How did Germany plan to conquer Britain in WW2 Operation SeaLion

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How did Germany plan to conquer The United Kingdom in WW2? - Operation SeaLion
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♦Music Used :
Kevin MacLeod - Impact Allegertto
Kevin MacLeod - Hiding your reality
Kevin MacLeod - The Descent
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♦Sources :
Fleming, Peter (1957). Operation Sea Lion. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-330-24211-3
Forczyk, Robert (2016). We march against England: Operation Sea Lion 1940-41. Ospsrey.
Cox, Richard (1977). Operation Sea Lion. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-015-5
Keith W. Bird - Erich Raeder
https://www.britannica.com/event/Batt...
#History #Documentary
Operation Sea Lion
It is the year 1940. What was unthinkable 20 years ago when the German Empire was defeated
has just happened. Germany was again a very powerful nation, more radical than in the
previous war, and expanding aggressively. What was thought to be more of a diplomatic problem
quickly turned into a military one, after uniting with Austria and gaining lordship
over Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, Germany started a new war after attacking Poland,
Denmark, and Norway. No huge offensive was made from the west to stop them in the first phases
of the war. The Allies thought they could stop the Germans in France as they did previously.
But the unthinkable happened. On May 10, 1940, the Germans attacked.
France, the country that resisted more than four years in the First World War,
collapsed in just 46 days. The United Kingdom was next.
Having this rapid victory, the Germans secured the western flank. Having this plan prepared in
mind in order to achieve a greater chance of winning than in the First War, the path was
almost clear for a campaign in the east, but fearing the Royal Air Force and probably a
maritime landing on the coast of France, the goal was to knock Britain out of the war.
The Germans hoped that they could force the UK to negotiate peace and make an invasion
unnecessary. The German High Command recognized the visible logistical problems of a seaborne
attack facing the Royal Navy that controlled the English Channel and the North Sea.
On the 16th of July, the preparation of Operation Sea Lion was ordered. As a potential amphibious
and airborne assault on Britain was to follow, only once the Luftwaffe had air superiority over
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get your rewards. In November 1939, the High Command of the German Armed Forces reviewed
the potential for an air and seaborne invasion of Britain. Germany started to prepare its army
from 1933 onward, and even though the land troops at the beginning were superior and more prepared
for war than the British troops, the German Navy was far behind the British Navy. The German Navy
was faced with the threats of the Royal Navy's larger fleet, which could easily intervene in
case of German invasion and crossing of the English Channel. Thus, the focus was put on
air superiority as a necessary precondition for a possible invasion. But the German Navy
thought air superiority alone was insufficient for this kind of action. This stirred up debates
and concerns. A study made in 1939 on the possibility of an invasion of Britain concluded
that it also required naval superiority. The Air Force commanders agreed somehow that an invasion
would be the final act in an already victorious war. The German Supreme Ruler discussed the idea
of invasion on May 21, 1940, meeting with Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who spoke about the
difficulties and his own preference for a blockade. Chief of Operation Staff of the Armed Forces had
a report made on the 30th of June. He described the invasion as a last resort once the British
economy had been vastly affected and the German air forces had full air superiority. Thus, the
Chief of Operation Staff reviewed options to increase pressure on Britain to agree to a
negotiated peace, as it was said in an address to the German Parliament. The goal was to eliminate
the Royal Air Force by intensified air attacks against shipping and economic targets. The report
said that if the Germans had control of the air and the British economy had been weakened,
an invasion would be a last resort to an already defeated country. At a meeting, the Chief of
General Staff of the Land Troops Franz Halder heard that the attention was turned to Russia.
Halder met Admiral Otto Schneewind on the 1st of July, and they shared views without exactly
understanding each other's position. They agreed on the idea of air superiority, and in doing so,
making the invasion unnecessary. They also agreed that minefields and the German U-boats could limit
the threat of the British Navy. Additionally, the Admiral expressed his opinion over the significance
of weather conditions. On the 11th of July, it was agreed that the invasion would be a last resort,
and the air force command advised that gaining air superiority would take two to four weeks.
The German Führer met his army chiefs von Broditch and Halder on the 13th of July,
where the officers presented detailed plans in the case that the navy would provide safe transport
for crossing the channel. The two army chiefs were surprised that he took almost no interest
in the invasion plans, probably considering that focus should be put on the expansion into the
But on the 16th of July, he issued Directive Number 16, ordering preparations for Operation
Codenamed Sea Lion. It was considered by the navy that ten days would be needed to get the first
wave of troops across the channel. On the next day, Halder dismissed the navy's claims and required
a new plan. Disagreements and doubts existed between the navy and land forces, while the air
force was more confident in its actions. At a meeting with the army, the navy proposed a delay
until May 1941, when the new battleships, the Bismarck and Tirpitz, would be ready. The high
command thought about alternatives, including attacking the British bases in the Mediterranean
and then focusing with their operations against England while remaining on good terms with the
Soviets. The German navy insisted on a narrow beachhead and an extended period for landing
troops. The army rejected these plans, fearing again the threat of a more superior navy force.
