A Shock Hits Beijing, Zhang Youxia to Reappear? Xi Loses Legal Command Authority?

The emergency meeting of the National People's Congress on February 4th laid bare Xi Jinping's true predicament. A series of signs suggest that Xi is losing legal control over the military. John Yoshua is reportedly under house arrest, yet remains strikingly calm, possibly holding damaging black materials on the Xi family. So which faction is gaining the upper hand, and who will emerge as the hero to usher in a new era for China? Join us for an in-depth analysis in today's program. Xi Fails to Legalize John's Arrest On February 4th, an emergency session of the National People's Congress, closely watched overseas, did not revoke the delegate status of John Yoshua or Liu Zhenli. This immediately became a major flashpoint among overseas Chinese communities. To date, both Zhang and Liu remain military delegates to the NPC. Under the CCP's legal framework, when an NPC delegate purged, the NPC must approve the case. Without that approval, the legal process cannot proceed. Observers also noted an oddity. 150 people attended the meeting, but only 149 voted. State media offered no explanation for the missing vote, fueling suspicions of hidden maneuvering. Meanwhile, on January 29th, China's Ministry of National Defense held its first regular press briefing after officially announcing Zhang Yoshua's downfall. Foreign media pressed hard. Of more than 30 questions, 10 concerned Zhang. Yet when the ministry later posted the official transcript online, all questions related to Zhang Yoshua and Liu Zhenli were completely removed. Those exchanges had made up about one-third of the briefing. If the authorities were confident, if Zhang were clearly guilty, why erase them? The deletions underscore how sensitive the issue is and the pressure facing Xi's leadership. Journalist John Fung commented that Xi Jinping tried to retroactively patch up the arrest through procedural fixes but failed, exposing a major legal flaw in full public view. According to John, this means China's five theater commands have become the biggest variable, and Beijing has lost legal command over the military. If the arrests of Zhang Yoshua and Liu Zhenli are unlawful, then Xi's actions amount, in essence, to a military coup. Legally speaking, the theater commands would be justified in asserting autonomy, defending party rules, and refusing to carry out orders issued outside proper procedure. Veteran journalist Wang Jian argues that NPC chairman Zhao Leiji delivered a fatal blow to Xi, tantamount to betrayal. Commentator Tan Jingyuan disagrees, saying Zhao lacks the nerve to defy Xi on his own. Though not part of Xi's inner circle, Zhao is no political strongman either. If Xi truly had everything under control, Zhao would have neither the motive nor the courage to block Xi's demands alone. The only plausible explanation, Tang says, is that anti-Xi forces within the party have grown strong enough for Zhao to openly refuse Xi. At the same time, the PLA Daily, the military's top mouthpiece, has steadily softened its criticism of Zhang Yoshua, shifting from accusations of five major offenses to focusing solely on corruption. From February 3rd onward, it stopped criticizing Zhang and Liu altogether for three days. Adding to Xi's predicament, Zhang Yoshua and Liu Zhenli are still, formally, members of the Central Military Commission. Under China's current system, appointments and removals of top generals must be discussed and decided in CMC meetings and issued in the name of the CMC. Even as CMC chairman, Xi cannot simply bypass other members. Doing so would violate collective leadership principles and disrupt the CMC's normal functioning. If Xi is already encountering such resistance, just trying to strip Zhang and Liu of their NPC delegate status, then directly appointing senior generals will be even more difficult. Does Zhang Yoshua hold black files on the Xi family, and is he about to reappear? The developments above point to one possibility. Zhang Yoshua may be headed for a soft landing. Recently, Qian Wangjiang dropped a bombshell, claiming that Zhang is currently under house arrest in Shenzhen, accompanied by his only son, Zhang Shen, and his personal secretary, Zhang Li. On the 4th, Guangdong Party Secretary Huang Kunming reportedly took the initiative to host Zhang Yoshua at a luncheon. The menu, ordered by Zhang Shen and Zhang Li, included two cold dishes, spicy beef lung and Sichuan pickles, three hot dishes, shipping-style grilled tofu, stir-fried mixed vegetables, and fish-fragrant pork, plus