Red Elite Revolt? Mao’s Grandson Supports Zhang Youxia? Xi Panics After Khamenei’s Death

Only two months into 2026, and China's political landscape can already be described as deeply unsettled, with waves of breaking news hitting one after another. Recently, a screenshot of a WeChat post allegedly written by Mao Xinyu began circulating online. The post, which appeared to express support for Zhang Youxia, quickly drew public attention. Some analysts argue there are four suspicious elements, suggesting the post was very likely not written by Mao Xinyu himself. Others contend that, authentic or not, the message amounts to the second generation of red elites, openly signaling strong dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping. Meanwhile, the elimination of Kamine has dealt a heavy blow to Zhongnanhai, shaking Beijing's position on the global chessboard. Against this backdrop, the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting raises a pressing question. Will it be a balanced exchange, or has the dynamic already tilted decisively in favor of one side? A sweeping political drama is building toward its climax, and perhaps the decisive acts are only just beginning. Let's dive into the analysis in today's program. Mao Xinyu backing Zhang Youxia? On February 26, the 21st session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress concluded. However, Communiqué No. 16, issued after the meeting, made no mention of revoking Zhang Youxia's status as a National People's Congress deputy, or stripping him of related positions. Nor did it address Liu Zhenli. Instead, beginning February 27, a screenshot began circulating widely online, purportedly showing a post from the WeChat Moments account of Mao Xinyu, the direct grandson of the late leader Mao Zedong. The post read, We should pause and reflect. Why was Zhang Youxia a good comrade of the party one day, and a corrupt element the next? Allowing the people to supervise the government and the military is the only real remedy. It is regrettable that even by 2026, this has still not been achieved. The WeChat display name was shown as Major General Mao Xinyu, and the post was timestamped 11.39am, January 25, 2026. A blogger known as Xin Gaudi on the platform X commented, Note, after verification, this statement did indeed originate from Mao Xinyu's WeChat Moments, and is currently spreading like wildfire domestically. Internet censors have not yet deleted it. The timing is highly sensitive, just ahead of the upcoming two sessions in Beijing. Mao's remarks are not merely raising doubts. They signal dissatisfaction with, and even a repudiation of, Xi Jinping's actions. Given Mao's level of education and awareness, it would be difficult for him to compose such words on his own. Someone likely drafted it for him to post. Although Mao may have intellectual limitations, within the CCP's red families, he remains one of the most authoritative spokespersons, with influence far surpassing that of Liu Yuan and others. It is precisely due to resistance from these red families that the handling of Zhang Youxia has yet to reach a final conclusion. US-based current affairs commentator Tang Jingyuan argued that there is a high probability the screenshot was doctored. He finds it hard to imagine someone like Mao Xinyu personally registering a WeChat account and appending his military rank, Major General, a title closely associated with his lineage from Mao Zedong, to his display name as Major General Mao Xinyu. In his view, the situation resembles a previous open letter, allegedly issued by Zhang Shen, son of Zhang Youxia, which also circulated online and was widely suspected of being written by others under borrowed identity. What stands out in this case is the use of Mao Xinyu's profile image and name to publish the statement. Tang notes that Mao Xinyu has in fact expressed similar views before, and on more than one occasion. In March 2016, during the two sessions, Mao Xinyu, then a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, told state media, In March 2013, according to Xinhua News Agency, Mao Xinyu said, These rights, which rightfully belong to the people, are sometimes not respected by certain leading cadres and are even arbitrarily trampled upon. This is what angers the public most. Tang Jingyuan observes that these earlier statements bear strong similarities to the content of the recent WeChat screenshot. Even if the image were fabricated, the message itself aligns closely with Mao Xinyu's consistent positions. Using Mao's name to question Xi Jinping's move against Jiang Yuxia is, in that sense, contextually fitting. Anyone capable of imitating Mao Xinyu's rhetorical style so closely would likely be deeply familiar with the second generation of red elites, and it cannot be ruled out that the post originated from within that circle. Tang emphasizes that even if the screenshot is fake, it does not mean it is meaningless. The remarks strike at the core issue in Jiang Yuxia's case and, to a considerable extent, articulate what many among the red second generation wish to say but cannot say openly. The fact that the screenshot has spread widely online effectively amounts to a public expression of strong dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping. Is Xi Jinping gripped by deep fear? A sweeping historical drama is steadily building toward its climax. In January, former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was reportedly captured by the United States in his own bedroom. In February, Mexico's notorious drug lord known as El Mencho, Oseguera, was eliminated. And on the final day of February, or depending on how you count it, the first day of March, Khamenei was gone. In that strike, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Pakpur, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Shamkhani, and several other senior officials were also killed. So who will be next? Xi Jinping has reportedly grown increasingly suspicious. Sometimes a single sentence can carry more destructive force than 10 aircraft carriers, enough to leave someone as jumpy as a startled bird. On March 1st, Xinhua quoted Donald Trump publicly praising the U.S. military for possessing extremely sophisticated intelligence and tracking systems. In the wake of Khamenei's successful decapitation, that remark suddenly carried unprecedented deterrent weight. Xi is said to be both