Taiwan’s lessons for Europe in the gray zone of warfare

Here at the Warsaw Security Forum, all of the buzz in these corridors has been about this spate of Russian incursions by drones and fighter jets into NATO airspace that's been going on recently. Well, how about this for a comparison? Taiwan reported that there were 3,600 incursions by Chinese military aircraft into its air defense identification zone in 2024 alone. Think about that. That's roughly 10, on average, such incursions every single day for a whole year. Well, one of the top advisors on national security to Taiwan's president has been here in Warsaw this week, sounding the alarm, saying that these numbers are no coincidence and that these two theaters of Eastern Europe and East Asia are connected. His name is Xie Ziqian, and he joins us here in Warsaw. Thank you very much for your time, Dr. Xie. Thank you for having me. So first of all, let's talk about these incursions by the Russians that the Poles, the Estonians, and others have been witnessing. What's your analysis of what you believe the Russians are trying to do with these? Of course, first of all, I'm not an expert on the Russian-Europe relationship, but if it becomes a pattern, it's very similar to what China has been doing to us. It would be a long-term, some kind of a gray zone harassment, but this is more serious than what we have been experiencing because these strong incursions goes into other countries' territory. The Chinese drones doesn't come into our territory, so this is more serious. But what you've had is, I mean, thousands just in 2024, I think the number was 3,600 was announced by the Taiwanese government, incursions into the air defense identification zone. Air defense area, yes. Exactly. Explain to our viewers what's the difference there and how is what Russia is doing more serious? More serious part is that the Russian aircrafts or unmanned systems, unmanned aircraft drones go into other countries' territory. We're talking about territorial area. Whereas the Chinese ones, they don't go into our 24 on 12 nautical mile. Their incursions come back to outside that. But still very dangerous, but at least not into our territory. But because once they come into, before they come into, they have already been targeted by our radar and the missiles. So actually it's very dangerous. I believe if the fighter just come into our territory, it takes only very short period of time, few minutes to arrive at our capital in other big cities. And we'll be too late if we don't handle them first. So they don't come into. But right now the unmanned system of Russia, the drones come into other countries' territory. You don't know whether those drones have carried kinetic capabilities or not. And you won't be able to know. And warn them by broadcasting is useless because there's no man there, right? So it's a big challenge. So from what you've learned of these many years and many thousands of incursions by the Chinese, so into the air defense identification zone, but certainly in a dangerous situation, what do you deduce from that, from what you've learned from those incursions about what could be the motivations that the Russians have? If it's some kind of gray zone, then the motivations are multiple. First of all, depletion of your, where you out of your capabilities, testing your vulnerabilities, and testing your response time. And sometimes it will also, if it's added with information manipulation, they will create image of your government not being capable of handling the issue and then become a domestic issue, discrediting the governments. And we're seeing that happening, right? There's public debate about how to deal with this. So it's a lesson I believe Russia is learning from China. And from our experience, they call it new normal. So like before that, they didn't do anything. All of a sudden they start to do, and becomes a political tool, becomes new normal. And they will keep doing that. Will be a prolonged process of the gray zone harassment. And let's be careful. Maybe some people think, oh, that's only harassment is going nowhere. No, no, no. They're familiarizing the air and the ground and the sea that they shall carry out their battle in the future. They'll familiarize themselves with that. They'll manage the environment. So when they come all the time, sometimes people become numb about that. We're numb, numb about that. We're very cautious. But if you're numb about that, then all of a sudden they can turn the exercise into a blitzkrieg attack. So that's another purpose. So it's on a continuum from gray zone to real invasion. They can just turn like that. And what's your, I mean, European countries are publicly debating how to deal with this. Without you telling them what to do, what's your advice from what Taiwan has learned from so many years of experience of this? You have to be firm from the very beginning. You have to be firm. You let them know your position and you carry it out. You have to establish your credibility from the very beginning. You said speaking in one of your appearances at this conference that these theaters of Europe, Eastern Europe and the Taiwan Strait and East Asia, these theaters are connected. Connected, directly connected. Explain what you mean. First of all, they have already been helping each other, Russia and China, China and Russia. China has been helping Russia building their indigenous defense industries by providing them machinery tools, providing them