China’s Q2 GDP growth of 5.2% reflects a managed economic narrative, though deflation persists. Despite robust household income growth outpacing CPI, consumption weakened, with a 300 billion yuan trade-in program failing to sustain June’s growth. A liquor ban targeting public sector spending curbed catering revenue, while food delivery platforms shifted subsidy burdens to merchants, undermining income goals. Real estate struggles, with negative eastern investment and no significant policy relief, as urban renewal replaces quick-fix land finance. Anti-involution efforts address critical overcapacity, with industrial utilization at 74%. Policy-driven A-share gains, particularly in bank stocks, mask weak fundamentals and low market confidence. Economic reliance on policy support faltered by June, with declines in investment and consumption. Future policy hinges on U.S. trade talks and Federal Reserve rate decisions.
Hi, I'm Dong Shan. Welcome to Digging
into China, where we explore China in
depths to review unique perspectives. As
anticipated, China's GDP growth for the
second quarter registered at 5.2%, a
figure that's hardly surprising, almost
like solving a basic math problem. Given
that the fullear GDP growth must meet or
exceed 5% and with the first quarter at
5.4%, what would be a fitting number for
quarter two? The first quarter typically
benefits from a strong start with
figures often inflated. So, a 5.2%
growth rate in Q2 creates a smooth GDP
trajectory, reinforcing the narrative of
economic resilience. While the National
Bureau of Statistics data often invites
skepticism, broader macroeconomic trends
still offer valuable insights. This is
why I continue to analyze China's
economic data for you because at the
very least the government's
macroeconomic policy direction aligns
with the figures they release. In
today's video, we'll follow our usual
approach using data to forecast policy
trends. This time we'll delve deep
examining sectors such as consumption,
real estate, anti-involution measures,
and the ash share market in detail.
Let's begin with consumption. Based
solely on official statistics, China's
consumption should be robust. Why?
Household income growth significantly
outpaces CPI, the consumer price index,
and even exceeds GDP growth. In second
quarter, per capita disposable income
reached 21,840,
up 5.3%
year on year, surpassing the 5.2% of GDP
growth. While CPI remained near zero,
logically with more money in people's
pockets, a larger share of the GDP, and
a stable prices, consumption should be
thriving. Yet, China's economy is
grappling with deflation. In the first
half of this year, the government
allocated 300 billion yen to a tradein
program for consumer goods. Those funds
have been dispersed, but consumption
growth slowed in June despite the
traditional June 18 shopping festival
during which JD Muan and Alibaba
invested heavily in the food delivery
market. On the topic of stimulating
consumption, Xi Jinping has provided a
textbook example of a flawed approach
this year. While he committed 300
billion UN in subsidies to boost
consumption figures, he simultaneously
imposed a liquor ban within the public
sector, emphasizing anti-corruption and
frugality, urging officials to tighten
their belts. But who drives consumption
in China today? its public sector
workers, the ones with a stable income
and a robust benefits, those able to
spend confidently. Now, a single
directive has stifled their spending
enthusiasm. Consequently, the National
Bureau of Statistics presented Shei with
a report showing a sharp decline in
catering revenue growth for June.
Doesn't it seem like the 300 billion UN
in subsidies was squandered? Liquor
maltise prices have dropped repeatedly
this year, leaving sculpers with heavy
losses. Some attribute this to she's
liquor ban, claiming public sector
workers are too worried to buy Maltai,
reducing demand. But a closer look
reveals that Maltai's profit remains
untouched. The factory price hasn't
budged. Only wholesale prices in
distribution channels have fallen. The
losses are borne by dealers and
sculpers, not Mao Thai itself, whose
financial reports remain strong. From
she's perspective, the liquor ban makes
sense. He aims to make Mao Thai more
accessible, stripping away its image as
a symbol of elite privilege. It also
serves as an anti-corruption measure,
appealing to public sentiment, easing
class tensions and offering
psychological reassurance to the masses.
Best of all, it doesn't hinder tax
revenue. Maai's profits continue to rise
and tax contributions grow. As for the
consumption chain, how a liquor ban
spares Ma Thai but devastates
restaurants, that's beyond the she's
understanding. It's simply not in his
playbook. Next, let's address the food
delivery platform wars. She likely in
instructed the regulators to press major
tech firms to prioritize the welfare of
delivery writers. In his straightforward
view, increasing people's income means
supporting grassroots workers like
writers. But the food delivery ecosystem
isn't just writers. It includes
countless merchants and their employees.
platforms heeding she's call have
improved the conditions for writers but
in doing so have indirectly squeezed the
merchants and their workers merchants
bear the cost of subsidies while their
employees face grueling overtime without
pay increases effectively reducing their
income thus she's vision of boosting
people's income falters platforms have
merely shifted funds from merchants to
writers leaving the broader population
with no real gains. China's business
news revealed the true plight of
merchants in this subsidy war. On the
surface, platforms didn't impose
additional subsidy burdens on merchants.
