What was Varus thinking? - The "Fool" of Teutoburg

The ambush in the Teutoburg Forest is remembered as one of the worst defeats in Roman military history. The 9AD disaster wiped out three entire legions and their auxiliaries within the dark forests of Germania, and reportedly had Emperor Augustus pacing the halls of the imperial palace yelling Quintilius Verus, give me back my legions. Since then, much blame has been placed on the commander of the doomed force, who literally fell on his sword for the defeat. But was Verus really the fool of Teutoburg he's made out to be? Let's find out. This video was sponsored by MagellanTV. They're an awesome documentary streaming service run by filmmakers with a selection of over 3,000 videos to choose from among the categories of history, science, nature, space, and more. When it comes to history documentaries, MagellanTV has the richest and most varied content anywhere. Ancient, modern, current, war, biography, and even related genres like science and crime which are historical in nature. If you like our content, I can highly recommend you check out the documentary series Warrior's Way, which traces the lives of famous warriors from childhood training to bloody battle. MagellanTV is compatible with Roku, Amazon Fire TV, Apple TV, Google Play, and iOS, which means you can watch it anytime, anywhere, on your television, laptop, or mobile device. Sign up today to get 30% off an annual membership, which starts with a two-week free trial. That's less than $3.50 a month for access to thousands of awesome documentaries. The offer is available for both new and returning users, so be sure to click the link in the description below or go to try.magellantv.com. Enjoy! As with any such story, it's important to peel back the layers of built-up narrative and return to our original sources. For the Battle of Teutoburg, only four such accounts exist. They come from four different authors, none of whom were eyewitnesses, but all of which seem to have relied on their own sources, which were roughly contemporary to the event. No single account is entirely comprehensive, and it's important to note that each brings a useful but biased perspective on what really happened. Let's recap. Our first source is a Roman officer by the name of Vileus Patroclus. He was a friend of the general Tiberius, accompanying him during the Illyrian Revolt and the retaliatory campaigns in Germania. Our second source is the Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus. He was a politician born some 50 years after the infamous ambush, who wrote the Annals and the Histories, which examine the string of emperors who followed Augustus. Our third source is Publius Annius Floris, who was a contemporary of Tacitus, and who summarized and condensed many works of Livy on Roman history. Our fourth source is Cassius Dio, one of the greatest historians of antiquity, who lived in the later 2nd century AD. Let's talk about the scope and potential bias of these respective narratives. For Patroclus, the passage on Teutoburg is framed as an aside in the greater context of his book Roman History. A few paragraphs are spent on the character of Verus, and the lead up to the defeat, with just a couple sentences on the actual battle itself, before moving on to the other events of the Germanic Wars. In terms of reliability, we know that he had access to many of the key players, and potentially even survivors of the disaster, with whom to consult, which should lend him some substantial credibility. However, we also know that much of his writing is meant to praise Tiberius, which risks injecting some bias when it comes to the scapegoating of other leaders. For Tacitus, his passage on Teutoburg is short as well. It's a few quick paragraphs that deal with how the army of Germanicus revisited the site several years later, and what they found. There are certainly some interesting, specific snippets in there, likely drawn from Pliny the Elder's History of the Germanic Wars, which is itself suspected to have drawn from the accounts of survivors. Again, however, we must be wary of potential bias from an author who often seeks to present history as a moralistic narrative, with characters being portrayed in accordance with a desired theme. For Florus, his passage on Teutoburg comes in a summarized description of Roman-German relations. He mentions Verus and the barbarian revolt briefly, states that a slaughter ensued, and adds a little flourish on top regarding the fate of Rome's captured prisoners and eagles. His description is also filled with rhetorical flares, but does seem to contain elements derived from eyewitnesses. And finally, we have Cassius Dio. He gives us the most detailed and complete account, starting just before Verus arrives in Germany and extending to the news of his defeat reaching Rome. As an ancient historian, he is well regarded for judiciously collecting sources and considering subjects with a critical eye. Yet even so, we should accept his story cautiously, as we don't have a way to examine what kinds of sources he had access to some 200 years after the event. These four sources form the foundation for our understanding of what happened at Teutoburg. On top of this, researchers and archaeologists have worked diligently to build upon our understanding using additional findings and clues. This has all helped to shape the story we are left with today. So how does this stack up against the common accusation that Verus was squarely to blame for the disaster? Let's now consider the major charges raised against him. 1. He foolishly caused the unrest in Germania. 