Xi Trapped Zhang Youxia 2 Months 10 000 Agents A Shocking Coup

The tactics Mao Zedong used to deal with Lin Biao can be regarded as a textbook case of political struggle within the Chinese Communist Party, CCP. This strategy of first cutting off the claws, then taking the head, is now being closely emulated by those currently in power at Zhongnanhai. Comparing Zhang Youxia to a second Lin Biao is not only because both held the powerful post of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, but also because of the similarities in their power structures, the evolution of their relationships with the supreme leader, and ultimately a shared sense of destiny. Lin Biao's fate was sealed when the aircraft carrying his wife and children fleeing toward the Soviet Union crashed in the Andurkan desert of Mongolia. By contrast, the official announcement of Zhang Youxia's political downfall suggests that Xi Jinping has drawn lessons from Mao Zedong, applying a method of striking first to preempt the enemy, setting off a time detonation. Yet the irony is that after Lin Biao was overthrown, Mao Zedong's health and reputation rapidly deteriorated. With Zhang Youxia and 17 generals removed, the command center of the Chinese military has fallen into a state of vacuum. When there are no longer any battle-hardened generals in the ranks who dare to speak the truth, what will the next step be? From trusted lieutenant to overmighty subordinate. Lin Biao was once the successor personally chosen by Mao Zedong and written into the party constitution. Mao even declared, whoever opposes Vice Chairman Lin, smash that dog's head. Zhang Youxia was once Xi Jinping's most trusted elder brother within the military. The two families shared deep revolutionary ties. Zhang Zhongshun and Xi Zhongshun were old comrades in arms in the Northwest Field Army. During Xi's first and second terms, he relied on Zhang Youxia to stabilize the military and to eliminate the remaining influence of Xu Caihu and Guo Baxiang. Both men were once the supreme leader's number one comrade in arms. Yet in the end, both amassed such prestige within the military that they formed an independent core of power outside the supreme leader's control, thereby arousing the suspicion of an autocrat. Lin Biao had outstanding military achievements, but toward the end of the Cultural Revolution, he held deep contempt for the civilian official faction represented by figures such as Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. This led Mao Zedong to suspect that Lin intended to use military power to intervene in politics. Zhang Youxia, together with Liu Zhenli, represented the combat practical faction and was deeply dissatisfied with such as Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong in military decision-making. According to an internal party account of a meeting that has circulated privately, Zhang Youxia once opposed several of Xi Jinping's risky and unrealistic military plans, such as applying extreme pressure across the Taiwan Strait. This was subsequently interpreted by the civilian official clique around Xi as relying on military power to bolster one's own authority and refusing to carry out orders. In addition, there is another version of the story explaining why Zhang Youxia was ultimately beheaded. A winner takes all conflict. In an interview with well-known Taiwanese host Liao Xiaojun, Yuan Hongbing, a legal scholar living in Australia, cited insider sources revealing that Xi Jinping had personally cultivated two major factions within the military. One was the Southeast Faction, centered on He Weidong. The other was the Northwest Faction, with Zhang Youxia at its core. After the CCP's 20th Party Congress, the Southeast and Northwest Factions entered a bloody struggle for power. The Southeast Faction struck first, using the banner of anti-corruption to purge Zhang Youxia's protégés, most notably Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who belonged to the Northwest Faction. Zhang Youxia then launched a counteroffensive, leading to the sweeping purge of dozens of full and lieutenant generals, including figures from the Southeast Faction. After this round of mutual slaughter, the ranks of senior military officers were left severely depleted. When it came time to refill key posts, especially the question of who would succeed to the position of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, the first open clash between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping erupted. Ahead of the Fourth Plenum, Zhang Youxia nominated Liu Zhenli, a veteran of the Sino-Vietnamese War, for the post. Liu had real combat experience and was closely aligned with Zhang. Xi Jinping, however, viewed this proposal as a direct challenge to his authority. His preferred candidate was Zhang Shengmin, and this disagreement triggered their first serious confrontation. The second clash occurred roughly a month and a half to two months later. After successive downfalls among Southeast Faction generals left many positions vacant, Zhang Youxia joined forces with Liu Zhenli to submit to the Central Military Commission a promotion list involving more than 70 officers. He sought to push lieutenant generals and major generals from his own faction up another rung. According to speculation, Zhang Youxia realized that if he were forced to retire at the 21st Party Congress, he would have to build a successor network within the military to avoid being purged by Xi Jinping, essentially to secure political survival for himself and his faction. It was precisely over this issue that Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia again collided head-on. Kai Shengkun has also disclosed that more than a month ago, Xi and Zhang had a fierce argument, very likely over that list of more than 70 promotions. The quarrel escalated to the point that Zhang Youxia reportedly issued a direct threat. If I don't let you leave here today, would that count as a coup? After this explosive confrontation, Xi Jinping appeared on the surface to make concessions to Zhang Youxia, but in reality, this was meant to lull him into a false sense of security. From that point on, Xi had already begun laying plans for a decisive blow to eliminate Zhang. It is said that Xi Jinping spent more than two months preparing, mobilizing a special force of some 10,000 agents that he personally built up, and ultimately arrested Zhang Youxia along with Liu Zhenli. I have no independent means of verifying the information disclosed by Yuan Hongbing, but we believe that Xi Jinping's sudden turn against Zhang Youxia and his arrest did not happen without cause. Something significant must have occurred. The same downfall template severing the ally network. Before moving against Lin Biao, Mao Zedong first struck at the four diamonds under Lin's command—Huang, Wu Li, and Qiu. Xi Jinping has followed an almost identical playbook, first arresting Li Shangfu, Zhang Youxia's presumed successor, then, in recent days, detaining 17 generals from the Central Military Commission Office and the Equipment Development Department. In political parlance, this is known as cutting off the hem, systematically eliminating one's allies. Once Zhang Youxia realized that everyone around him had been taken away, he was left as a vice chairman in name only, effectively under house arrest. This situation closely mirrors how Lin Biao was cornered back then. Mao Zedong's handling of Lin Biao's four diamonds—Huang Yongsheng, chief of the general staff, Wu Faxian, Air Force commander, Li Zuoping, Navy political commissar, and Qiu Huizhou, director of the General Logistics Department—can be summarized in the following ruthless maneuvers. 