chips, providing them other manufacturing capabilities. And we don't have direct evidence. We doubt China is also testing some of their systems on the battlefield. And reversely, likewise, Russia is helping China a lot. They have been already patrolling together for several years with their bombers, with their frigates and even Coast Guard in the Northeast Asia and near Taiwan too, all the way sometimes up to Arctic. So this is one thing. They have been working together. Another thing is Russia is helping China recently, as reported, to strengthen and train their airborne battalion by providing aircraft and vehicles and other equipments. Of course, that's for the purpose of the future invasion of Taiwan. So they have been helping each other. And furthermore, we should always assume, not assume, actually they need each other strategically. China has said that publicly, Wang Yi has said that publicly, that they don't want to have Russia being defeated because once Russia is defeated, China will be left alone and to be dealt with by the whole Western world. They don't want that, first of all. Second, when they work together, they intimidate the whole world. They're able to do that. Third, when they work together on both theaters, they divert our attention. Europe is busy with Russia. They don't have much time paying attention to what's going on in the first island chain in Asia Pacific and we're also warned by some not to help Ukraine. No, we should pay attention to our own business. So they divert our attention, they isolate us. So they're able to manage that. And in the future, God forbid, but just in case China would like to invade Taiwan, should there be any contingency, I believe Russia will also keep Europe very busy at the same time. I mean, Russia is certainly keeping Europe busy right now. Exactly. Are you concerned that there is too little attention on the Taiwan Strait and the situation right now? From Europe? Well, from Europe, but also the wider West that we have a feeling that the United States, for instance, is also busy with the Russia-Ukraine war. It's busy with the Gaza war. With respect to China, we see Donald Trump most interested in trying to get a new trading arrangement. Not so interested, seemingly, in security issues. We can't speak for the Trump administration and the U.S. government, but from what has happened currently, not only what they say, but what they have been doing, Indo-Pekong has been working very hard. We still have very good confidence in Indo-Pekong. So meaning the U.S. regional military command? Yes, yes. They have been conducting unprecedented scale of exercises with allies and partners in the region in a scale unprecedented. And jointly, in a more jointly manner. And sometimes they leave their assets in the country when they finish the exercise. That's some kind of preposition, which is also very welcome in the region. And our security cooperation with United States have been going on for many, many years. And it's going very well. We still have various kinds of help from United States directly. And our soldiers are getting new equipment and also getting new training. And so we appreciate that. We hope that can continue. I'd like to come back to relations with the U.S. shortly, but we're here in Warsaw, we're here in Poland, we're here in Europe. I'm interested in the kind of message that you're taking to Europeans as well. Because also in one of your appearances here, you've been saying to the Europeans, support us, we want your help. Particularly in terms of, as I understood it, military exports, military supplies. Spell out, what would you like from the Europeans? First of all, it's not only that we hope Europe can help us, we hope Europe, by helping us, can help themselves. This is mutually beneficial thing. Because as we mentioned, China and Russia have been working together. So if we don't help each other, we're falling into their trap. We're isolating ourselves from each other. And this is exactly what they want, right? Divide and rule. So we should help ourselves from now on. Let's not delay that. There are many ways we can help each other. First of all, in terms of international narrative, China has been twisting, mischaracterizing the international law and the international norms to their own benefit. So whenever we find they're disrupting the international order, or disrupting international peace with their own narrative, we hope European partners can come out and refute that. For example, all the coercions and aggressions and military exercise intimidation they have been doing, not only to Taiwan, but for the whole first island chain, is something against the United Nations Charter principle of no use of force. German foreign ministers have said that repeatedly, again and again. He said that to the face of Wang Yi. We appreciate that. We hope that kind of narrative can be amplified and repeated. So that's the easiest thing to do. Other than that, I think it's important we understand each other strategically. We're not expecting European countries to come to fight our war. We will defend ourselves, but there are many ways we can support each other in building capabilities. Not only European countries helping us. In Taiwan, we have the best microelectronics manufacturing capability in the world. The best. Not only the best, but also the most reliable ones. Because in most of our supply chain, we don't have Chinese components. So for example, on the unmanned system, the drones and