Moscow Dậy Sóng Tin Đồn Đảo Chính: Sự Phản Bội Từ Fsb, Quân Đội Và Giới Tinh Hoa?

A major disaster is taking place in Ukraine, as the Kremlin leaders are fighting for the future of a whole generation to save a few square meters on the battlefield, and the internal pressure is getting higher. The cause is not only the fact that every day, Ukrainian drones continue to attack Russia, destroy oil refineries, industrial facilities and damage the operations of many airports. Another element, more dangerous, is the unrest in the ranks of the Russian military officers, who are worried about the growing escalation, because the collapse has exceeded the tolerance level. Along with that, internal conflicts are causing chaos. In particular, there are rumors circulating that, right in the General Staff of Russia, there may be a coup plot. If this rumor is true, it means that the solidarity in the command system is breaking down seriously. If not, it is highly likely that this is a fabricated script, and the authors stand behind many of the main possibilities, namely the FSB. This is a way for them to pave the way for a growth campaign, which is not uncommon in a regime ruled by fear. In fact, on the battlefield this summer, there was a bitter crisis for the Kremlin. After months of mobilization of troops and vehicles, the Russian army only won 0.094% of Ukraine's territory, less than 10%. In return, the price of tens of thousands of soldiers' lives, the number that makes any roar of victory on the Western media, also becomes unbearable. If you look at the top of the Russian territory control in the summer of 2022, about 20% of Ukraine's territory, from the current picture, is even darker. Russia now only holds about 18.9%, which is less than 10,800 square kilometers, compared to that time. This shows that despite the assertions about progress, in fact, Russia is gradually losing its position. Meanwhile, Ukraine not only protects the territory, but also takes the initiative to attack deeply into Russian territory. The attacks have destroyed strategic bombers, hit the oil industry and damaged many weapons production facilities. Only yesterday, two unmanned aerial vehicles of the Russian army were completely destroyed. As of 2022, Ukraine has gained more than 40,000 square kilometers of territory, a clear proof that the strategic initiative is gradually coming to an end. At the same time, the war has spread to Russia, where explosions and smoke have become a familiar image every day. It is noteworthy that areas that used to be considered the strength of Russia are also gradually losing their effectiveness. For example, the Shahed unmanned aircraft project, imported from Iran by Russia, and deployed extensively, used to be a tool of effective pressure. However, currently, Ukrainian pilots using electronic warfare systems and air defense forces have stopped and destroyed them right in the air. While Ukraine applies high-tech from unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, attacks the cyber communication information system, many Russian units are pushed into crude and reckless tactics. Russian small-scale assault teams move by motorized vehicles to infiltrate gray areas such as fortified units. There is no electronic deterrence, no artillery firepower or armor protection. Each mission becomes a one-way trip. In this context, the Russian military has to confront the Ukrainian forces, where the troops are trained according to Western standards, equipped with the latest weapons and flexible tactics. The more they retreat, the stronger the unfavorable situation for Moscow. The unstable situation is not only on the front lines, but is also erupting in the heart of Russia. A series of large-scale explosions at oil and gas facilities and defense industries show that Ukraine has succeeded in bringing war to the Russian interior. But more dangerous and more unpredictable is the wave of rumors about a coup in the territory of the commander-in-chief, which could change the power game in the Kremlin. To understand the rumors about a change in the current commander-in-chief, we need to look back at the June event in 2023, when Yevgeny Prikhodin and the Wagner forces rose. The rise in public opinion was not only the speed at which the Wagner troops were moving towards Moscow, but also the attitude of the Russian machine during that moment. The main force did not even need to say that the security forces did not dare to confront and many points of power fell silent. In Rostov, instead of arresting the generals in contact with Prikhodin, such a meeting between people on the same line, coffee breaks, the solidarity of the command system was exhausted. The image of the people of Rostov, standing on both sides of the road, welcoming the Wagner troops, bringing food, wine, is not an unusual moment. It reflects the state of society and the feeling of a wide-ranging dream. At that time, the levels of power were silent, from the guests who used to roar on the media, to the high-ranking religious leaders. Even the highest leaders did not hesitate to shoot in the dark, trying to impress that at the decisive moment, the regime lacked an effective mobilization center. This shows that if there are customs today that think of confrontation, it is not necessarily an act that originates from ideology or a political program. Many of those possibilities are survival reflexes. In a system where failure on the battlefield is easily held responsible for the individual, where each investigation can open up, No one claims to protect their corruption. But people can claim to ask for justice for the soldiers to gather support. In the civilian hospital, the recent scandals of logic and ideology are familiar to a tense machine. The case of General Alexan Lapine was replaced by the role of the Northern Commander-in-Chief after public attacks from the leader Chechnya Ramchand Kadyrov It is not just a decision for health as announced. It reflects the familiar rhythm when the battlefield needs someone to take responsibility and when a fallen general often pulls the entire team around. But why are the characters in the security top like Valery Gerasimov, Alexander Ponykov or Viktor Zolotov still standing? The answer lies in the circle of personal experience. As the war drags on, the leader becomes smarter in the security level, handing sensitive documents to the FSB rather than to the army. The chaotic defense in front of the attack nozzles, even the situation in Kos, has become the basis for the transfer of power to the security agency. Because there, loyalty is considered more important than the effectiveness of warfare. And when priority is transferred like that, the army, the most vulnerable