Top Economist Explains U.S. Market Collapse (Wall Street Fail)

Wealth Wizards
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Mar 31, 2025 #finance #personalfinance
Fear is extraordinarily contagious and we saw that in September of 2008 like we've never seen
it before in financial markets. What in the world is happening on Wall Street? If you wait till you
know everything it's too late. Now most of you wouldn't even know this happened unless you were
on the market at the time but the market fell by almost 50 percent and that's again this is
it's hard to see because the log scale hides the depth of a fall on that coast but the market
peaked at 1052 in January of 73 and by December of 94 it was 578 and that's the beginning. Then
you have a bubble which takes off in 1982 and that's even greater than the one back in 56.
So that's the actual structure of the market and you end up in 1999 with the market 21 years ahead
of its trend. You look at that stuff and the fit's not so crash hot anymore but of course this little
bit here it was good timing. If you're going to put forward a stupid theory of the markets that
was a good time to do it. The origins of mainstream finance theory which are worse than you'd expect
usual sort of strike the mainstream economics. The influential contrarian economist Steve Keen.
Brilliant economist that criticizes much of modern economics. A research fellow at the Institute for
Strategy Resilience and Security at University College in London. He is someone that each and
every one of us has to listen to whether we agree or disagree. You're Steve Keen. Now the underlying
paradigm of neoclassical economics is based upon a subjective theory of value. So you argue value
is the satisfaction that the consumer gets from consuming product and you add value by adding
utility. That was the particularly Jean-Baptiste Say made that very explicit way back in the days
when he was arguing at the classical school of thought. But neoclassical is strongly based on a
subjective theory of value and equilibrium plays a major role in their logic. What it's worth
about cleaving the equilibrium between supply and demand and if you think what does the foundation
meme. I think meme is an extremely good way to describe this idea. It was Marshall's drawing of
intersecting supply and demand curves determining price that he first wrote in 1890 I think revised
up to 2020. And he then said to a company this is rather famous phrase we might reasonably dispute
whether it is the upper or under blade of a pair of scissors that cuts a piece of paper as to whether
value is determined by utility or cost of production. So they reached a combined method where marginal
cost and marginal revenue both came together to give you price and both of the subjective
conditions of demand and the objective conditions of production play a role in setting both price
and quantity. Now that's the generic model which they clearly apply to commodity markets but the
finance markets are a different kettle of fish. And the first person to attempt to model this
use apply this meme to finance was Irving Fisher. And he did it for his PhD thesis and he was easily
the most talented mathematical economist of his time. But he thought it didn't get sufficient
reception in 1907 so he republished it in 1930. And I think this means another reason to give
Irving Fisher the prize for the man with the world's worst timing. So it's called the theory
of interest as determined by impatience to spend income and opportunity to invest it. And that
alone and the subjective objective elements that I'm talking about while impatience is subjective
opportunity to invest is objective. So the two factors tied together. But there is an important
element about both finance markets and labor markets that of course neoclassical economists
would not mention or maybe even be conscious of but of course I'm going to mention it. And that
is the standard model has supply determined by the objective cost of production. So you have
marginal cost you're paying it for inputs at the cost of market price etc. It's all objective stuff
that determines how much you supply. The demand side is subjective. Now there's enormous problems
with these anyway because marginal cost is assumed to rise by the textbooks but when you do empirical
research no it doesn't. For vast majority firms it falls. It gets worse because for finance you're
not buying and selling on a spot market. The conventional model really applies to spot markets
where you go down to a fish market or whatever else and you've got to buy the stuff on the day,
you buy it, you eat it on the day, there's no time element to it. And that's not at all what
happens with finance. With finance instead it's necessarily time dimension. You get a loan now,
you've got to pay it back over time. You buy a share or a bond now, you get income from it over
time. So time is an inevitable part of those markets. You can't just ignore time as neoclassicals
do when they talk about supply and demand for individual commodities on spot markets. So Fisher
described finance as being caused by the supply determined by subjective preferences for individuals
for present goods over future goods. So he was aware of this particular dilemma. Demand,
the objective possibilities of profitable investment, and then the loanable funds,
because fundamentally there's no understanding of money creation in conventional neoclassical theory
and at this stage Fisher was a conventional theorist. That's the basic system. And he said
the rate of interest expresses a price in the exchange between present and future goods.
