Hello everyone. Today, I will guide you to the back of the unreleased world. Do you know that a huge city's lifeline is now quietly but firmly trying to survive? It is about Yunnan, a major region with a population of 8.5 million. The underground railway of Kunming has declared financial bankruptcy. Not only are urgent staff payments at risk, but the scale of the crisis is shocking. For the general public, the fact that a major city subway is damaged is a nightmare to imagine. However, this is reality and has triggered widespread controversy in China. The numbers do not lie. At the end of 2021, there was a balance of 3.14 billion yuan in the hands of Kunming Metro. However, only two years have passed since then. Surprisingly, the huge amount of 3 billion yuan disappeared like smoke, leaving only 1.1 billion yuan. Furthermore, leaked videos show that Metro Line 9, which was supposed to be launched in 2016, has been completely suspended for several years and left unfinished.
Hello everyone. Today I will guide you to the back of the unreleased world.
Do you know that a huge city's lifeline is now quietly but firmly trying to survive?
It is about Yunnan, a major region with a population of 8.5 million.
The underground railway of Kunming has declared financial bankruptcy.
Not only are urgent staff payments at risk, but the scale of the crisis is shocking.
For the general public, the fact that a major city's subway is damaged is a nightmare to imagine.
However, this is reality and has triggered widespread controversy in China.
The numbers do not lie.
At the end of 2021, there was a balance of 3.14 billion yuan in the hands of Kunming Metro.
However, only two years have passed since then.
Surprisingly, the huge amount of 3 billion yuan disappeared like smoke,
leaving only 1.1 billion yuan.
Furthermore, a leaked video showed that Metro Line 9, which was supposed to be launched in 2016,
has been completely suspended for several years and left unfinished.
The chain of collapse does not stop.
Do you remember the news reported on May 22nd?
The contract for Dongguan Rail Transit Line 1 in Dongguan,
which had already begun construction, was suddenly terminated.
This route was supposed to be an important link between the two major economic centers,
Guangzhou and Shenzhen.
Dongguan citizens were eagerly waiting for its opening.
Originally, it was supposed to be completed in August 2024 and carry large numbers of passengers.
However, construction was suddenly cancelled.
This dealt a heavy blow to the local real estate market and sparked intense public debate.
In recent years, China has been under mounting economic pressure.
The economy has shifted.
B, the real estate bubble has burst.
Banks have faced instability.
And exports have declined.
Foreign companies have withdrawn one after another.
Waves of layoffs and wage cuts have spread.
And the unemployment rate has remained high.
Declining cash flow has weakened consumption.
The stock market remains fragile.
Social security is under strain.
And human rights concerns continue to surface.
These overlapping pressures have pushed social anxiety and tension to their limits.
The central government has repeatedly ordered local governments to tighten their belts
and prepare for hardship.
As a result, subway and expressway expansion,
projects that once relied on massive government subsidies,
have been halted one after another.
According to past data, the pandemic year of 2022
dealt a fatal blow to public transportation.
In 2021, the net profit of the Shenzhen Metro Group was close to 3 billion yuan.
However, in the following year, profits plunged dramatically.
The same pattern appeared in other cities.
The annual net profit of Nanjing Metro reached 14.9 billion yuan.
Guangzhou Metro recorded 95 million yuan.
Lanzhou Metro recorded 5.14 billion yuan.
Even Beijing Infrastructure Investment Company Limited
reported a loss of 272 million yuan.
With declining passenger numbers and fare controls set too low,
normal operations are no longer possible without massive government subsidies.
China has more than 40 cities with subway systems.
Yet the more construction advances, the heavier the financial burden becomes.
Beijing Infrastructure Investment holds assets of 533.8 billion yuan.
Subway expansion plans have been scaled back in cities such as Shenzhen,
which were once in a construction boom.
More than five years ago, the government quietly raised the threshold for subway construction,
imposing strict conditions on GDP, population size, and local fiscal revenue.
Even economically strong cities can no longer expand freely.