steamed glutinous rice cake and chili oil noodles as the main course. By all accounts, Zhang's daily life appears to be relatively comfortable. Why would Huang Kunming host him at such a moment? Was this done at Xi Jinping's instruction? One view holds that during his power struggle with Xi, Zhang Yoshua obtained extensive black materials on Xi's core inner circle. Using this leverage, Zhang allegedly forced Xi to deal with close associates such as He Weidong and Miao Hua. Now, Zhang is said to be using the same materials to strike back in a mutual destruction gambit. As I mentioned in a previous video, after Zhang Yoshua was detained, overseas circles suddenly saw a wave of explosive disclosures about the Xi family's vast wealth. Xi Jinping's elder sister, Qiao Qiao, is alleged to monopolize China's oil business, earning as much as 400 billion yuan a year while also dominating the concrete industry in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, at its peak generating up to 130 billion yuan annually. Insiders estimate Qiao Qiao's current assets at as much as 20 trillion yuan. Could this be why Xi Jinping was forced to soften his stance and negotiate with Zhang Yoshua? Three signs that reveal which side is gaining the upper hand. Power struggles like this are fluid. The balance can tip at any moment. To judge who currently has the advantage, commentator Tang Jingyuan points to three key barometers. First, the Ma Xingri case. Ma Xingri can be seen as a core member of Xi Jinping's inner circle, his political weight arguably even greater than He Weidong's within the military. Ma has been out of public view for more than three months since the fourth plenum, missing multiple major events. Yet to this day, there has been no official announcement regarding his case. In CCP politics, as long as there is no formal announcement, the situation is not settled. There is always a chance of reversal. Moreover, Ma's case reportedly involves Peng Liyuan, meaning Xi cannot simply stand aside. He has strong incentives to intervene. So if Xi truly succeeded in moving against Zhang Yuxia, how much leverage did he actually regain? Whether Ma ends up being handled lightly despite serious charges will reveal how much real power Xi still wields. Second, Chen Yuan, the new commander of the Beijing garrison. The Beijing garrison is often colloquially described as the CCP's imperial guard. It is responsible for the security of Beijing and surrounding areas, as well as the safety of the top leadership. Whoever controls the Beijing garrison effectively controls half of Beijing. For that reason, its commander must be someone the CCP leadership trusts most. Chen Yuan's predecessor was Fu Wenhua, who had served for many years in the former Shen Yun Military Region's 16th Group Army and was a trusted former subordinate of Zhang Yuxia. In March 2025, Fu Wenhua was officially transferred to the armed police as a deputy commander. After that, the post of Beijing garrison commander remained vacant for nearly a year, until this time when it was filled by Chen Yuan about a week before Zhang Yuxia was detained. According to Tang Jingyuan, Chen Yuan is a particularly sensitive figure because of the sudden death of Li Keqiang in October 2023 at the swimming pool of the Dongzhou State Guesthouse in Shanghai. At the time, there was widespread speculation abroad that Li Keqiang may have been assassinated. One of the most frequently suspected individuals was Chen Yuan, who was then commander of the Shanghai Armed Police. In late October 2023, shortly after Li Keqiang's death, former mainland journalist Zhao Lanzhen posted on X, claiming that he had received insider information suggesting Li was poisoned and that Chen Yuan was responsible. Of course, none of these suspicions or revelations can be verified at present. Even so, this shows that Chen Yuan is often viewed externally as aligned with Xi's camp. And regardless of the rumors, Li Keqiang's death at least occurred within Chen Yuan's jurisdiction. Yet after Li's death, Chen was neither demoted nor removed, nor even investigated. On the contrary, he was brought to Beijing and placed in an extremely important position. In hindsight, Chen Yuan's appointment to command the Beijing garrison about a week before Zhang Yuxia's downfall is clearly closely connected to the operation against Zhang and Liu. In other words, transferring Chen Yuan to this post was very likely a calculated move on Xi's political chessboard. So what role did Chen Yuan actually play in the two major cases, the sudden death of Li Keqiang and the Zhang-Liu