force, is pushed out of the circle of experience. The more depressed the mind is, the more those pieces come together into a picture. The name of the Nationalist Party has proven a system that can collapse in a moment, from there create a political space for the survival of the generals. At the same time, it also reveals the FSB's hands, which are busy in dealing with disputes, clearing the way for the generals, as a theme that can take advantage of the crisis to reorganize power, in my opinion. When the FSB divides power, the essence of disputes about coups lies in a dry reality. In the current Russian power structure, Nikolai Petroshev, the main character of the Security Council, is said to be exploiting the crisis to weaken the retreating wing of the Soviet Union, the former defense minister. When the war drags on, the power in the country stagnates, the benefits are scattered and the places make money from each other, the division of power becomes the easiest way out. Recent arrests of Vietnamese authorities and a few high-ranking officials show the opening of a systematic escalation. It is more noteworthy when the FSB is given the right to operate its own detention facilities with a limited level of legal supervision, a limited level of idealization to adjust the order of power. When the legal and security tools are in hand, the fight against corruption is easy to turn into a re-distribution of wealth. The economic reasons are clear on the energy front, the weakness of the power struggle. The Ukrainian drones have not only destroyed oil refineries and fuel depots, but also set fire to the illegal X-chains linked to the oil spill. The area where the networks with the FSB have long been deeply disputed, the result is a surge in money forcing them to open the way to other networks, defense funding, military supplies, and fat military contracts. Meanwhile, the social foundation is collapsing day by day. Homeless people have to save up to 80% of their income from food, sleeping pills, and essential convenience. Household debt increases steadily every month. The price of coal energy to A95 exceeds 80,000 soups per ton and continues to rise continuously for many days. These sharp numbers not only reflect the cost of war, but also create conditions for security agencies to monopolize the catch-up campaign to feed the machine an economic growth of more than a generation. In this logic, the army becomes an easy-to-deconstruct warehouse. When the battlefield is dilapidated, it means cleaning up the military machine, claiming responsibility for large shortages or losses, becoming a layer of morality for withdrawing money and re-arranging contracts. Why are the owners of the security towers, such as Valery Gerasimov, Alexander Pornikov, Victor Zolotov, still in charge? Because the circle of trust around President Putin prioritizes loyalty and ability to control over the ability to fight. When the military's power falls over the security system, the army's voice becomes weaker, and when the voice weakens, the resources attached to them are more likely to be transferred. Since then, the words of the struggle bear the form of another war, not to set up a trap, but to hide in silence. If there is crying, there are many possibilities that it is crying for resources. A re-distribution of money and resources ensures that even when President Putin is weak, no party outside the security bloc can take advantage of it. Three scripts for the Russian society What is happening inside Russia shows a chain of unrestful movements. The rumors of the coup are not just rumors on Telegram. In the way they are collected and expanded, you can see the professional hand of a security agency that is used to operating the country in a new way. If you put the pieces together, you can see three close-up scripts. First, the expansion of the regime led by the FSB, when resources were reduced and traditional funds were cut off by war and attacks. The FSB has the motivation to use tools to strengthen control, prosecution, promotion of personnel to redistribute power. The goal is to weaken the special competitive powers in the military and strengthen the loyal circle around the nuclear power. With a separate detention system and legal flexibility, this campaign can proceed silently but effectively, from the central to the local. Second, the chaos in the military and the fatigue of the strategy, the loss of personnel, equipment, and the risk of being chosen as a sacrificial object. When the battlefield is closed, everything is filled with a sense of responsibility to counteract survival. In the case of Wagner 2023, it was pointed out that the network of the machine can be broken in a moment, creating a gap for maneuvering actions. But if this kind of chaos occurs, it usually does not involve political forces Third, the silent coup, the reorganization of resources. This is likely to be the favorite path of the FSB. It is not unbridled, it does not need to be calm, but it attracts opponents through investigation, extortion, deregulation, contract cutting, and putting people in a position in the military and defense industry. The strategic goal is not just to hold power, but to ensure that if President Putin weakens or withdraws, nothing other than the security bloc can take advantage. The indicators to be monitored in a very short time include arresting, detaining generals and defense industry officials, extorting, extorting, information about the FSB expanding the scope of investigation, the number and intensity of attacks on oil refineries, oil refineries, weapons production facilities, and especially the coordination between the General Staff of the FSB and the military. This is a warning in the military order. The effect on the battlefield is likely to be a trigger for Russia's military action. Meanwhile, the FSB is still actively bringing war into Russia's territory by drones, undermining energy, industrialization, and tightening the military security of the FSB. If the war continues, Russia will have to pay more to keep its position, and the central power will have to spend more energy to contain the internal security. If there is an emergency, it is likely to be a redistribution of resources, rather than a direct lock-down to tighten all links to the power of the external security blocs. In conclusion, these rumors should not be taken lightly. The way they appear, spread, and are broadcast by the media is a technique that is familiar to each stage of the war. And if you put aside the explosions at the factory, the oil storage, and the arrests from the military to the Vietnamese border, the picture shows only one reality. Inside Russia, the power crisis is spreading silently but vigorously.