Beyond subways, high-speed rail represents an even more expensive infrastructure burden.
Annual express rail passengers reach around 700 million,
while subway ridership exceeds 1.5 billion.
The Beijing subway alone carries 3.5 billion passengers per year.
Yet high-speed rail was promoted as a symbol of national ambition by Xi Jinping.
In 2015, he declared high-speed rail a shining national brand.
Construction accelerated rapidly,
and in 2016, a long-term rail network plan was approved.
Ahead launching an enormous expansion project aimed at 30,000 kilometers by 2020.
By 2022, however, debt at China State Railway Group had soared into the trillions of yuan,
with annual losses reaching hundreds of billions.
Of 18 railway bureaus, 12 were operating at a loss.
Across the country, unused or underused stations have appeared.
In Nanjing, some completed stations remain unopened, fenced off and empty inside.
During the pandemic, smaller stations between Shanghai
and other regions were closed due to lack of passengers.
In Yunnan, certain stations completed in 2016
remain idle because larger nearby stations absorb most traffic.
Experts point out that this outcome stems from ignoring market demand
while blindly pursuing scale and speed.
Despite a population of 1.4 billion,
high-speed rail struggles under five fatal factors.
Excessive debt finance construction,
demographic decline,
soaring operating costs,
politically constrained fares,
and systemic waste.
Even routes operating at 350 kilometers per hour
require 25 million passengers annually to break even.
Yet aside from the Beijing-Shanghai line,
a most failed to meet this benchmark.
Scholars such as Professor Zhao Jian of Beijing Jiaotong University
have warned that high-speed rail poses a structural financial risk.
Senior researchers, including those from Brown University,
argue that an economy driven by shortcuts and debt-heavy expansion
cannot sustain global leadership.
The collapse of overextended infrastructure
and mounting public dissatisfaction
may ultimately reshape the future of the system itself.
China's railway system was built to symbolize speed,
power and national revival.
But today it stands under the crushing weight of debt.
Massive expansion finance through aggressive borrowing
has created a structure that looks impressive on the surface,
yet struggles to sustain itself financially.
When infrastructure depends more on policy ambition
than real passenger demand,
Aussie imbalance is inevitable.
Interest payments alone consume enormous resources every year.
Instead of generating stable returns,
many lines operate at a loss.
A system designed to showcase strength
now exposes deep fiscal vulnerability.
Debt is not the only concern.
Construction quality has also raised serious questions.
Rapid timelines and political pressure to meet targets
often reduce room for careful planning and engineering oversight.
Maintenance costs are climbing
as equipment ages faster than expected.
In some regions,
underused stations and lightly traveled lines
reveal misallocation of capital.
When expansion outpaces realistic demand,
inefficiency becomes structural rather than temporary.
Over time, poor cost control and questionable durability
undermine public confidence.
Ultimately, high infrastructure should serve people
and strengthen long-term economic productivity,
not become a financial burden
that future generations must repay.
A sustainable railway network
requires transparent accounting,
disciplined investment
and realistic projections of population and growth.
Slowing down expansion may be wiser than chasing symbolic speed.
Quality, efficiency and fiscal responsibility
matter more than headline kilometers.
If reform does not address debt,
waste and operational imbalance,
the pressure will continue to build.
The future of China's railway system
will depend not on how fast it runs,
but on how responsibly it is managed.
China's high-speed rail was once presented
as the ultimate proof that speed could rewrite history.
With more than 50,000 kilometers of track,
China now controls nearly two-thirds
of the world's high-speed rail network,
a scale no other country can rival.
For years, trains racing across the country
at 350 kilometers per hour
were framed as symbols of efficiency,
unity and national resurgence.
The message was simple.
If trains could move this fast,
the nation itself was unstoppable.
Yet behind the spectacle,
the story has quietly changed.
The miracle of China's speed
is no longer defined by velocity,
but by fragility.
What looks smooth and futuristic on the surface
is increasingly undermined by debt,
decay and systemic deception.