2. He foolishly trusted Arminius. 3. He foolishly failed to uncover the ambush. 4. He foolishly failed to repel the ambush. Let's now take a look at each of these points one by one. The first accusation is that Verus basically precipitated the ambush by creating unrest in Germania. Slurs are thrown out by authors like Kruel, Prideful, and Licentious, but the main thrust of the claims are that he acted in a negligent manner, trying to rule the region through laws rather than an iron fist. Patercullus states that He entertained the notion that the Germans were a people who were men only in limbs and voice and that they who could not be subdued by the sword could be soothed by the law. With this purpose in mind, he entered the heart of Germania as though he were going among a people enjoying the blessings of peace, and sitting on his tribunal, he wasted the time of a summer campaign in holding court and observing the proper details of legal procedure. Florus then goes on to add that Verus had the temerity to hold an assembly and had issued an edict against the Chanti as though he could restrain the violence of barbarians by the rod of a lictor and the proclamation of a herald. So basically, the idea to summarize here is that he was a fool for attempting to treat such inherently warlike people with anything but the language of force they best understood. It's a point that reeks of Roman condescension and is a bit hard to take seriously, but let's humor the idea and see whether Verus was out of his depth when it came to governing an unruly province. Well, if we look at his track record, Verus was not some administrative greenhorn. His family was well connected politically and he seems to have been plugged into a fair amount of important posts early on. For instance, it appears that he participated in the campaigns to pacify the Alpine regions around 15 BC, was made co-consul with Tiberius in 13 BC, and served as governor to multiple provinces including Africa and Syria. This last post is of note. It's here that he commanded three legions in one of Rome's most volatile imperial regions. When unrest broke out, Verus moved decisively to crush a rebellion in Jerusalem, crucifying 2,000 insurgents in the process. Clearly, he was not one to treat enemies of Rome with kid gloves. It's perhaps for this reason and his important political connections that he was appointed as first governor of Rome's newly minted province of Germania. There he commanded several legions and seems to have done what just about any other Roman administrator would have. He dispensed justice, collected taxes, built forts and roads, and mingled in local affairs to secure the peace. Admittedly, we don't know much about the finer points of his governing methods, but it seems likely that the pushback he eventually received from the locals was part of a larger trend of anti-imperial resentment. After all, Germania had only recently been pacified, and even then it was really in name only. For example, just a few years earlier the tribes had risen up in revolt, and surely there were many among the defeated who wished to try again when the opportunity presented itself. Rather than Varus himself in particular serving as the spark, it seems more likely that the outbreak of the Great Illyrian Revolt and the transfer of most of Rome's armed forces out of the area were more to blame for rekindling the dreams of German independence. So on this count, I'd vote not guilty. Let's move on to the next charge. In this case, the claim is that Varus mishandled the revolt that ensued by foolishly trusting Arminius. The story goes that the Roman general was making ready to leave his summer headquarters when the traitor brought news of a growing revolt. Apparently, another Germanic nobleman named Segestes tried to warn Varus of the betrayal but was ignored. This seems quite damning, however we must remember that hindsight is 20-20. Arminius was not some random German. He was the son of an allied tribal leader who shed blood, sweat, and tears in the Roman Auxiliary, learned Latin, and was granted the prestigious title of equite, making him a citizen of Rome. In this capacity, he was well regarded and above virtually all suspicion from an outsider's perspective. That he would go rogue was by no means an assured fact since we know that his younger brother remained loyal to the Roman cause even after Arminius had betrayed it. As for the warning from Segestes, this too was not so straightforward. After all, Arminius had a known, public quarrel with the man after having married his daughter without consent. Such bickering between locals was to be expected and could easily have been chalked up to as nothing more than background noise. Given the same chance, it's hard to imagine that your average Roman governor wouldn't also have chosen to trust Arminius, the citizen, over Segestes, the barbarian chief. Sure, an exceptional commander like Caesar or Tiberius may have sniffed out trouble and acted with greater caution, but that's raising the bar quite high. Thus, on these charges, I also find Varus not guilty. The next accusation of foolishness comes from the fact that while Varus perhaps reasonably trusted Arminius, he nonetheless failed to uncover the ambush while on the march. Based on our sources, this occurred for a couple reasons. The first reason is that Varus chose to march against the revolt by taking a shortcut through unfamiliar territory. Why do this? It sums dumb at face value. Well, he was apparently already headed west to encamp for winter along the more secure Rhine when word of the supposed uprising reached him. Deviating