Israel Confirms Killing of Iranian Intelligence Minister, Analyst Discusses Potential Replacement

Israel's defense minister, Israel Katz, announced that Iranian intelligence minister Ismail Khatib was killed in an overnight strike in Tehran. Joining us now is Babak Chikarabi, political analyst and founding member of Cyprus The Great Institute. So thank you, first of all, for coming on the show, Babak. Can you just tell us, talk to us a bit more about who this Iranian intelligence minister is, how important was he, and what's his role? Thank you for having me. Obviously, this is a very important position within the Islamic Republic regime. The Minister of Intelligence essentially oversees 17 different agencies of intelligence, being the top position that oversight every one of them. So that gives him enormous power and importance within the regime. Also, for a few reasons, this position and importance of it stands out. Number one, there are only three different ministers appointed by the Supreme Leader, and they're not going to go through the whole parliamentary vote of confidence and they're not nominated by the President. This position was one of them. So it was always and always have been appointed by the Supreme Leader. More importantly, it was always traditionally a cleric who would fill in that position. But Khatib was different. He joined the intelligence services at a very early age. And after that, he became a cleric. By the age of 30, which he was considered to be a very young cleric, he was fully trusted by Supreme Leader Khamenei, the father. At the age of 30, he became in charge of the city of Qom. The city of Qom is the holiest Shia city in Iran, and it's also the largest hub of religious scholarship. So at the age of 30, he became in charge of overseeing all the high-ranking ayatollahs in the city of Qom. And obviously, that gave him an enormous amount of influence and power. The reason the head of the intelligence always has to be a cleric is because they could issue a debt warrant without going through the whole judicial system. And that would also give him an enormous operational power. So that's another reason that his position was super, super important. What also separates him from his predecessors is that he served in both government of reformists and hardliners. This happened, he was originally appointed when President Raisi was in power and his mysterious helicopter crashed. And when Pazishkian ran for presidency, Supreme Leader Khamenei, the father, appointed Khatib again to serve in Pazishkian's government, which tells you that at that point, at least, the Supreme Leader couldn't trust anybody else who worked with both factions and at the same time to be trustworthy. That brings us to the point that he was supposed to be as head of the 17 different intelligence agencies to be in charge of security for all the regime's elite, including himself. And clearly, that shows that there's so much infiltration within the security agencies of the regime that he couldn't even protect his own life. And now that he's dead, considering that that position has to be only filled in by the Supreme Leader, and obviously, we don't know the whereabout of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, the son, we don't know the condition that he's in. We don't know if he is in comatose or he's disfigured or incapacitated. Nobody, based on their rules and regulation, can appoint the next person. And keep that in mind, he was very close to Khamenei, the son, the current Supreme Leader. And losing him, obviously, creates a vacuum of trust within the regime. They don't know who to choose. If he's actually incapacitated to choose the next person, he essentially, just like his father, doesn't have anybody to replace him. And then the last point, Don, is that the regime had the succession plan up to three people. What Israel did before eliminating Khatib, they had eliminated his successors, as well as they had completely destroyed the main buildings of the Ministry of Intelligence. So all of that together brings a huge, huge challenge for the regime currently. And it is considered a big victory for Israel. Okay, so I just have two follow-up questions to everything you said just now. Obviously, you're outlining how much power Khatib has had during his lifetime, the head of 17 agencies, as you mentioned. So ultimately, what does this mean? What are the consequences for the Iranian regime that he is dead? And the second question is, what does his death mean then for this war overall? Well, what happens, first of all, just like I heard in your report, for them to exert pressure within the country and outside of the country has been enormously reduced. Replacing him is not going to be an easy task. Somebody that the entire elite of the Islamic Republic can trust is almost impossible. I cannot imagine anybody else that could replace him to be as capable as he was, and to be trusted by both sides, by the reformists, as well as the hardliners. Right now, from the reports that we hear coming from Iran is that the IRGC has taken over the security of the Khamenei, the son, the current Supreme Leader, nobody knows his whereabouts. And that obviously creates a big challenge. So the next person is going to come, he's not going to be as qualified as he