The Mission Impossible of 1976- Operation Thunderbolt

Operation Thunderball was to begin at nightfall on July 4th, 1976, when Israeli C-130 Hercules transports flew 100 commandos over 2,500 miles to Uganda. But part of the planning required a solution, and that was refueling the C-130s on the return leg of the trip. The Israelis did not have the ability to aerially refuel the aircraft. They appealed to several East African nations, including Kenya, which was the most logical choice. All the nations contacted were sympathetic, but unwilling to help fearing retribution by Yemen or the Palestinians. The Israeli government managed to get the British government involved through Sir Maurice Oldfield, who was then chief of MI6. He contacted the Kenyan Minister of Agriculture, Bruce McKenzie, who was a long-time contact. McKenzie convinced Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta to allow Mossad to gather critical intelligence in-country prior to the operation and to allow the commandos to land and refuel at what is today Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi. The Mossad managed to get the blueprints for the new airport, which had been built by one of the Israeli construction firms, Sobel Bonet, that a man had thrown out of the country a few years earlier. He also spoke with some of the released hostages and were able to obtain the location of the hostages still in custody and detailed information about the numbers and types of weapons carried by the terrorists and Ugandan soldiers. According to the information, the army and hundreds of civilians, including those who had built the original structure, rapidly built a partial replica of the airport terminal. They rehearsed their actions from disembarkation from the aircraft to contact to extraction day and night. Due to all of the back-channel diplomatic traffic, Uganda's Ambassador to Lesotho, Isaac Lumago, while in Nairobi, apparently overheard some Kenyan Air Force officers openly discussing the possibility of Israeli action and Kenya receiving compensation for the assistance. Lumago forwarded that information to Ugandan military commander Isaac Meliamungu. However, astonishingly, Meliamungu did not inform Amin or even act on the information and dismissed the unverified report as gossip and gasea or rubbish. According to Amin's son, Jafar Rimo, the Amin was informed directly by Lumago and, after the OAU meeting, he flew back to Uganda. Amin was apparently terrified of possible reprisals in case his troops actually fought the Israeli military, which may be why he ordered the Ugandan army not to open fire on any Israeli aircraft during a possible raid. It was also stated that Amin did not believe the Israelis could even pull such an ambitious mission off and then decided that it was just a rumor. The Israeli force numbered 100 commandos, excluding the air crews, and was comprised of the following elements. Brigadier General Dan Shamran commanded as overall ground commander. Colonel Ami Ayalon handled communications and support personnel. The primary 29-man assault team was led by Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu. Commandos would assault the old terminal and rescue the hostages. Paratroopers led by Colonel Matan Vilnai would secure the civilian general airport field, clearing and securing the runways and protection and refueling of the Israeli aircraft. The Golani force, led by Colonel Yuri Sagi, would secure the C-130 Hercules aircraft, getting as close as possible to the terminal and boarding the hostages.