affair? For now, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions due to the lack of information. However, Chen Yuan's future trajectory can be seen as another crucial barometer for observing political trends within Zhongnanhai. Third, Tai Chi and Wang Xiaohong Tang Jingwan argues that the likelihood of Xi sacrificing Tai Chi to deflect pressure rises in direct proportion to the strength of anti-Xi forces. Tai Chi is no ordinary figure. He is a core member of the National Security Commission and director of its powerful office. He controls vast resources, not only the propaganda system, but also covert forces and intelligence networks. It cannot even be ruled out that he oversees irregular armed units akin to the private forces reportedly built by He Weidong and Miao Hua. In recent days, online rumors, fragmentary and unverified, have circulated such as Wang Xiaohong has offered to resign or Zhang Shengmin is about to fall. Both pro- and anti-Xi camps are clearly floating trial balloons. Even if these rumors are false, their constant emergence reflects the precarious position of Tai Chi and Wang Xiaohong. Their fates can be said to lie in Xi's hands, or in their own. At this point, the Caiyun duo has become an inseparable community of interests, even a community of shared life and death. There are also claims from within the system that the Red Second Generation, Red Princelings, are collectively furious, openly demanding that Xi hand over those responsible for Zhang's arrest, pointing squarely at Tai Chi and Wang Xiaohong. While unverified, the political culture of the Red Second Generation is well known. They see their own people as untouchable. Anyone who moves against one of them can expect a backlash that is anything but easily swallowed. Will the Taiwan invasion plan remain forever on paper? On the February 5th episode of ZhenGuanDian, commentator Zhen Fei cited a well-connected insider, Mr. He, who revealed that Zhang Yuxi's current predicament has delivered a heavy blow to the CCP's existing operational plans for Taiwan. It has directly severed continuity across personnel, responsibility, and execution. More importantly, Zhang had long been deeply involved in Taiwan war planning and possessed extremely broad, high-level knowledge. Once someone like him runs into trouble, whether detention or any other uncontrollable factor, the top decision-maker's first concern is whether the plan has been compromised and whether its security can still be assured. Under such extreme mistrust, officials have begun assessing whether major revisions or even a complete rebuild of the plan are required. Mr. He said this is not a matter of swapping out a few people or making minor tweaks. The entire plan would need to be redone from scratch, even under tight secrecy and controllable conditions. Any reconstruction would take at least seven or eight years, possibly a decade. Zhenfei asked pointedly, even if Xi Jinping has taken down Zhang Yuxia, who will now help him design a Taiwan attack plan, even if someone does, can it really be completed in five to ten years? If not, what is the point of Xi continually elevating the Taiwan issue today? Zhenfei mocked it as the emperor's new clothes, quipping that the one permanently embarrassed is still the 200-jin fool who refuses to change roles. At present, the CCP is mired in fierce internal power struggle, and China stands at a historic crossroads. Who can bring Xi Jinping's rule to an end? Commentator Hung He, drawing on historical experience, argues that those who truly shoulder the task of ending an old system usually share three traits. First, they bear no responsibility for the old system, and thus dare to make decisive choices. As in the Soviet collapse, where the final break was made not by reformers inside the system, but by Yeltsin returning as an outsider. Second, they may not hold the very top position, but they control a key execution point and can choose non-cooperation at a decisive moment. Third, character matters more than resume. Seasoned bureaucrats skilled at balancing interests can only patch things up. They rarely carry the weight of historic change. Hung He believes the ultimate strongman will be someone who dares to make a clean break with the old system and happens to stand at a structural choke point. The drums of war across the Taiwan Strait and the power struggle in Beijing are feeding off each other. The question for viewers is, who will be the final winner in Zhongnanhai's internal battle? Feel free to share your thoughts in the comments. Thank you, and see you next time.