was, he's not going to be as trusted as he was, and whomever they pick is not going to be trusted by the other side. This, considering the pressure is being applied from outside, war from one hand, and the messages that are coming from President Trump that says that he's ready to talk to whatever factions, ready to talk to him, that creates the atmosphere of not trusting one another. So each side may think that the other side is about to come to some sort of a deal with the US, and throw the other side under the bus. These are the challenges that are very difficult, create a very difficult situation for the regime. Okay, I'm wondering if you can provide us a little bit more context here, what exactly is the role of the intelligence ministry in Iran? I can go on about it for a very long time, Don, but imagine at the age of 30, he was, this person in particular, but also talk about the position, he was in charge of overseeing all the Ayatollahs. So all the other Ayatollahs, they had some of the power to religiously challenge the Supreme Leader Khamenei, the father. And obviously, this guy, this guy's, this person's job is to make sure that no religious person stands up or comes up to anywhere close to that holy position, they believe in for the Supreme Leader. So that's one thing. So at this point, if that pressure is gone, we have other religious figures that they may come out with a fatwa or decree, and they say this whole is an unholy word, this is against Islam, against Iran, and whatever else they might say. This is going to religiously create a huge problem for the regime and for its legitimacy. So once this position is vacant, all the other Ayatollahs, all the other religious figures, they can actually challenge the regime or challenge the Supreme Leader, unlike before that. So that's one aspect of it. The other aspect of it is obviously they were overseeing whatever security measurements was put in place to make sure there's no uprising inside Iran, and whatever else they could have done outside of Iran. All of this right now, it seems to be in disarray. That doesn't mean that the security apparatus, they're not going to do what they did before. We have learned in that 18, 19 days, previous 18, 19 days is that they kind of disperse the management of smaller factions of different ministry to go on without even the head of that ministry. So it is very possible that some of the elements within this security apparatus continue operating based on the old order they have. But that doesn't mean they can go on for a very long time. Okay, maybe just one or two more questions here. I want to ask you, by your assessment, because Israel has said it's going to continue targeting Iranian leadership. Benjamin Netanyahu said they don't really need approval. They can just go ahead to target these leaders. By your assessment, how close is the Iranian regime and its leadership to being completely dismantled at this point? Or how close or how far? Well, we have to keep that in mind. People inside Iran also are against the regime. They're waiting for an opportunity to come on the street and topple the regime. So we shouldn't be only expecting that by continuation of this war, and by Israel or American forces eliminating the head of the Islamic Republic elite, we're going to see the regime fall. The regime might fall when that situation is created for the people to rise up and topple the regime. So that's very possible. At the same time, remember, every time the head of ministry or whomever on top elite of the regime is eliminated, the mid-ranking officer or the mid-ranking management and the people have the opportunity to kind of distance themselves from the regime and join the people. At the same time, we have Prince Reza Pahlavi, the head of the opposition from outside, that continuously has been sending messages and has been inviting the different member of the regime elite to join this Iranian revolution and has given them a kind of amnesty. If they don't have their hands soaked in the blood of Iranian people, they can come to this side and they don't have to worry about what the future holds. And there's going to be a fair trial for everybody. What is also important that he has mentioned that there's not going to be any death sentence in the future of Iran. All of that, it creates an environment that the mid-ranking management and officers, they kind of see a light at the end of the tunnel if they can join the other side, join this revolution and topple the regime from within. So there are two different, essentially, power being exerted, one from outside by the war and every high-ranking political person is being eliminated and also military people are being eliminated. And from within, you have the Iranian people that they're looking for that opportunity, ready to go. So all of that together, I believe it's going to end up forcing some of the mid-ranking people to defect and join the people. If I were to give you a time frame, my estimate, my assumption is that within the next two weeks, we're going to see a huge gap between the different factions of the regime, which is going to lead to essentially their fall. Okay. Well, very comprehensive explanation today. I learned a lot. Thank you for joining us today, Babak. You're most welcome. Thanks for having me.