Business as usual, but consider a milk
tea shop selling a 19 yen drink. The
merchant subsidizes a 6.4 yen, then
deducts delivery fees and the platform
commissions, netting just six. Some
merchants caught by platform algorithm
inexplicably shoulder the 14 yen subsidy
earning only one and a half yen per
drink. Clearly delivery platforms met
she's anti-involution targets by
boosting rider incomes while quietly
eroding merchants profits to minimize
their own losses. It's a clever maneuver
and one wonders if she will eventually
see through it. But with the government
reluctant to increase fiscal spending
and expecting companies to bear social
responsibilities, private firms
prioritize their stock prices and
profits over statedriven goals. With the
subsidy funds depleted, how will
consumption data fare in the second half
of the year? Will Xiinping pour in
another few hundred billion yen? I
consider that highly unlikely. It's
evident that in the second half the
central government will rely on window
guidance allowing local governments and
companies to drive consumption efforts.
Economically strong provinces can issue
consumption vouchers while others may
fabricate consumption scenarios or craft
compelling narratives leaving the
National Bureau of Statistics to tidy up
the results. turn into investment. Two
key factors define the second quarter.
First, in economically advanced eastern
regions, fixed asset investment growth
was negative this year. Only the central
and western regions continue to bolster
investment figures. Why? They have no
alternative. Without the project
financing platforms to sustain
construction and a spread cost, counties
in these regions would struggle to pay
salaries. Second, real estate data
paints the bleakest picture. From
investment and sales to price declines,
even the National Bureau of Statistics
acknowledged at a mid July press
conference that the real estate sector
faces severe challenges calling for
stronger stabilization measures. Yet the
central bank previously stated that the
real estate had already stabilized and
the focus was on maintaining that
stability. So whose narrative holds the
central banks or the statistic bureaus?
It's straightforward. The central bank
is a signaling that monetary policy has
done its part and it's a stepping back
from real estate. The Statistics
Bureau's remarks align with the central
urban work conference, setting the stage
for real estate policy expectations.
But will new real estate policies emerge
in the second half? Likely not.
Unfortunately, the conference is a
fanfare is the extent of the stimulus.
Consider the Central urban work
conference heralded as a once in a
decade event. The 2015 conference
triggered a real estate surge. So,
property stocks rallied in anticipation
this time. But the content, it's all
about urban renewal. No Shante Town
redevelopment 2.0, no priced driven
inventory clearance. Unlike a shanty
town redevelopment which fuel the land
sales and a quick cash for local
governments, urban renewal demands
upfront local investment with returns
stretching over 20 to 30 years. Tracing
the cash flow clarifies the situation.
Land finance is defunct and so is real
estate. The central bank has already
signaled no further monetary support
without the fiscal intervention. It's
all rhetoric and expectation management
with the stock market taking a hit to
clear real estate debts. My advice,
avoid Chinese property stocks. Lastly,
let's address this year's major
macroeconomic theme, anti-involution.
Consider this data. In second quarter,
national industry capacity utilization
was 74%. Typically first quarter is
lower due to the spring festival but
this year Q2's rate was one was onetenth
percentage points below Q1. Compare this
to 2016 during Leica Ch's supply side
reforms when Q2 capacity utilization was
73.1%.
This explains she's aggressive push
against evolution. It's reached a
critical point. The auto industry's
capacity utilization is at 71% and the
food manufacturing tied to domestic
demand is at 69%.
Further competition risks mutual
destruction. External demand faces
tariff uncertainties. Domestic incomes
remain unrepaired and businesses are
lacked in a cycle of relentless
competition. As we've noted, China's
persistent overcapacity stems from
nonmarket forces. government
intervention causing resource
misallocation. The government has
supplanted the market leading to greater
disorder. Policydriven Asia sectors tied
to anti-evolution are performing
strongly over the past months. The
photovoltaic equipment index rose 15.6%
electronic components 20.4%
glass and fiberglass 20.2%
general steel 12.4%. 4% and the cyclical
sectors like a steel and a cement gained
7 to 9%. Despite weak economic
fundamentals, policy signals have driven
the Shanghai index to 3,500.
But this isn't a bold market. Trading
volumes tells the story. It's modest
during rises, spiking only during drops
or failed rallies. Market confidence is
fragile. The index relies on
policydriven surges. Bank sectors
recently hit record highs, boosting the
index. But if you didn't invest in big
finance, you are likely losing money. In
Asares, it's a structural market. You
must align with policy signals to
profit. Recall past bull markets. Funds
flooded in. All stocks rose and new
capital kept flowing. Now there is a
finite pool of money. Boosting bank
stocks leaves others behind. A shares
aren't drawing new capital. So the focus
is on popping up the index to preserve
she's reputation. If someone claims a
bull market is underway, take it with a
grain of salt. Ask them to buy bank
stocks now. They likely won't. That's
the state of market confidence. In
summary, while Q2 economic data appears
solid overall, June showed a clear
declines with investment and consumption
trends turning downward. This suggests
the first half was propped up by policy.
But once resources are exhausted, the
effect fades and the economy reveals its
true state downward. Be aware the
Chinese government's policy response is
often delayed, largely due to she's
leadership. Having only recently grasped
the concept of deflation, he may view
second quarters of 5.2% 2% GDP growth as
evidence of a robust economic resilience
potentially leading him to take a
passive stance in third quarter. We
should focus on two critical
developments. First, the outcome of the
second round of China US trade war
negotiations. Second, whether the
Federal Reserve cut rates in third
quarter. Once these signals emerge,
we'll have a clear sense of she's next
steps. Thank you so much for watching.
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