unmanned systems on the water under the sea, we're also investing in Taiwan. But let's become each other's supply chain. This is the way we help each other developing our own capabilities. Let's invest in the peace we have right now and deterring the next war from happening. So yeah, and Taiwan is exporting, for instance, a lot of drones to Poland, right here. To Poland. Poland is the biggest export destination for our drones. And is this a business you're looking to build up? Definitely. Not only export, but also, as I said, we become each other's supply chain. We should have co-production. We can explore the possibilities of joint venture. NATO countries will all have to raise your defence budget. It's a huge market. And each of us, we need to develop our own indigenous defence industries. We all have scale issues, right? So let's scale up by teaming up. But specifically on getting European countries to agree to supply weapons to Taiwan, there's very little of that. Not nothing, but very little. What scope do you see? What would be your ask to an arms supplier in an ideal world? What, for instance, would you like to receive from Germany? I won't talk about individual countries, but in general, European countries have very good stuff. They have very good qualities of various kinds of items. And as long as it helps us defend ourselves, defend defensive items, we all welcome, especially those asymmetric capabilities, similar to stingers and things like that. But European countries are worried that, or don't want to do this traditionally because they're worried about China's reaction. So what's your argument to them? Why should they risk a negative reaction from China in order to help Taiwan? They are actually taking greater risk not investing in the peace they have right now, not investing in deterring the next war from happening, not helping Taiwan defend itself. It's exactly the same they're helping Ukraine. Let's not wait until next war really happens that we do this. It will be too late and will be more expensive. It's wise that we do it right now. Invest in the peace, invest in deterring the next war. And are you getting any signals from any of the European partners that you're talking to that they might be open to that? I'll let you know if I do. Let's come back to the United States and relations with the U.S. So I want to pick up on something interesting that Howard Lutnick, the U.S. Commerce Secretary, said in a recent interview in the U.S. He said that the U.S. wants to start ramping up its own domestic chip production. It would like to produce 50% of its advanced chips domestically. And he wants Taiwan's help for that. Now, as you mentioned, Taiwan dominates in this area of silicon, 90 plus percent of the world market. This is Lutnick from the Trump administration saying he wants to bring that down to 50% and he wants your help with that. Can you confirm that those conversations are going on? I read that in the newspaper. I'm not part of the tariff negotiation team nor the 232 team. So what do you know is actually what I know too. You're a national security advisor to the president of Taiwan. Are you really out of the loop on this? The thing is, I think there is a fact that in recent years, our outbound investment in Taiwan to United States has already exceeded our outbound investment to China. Right now, several years ago. Right now, U.S. is the biggest destination of outbound investment. It happened before Trump came to power this time. Why? Not because of Trump. Because we want to. Our companies, industries, they don't listen to our government. They listen to the customers. They follow the market. There's huge potential in U.S. market because we're stepping into an AI-driven economy. There will be huge demand for chips, advanced chips. That is the reason why some of our companies already are investing in United States. They are working not for United States, but for the interest of their own company. So actually, this is already happening. This is already happening. But it's a long way from the current situation to 50-50 production that Howard Lutnick has been talking about. I'm not 100% clear about what Secretary Lutnick means by 50-50. He may mean 50-50 of their domestic demand. I mean, certainly it's something we can talk about. But there, how should I put it? The industrial investment is not something that can be reached like that. It requires a lot of conditions. And so it requires the formation of ecosystem and supply chain. And usually that takes time. If they are setting that as a goal, we can talk about a feasible way, a roadmap to reach that goal in a more practical manner because we don't want this to be something that like a flower, it blossoms and then it goes away. It withers away. We don't want that. We want to be a sustainable roadmap, a sustainable way of economic development to help U.S. to build the AI supremacy is also our interest. So we have a common interest. So we can have a pragmatic negotiation about that. And after all, Donald Trump is, if it's anything, he's a deal maker. This is how he likes to portray himself as well. I mean, can you imagine a deal where Taiwan perhaps gets some advantage? Would you, for instance, appreciate having a slightly clearer security guarantee from the United States? Because after all, a deal that lessens the U.S. dependence on Taiwan for semiconductors arguably could weaken the famous silicon shield that is seen by many as protecting Taiwan. Silicon shield is never a policy. It's something the press created. I mean, we believe Taiwan and U.S. shared interest in both security and economic development. Let me repeat again. It is our interest, Taiwan's interest to help U.S. to build the AI supremacy and we are part of that effort. So this is a joint effort. This is common interest. Also, we believe to keep Taiwan Strait safe will benefit both our countries. So in that, we also share very strong common interests. We also strongly believe in that. The U.S.