immediately to stamp out the threat, ASAP, was actually in keeping with Rome's According to historian Adrian Goldsworthy, It was a gamble, since the Roman column was only capable of defeating relatively weak opposition and risked disaster if it encountered a well-prepared and strong enemy." As examples of this risk, Goldsworthy goes on to point out the Roman loss against Boudicca at the Battle of Cumulodunum in 60 AD and the loss against Jewish rebels at the Battle of Beth Horon in 66 AD. Note here though that both of these case studies occurred after the Battle of Teutoburg and would not have served as a precedent for a commander in 9 AD to reflect on. So perhaps in this regard we can excuse Varus for wanting to immediately take the short path towards the supposed threat despite the risks. However, I think it's still reasonable to fault him for not scouting the path properly. As we discussed in our video on Roman Exploratories, this normally would have involved deploying both close and far rings of cavalry patrols to clear the area ahead. Unfortunately in this case though, Arminius, the Germanic auxiliary cavalry, and likely even the locals, were in on the deception and prevented Varus from realizing that the revolt was already upon him rather than several days' march ahead. This in turn led him to take a more lax approach than usual in what was thought to be still friendly territory. But come on, you might say, it doesn't take a military genius to know that one should be on guard walking right into a dark, scary forest. Well actually, as it turns out, the battlefield we have identified archaeologically does Yes, there were some woods and marshes present, but this was still an area of Germania under active cultivation with open areas and several villages in the close vicinity of the site which even housed legionary detachments. So on this count, it's a bit easier to see why Varus acted the way he did and failed to uncover the ambush. I'd hesitate to condemn him unambiguously here without additional information on how the scouting unfolded. That being said, I think it's fair game at this point to at least start to question whether your average Roman commander would have done the same. Once again, it's easy to imagine a Caesar or Tiberius figure being better prepared. This now gets us to the final charge against Varus, that he was a fool for failing to repel the ambush once it had been sprung. The idea here is that an able commander should have been expected to better marshal his forces to escape the disaster. Sure, this sounds practical enough on paper, but let's consider some of the practical realities that got in the way. We know for instance that the Roman army was attacked on the march and was thus arranged in a long column. From Josephus, we know roughly how the troops would have been grouped, and from other sources we learn that soldiers most likely would have been spaced out 6 men or so apart. Put together, researchers have estimated that a single legion would have been about 2 kilometers long while its associated support and baggage train was another 3 kilometers long. Consider then that Varus had 3 legions in total and was not advancing under ideal conditions. We are told that the column was slowed by a variety of factors including road clearing activities, the presence of numerous camp followers, and the arrival of a sudden violent rainstorm. All of these together conspired to greatly stretch out the army to somewhere around 20 kilometers, as is estimated. For context, that distance would take about 4 hours to walk across in person. It should be no wonder then, how confusing things would have been once the barbarians struck, given that people at other ends of the army may very well have had no idea what was happening for quite some time. Word of mouth or riders would have been sent by Varus to attempt to coordinate a top down response but these would have also been disrupted by the disjointed nature of the Roman force which was only worsened by German attacks along the front. Archaeological findings seem to indicate that the legions were ultimately split in at least two major groups. Thus, it was up to the local officers, the trusted centurions to get the job done. In this capacity, they seemed to have done a pretty good job and held the army together at first. Usually, such enemy assaults could be expected to dissipate and the Roman position to strengthen as time went on. However, in this case, Arminius had done an excellent job with his preparations that ensured that the barbarians could keep pouring on the pressure while the legions were robbed of the ability to retaliate effectively. All in all, it was just a brilliant ambush. I think most Roman commanders dumped into this same encounter would have found the situation equally untenable. Thus, it seems a bit unfair to fault Varus here for not coming out on top. After all, legions in a similar ambush at the Vulcan marshes during the Great Illyrian Revolt had almost been wiped out as well even though they had the advantage of being in a fortified camp. Taken together, I hope the discussion has shown why we should not unanimously condemn Varus as the fool of Teutoburg. On many accounts, he seems to have performed as well as your typical commander and fell victim to circumstances outside of his control. However, I think the point of criticism where he is most at fault comes in his failure to properly detect the ambush, or at least to adopt a marching stance better suited for the possibility of such an event. But that's just my opinion. Let me know what you think in the comments below. See you in the next one.