians. And so what I would say is we’ve been compliant with the treaty,
we will – we are remaining compliant with the treaty as it’s in effect right now.
And so whatever that becomes going forward is kind of an open question, I would say.
QUESTION: I’m sure you’ve followed the recent Munich Security Conference.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: I didn’t really, but I – I’m vaguely familiar, yeah, yeah.
QUESTION: Yeah. The Vice President was there. He made a speech which shocked many –
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay.
QUESTION: — many Europeans. I’m sure you’re aware of that. Now, many of the European
members of NATO – almost all of them – they are getting ideas about going – becoming autonomous,
by which the implication is that when you go autonomous, you are within yourselves, within
Europe, and exclude non-geographic partners. And inadvertently it means that – excluding
not America. Do you think it’s a viable proposition of an idea that is very realistic?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Well, so I didn’t – I didn’t watch the Munich Security Conference. I was doing
other things at the time. But I would say that I think it’s always relatively normal, I think,
for allies and partners to interact in ways that probably from the outside look challenging,
but I think it’s ultimately good because it – and it can make allies and partnerships
stronger. And so, having not been familiar with what was said or the reactions, actually,
to what were said, that’s kind of what I would say, is we have a good history of
all working together on many things. We don’t have to agree on everything, but we often work
together in ways that are very productive, and I think that – I think that’s likely to
continue. We have a lot of shared interests and shared values that we work towards, so –
QUESTION: The French president reacted in a very remarkable
way. The moment the Vice President left – I’m talking of JD Vance –
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah.
QUESTION: — he held a kind of a summit with his European colleagues. And the
only question they were discussing was security.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Hmm. Well, so I think on the heels of a security conference,
that’s probably reasonable. Again, I don’t know what the Vice President said or what
the reaction to it was, but I think – if we’re talking about security,
there’s probably good outcomes of that, right? So – because from the environment
we operate our global forces within, we have a good history of doing just that.
And again, I’m certain – certainly – I don’t – my experience in this job is only little
over a year and a half. I’m certain before that there were things we didn’t see exactly the same,
and I’m certain going forward there will be other things we don’t see exactly the same.
But the history of the Alliance when we talk about NATO is very strong. There’s – again,
there’s probably always historical examples of internal disagreement on things, but the outcome
is better in the end, I think, when we work through those shared values and interests, so.
MODERATOR: Sir, we received a question via chat. He’s having a little technical difficulty, so —
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay.
MODERATOR: — let me ask it on his behalf. He’s on Zoom. His name is Donghui,
reporter with the China Review News Agency out of Hong Kong. “Recently, China tested two new
types of jet fighter and caused attention of Western analysts. How do you evaluate this new
development regarding the strategic deterrence? How is NGAD program of the U.S. going on?”
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay. So I saw those photos of that – those – from that air show or the –
I can’t remember what the event was that – where they had those flying,
but no – so military competition is kind of an eternal thing. It’s not – there are often
surprises. There are new things. There are – we have – we reveal capabilities, we do things,
we plan, we restructure ourselves; we organize, train, and equip ourselves in different ways,
just as every international competitor would do. And so I tend to not be surprised when new
capabilities are revealed, and I’m also driven on – within my command, what we do is we provide
global forces with range, payload, and access for global operations for combatant commanders.
And so what remains true through whatever competitive activity takes place are those
things for me, and we figure out ways to deal with how we’re – that looks going forward. I
think that the Trump – the Biden administration deferred a decision on the next-generation air
defense for us, and I think – get with the – with the opportunity to let the
Trump Administration make that decision. So I would say that that remains to be seen, so.
QUESTION: How many aircrafts do you have?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: A hundred and forty – 140 – between B-1, B-52, and B-2. And right now we
also have a modernization program going on for the B-52 which is going to become the B-52J,
which is engines and avionics and some subsystems
to modernize it. And then the B-21 is going to ultimately replace the
B-1 and the B-2, so ultimately we’ll be a two-bomber fleet force going forward.
QUESTION: Is there a way where journalists can visit the air base?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: I’m sorry, say —
QUESTION: Is there a way for the journalists to visit the air base?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: I’m sure there’s – our PA experts can – he knows all the ways to do that.
STAFF: Short answer, yes. (Laughter.)
MODERATOR: We’ve received a couple presubmitted questions. I’ll offer one to you —
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay.
MODERATOR: — considering we have a couple more minutes. This is from Mohamed Maher from Egypt:
“How do U.S. nuclear deterrence policies affect Middle East stability? How does China-Russian
military expansion impact America’s deterrence strategy in the region?”
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay, specific – the second portion of that is
also specific to the Middle East, I’m guessing?
MODERATOR: Yes, sir.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Okay, so I would kind of go back to the competition piece of what I just
said with regards to – competition, whether it’s explicitly talked about as an activity or not,
is constantly taking place. It’s kind of the example you just gave of China revealing two
new fighter systems. What I – so what is the activity of competition from a military
perspective? It is if there is a perceived weakness of someone who has an interest that
is contrary to yours or has values that are different than yours, and you find ways that
you think you can expand your interests into that space, then you find ways to do that.
And so that activity of competition also relates to nuclear – in fact I would say
our understanding of competition through the Cold War was elevated significantly as
a result of one of the side – if you want to call it a benefit of a nuclear competition,
we understand what that means. And I would offer – when I say “we,” I
would say the international community understands better what that means.
Now, the complexities that come from a multipolar or not just a bipolar Cold War that affects many
on the periphery who may have not necessarily been part of either the Soviet Union or the
United States but were chosen partners or allies or choosing which side to be on, that dynamic
is spun significantly or increased significantly when you have multiple players in that arena. So
the nuclear aspects of competition in the Middle East would be complicated immensely if Iran had a
capability, and that has been the explicit desire that they do not have a capability. So militarily,
we plan for all eventualities. We can react no matter what ends up happening, but – and we will
be available for use in whatever scenario. So that’s kind of how I would answer that.
