Tanks Toward Beijing? Why Zhang Youxia’s Arrest Triggers Xi's Deepest Fear

On January 24th, the official announcement that Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, is under investigation will, without a doubt, become a topic that is repeatedly revisited in the period ahead. The shockwaves caused by this event are no less severe than those triggered by Lin Biao's attempted defection in 1971. This is not merely the downfall of a senior official. Rather, it has thrown the entire power structure of the CCP badly off balance. It has inflicted structural damage, irreparable damage, on the Chinese Communist regime's system of power as a whole. More specifically, the Central Military Commission has effectively been paralyzed, leaving only Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin. Yet Zhang Shengmin is merely an executor who follows orders in handling cases, meaning that in substance, Xi Jinping now stands alone. At the same time, the Central Military Commission is one of the most critical foundations of the CCP's power edifice. Once this foundation is gone, the center of gravity of the entire structure shifts, causing it to tilt and lean dangerously to one side. The collapse of Zhang Youxia will have extraordinarily far-reaching consequences, triggering a series of upheavals and affecting numerous domains. Is the loyalty and morale of the military still stable? Is there a possibility of unrest or even a military mutiny that could overturn the situation? Does Zhang Youxia have any chance left at all? These are the questions we will analyze in today's program. According to information currently circulating through multiple channels, military officers have been ordered to turn in all instant communication devices, that is, to surrender their mobile phones for centralized control, while service members are also forbidden from privately discussing this topic. Military units are continuously organizing study sessions on Xi Jinping thought, which in reality are meant to force personnel to publicly state their positions and clearly draw a line between themselves and Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. At present, the military is under extremely high pressure. That said, large-scale resistance within the armed forces cannot be ruled out. Numerous videos filmed by netizens appear to show tanks and troops moving toward Beijing from multiple directions, suspected to belong to Zhang Youxia's faction. Moreover, there are many within the military who respect Zhang Youxia and harbor deep resentment toward Xi Jinping. I have analyzed this in considerable detail in several previous videos. The next question, then, is whether the Chinese Communist Party will immediately resort to force against Taiwan. On the very day Zhang Youxia was detained, many people argued that he'd been the key figure restraining Xi Jinping from pursuing reunification with Taiwan through military means, and that Xi's move against him was intended to clear the final obstacle to a military reunification. Some analyses over the past few years have suggested that Zhang Youxia took a relatively cautious stance on the use of force against Taiwan, believing that the People's Liberation Army still had significant weaknesses that had not yet been remedied, and therefore lacked the capability to launch an attack on Taiwan. Several U.S. think tanks have likewise noted that Chinese generals are deeply wary of a direct military confrontation with U.S. forces, creating the impression that Zhang Youxia held a negative or resistant attitude toward a military solution to the Taiwan issue. According to commentator Wen Zhao, the risk of the CCP using force against Taiwan has decreased in the short term, also decreased in the long term, but increased in the medium term. The medium term here likely refers to a period of several months to a year. The short-term risk is lower over the next few months because Xi is simply too preoccupied. The regime is currently in a phase of isolating and scrutinizing large numbers of officers, forcing them to confess and account for issues, leaving little capacity to plan an attack on Taiwan. This is a time to suppress the vitality of the military until a complete reshuffling of personnel is finished. Zhang Youxia's extensive experience and deep roots within the armed forces also mean that the investigation into his case will inevitably implicate a large number of people. Zhang Youxia's career in the military was broad, and his personnel network ran deep, which likewise means that probing his case will draw in many others. For example, during his tenure as deputy commander and later commander of the 13th Group Army, one of his direct subordinates was Wang Kai, commander of the 37th Division. Since 2021, Wang Kai has served as commander of the Tibet Military District, holds the rank of lieutenant general, and is also a member of the 20th Central Committee. Another subordinate from the 13th Group Army, Division Commander Cao Junjian, has served as acting commander of the People's Armed Police since July 2025. These examples represent only a portion of Zhang Youxia's direct and clearly identifiable network. Generals who rose through the ranks of the 13th Group Army are now almost certainly all targets of scrutiny. Much like after Lin Biao's downfall, when generals associated with the former 4th Field Army were systematically investigated. The investigation into Zhang Youxia is now proceeding along precisely the same path. In addition, Zhang previously held a series of key positions, including deputy commander of the Beijing Military Region, commander of the Shen Yun Military Region, director of the General Armaments Department, and ultimately vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. From group army level to major military regions and then to the general headquarters, his resume is comprehensive. He left traces everywhere, with former colleagues and subordinates at every level. As a result, the scope of the investigation will be extraordinarily broad. Moreover, the