Afraid? Xi Hasn’t Left Beijing in 18 Days! Zhang Youxia’s Updates Breaking Soon

For three months, he hasn't left Beijing. For 18 days, he hasn't dared to personally inspect the troops. Now the National People's Congress has announced a meeting to deliberate on the qualifications of certain individual delegates. Is this the second step in formally legitimizing John's arrest? Or is the leadership being forced to respond under mounting public pressure? What lies ahead for John Ushia? Amid growing discontent within the military, experts warn that Xi Jinping is confronting his three greatest fears. Chinese society resembles a powder keg. How much longer can Xi Jinping hold on to the throne? Let's break it all down in today's program. Xi strikes back? Is Jiang's fate about to be sealed? On February 10th, the Chinese Communist Party's People's Daily reported that Zhao Leji chaired a meeting in Beijing that morning. The meeting decided that the 21st session of the National People's Congress, NPC, would be held in Beijing from February 25th to 26th. What drew particular attention was the announcement that the session would review a report on the qualifications of certain individual delegates and related proposals concerning appointments and dismissals. This has inevitably led many to connect the dots with John Ushia and Liu Zhenli, both of whom were officially declared by the authorities not long ago to have fallen from power. Not long before that, during the emergency 20th NPC session held on February 4th, John Ushia and Liu Zhenli were neither removed from their posts nor stripped of their NPC delegate status. Some analysts believe that Xi may have failed at that time to legitimize Jiang's detention. Could the upcoming late February meeting represent a new round of counterattack by Xi? Under regulations set by the Chinese authorities, the personal freedom of NPC deputies is specially protected. In other words, any arrest, criminal trial, administrative detention, judicial detention, re-education through labor, release on bail pending trial, residential surveillance, compulsory centralized education, or any other legally prescribed restriction of personal freedom must first receive approval from the Presidium or the Standing Committee of the NPC to which the deputy belongs. As of now, John Ushia and Liu Zhenli are still listed as NPC deputies on the official NPC website. Therefore, if their personal freedom has indeed been restricted, it would strongly suggest that Xi Jinping's move against them amounts to a political coup. However, others argue that the upcoming NPC session may reflect Zhao Liji's lack of either the courage or the ability to resist Xi Jinping. The announcement of yet another meeting could be an attempt by the authorities to hastily demonstrate to the outside world that rumors such as Zhao Liji opposing Xi or Zhao supporting Jiang Ushia are nothing more than speculation. Yet this very move could produce unintended consequences, lending weight to the observation made by French scholar Jean-Noël Kapferer in his book Rumors that rumors can sometimes force those in power to respond. Rumors force the authorities to speak out. Back in 2009, the Chinese Communist Party's official outlet Guangming Net republished excerpts from the book Rumors, giving it the subtitle, Rumors, the Black Market of Information. The book explains, a rumor is improvised news formed in the course of group discussion. It also notes, rumors always originate from an important yet ambiguous event. For example, late at night, dozens of tanks roll through a small town. In a country where news is tightly controlled, people immediately ask, what happened? And so rumors arise. Was there unrest caused by soaring prices? Is it merely a military exercise? Has the president died? That very kind of scene has recently appeared online. Large numbers of Chinese military vehicles and troops have been spotted across various regions of China. Countless people are asking, what exactly is going on? Is it related to Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli? Is the military in revolt marching toward Beijing? Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities impose some of the strictest controls in the world on the flow of authentic information. Under such conditions, all kinds of speculation and unofficial talk naturally emerge. From the moment a rumor takes shape to the point it spreads, what people are really doing is collectively searching for the truth, something that should not be condemned. On the contrary, it is the government's relentless efforts to block the truth from reaching the outside world that create the very conditions in which rumors flourish. Kapfer further argues in Rumors that a rumor represents the collective intelligence of a group seeking a satisfactory explanation for an event. Rumor is both a process of information transmission and a process of interpretation and commentary. Changes in a rumor's content do not stem from faulty memory, but from the evolution of the entire chain of transmission, accompanied by embellishment and added interpretation. The book offers a simple formula. Rumor equals importance of the event, ambiguity of the event. When people want to know something and receive no official answer, rumors will erupt noisily. They become the black market of information. The tighter the authorities clamp down on genuine information, the more these black markets of information expand rather than disappear. And in the end, the government is compelled, in one way or another, to respond to the rumors. At some point, perhaps without anyone noticing exactly when, the public seems to have gained the upper hand in this ongoing tug-of-war with the authorities. Is Xi growing afraid 18 days without leaving Beijing? On February 11, 2026, Xinhua News Agency reported that the previous day, February 10, Xi Jinping visited the Baiyi Building in Beijing, headquarters of the Central Military Commission, where he extended greetings to officers and soldiers across the entire armed forces via video link, inspected combat readiness and, with the Lunar New Year approaching, conveyed his holiday wishes to military personnel nationwide. That same day, China's Ministry of National Defense also posted the news on its official website. Xi, dressed in a dark blue Mao-style Zhongshan suit, sat at the front of the hall and addressed, one by one via screen, representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Cyber Operations Force and the Aerospace Force. In his New Year remarks, Xi described the past year as highly unusual. He said the military had undergone revolutionary tempering through the anti-corruption struggle and that officers and soldiers, especially