The air forces could begin a massive air attack in August. Another meeting was held between the
army and navy chiefs on the 31st of July. The navy said that the date of the 22nd of September was
the earliest possible date and proposed a delay until the following year because weather was
likely to be inopportune. But September was preferred because the British army had started
to grow in size. It was told to von Broich and Halder that the landing operation could begin
8 to 14 days after the air attack began. On the 1st of August, the Directive No. 17 was issued
for intensified air and sea warfare. The German Army High Command originally planned an invasion
on a vast scale by landing over 40 divisions from Dorset to Kent. This was far in excess of what
the navy could supply, and final plans were much more modest, calling for nine divisions to make
an amphibious assault on Sussex and Kent with around 67,000 men in the first echelon and a
single airborne division of 3,000 men to support them. The navy wanted a front as short as possible.
Admiral Raeder wanted a front stretching from Dover to Eastbourne and said that shipping between
some French ports would be very exposed to attack from the Royal Navy. General Halder rejected this,
saying, From the army's point of view, I regard it as complete suicide. I might just as well
put the troops that have landed straight through the sausage machine. One complication was the
tidal flow in the English Channel, where high water moves from west to east. With high water
from Lime Regis occurring around six hours before it reaches Dover, if all the landings were to be
made at high water across a broad front, they would have to be made at different times along
different parts of the coast, having the landings in Dover made six hours after any landings in
Dorset. If landings were made at the same time, different landing methods should be created.
The invasion was very risky, and the focus was put more and more on direct attacks by air and
U-boats. Nevertheless, both the German Army and Navy undertook a major program of preparations
for an invasion, training troops, developing specialized weapons and equipment, and modifying
transport vessels. A large number of river barges and transport ships were gathered together on the
Channel coast. Any simple idea about the crossing was dismissed by Raeder, and the Navy could not
complete its preparations by mid-August. The heavy air attack was to begin early in August,
and if it succeeded, the invasion was to start around the 25th of August before weather
deteriorated. The main interest was the question of countering potential Russian intervention.
Halder outlined his thoughts on defeating Russian forces. In the meantime, detailed plans were made
to attack the Soviet Union. From the 5th of August, subject to weather delays, the Luftwaffe
was to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command in the shortest possible
time. Attacks were then to be made on ports and food stocks, while leaving alone ports to be used
in the invasion, and air attacks on enemy warships and merchant ships may be reduced except when some
particularly favorable target happens to present itself. In addition, the Air Force kept sufficient
forces in reserve for the proposed invasion. The battle over Britain began in early July 1940,
with attacks on shipping and ports in the Channel. On the 13th of August, the German Air Force began
a series of concentrated aerial attacks known as Operation Eagle Attack on targets throughout the
United Kingdom in an attempt to destroy the RAF and establish air superiority over Great Britain.
The Germans attacked hangars, air bases and radars, achieving mixed results. Some radar stations were
damaged, and the attacks against the RAF stations had failed to destroy them. The Germans had not
achieved a degree of success as they expected, but the German air strength had reached acceptable
levels and stated to be a great danger against the Royal Air Force. The change of focus of the
into a short-range strategic bombing operation. The effect of the switch in strategy is disputed,
as some historians argue that the change in strategy lost the opportunity of winning the
air battle over Britain, while others argue the Germans achieved little in the air battle,
and the Royal Air Force was not on the edge of collapsing, also considering that the Germans
were pushed by time and by weather. It is debatable if the Germans could have achieved
total air superiority over the English Channel and southern part of Great Britain. Considering
the scenario that the British losses were severe, the RAF could simply have withdrawn
northward and regrouped and been redeployed if an invasion was launched, and even in that case,
Operation Sea Lion had a high chance of failing, mainly because of the weaknesses of German sea
power compared to the Royal Navy. The record of the Luftwaffe against naval combat vessels up to
that point in the war was poor, as in other past cases in history, the Royal Navy assured the
protection of the islands. The German Navy, already numerically inferior, had lost an
important part of its large modern surface units in April 1940 during the Norwegian campaign,
as these were the very warships most suited to operating in the Channel Narrows. The U-boats
were meant for destroying ships, not supporting an invasion. As Britain relied on its powerful
fleet, they did not want to lose their most powerful advantage. The fleet of the defeated
France was a very powerful one. France fell to the Germans and a pro-German government was
established. Immediately, the British feared that Germany would use the French ships against them.
This might have tipped the balance against Britain if it had been captured by the Germans.
However, knowing this desperate situation, the British fleet attacked a large part of the French
fleet that was based in North Algeria at Mers-el-Kabir, destroying many warships and
killing more than 1,200 French soldiers. The German forces did not achieve air or
naval superiority at any point during the war, and both the German high command postponed the
invasion until it was cancelled due to other military actions. Not only did the invasion not
happen, but the Germans also failed to create an armistice with the United Kingdom to be sure of
full peace in the West. The British were not seen as enemies by the German government,
but as a country they could partner up with and a potential ally. One of the primary German foreign
policy aims throughout the 1930s had been to establish a military alliance with the United
Kingdom, and despite anti-British policies having been adopted as this proved impossible,
hope remains that the UK would in time become a reliable German ally. The continued military
actions against the UK after the fall of France had the strategic goal of making Britain give up
and have an armistice with the Axis powers. Other ideologists hoped that after the victory
against the Soviet Union, the British would accept a peace deal and maybe an alliance,
but neither ever happened.