The network still runs,
but it is running on borrowed money,
deteriorating concrete and political silence.
Yet for two decades,
high-speed rail was treated as an economic engine
that would pay for itself through future growth.
Local governments rushed to approve lines,
stations and tunnels,
convinced that expansion itself was prosperity.
Between 2019 and 2024 alone,
more than 500 billion U.S. dollars
were poured into new rail construction
at breakneck speed.
The assumption was that tomorrow's passengers
would cover today's costs.
That assumption collapsed under its own weight.
By the end of 2024,
the China State Railway Group
was carrying roughly 6.2 trillion yuan in debt,
close to 885 billion U.S. dollars.
Economists now describe this burden as a grey rhino,
a massive and obvious systemic risk
that can no longer be ignored.
The problem is not hidden or complex.
It is simply too large to pretend away.
And the fundamental flaw is that
most high-speed rail lines
were never designed to be profitable.
Officials pushed projects
not because passengers demanded them,
but because rail construction
boosted GDP statistics
and advanced political careers.
High-speed rail became a political trophy
rather than a transportation service.
As a result,
efficiency was sacrificed for speed
and long-term viability was ignored.
Today, the entire system
rests on a narrow financial base.
Only about 5-6% of the total network,
mainly the busiest corridors
linking cities like Beijing,
Shanghai and Guangzhou,
generate enough revenue
to cover their own costs.
The remaining 94% operates at a loss,
draining resources year after year.
Instead of supporting growth,
the network bleeds cash.
Each year,
roughly 25 billion U.S. dollars
is spent just to service interest
on existing debt.
That money does not improve safety
or repair aging infrastructure.
It merely keeps the system alive
for another cycle.
As local governments run out of money
and real estate revenues collapse,
the old model of endless expansion
has reached its limit.
What remains is a vast system
entering a long phase of slow decay.
This decay begins deep inside the concrete.
High-speed rail requires
extremely precise ballastless track systems
capable of handling immense stress
at very high speeds.
To achieve this,
construction standards
demand high-grade fly ash
and strict quality control
to ensure durability and alignment.
In reality,
those standards were widely ignored.
And investigations revealed
that many contractors
replaced premium materials
with low-grade industrial waste
to inflate profits.
Inferior fly ash,
recycled residues
and unprocessed byproducts
were poured directly
into track foundations.
This was not an isolated incident,
but a widespread practice
across multiple projects.
Structural weakness
was built into the system
from the very beginning.
Chinese experts themselves
acknowledged this reality.
Professor Wang Lan
from the China Building Materials Academy
admitted that
under mainland construction practices,
the use of substandard materials
was almost inevitable.
In 2021,
an internal inspection
led by the China State Railway Group
confirmed serious structural deterioration
after barely a decade of operation.
These findings came
not from foreign critics,
but from the system's own audits.
Every major track design
has shown signs of failure.
CRTSI slab tracks
exhibit cracked slabs,
fractured steel reinforcements,
and separation between layers.
Waterproof coatings peel away,
while mortar layers are crushed
or displaced under pressure.
These defects compromise stability
and require constant monitoring.
CRTSII tracks suffer
from warped slabs
and widespread bonding failures,
undermining alignment and safety.
Even CRTSIII,
promoted as a
domestically perfected solution,
is already cracking at the base.
In many locations,
concrete foundations
have fractured completely
at expansion joints.
Not a single design
has escaped structural decay.
Nowhere is this negligence
more dangerous than inside tunnels.
Along major corridors
such as the Shanghai
to Kunming high-speed railway,
state media quietly revealed
severe construction fraud.
Elm tunnel linings
were built thinner than required,
and gaps between concrete
and surrounding rock
were never properly filled.
These voids weaken structural integrity
and allow water infiltration.
As a result,
trains designed to operate
at 300 kilometers per hour
were forced to slow
to just 70 kilometers per hour
in some sections.