those at the grassroots level, had remained steadfast in listening to and following the Party. He praised them as a force that is absolutely steadfast and reliable, capable of withstanding strict tests. Online commentators on Platform X interpreted the phrase unusual or extraordinary as a veiled reference to internal power restructuring rather than military achievement. In their view, this was not a display of combat confidence but a test of political loyalty. No red envelopes were in sight, only the tightening of the invisible headband they quipped. That, they suggested, was the leadership's version of deep affection for the armed forces. Some analysts believe Xi's wording betrays a deeper concern, fear that the military's loyalty may no longer be assured. This was also Xi's first interaction with military personnel since Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Jiang Yuxia and CMC member Liu Zhenli were declared to have fallen from power on January 24. Eighteen days have passed since then, yet Xi has chosen to remain in Beijing. On the surface, everything appears calm. Beneath that calm, however, lies unease. His reluctance to move freely through military regions, as he once did, may well reflect concern that elements within the armed forces could act against him. Externally, the various military regions and branches remain silent. Internally, however, quiet struggles are said to be unfolding beneath the surface. Corps Commander, an armed uprising, is extremely difficult. Earlier, Du Wen, a former Inner Mongolia official now living in Europe, said on his personal program that he had spoken with a Chinese PLA Corps Commander who was facing the risk of being purged. When asked, if dissatisfaction has reached 80%, why not take action? The general replied, I would like to launch an armed uprising too, but in China that's extremely difficult. He explained that the only force he could directly mobilize was the guard company at his side. To deploy large troop formations would require going through division, brigade, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, and squad. The chain of command is simply too long. The military is also filled with fervent loyalists and opportunists. If even one person were to report up the chain or tip someone off, any plan to move troops would be exposed immediately. In the age of modern communications, there is virtually no room left for secrecy. The commander also pointed to practical constraints. Although units possess weapons, large-scale ammunition supplies are often not stored locally. Sometimes they are kept in entirely different theater commands. The ammunition on hand is typically sufficient only for training exercises, meaning they lack the capacity for sustained combat operations. Moreover, the military reforms pushed by Xi have completely separated command authority from administrative control. Logistics and communications fall under different systems, creating major obstacles to coordination. Different units are almost incapable of linking up to stage a coordinated rebellion. If they were to rise up locally, they would risk being preemptively decapitated by naval, ground, air, or missile forces. As for marching on Beijing, unless the Central Guard Bureau were to collectively turn their guns around, the chances of success would be virtually zero. In addition, the Central Military Commission has required officers and soldiers to submit written pledges and ideological reports. Even if dissatisfaction exists internally, they must publicly play a double role. Within the military, people have already begun reporting on one another to protect themselves, identifying who might harbor sympathy for Zhang Yuxia. The brutality of internal political struggle, he suggested, may far exceed that of real warfare. Despite acknowledging how dangerous it would be to mobilize troops, the commander's next remark was startling. If Xi Jinping comes to inspect our unit, I guarantee I would personally take him down. That statement reportedly spread widely online, and there is no guarantee it did not reach Xi's ears. During this year's Lunar New Year, Xi limited himself to video greetings to military regions. Perhaps that caution reflects concern about the unpredictable risks of visiting units in person. Separately, a Public Security Division chief in Lianyonggan, Jiangsu Province, revealed that all officers there have recently been confined to their units for study sessions, effectively to eliminate the harmful influence of Zhang Yuxia. All this suggests that the authorities, and Xi Jinping in particular, continue to tighten ideological and political control over the military. Xi's increasingly hardline measures appear to be pushing the armed forces toward a breaking point. In particular, the directive to eradicate Zhang Yuxia's harmful influence signals that Xi may be preparing for an even harsher round of purges within the military. The Three Things Xi Jinping Fears Most Yu Maochun, director of the China Center at the Hudson Institute, recently emphasized that the Chinese Communist regime fundamentally lacks a foundation of public support and political legitimacy, leaving its leadership in a constant state of insecurity. He pointed out that the three things Xi Jinping fears most are a coup, a military mutiny, and a popular uprising. Historically, the transfer of power after Mao Zedong's death was entangled with coup-like maneuvering, and given the Party's long-held belief that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, instability within the military has always been a central concern. But at the deepest level, Yu argues, it is popular unrest that Xi fears most. An intense fear of public resistance has driven the authorities to construct one of the world's most extensive systems of surveillance and repression, from grassroots monitoring to transnational crackdowns, sparing no method. Hu Liren offers a similar assessment. He believes Xi has sought to consolidate power through sweeping purges, but in doing so has generated even greater instability. The military could experience upheaval at any time, he argues, and anti-Xi forces are on the rise. Yu also highlights a critical economic factor, high unemployment, declining foreign trade, outward investment nearly at a standstill, and a collapsing real estate sector that has shrunk household wealth, all of which have weakened both the willingness and the capacity of ordinary people to spend. Under such economic conditions, he contends, Xi can hold on for at most three more years. What do you think about the future of Xi Jinping and China? What do you see happening next? Feel free to share your thoughts below. Thank you and see you next time.