So time is tied up there again, which he's acknowledging. So how do you handle time?
Well, it's simple. You make assumptions. And here are the two assumptions that Fisher made
to handle the time dimension of finance. The market must be cleared in respect to every interval
of time. So rather than just saying there's a spot market, it's an equilibrium, you push it
through time, it's got to be an equilibrium through the whole of time. And secondly,
debts must be repaid. This is 1930. And of course, by 1929, he was already suffering very badly
personally from the fact that these two assumptions were violently contradicted by the real world.
And in response to that, and this is why I have a lot of time for Irving Fisher as a person as
well as an economist, he had the courage to change his mind. It also was the sheer shock
of being sent bankrupt, destroyed, totally wrong in your predictions. There was an enormous
existential experience for him, but he came through with it with an alternative theory.
And an essential component of that was abandoning equilibrium very explicitly. And I'll talk a bit
more about that when I explain Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, which I'll be covering
later in these lectures on finance. Now, typically the neoclassicals ignored his work on debt
deflation, and they rebuilt his equilibrium analysis after the Great Depression was over and
after the Second World War. And the foundation paper, the modern... No, I hate to call it modern,
but the conventional theory of finance, the capital asset pricing model was given by Sharpe
in a paper published in 1964. And notice it says, the theory of market equilibrium
under conditions of risk. So the market reaching equilibrium and risk rather than uncertainty
determining the volatility of shares. So you start off by saying there's one of the problems
that plague those attempting to predict the behavior of capital markets. It's the absence
of a body of positive pro-economic theory dealing with conditions of risk. So forget about macro,
this is all being done from the level of microeconomics. And he developed a model
of asset allocation under conditions of risk. So if you think about the neoclassical theory
of consumption, subjective side of the theory, you have a consumer who's maximizing utility
subject to income constraints. And that became, in Sharpe's head, he made that
an investor maximizing utility subject to return and risk. Now, utility is therefore seen as a
positive function of expected return. So the more of a return you expect that you get from a
particular share, the higher your utility, but a negative function of risk, which was treated as
standard deviation. So the risk is the standard deviation, the variation of returns over time
for a particular share. And the constraints, that's a utility. What are your constraints on
your utility? It's the available spectrum of opportunities for investment. And when you look
at the consumer theory, the budget line is the constraint, and that's a product of your income
and relative prices, and also your subjective preferences. But here, rather than have the
consumer budget line, you have what he called the investment opportunity curve, or IOC.
Now, all investments were ranked by Sharpe on two dimensions, expected return and standard deviation
of the expected return of each share. So you have expected annual return, which is a good,
expected volatility of bad. And therefore, when you put each share somewhere on a chart showing
volatility vertically and return horizontally, each of those dots on this chart will be of an
investment, a particular share you can invest in. And then he combines that with the idea of
indifference curves between return and risk for individual consumers. So here's the utility
maximization problem, as shown in the article. Here are the utility curves, and this is the
opportunities, and you're therefore trying to maximize your outcome. So the return going further
to the right is a good thing. Volatility is bad, so the lower you are on the vertical axis, the
better. So therefore, the direction of utility increasing is to the bottom right-hand corner
of the graph, rather than going up to the top right-hand corner, which is for standard commodities.
This one points down. Now, every dot here is an individual share. Obviously, just a diagram, but
if you did it yourself, you'd have a cloud of different combinations, and each one would be
IBM or Tesla or whatever else. Now, every dot on the edge is a share portfolio, and this is about
the slightly clever things in the paper, because he argues that if you have an individual share
as expected return and a volatility, a standard deviation, and another share with a different
expected return and a different volatility, when you combine the expected returns, it's just the
linear sum of the two. But when you combine the standard deviations, it involves the correlations
and the ratio of the standard deviations as well. So if you have diversification, you reduce the
risk element unless the shares are perfectly correlated. So they're not perfectly correlated,
you can't reduce risk by combining them, but if they're not perfectly correlated,
you reduce the risk by diversification. Therefore, all these points on the curve
here are not an individual share, they're a portfolio of shares. And that's what he called
the investment opportunity curve, this arc from A to X up here. So for this particular investor,
just the way the drawing is made, that's the optimal combination. The investor should buy
portfolio F. Now, when you have borrowing, and that basically means you can buy government bonds,
which have a risk-free rate of return, then you can combine that bond with a pure asset,
which returns P, which is the pure interest rate. You can combine that with any of the
portfolios you like, but you therefore locate yourself not on the cloud and not on the point,
but on a tangent. So the point of tangency now is the ideal location for that investor.
