Xi Must Hand Over Zhang Youxia Within 3 Months? Wen Jiabao’s Secrets Goes Viral!

Rumors of a three-month ultimatum are heating up Beijing's political climate. The so-called Red Princeling faction, represented by Zheng Qinghong, together with other second generation revolutionary elites, is said to have joined forces to pressure Xi Jinping into handing over Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. At the same time, a post reopening the case of Wen Jiabao has been circulating on Reddit, prompting public speculation about whether it was directed from the highest levels. All eyes are now on the upcoming March two sessions, seen as the pivotal moment that could determine the political landscape. Let's break it down in today's program. Hand over Zhang Youxia within three months? On February 14th, overseas media circulated an internal rumor claiming that the so-called Red Princeling faction, represented by Zheng Qinghong and joined by second generation elites from prominent revolutionary families such as Deng Xiaoping, Liu Xiaoqi, and Ye Jianying, has united to pressure Xi Jinping. They are reportedly demanding that Xi hand over Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli within three months, arguing that their detention is unlawful. Why the three-month deadline? According to the Chinese Communist Party's internal disciplinary practice, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, CCDI, typically reaches a preliminary conclusion within three months on whether an official will be formally taken down. If so, the case proceeds to the next stage. If not, the individual may reappear publicly and even resume their former position. In this sense, three months is seen as the CCDI's internal investigation window. Commentator Tang Jingyuan suggests this information should be treated cautiously. A full three-month delay would in fact benefit Xi. If Zhang and Liu are alive and in Xi's custody for questioning, that would be ample time to produce whatever evidence, or confessions, are needed. Under coercive interrogation, almost any statement can be extracted. Moreover, recent official rhetoric and commentaries in the PLA press suggest a shift from political charges to economic corruption investigations. Once economic corruption is involved, it is difficult for senior CCP officials to claim complete innocence. If Xi can firmly establish corruption charges, even limited to financial misconduct, he could remove them, leaving opposing factions with little room to intervene. The immediate consequence would be vacancies in the Central Military Commission, CMC, triggering a fierce struggle over new appointments. This would directly affect control of the military. Any new CMC vice chair or member holds real decision-making power. If Xi's allies enter the CMC, he could effectively reclaim military authority. If anti-Xi figures secure those posts, Xi might remain CMC chairman in name only. Unlike national armies elsewhere, the CCP's military operates as a party army that follows individuals more than titles. Holding the formal title of CMC chairman does not automatically guarantee control. As a result, the battle over CMC seats would almost certainly become an intense and high-stakes power struggle between rival factions. So why is Zeng Qinghong, long known for keeping a low profile, now said to be leading this three-month ultimatum pressure campaign against Xi? According to the source, there are two main reasons. First, Xi Jinping's rise as successor was strongly backed by Zeng Qinghong. It's widely acknowledged that Xi was selected by Zeng and Jiang Zemin to compete with Li Keqiang, who had been favored by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The two factions ultimately compromised. One would become general secretary, the other premier. But few expected that after taking power, Xi would move to revive Mao-style policies, posing what some see as a threat to the party's survival, and even to the broader princeling elite. As a result, Zeng now faces heavy internal pressure. Many view him as the one who originally brought Xi up, and the sentiment is essentially, if you created this problem, you must now fix it. Second, Zeng himself is a prominent red second-generation figure, one of the elder representatives of that group. If Xi is now willing to detain high-profile princelings like Zhang Youxia, it signals that no one in that circle is untouchable. From this perspective, Xi is encroaching on the collective interests of the princeling class. Zeng would naturally fall within that scope. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Xi reportedly sent warning signals toward Zeng as well. While Zeng may have been cautious toward Xi, their tensions now appear to have sharpened considerably. Still, the reported three-month deadline should be treated only as a reference point. According to Tang Jingyuan, the real key moment will be the upcoming March 2 sessions, which traditionally involve significant personnel adjustments. Sensitive changes in leadership roles will serve as crucial indicators of the next phase of the power struggle. For example, rumors suggest that Wang Xiaohong may be removed. The March meetings could clarify that. Likewise, the positions of Hu Chunhua and Xi Taifeng bear watching. Xi, as head of the CCP organization department, could be replaced, and whether Hu retains his post in the CPPCC may also signal broader shifts. Tang also argues that Xi is unlikely to hand Zeng over. Official commentary in the PLA press has already outlined what are described as five major charges against Zeng. Under such circumstances, reversing course, releasing him, and declaring him innocent would amount to a public humiliation for Xi and could undermine his authority as party leader. Therefore, it appears highly unlikely that Zhang Yuxia or Liu Zhenli will be rescued. The situation, as described, resembles a political deadlock with no easy resolution. Wen Jiabao cleared of blame? On February 13, Xinhua News Agency reported that ahead of the Lunar New Year, Xi Jinping and other senior leaders either personally visited or sent representatives to call on retired senior officials, including Hu Jintao, Zhurong Zhiliruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Yang, and Song Ping, among others. At the same time, an article circulating overseas on Reddit sought to reopen the case of Wen Jiabao, directly rejecting the label of best actor that critics once used to mock him. The piece was detailed and coherent, hardly something casually written. Though unsigned, journalist Li Dayu suggested it may have been released with high-level backing. The article argues that Wen's power was severely