At that speed,
the entire economic justification
for high-speed rail collapses,
what was sold as modern infrastructure,
was reduced to performance levels
resembling 19th century railways.
The deception extended
even to small safety components.
On the Hefei to Shunyi line,
vibration damping pads
were replaced
with cheap recycled rubber
that failed safety standards.
When pillars later crumbled
during heavy rainfall,
officials blamed natural causes.
Engineers, however,
pointed to defective materials
and rushed construction.
Political pressure to deliver
China speed
had overridden
basic engineering discipline.
Beyond hidden defects,
the failure is visible
across the landscape
in the form of empty stations.
And by early 2026,
at least 26 high-speed rail stations
were officially classified
as dormant or unused.
Many were fully built,
staffed and equipped,
yet never open to the public.
Others were quietly shut down
after years of minimal use.
In Nanjing,
Purple Mountain East Station
and Jiangpu Station
have stood idle for more than 13 years.
Both were completed
as part of a 39.4 billion yuan
intercity rail project,
but were deemed impractical
to operate.
Stopping high-speed trains there
was considered inefficient
despite the enormous sunk cost.
The stations became
monuments to miscalculation.
Even unused stations
require money
to prevent deterioration.
The rail operator
still spends up to 2 million yuan
per year on basic maintenance
and security
for each dormant station.
And many were built
10 to 20 kilometers
outside city centers
under the assumption
that urban growth
would follow the tracks.
Instead,
passengers found it faster
and cheaper to drive.
The crisis extends
beyond construction quality
to the ground itself.
Large portions of China's
high-speed rail network
pass through regions
experiencing severe land subsidence.
Decades of groundwater
over-extraction
have caused the soil to compact
and sink unevenly.
This process is slow
but relentless.
Satellite studies show
sections of the Beijing-Tianjin
intercity railway
sinking at rates
exceeding 110 millimeters
per year.
The greatest danger
lies in differential settlement
where uneven sinking
distorts track geometry.
At speeds above
300 kilometers per hour,
even minor deviations
can violate safety thresholds.
Permanent speed restrictions
have become unavoidable.
Deep clay layers
will continue deforming
for decades,
meaning some lines
may never regain
full operational speed.
While cracked concrete
is alarming,
the most profound threat
remains financial.
By 2026,
the rail system
had entered a cycle
where new borrowing
was required
simply to service old debt.
Operating revenue alone
was no longer sufficient.
Official claims of profitability
rely heavily on state subsidies
disguised as auxiliary income.
Without these transfers,
losses would be impossible to hide.
Only about 6 percent
of the network
is genuinely profitable,
while the rest
operates at a massive deficit.
The illusion of success
is maintained
through accounting maneuvers.
To compensate,
authorities raised ticket prices
by 20 to 40 percent
on major routes
between 2024 and 2025.
Uh, this strategy backfired
as low-income travelers
and migrant workers
abandoned high-speed rail.
Ridership declined
on precisely the lines
that needed revenue most.
The system lost volume
while costs remained fixed.
The collapse of land finance
removed the last safety net.
Local governments,
once able to subsidize
rail projects through land sales,
now face their own debt crises.
They can no longer support
idle stations
or expensive maintenance.
As a result,
the era of rapid expansion
has ended,
replaced by retrenchment
and managed decline.
Much of the network
during the post-2008 boom
is now entering
its midlife overhaul phase.
Due to poor construction quality,
repairs often require
entire sections
to be torn out and rebuilt.
In many cases,
maintenance costs
exceed the original
construction budget.
The financial logic is inverted.
And finally,
the system confronts
a demographic reality
it was never designed for.
High-speed rail was built
for a young,
growing,
urbanizing population.
China's population
is now shrinking and aging.
Older citizens travel less,
while the working-age population
continues to decline.
Lines in the northeast
and far west
are unlikely to ever break even.
They will remain
permanent liabilities,
draining state resources indefinitely.
China's high-speed rail
is not collapsing overnight,
but it is eroding steadily.
The trains still run,
but the foundation beneath them
is hollow.