MODERATOR: Here.
QUESTION: Right, so I have a question on the – so last year the U.S. warned about
the prospect of a nuclear weapon in space or other type of weapon of mass destruction.
What is your current assessment on that? What is your position on that – 2025? I’m sorry.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: So the Cold War actually gives a good example of some of the things that we’re
seeing happening now in a renewed competition, where I think it was the SALT II treaty in
the early ’70s – 1974, maybe – where the Soviet Union and the United States both saw that it was
possible to do those things even back in the early ’70s, and they explicitly said we are not going
to conduct that, we are not going to do that. So I think it is militarily very problematic if someone
takes that step to do that, and so we – again, from a military perspective, we have to find
ways to address whatever the eventualities are. And so politically or from a treaty perspective,
then that is a – that’s a separate question, but again, I would offer that that is not a
stabilizing activity when that’s done. It creates dynamics for escalation that are very problematic.
QUESTION: Do you view Russia as taking that step to put a nuclear weapon in space?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: I don’t know what the current assessment is as far as, like, what’s out there,
but I think Russia – again, we learned this from the Cold War, and we had a very good shared
understanding of what – for example, what a triad meant, with intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bomber forces with a – knitted together with a strategic
command and control capability that provided for the use and control of those forces. One
of the big concerns about a nuclear weapon in space is what that does to the binding
elements of the control – nuclear command and control, and it takes away some of the
time aspects of military decision making. And so that’s a very destabilizing kind of thing,
and I would think anyone who would do that would understand exactly what that meant.
MODERATOR: We have time for maybe one, two more questions, if anybody has any.
QUESTION: Hypersonic. GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yes.
QUESTION: Do you have any plans on deterring hypersonics —
GENERAL ARMAGOST: So hypersonic missiles –
that’s another good one, actually, that – relative to Cold War. So a ballistic missile,
like an intercontinental ballistic missile, is actually much faster than a hypersonic missile. So
what makes a hypersonic missile different is its – is the way – the flight profile that it takes, and
what it attempts to do through that flight profile is to potentially defeat warning systems. And so
if you are creating systems that defeat warning systems, what you are doing is destabilizing that
environment as well. And so that’s why there’s, I think, a lot of concern about hypersonics as
far as what it does to stability for overall force structure when there is a competition.
And so hypersonics to me are – from a military perspective,
again, are a differentiating capability, but they’re not a game-changing capability when
you have the ways to respond in your – the time and place and manner of your choosing.
And so they can be a system that is militarily valuable, but what’s the
stabilizing or destabilizing aspect of that capability, what I would – is what I’d say.
QUESTION: Did the Ukraine war expose Russia’s capabilities?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Well, so I think if you look at the systems that they used in the conduct of
that war, I think quite often they were put in that situation because they had run out
of the more traditional systems they would have wanted to have used and they had expended them,
and to lesser effect, probably, than they intended would – they thought they would get from them. And
so I think to a certain extent it took the – a little bit of the shine off the hypersonic
system as a game-changing system, and it is in fact a weapons delivery platform similar to a
short-range ballistic missile, for example. It just does it in a slightly different way, so.
QUESTION: Thank you, thank you.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah.
QUESTION: I have a question regarding the use of drones, which in some ways have drastically
changed the way the war is conducted from the air. How do you see that as a – as something
that you would be able to deal with, or is it something else, some other authority?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah, so I think the Ukraine – Russia-Ukraine war has brought
a lot of attention to that, and for – in some ways I’ve heard it termed it’s the
first drone war. I think what we most have to be careful with from our perspective,
from Global Strike Command’s perspective, is that we don’t learn the wrong lessons from
that action. We would not have conducted our military operations in the same ways,
and so don’t presume that the same outcomes would be needed or derived from drone activity.
Now – so look at what the drone traits and capabilities are and determine how
we might use or defend those same kinds of things. So those are all
the kind of things we’re doing now. We’ve been doing that for a while,
but I think we are kind of at an inflection point where, because of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
it’s now real and very ubiquitous and so it has to be dealt with directly.
MODERATOR: We have time for one more. Mr. Song, if you want to ask your question,
please enable your mike again and your video. Thank you.
QUESTION: Thank you. I have one question about the – President Trump’s plan on Iron Dome. And
if you look at the executive order, then there is an element about the protection
of allied territories. So do you think that there is a possibility that Trump
might consider deploying more THAAD system or other anti-missile system in South Korea?
GENERAL ARMAGOST: I’m sorry, what was the – you said like an acronym or something at the very
beginning and I missed what it was, like the executive order on something. I missed that.
QUESTION: On Iron Dome plan, and then there is an element —
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Oh, Iron Dome, yes, yes, yes. Okay.
QUESTION: Yeah. And there is a element about protection of the allied territories and
people. And so I’m wondering if there is any possibility that you think – in the plan about
establishment of additional THAAD deployment to South Korea or other anti-missile system in Korea.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: Yeah, I’m not aware of that. I do know, like, historically there
have been fielding of systems, missile defense systems, throughout the region that has been
very deliberate and very considered and very much partnered with those countries and those
nations. So I would assume that a similar thing would be conducted going forward, but again,
I’m not familiar enough with what their objectives are specifically in that executive order, so.
MODERATOR: Great, thank you. Well, that concludes our briefing today. Again,
the transcript will be available later this evening. We will send that out to
you. Thank you for your participation, and sir, thank you for being here.
QUESTION: Thank you, sir.
GENERAL ARMAGOST: All right, thank you all. Thank you.