simultaneous detention of Liu Zhenli, chief of the Joint Staff Department, has further paralyzed the CCP's senior command system. Rebuilding the chain of command will inevitably take time. Therefore, in the short term, the risk of an attack on Taiwan will decline. Looking to the long term, the risk of a CCP attack on Taiwan is also decreasing, because the entire military command system must be reconstructed, a process that will significantly prolong war preparations. Some military procurement programs may be forced to pause in order to undergo audits aimed at uncovering evidence of corruption linked to Zhang Youxia and his associates. Large-scale personnel reshuffles will also disrupt the continuity of existing plans. For the People's Liberation Army, a vast bureaucratic machine, such upheavals are bound to reduce efficiency. Moreover, personnel turbulence is likely to cascade down to the mid-level officer ranks. Many officers at this level may resign or be reassigned to civilian posts, as occurred during Xi Jinping's first anti-corruption campaign targeting Guo Boxiong and Xu Kehou, and again during the subsequent military reforms. Now that it is time to purge the residual poison of Zhang Youxia, Wen Chao believes the same pattern will repeat itself. All of these moves will weaken the military's operational effectiveness and delay planning. However, even though the risk of attacking Taiwan declines in both the short and long term, it increases in the medium term, defined here as several months to a year. The reason is that Xi Jinping will need to make a series of temporary appointments to fill critical vacancies, creating opportunities for younger mid-career officers to rise rapidly. To secure their positions and advance further, especially with many Central Military Commission posts still vacant, these individuals may seek to prove themselves by calling for combat and forcefully advocating an early use of military force against Taiwan. Xi Jinping himself has long harbored a genuine desire to fight and has spent years seriously preparing for a Taiwan invasion. At the same time, he has a strong incentive to divert internal tensions outward. Under such circumstances, if these aggressive voices gain influence around him, there is a real risk that he could once again be misled, misjudge the situation, and proceed to personally command and personally deploy military action. In that sense, the medium-term risk is indeed substantial. So what is Xi Jinping's current state of mind? According to Wenzhou, rationalists at critical historical junctures often make grave misjudgments because they assume others are as rational as they themselves are. The question, then, is whether Xi Jinping is rational at this moment. After the massive shock of the Jiangyuxia affair, whether he can still maintain clarity and composure is highly uncertain. No one knows how the General Secretary's peculiar mind will function under such pressure. It is quite possible that Xi Jinping today feels even more insecure than he did before the coup attempt. His brutal purges have not inspired fear so much as panic. Stalin and Mao Zedong were undoubtedly extremely ruthless dictators, but they were not deranged. They wielded brutality as a rational instrument of rule. Their subjects sense that violence was applied calmly and deliberately, which fostered submission. People chose obedience in exchange for safety. Xi Jinping, by contrast, projects an air of paranoia. He lacks strategic thinking and everything he personally commands ends in failure. His character and abilities do not command respect, and observers see no capacity for calm, deliberate planning. Even his so-called grand plans for a thousand years are improvised on the fly, conceived and executed without foresight. Therefore, when events like a coup occur, people cannot help but wonder whether they are once again the result of a snap decision, an impulsive move made on the spur of the moment. Xi Jinping is unable to inspire a sense of awe or submission. When this happens, those around him fall into extreme panic. Jiangyuxia is finished, so who will be next? Xi Jinping has no one he truly trusts. The closer someone is to him, and the more power they hold, the more insecure they become, uncertain of what tomorrow may bring. Fear can produce obedience, but panic breeds risk-taking. When Xi Jinping panics, the other elite layers panic as well. Panic piled upon panic makes it easy for events to spiral out of control, allowing all kinds of unpredictable scenarios to unfold. Those close to him may begin to think, rather than being used by the emperor and then discarded, or even losing one's life and having to offer one's head as an apology to the world, it might be better, while power is still in hand, to kill the master outright and then bargain and compromise with other factions. In addition, Xi Jinping's coup to seize Jiangyuxia has inflicted an extraordinarily severe and irreversible form of structural damage on the CCP. At present, aside from Xi Jinping himself, the Central Military Commission is left with only one vice chairman, Zhang Shengmin, whose role is limited to handling disciplinary cases. This has effectively paralyzed the CMC as a decision-making body. At this level, there is no one left who truly understands warfare. This represents an unprecedented crisis in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong may have been able to operate under such conditions because he personally understood military affairs, but Xi Jinping does not. Moreover, the timing is neither early nor late. There is now just over a year left before the 21st Party Congress. Within such a short window, it will be extremely difficult for Xi Jinping to identify individuals who are both absolutely loyal to him and genuinely capable of filling the vacant seats on the Central Military Commission. The result is a structural crisis of power within the military. What do you think the consequences of this will be? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you and see you next time.