constrained. It claims he was the only senior leader after 1989 to openly advocate political reform, but faced strong resistance from John Lein factions and conservative princelings, who would not even allow symbolic deviation from the party's unified line. According to the author, Wen had no factional base and was isolated from the outset, reportedly even pressured to the brink of resignation before taking office. It also challenges the common belief that Wen and Hu Jintao both belonged to the Communist Youth League faction. The author notes that Wen's career began in the Gansu Bureau of Geology, and that he never worked within the Youth League system. He was promoted by figures such as Song Ping and Hu Yaobang, whereas Hu Jintao was personally designated by Deng Xiaoping. Wen, the article insists, built no faction of his own. If Wen had no faction, how did he remain standing through three administrations? The piece recounts that Jiang Zemin, while retaining control of the Central Military Commission, expanded the Politburo Standing Committee from seven to nine members, diluting the authority of Hu and Wen and making Wen one of the weakest premiers at the start of his term. The military was said to be aligned with Jiang. Domestic security was overseen by Zhou Yongkang. Propaganda by Li Chanchun, meaning the pen, knife, and gun were all effectively in Jiang's camp or allied hands. The author questions why a book titled The Best Actor Wen Jiabao targeted Wen rather than figures such as Jiang, Bo, or Zhou. Why attack someone whose authority was already hollowed out? Was there an ulterior motive? According to the article, Wen earned hostility within the system because he advocated political reform, diverged from hardline orthodoxy, and projected confidence in his own integrity. Even before the New York Times reported in 2012 on alleged family wealth, Wen had repeatedly criticized corruption in internal meetings and pushed forward an aggressive audit storm. Some reportedly argued that even the premier should not interfere in audit work. Eventually, senior audit officials were exposed and scrutiny turned back toward Wen. Under the Hu-Wen administration, both political reform and anti-corruption efforts faced enormous obstacles. Powerful vested interests and conservative forces were deeply entrenched. Any attempt at reform risked backlash. The author cites Wen's push for the 36 measures supporting non-public private enterprises, which triggered resistance under the banner of protecting state assets, as well as campaigns favoring the state advances the private sector retreats. Although the 2007 property law marked a modest victory for market reform, conservative factions, princeling interests, and leftist platforms such as Utopia reportedly continued attacking Wen. The article concludes that Wen frequently clashed with entrenched bureaucratic elites while lacking factional backing, leaving him isolated and obstructed. Before the 18th Party Congress, over 1,600 veteran cadres and left-leaning scholars reportedly issued a lengthy petition opposing reform and calling for Wen's removal. An attempt to derail him ahead of the leadership transition. Corruption allegations, the author argues, had long been used to block his rise and later to pressure him out. Rumors, such as claims that Wen's wife spent millions on jewelry in Taiwan or that businessman Xu Ming was his son-in-law, are portrayed as fabrications. In sum, the piece paints Wen as a reform-minded but politically isolated leader who is persistently targeted from multiple directions within the system. According to Wikileaks, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao supported promoting asset disclosure, but the proposal was blocked by a majority of senior Politburo standing committee members. The Hu-Wen era is often described in China as a relatively dark and corruption-ridden period. Why? The author argues that Hu and Wen were criticized precisely because they genuinely wanted to fight corruption but were unable to make headway and were instead saddled with the blame. Within the CCP system, this is not uncommon. Those who try to do good end up labeled as guilty. Those who push reform are ultimately forced out. The author also notes that during the Hu-Wen years there were efforts to advance a so-called sunshine bill and an asset declaration system, both aimed at increasing transparency. However, after Xi Jinping took office, these unfinished initiatives were not carried forward. Another question the author raises is, how did Wen Jiabao become premier at all? If he was neither corrupt nor faction-backed, that would make him something of an anomaly in the CCP system and unlikely to rise to the top. The somewhat surprising answer offered is that Wen's personal competence and outstanding record outshone other contenders and that Zhu Rongji strongly protected and supported him, enabling him to reach and remain at the highest levels. A writer named Zhong Hiren authored a book titled The Fourth Generation, drawing on materials from the CCP Central Organization Department to analyze senior party figures. According to that account, during the Deng Xiaoping-Hu Yaobang period, Carter's selection placed greater emphasis on genuine talent. As a result, technically trained officials like Wen emerged as part of a technocratic cohort—people with real academic backgrounds and professional expertise. Wen himself held a postgraduate degree obtained before the Cultural Revolution. Within the CCP system, he was regarded as relatively well-educated, unlike many leaders who came of age during the Cultural Revolution, such as Xi Jinping. Finally, the author asks why Wen survived the 1989 crisis and multiple leadership transitions without falling. He claims there is documentary evidence, though much information is mixed with rumor. Drawing on what he considers reliable sources, including a book that devotes six pages to a detailed causal analysis based partly on internal organization department materials and recorded remarks by Wen, the author concludes that Wen left little to attack. He made few personal enemies, maintained a strong grassroots reputation, and conducted his work without leaving exploitable vulnerabilities. Such a figure, he argues, is difficult to bring down. I cannot verify the accuracy of these claims, but it is clear the author views Wen Jiabao favorably. Indeed, reform-minded figures like Wen have been relatively rare within the CCP. In the coming period, we will see whether party elders can resolve the current stalemate, and when the Zhang Youxia case will finally become clear. What do you think? Feel free to leave your thoughts below. Thank you, and see you next time.