-Taiwan representative office recently was talking about its view of the status of Taiwan. And it's the AIT, the official representation of the U.S. in Taiwan. And it confirmed its view that the status of Taiwan is undetermined, which is a term that angers the Chinese, angers also the opposition KMT party inside Taiwan. What is your view? What is the government's view on this statement from the Americans? And is it helpful? I believe, of course I cannot speak for U.S. government. So make me guessing their motivation is difficult. But there is important background. I think we should keep in mind that the China's foreign minister Wang Yi, in recent years, have been promoting this narrative, talking about the Cairo Declaration and post-proclamation, and also the San Francisco Peace Treaty. By saying all these help China to own the sovereignty over Taiwan. This is not true. This is totally false. So on this point, we agree with AIT in refuting Wang Yi's narrative by saying the Cairo Declaration and post-proclamation have no legal binding effects. So it's futile for Wang Yi to use those two documents to claim sovereignty over Taiwan. And likewise, they always say UN Resolution 2758 set the one China principle. Actually in that resolution never mentioned Taiwan. So obviously a lot of the argument about what Taiwan's future will be is both sides kind of digging into history and their own interpretations of history. If we pull it back into the present, I mean, it's clear that Taiwan is bracing for contingencies, possibility that war could come to Taiwan in the next few years. The government produces regularly what's called a civil defense handbook. And this latest one is trying to get. Sorry, can I also follow up a little bit on the previous question? I think that China's intention is to, by its own narrative, to set a new norm for the international community that Taiwan is part of China and therefore it's their domestic affairs. And therefore foreign countries, there is no room for foreign countries to intervene. In case of any way they shall utilize to, so to speak, unite Taiwan, that is a narrative in preparation for their invasion. I think that's very, very dangerous. So against that background, the AIT's narrative to refute that argument is very useful to negate their narrative in paving the legitimacy for their future invasion. I think that's very meaningful. And as I just mentioned, so your government is trying to prepare the public for this possibility with your civil defense handbook. So this has been recently updated. How important is this to your government, getting the public ready, but also using that as a signal to China that Taiwan has the resilience to deal with that? Peace needs to be earned through strength. We strongly believe in that. And therefore the strength does not only include the military strength, but it needs to be whole of society resilience. So we're working on that. This is what we call whole of society defense and resilience. And there are many categories of efforts, including all kinds of resilience, telecommunication resilience, energy resilience, all kinds of critical infrastructure and everything. So this is very, very important. We have to give our people confidence. The best way to build their confidence is to allow them to understand the constructive role they can play to protect the society in practicing all of these. In some of our civil defense exercises and this kind of exercise. So to allow our citizens to understand how they can play a constructive role to protect themselves is the best way to strengthen their resilience. And when our society understands how to protect ourselves, we won't be panic. And that's the best way to protect ourselves. So, I mean, this is confronting a reality that it's really been a risk for Taiwan ever since the end of the Chinese civil war, right? The Communist Party of China has threatened to invade Taiwan ever since that time. You're here in Poland, close to Ukraine, where that reality actually happened now three and a half years ago. When you head back home to Taiwan, what are the thoughts that come with you? Do you feel that you've seen what could be coming to Taiwan here? Do you go back more optimistic? Do you go back with more concerns? We always have concerns, but we are always optimistic. We have to be. And we do see here, here in Warsaw, in this security forum, the unity that all participants have shown to each other, and this staunch support for Ukraine. And allies here are beefing up each other's confidence, helping each other, and being brave. I think that's the best message we will carry back. And also here, like I said, I'm conveying to our European friends to let them understand what's going on in our region, and the picture that China and Russia are working together. The two theaters are directly connected. And so we have to help each other. So that's the message I convey here. So yes, I'm being optimistic. Dr. Xu, thank you very much for your time. Thank you.