If they simply bought shares, but they can either have a portfolio consisting entirely of bonds,
or they can have a levered portfolio of the share market, they borrow and buy more shares than they
get, and they therefore lever up this return further out that way. So what the investor will
do now is choose some point along this line, which is the capital market line, or it becomes
the capital market line. So if you borrow money at the risk-free rate, you can buy more shares
than you have money for, margin debt and things like that. So here's now showing the situation,
and you have three investors here. You have investor A, who is a conservative,
and if they could only buy what's on the market, they'd be on G, but because they can combine
their purchasing risk-free asset with some levered, which is in the stock market,
they're going to be in this line instead. B is a more normal person. This one is a thrill seeker.
And the thing for all of them, this is the optimal combination to buy. Now, problem here,
first of all, this thing is subjective as well, but they're supposed to be objective at the same
time. So you think each of us could have a different idea of where you place IBM or Tesla
or Maserati, whatever else on this diagram. So the expectations about the prospects of different
shares, and they're held by different individuals. So there could be a different cloud and different
lines for every investor, unless you make an assumption. We assume homogeneity of investor
expectations. Investors are assumed to agree on the prospects of various investments,
the expected values, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients. What the ****?
Honestly, this is just obviously a crazy, false assumption. That is simply not true.
We know people take bull and bear positions in the market. You'll have dinner parties where you
argue over the value of shares. Some people think Tesla's worth a fortune. Others would
like to incarcerate the owner. That's all abolished. None of that happens. We all agree.
You can't have a conversation about the share market because you all agree with everything.
Now, needless follows directly on from coefficients. There's no break between
the two. He said, needless to say, these are highly restrictive and undoubtedly unrealistic
assumptions. So how does he justify it? He pulls out a bastardized version of Milton Friedman's
as-if methodology, which I'll discuss in the future lectures on methodology, which says,
however, since the proper test of a theory is not the realism of its assumptions,
but the acceptability of its implications, vague waffle, and since these assumptions apply
equilibrium conditions, which have become a major part of classical financial doctrine,
it's far from clear that we should reject this, especially since there seems to be no
other theory out there. So it was not exactly a ringing endorsement. But he said,
let's make this crazy assumption and then see what we get. So the crazy assumption
means that everybody agrees on the cloud. So everybody buys the same portfolio,
and that makes that portfolio more expensive, which reduces its return. And equally,
the people who don't buy other shares, the price falls. So you get a jiggling of prices.
And what actually happens is finally a whole range of portfolios align with the capital market line.
So you can choose portfolio A or B, C or B, and get the same rate of return because of the market
process. So there's a whole range of portfolios now that'll give you the tangent to the market
line. And that's where the capital market line comes from. That's this particular part of the
theory. And what he says, and equally, there'll be a simple linear relationship between expected
return and standard deviation. That's where the idea came from. Higher return, higher risk,
necessarily, because of a bunch of crazy assumptions about how stock markets actually
behave. So this is where the idea that you have a benign view of stock markets, there's a risk
return trade-off. If you want a higher return, you've got to put up with higher risk, but it's
all quite simple and rational and in equilibrium. Pass some algebra, which I won't bother taking
you through. He then said, if you take an individual share, share I, then you can say
the return on share I is equal to the pure rate of interest plus the correlation that I has with
other assets in its class. So it's a correlation coefficient between plus one and minus one,
multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviations, times the gap between the asset
class's return and the pure rate of interest. And that became known as beta. That particular
combination of factors multiplied together became a stock's beta, which showed its relative
performance compared to the broader market. So this is the equation. And this bit here is beta.
