Inside the CCP’s Spy Structure: 3 Layers, 4 Strategies, One Global System

We know that China runs a highly elaborate network that spans both military and civilian institutions. So in that network, you have the military intelligence units under the Central Military Commission, you have the state security apparatus, you have the public security apparatus, you have the United Front Work Department, you also have something called International Department, which in Chinese is called Zhonglianbu. It's the external PR department for the party, not for the state. So all of these play a role, directly or indirectly, independently or in a coordinated manner, in intelligence and influence operation. So let me first tell you about the type of Chinese spies there are, because this is according to insiders who have broadly divided Chinese intelligence personnel into three categories. The first one is called Mi Gong, and they're really professional intelligence officers. These are full-time trained operatives, and they work within the military intelligence, state security, public security. They're disciplined career intelligence officers. This is what most people imagine when they think of a spy. They may take on ordinary jobs, and come to the US as an undercover. So that's pretty straightforward. Now the second group is called Shanggan. They're semi-official operatives. This group operates in a gray zone. They may be registered in intelligence systems, but are not fully embedded in the formal bureaucracy. And within this category, there are two types, or two subtypes. The first subtype is closer to a professional intelligence officer. They may be listed within the system. They may receive some kind of compensation. And in some cases, their families are even compensated if something happens to them. So functionally, they operate like part-time or auxiliary intelligence officers. Now the second subtype is very different and far more important. These individuals are not traditional spies at all. Instead, they leverage their connections, often with military or intelligence bodies, to conduct business. And those connections bring advantages, preferential access, elevated status, political backing, which can translate into real commercial success. And with that backing, these individuals often become successful entrepreneurs, well-connected business figures, and insiders in elite circles abroad, including in Western political and business networks. And in return, they contribute financially or otherwise back into the system. And this is what's often described as one of CCP's strategy for its espionage activities. It's called using business to support intelligence. Which I'll explain later. So this group is large. Many wealthy Chinese business people operating overseas are said to fall into this category. And then the third category is called affiliates. This is the most widespread and the most difficult to detect. These individuals are not trained spies or non-formal agents. They're often ordinary people, but they attach themselves to intelligence-linked networks in exchange for protection, access, influence. And this is the broadest layer of the system. So when we talk about Chinese intelligence, we're not talking about spies in the traditional sense. What we're looking at is not a spy network. It is a layered system. Professionals, business-linked operatives, and a vast outer ring of affiliates. And this system didn't emerge randomly. And there is a doctrine behind everything you just heard. It reflects a broader strategic framework, often traced back to the 1990s during China's early reform period. And it's associated with senior military leadership who played an important role in Chinese intelligence operation. And the person who gave the strategy was former vice chairman of Central Military Commission. His name is Zhang Wanyan. He served as vice chairman of CMC from, I believe, 1995 to 2002. And so he gave a 16-word strategy for espionage. And they can be summarized into four key principles. The first one is junming jiehe, integrate military and civilian resources, and then operate both at home and abroad, and then balance immediate gains with the long-term positioning, and use business to sustain intelligence operations. And let me break that down. So first, military-civilian integration. And this is not new. China doesn't rely only on professional spies. It mobilizes a much broader network, business people, researchers, and diaspora communities, blurring the line between civilian activity and intelligence work. And when it comes to business entities, companies like Huawei are often cited. Drone maker DJI is another example. The key point is simple. Civilian and state functions are not clearly separated. And the second one is domestic and overseas coordination. This is not just about foreign intelligence. This is about linking internal control with external expansion, building networks inside China while extending influence abroad. Examples include the establishment of overseas Chinese police service stations in multiple countries, like in Canada, in Europe, in the US. And that's one example. And the second example is the use of family members in China to pressure diaspora communities abroad. So in short, the global Chinese diaspora becomes a bridge between domestic control and international operations. And this is a very key point, which I will elaborate later. The third is balancing short-term and long-term goals. Some operations are immediate—technology, acquisition, tactical intelligence—but others unfold over years, even decades. This is about embedding people, building relations, shaping influence over time. And the CCP is highly patient and deliberate in cultivating long-term targets. There were reports about honey trap operations targeting Silicon Valley. There was a British media outlet that reported how operatives may use personal relationships to develop access to tech professionals in Silicon Valley. And some of these cases may involve short-term objectives, like extracting trade secrets or source codes. But many are designed for the long game, long-term relationships, even marriage, and eventually integration into key environments like Silicon Valley. There's another well-known example, that is Christine Fang, also known as Fang Fang. Her relationship with Congressman Eric Swalwell has resurfaced recently. Let me retell you her story so that you can see this long game. When she arrived in the U.S. in 2011, she was an international student. Swalwell was still a city council member in Dublin, California, but she focused on him early after they met. He ran for Congress in 2012 and was elected, and Christine Fang helped with his campaign and even assisted in staffing his Washington, D.C. office after his election. Notice the pattern. She was not targeting top officials at the time when she started in California. She was targeting rising figures, individuals with future potential. And she was right on target. Swalwell sat on the House Intelligence Committee. So this reflects a broader strategy of Beijing, long-term cultivation, early-stage relationship building, and positioning before someone reaches national power. All right, so that's strategy number three. And strategy number four is what I mentioned earlier, use business to support intelligence. And this is very smart on the part of the CCP. Now, this is where its model diverges sharply from traditional espionage systems. The goal is clear, to make intelligence operations financially self-sustaining while using commercial entities as cover. So individuals are often positioned as executives, investors, or even tycoons operating overseas. And these are not fictitious businesses. They're real, serving multiple functions. The first one is, they serve as funding channels for local intelligence operations because they're business entities. And they also serve as identity cover because these businesses gave the agents an identity. And the third is, I think is the important one. It provides a platform for these business executives or tycoons to access power centers and influential circles because a successful business leader is highly respected and naturally gains leverage in Western society. Many Chinese individuals have gained access in the U.S. under the cover of business or investment. And their objective is straightforward, build profitable enterprises and use those profits to support intelligence activities. And that's how you end up with a system where intelligence, business, investment, and state power are fully integrated. And in some cases, individuals come to the U.S. to raise capital, effectively using American funds to support operations within the United States itself. So the system leverages the openness of a free market to generate profit while sustaining an intelligence network inside that very society or inside that market. The CCP's intelligence model is fundamentally different from Western systems. And it's severely decentralized and it's massive in scale. And it involves intelligence agencies, state-owned enterprises, private companies, universities, academia, and individuals. In other words, espionage is not a profession. It's an ecosystem.