1. Testing the Waters—Throwing Stones to Probe the Road at the Lushan Conference At the 1970 Lushan Conference, Lin Biao's faction attempted to restore the post of state chairman and lavish Mao with praise as a genius, crossing Mao's red line. Mao did not name Lin directly. Instead, he published A Few of My Opinions, savaging Lin's chief strategist, Chen Boda. He then forced Wu Faxian and Qiu Huizhou to write self-criticisms. This was the classic throwing stones tactic, exploiting cracks in Lin's supposedly ironclad alliance and instilling fear. 2. Mixing Sand—Fragmenting Military Command Mao knew that Lin Biao tightly controlled the general staff, the Air Force, the Navy, and the logistics system through these four men. He therefore mixed sand into the Central Military Commission Working Group, which the four diamonds dominated, by appointing generals outside Lin's faction, such as Li Desheng, to key posts like commander of the Beijing military region. This is akin to Xi Jinping planting figures such as Zhang Shengmin or deploying the Central Security Bureau to monitor today's military commission, ensuring that even commanders in their own jurisdictions feel watched and cannot freely move a single soldier. 3. Undermining the Foundation—The Southern Tour and Trial by Public Opinion In August 1971, Mao launched a tour of southern China, fanning the wind along the way among local powerbrokers and regional military commanders. He openly declared, Some people want to split the party. I think Lin Biao also bears responsibility. This was the move known as Undermining the Foundation. During the trip, Mao deliberately named Huang, Li, and Qiu, branding them a military club. In effect, this was a political death sentence, prompting other generals to shun them and completely isolating Lin Biao's military base. The September 13 incident of 1971 marked the greatest collapse of political credibility since the CCP took power. Lin Biao was Mao's personally chosen successor, even enshrined in the party constitution. His attempted flight and death in a plane crash amounted to a declaration of the total collapse of the image of the great leader. If even the successor Mao himself selected wanted to assassinate him, could Mao still be called great? According to confidential accounts from Zhongnanhai's medical team, after the Lin Biao incident, Mao Zedong fell gravely ill, suffering serious neurological and cardiovascular decline. How, then, did the CCP sustain itself afterward? Mao quickly pivoted to rapprochement with the United States—Nixon's visit to China—using the diplomatic breakthrough of Sino-US engagement to offset the catastrophic failure of domestic politics and redirect public attention. At the same time, Zhou Enlai struggled to prop up the administrative system, attempting to restore the economic and diplomatic order devastated by the Cultural Revolution. Together with bloody repression at gunpoint, the regime relied on an all-army, all-party purge. Criticize Lin, rectify the style, to forcibly erase Lin Biao's remnants, ruling through fear to maintain control. Mao Zedong ultimately chose Deng Xiaoping. To preserve the CCP's rule, Deng shifted the regime's foundation from leader worship to material distribution. When the creation of political deities no longer worked, Deng advanced the slogan Development is the Hard Truth, using the economy to save the party and economic growth to purchase the people's non-rebellion. This transformation moved the CCP's basis of rule from revolutionary ideals to an exchange of interests. It was also during this period that collective leadership took shape. Drawing lessons from the Lin Biao affair, Deng abolished life tenure and established a system of collective leadership. This made the CCP resemble a coalition of interest groups rather than a system of personal dictatorship, reducing the risk of systemic collapse triggered by the The key question, however, is this. Does Xi Jinping today have those conditions? Xi Jinping now finds himself in a situation akin to Mao Zedong's late-life crisis, but without the Deng Xiaoping-era conditions. First, there are no longer surplus interest dividends to distribute. Deng ruled during a period of rapid economic ascent when there was money to be made and shared. Xi, by contrast, faces crushing local government debt, a collapsing property sector, and foreign capital flight. Many local governments today are struggling even to pay civil servants' salaries. When benefits dry up, Xi cannot rely on the economy to buy loyalty, as Deng once did. Second, Mao in his final years could break out of isolation by aligning with the United States. Xi today is locked in an almost pre-Cold War confrontation with the civilized Western world. Diplomacy can no longer supply positive value for domestic governance. That leaves only one viable path—rule through fear. The problem is that while Xi's handling of Jiang Yuxia and the 17 generals mirrors almost exactly Mao's treatment of Lin Biao, Xi lacks Mao's towering authority within the party and lacks Deng's deep pockets. Thus, when the two Red and one Great General Jiang Yuxia fell, Xi Jinping effectively became a lonely ruler within the military. At present, the only pillar sustaining CCP rule is what might be called high-tech secret police politics, the combination of Wang Xiaohong's security apparatus and big data surveillance. Xi Jinping is attempting to pursue a path of absolute power without economic growth, something unprecedented in the history of the CCP. With the military unsettled, the economy, especially real estate, continuing to implode, the only card left in his hand may be war adventurism, such as action against Taiwan, to deflect internal contradictions. But given today's international anti-communist alignment and Taiwan's rising global standing, isn't the CCP racing headlong down the road to collapse? What do you think about Xi Jinping's ultimate fate? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you and see you next time.