furious and trembling with fear. Even the underground bunkers built for him by CCP engineers may no longer feel secure. Some analysts argue that what Xi fears most is not weaponry, but the possibility of American moles within his inner circle. Who is the U.S. informant? That question could become an inescapable shadow, depriving him of peace of mind from now on. Judging from the bottom-line thinking and legalist-style worldview Xi has previously demonstrated, his deepest anxiety lies in the belief that danger always comes from those closest to him. Anyone at his side could be plotting betrayal. Even family cannot be fully trusted. Such a mentality, of trusting no one, would make the military and officialdom the first to suffer. Xi's purges and loyalty investigations have turned his relationship with senior generals into a zero-sum struggle. For military officers, the ultimate form of self-preservation might even be to cooperate with the United States, coordinating internally and externally to bring down the CCP regime and Xi himself. Meanwhile, Iran may undergo political change. But such a shift would also deal a heavy blow to Beijing. If Khamenei's government has suffered the most devastating physical strike, the psychological, economic, and political aftershocks for the CCP could also be severe. Should Iran's regime change, China's oil supply could face serious disruption. Earlier this January, when Maduro was captured and Venezuela's government shifted, China immediately lost 800,000 barrels per day in Venezuelan oil imports. If Iran follows suit, the loss could be even greater. Current data show that China is Iran's largest oil customer, accounting for over 80% of its exports. In 2025, China imported roughly 1.38 million barrels per day from Iran, compared with 800,000 barrels per day from Venezuela, nearly 600,000 barrels more. Moreover, China has typically purchased Iranian oil at discounts of $3 to $5 per barrel below market prices, circumventing U.S. sanctions. If Iran's government changes and pivots toward Western markets, as Venezuela did, Beijing could lose that discounted supply. In that case, an oil crisis for China would be all but inevitable. Commentator Chen Pocon believes that Khamenei's death has dealt a heavy blow to the CCP, which he describes as the power behind the scenes. Since taking office, Trump has pursued a carefully calculated international strategy in his handling of Venezuela and Iran. Although neither he nor the U.S. military has directly aimed its spearhead at Beijing, Zhongnanhai, Xi Jinping, or the Communist Party, they have effectively severed the CCP's limbs and dismantled its global strategic positioning. Shenming Shi, a researcher at Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told the Epoch Times, Once the Iran issue is resolved, the United States will certainly increase pressure on After that, in the final two years of his term, Trump may well concentrate his full efforts on confronting the CCP, possibly even pushing for regime change in China, or at the very least preventing Xi from securing another term in order to stabilize the Indo-Pacific region. A domino effect has already begun, starting with Venezuela, then Iran, potentially followed by Russia, and ultimately China. Will the Trump-Xi meeting be Trump-strong, Xi-weak? The White House recently confirmed that President Trump will visit China at the end of March. However, at a regular press briefing, China's foreign ministry responded cautiously and did not confirm the news. Chen Pocong believes that Trump's meeting with Xi is largely diplomatic on the surface. Trump needs to maintain temporary stability with Beijing to prevent disruptive moves behind the scenes. At the same time, he must consider U.S., economic growth, and the incomes of American citizens, which makes continued engagement with Xi Jinping necessary. According to Chen, Trump is heading to Beijing this time from an unusually strong position. While dealing with Venezuela, he also addressed Cuba, and then Iran. As the CCP's proxies are cleared away, Xi Jinping is left in an increasingly awkward position. Trump arrives in Beijing as the victor, and the negotiating positions of the two sides are entirely different. Chen further argues that Xi Jinping is currently disadvantaged not only internationally, as the lifeline of the Belt and Road Initiative is being constricted, but also domestically, where he is preoccupied with internal power struggles and consolidating authority. Large-scale purges have cost him public support, party support, and because he used what are seen as coup-like measures to remove respected military generals, even support within the armed forces. With a military in this condition, talk of attacking Taiwan or confronting the United States is simply unrealistic. In this meeting, Chen says Xi is the one seeking Trump. He needs a form of endorsement from the U.S. president and Western leaders to strengthen his standing within the party. But at the negotiating table, he is in a weaker position. If there are trade negotiations or other agreements, the one making concessions will be Xi Jinping, while Trump will be the big winner. Of course, the CCP's domestic propaganda will claim the two sides are equal, or that China has won, or even that it's a win-win. But after the Iran episode, it's already quite clear who holds the upper hand in the Trump-Xi meeting. China and Iran have maintained extensive military cooperation. Iran's NEGA air defense command system is reportedly based on the JY-10 air defense command and control system provided by China. However, during the recent strikes, U.S.-Israeli fighter jets and drones were described as operating as if in unguarded territory. Chen Ming-Xi observes that the United States and Israel carried out their attack on Iran in broad daylight without attempting to conceal it as a demonstration of overwhelming military superiority. In that context, Xi Jinping's posture of deterrence over the Taiwan Strait may be diminished. For example, if Xi demands that the United States stop selling arms to Taiwan or refrain from intervening in a cross-strait conflict, Trump would likely refuse, reiterating America's commitment to arms sales under its long-standing policy and warning Beijing against the use of force. What do you think about these developments? Feel free to leave your comments below. Thank you and see you next time.