That's the one that people spend all their time trying to calculate. So you get a higher return
if your asset is highly correlated to the stock market, you're going to do a higher rate of return,
but necessarily it gives you a higher level of as well. And the expected return of the asset
is risk peculiar to that particular asset within this portfolio. So it's going to be distributed
around the overall line for the portfolio itself. And that's beta. That's where you'll see pages of
stock market journals reporting beta. That's how they calculate it. They work out a correlation
coefficient, standard deviation, work out the ratio, and they publish that as a beta. And that
became the basis of conventional approaches to the stock market for the last 50 or 60 years.
Now, the funny thing is, initially when this crazy theory first came out, Eugene Fama was
the person who decided, here's how I'm going to make my career. I'm going to empirically verify
the capital asset pricing market. And he went through the data and found a fairly good fit.
This is in 1970 now. So this is the evolution from 58 to 70 of the conventional view of finance.
And in a later paper, they summarized the three empirical tests. One is that expected returns
are linearly related to their betas and nothing else has any real explanatory power. The second
is the premium is positive. So the more risk you take on the more return you get. And the third,
that if you have assets which are uncorrelated with the market, they're going to return the
pure rate of interest. The beta premium is the expected market return minus the risk-free rate,
all the stuff I've shown you in those formulas beforehand. So that's the foundations of the
capital asset pricing model. Now, using data from 1946 to 1966, and those dates are extremely
important, Fama found a very good fit for the model. But it's crazy. There's obviously something
totally wrong with it. So why did he get that fit? So here he's going through making his case.
The efficient market hypothesis stands up well. The results depend, as some have said,
upon the validity of its assumptions. But let's check the data and see how well it does.
And he said, it seems to be not just a good first approximation, but a good second approximation
for most investors. And this is one reason why it swept the market at the time. So there's plenty
of evidence to support it. There's very, very little evidence to contradict it. He did admit
one curious fact. And this will turn up when I start talking about the fractal markets hypothesis
in a couple of lectures times. He said, one departure from a pure random walk is that if
there's large daily price movement in one direction, it's followed by large daily price
movements again. But the interesting thing is the sign of the next movement is apparently random.
So if a big step in the market, the next step is a big one. But that contradicts the random walk
hypothesis. Because the random walk, each time the drunk takes a step, it's a random step,
random direction, and a random magnitude. There should be no relationship in one step to another.
He found there was. If there's a big upward movement, there'd be a big upward or downward
movement the next day. Large scale goes with large scale. Small scale goes with small scale.
But he basically said, oh, that's only a little curly. One cancels out the other. So overall,
we can accept the overall outcome. Now, as I said, the assumptions are ludicrous. So why the hell
did he find a good fit? What's going on to explain that? This is the one I gave to my students back
the end of the 90s. But the data is still quite accurate. I've got the Dow Jones Industrial Act
average from 1915 to 1999. And when you do an exponential plot to that and then put that plot
on a logarithmic chart, you get a straight line, of course. And you look at the index versus the
straight line. And it's either well above or well below that line, except for 1955 to 1973.
So here's the data. You can see the 1929 stock market crash there. That's the 87 stock market
crash in terms of scale. And way above, way below, way below, flat close to it, dead flat,
and then taking off once more. So here's the period between 1949 and 1966. It's above the
exponential rate, but it's growing fairly smoothly. So if you do linear regression,
then you're going to find, yep, OK, there's a relationship between risk and return.
Sharpe's paper was published in 1970. So it's just at the point where the market starts to go
horizontal. But for the previous data, the fit looks pretty good. Then you have a crash of 1973.
Now, most of you wouldn't even know this happened unless you were on the market at the time.
But the market fell by almost 50%. And that's, again, this is, it's hard to see because their
log scale hides the depth of a fall on that case. But the market peaked at 1052 in January of 73.
And by December of 94, it's 578. And that's the beginning. I use that as the indicator where we
flip from semi-Keynesian to monetarist views in the economy, because a whole range of things
came along that seemed to contradict the Keynesian thing, including, of course, stagflation.
He said the real way to make money is to exploit the fact the market is inefficient,
highly inefficient. And you can make money by buying high return, low risk shares,
and watching their price rise as the market catches up to you.
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