Zhu Yuanzhang executed tens of thousands of corrupt officials over thirty years. He even had some of them flayed and stuffed as public warnings. Yet corruption in the late Ming became among the worst in Chinese history. The most extreme anti-corruption campaign and the most extreme corruption appeared in the same dynasty. This video explains why. The answer is not about bad people — it is about a system that was structurally designed to produce corruption. Official salaries were set far below the actual cost of running a government office. Every magistrate had to rely on gray income just to keep his administration functional. The empire knew this, tolerated it, and ultimately depended on it — because low pay kept the bureaucracy affordable, gray income kept local government running, and anti-corruption campaigns gave the emperor a tool to remove anyone at will. From ordinary citizens to merchants to officials themselves, everyone participated in this system because everyone got something out of it. It was not a flaw. It was how the system operated. When Emperor Yongzheng tried to fix it by formalizing gray revenue, new informal channels grew back within decades. The problem was never morality. It was arithmetic.
Zhu Yuanzhang was probably the emperor who hated corrupt officials the most in all of Chinese
history. He decreed that officials found guilty of corruption beyond a certain threshold would
be executed and in some cases subjected to a punishment known as flaying and stuffing.
The skin was peeled off the body, filled with straw, and displayed outside the government
office as a warning. Over 30 years of rule, the number of officials executed for corruption
may have reached tens of thousands. Yet the Ming dynasty did not become clean.
Quite the opposite. Corruption in the late Ming was among the worst in Chinese history.
The most extreme anti-corruption campaign and the most extreme corruption appeared in the same
dynasty. If anti-corruption measures could solve corruption, 30 years of killing should have been
enough. It was not enough. Perhaps the problem was never how bad the corrupt officials were,
but that the system itself needed corruption to function.
Consider one number. A seventh-rank county magistrate in the Ming dynasty earned roughly
90 shu of rice per year, equivalent to about 40 or 50 tales of silver. And even this modest
salary was often delayed or unpaid. Yet he was responsible for governing an entire county,
managing cases, collecting taxes, and maintaining order. He had to pay for his own secretaries,
legal advisors, and clerks. The empire did not provide them. The court gave him a salary.
Reality demanded an entire institution. He had to cover the wages of his runners,
the pay of his scribes, even the cost of ink and paper in his own office. His official income did
not come close to covering his actual expenses. This was not a problem unique to the Ming.
Across 2,000 years from the Han to the Qing, official salaries were almost always below
what the job actually required. Whether this began as fiscal limitation or deliberate policy,
low pay eventually became embedded in the system, and the system learned to use it.
A newly appointed magistrate arriving at his post full of idealism would quickly discover
a brutal reality. His salary could not feed his family, let alone run his office. He had two
choices. He could insist on integrity and watch his administration grind to a halt, or he could
accept the unwritten rules that everyone else already followed, surcharges known as meltage
fees, customary gifts called ice tributes and charcoal tributes. These sounded like corruption,
but within the system, they were open, expected, and tacitly approved by superiors.
When taxpayers paid in loose silver, the government melted it into standard ingots
for the treasury. The melting process caused some loss called huohao, or meltage, but the
surcharge collected far exceeded the actual loss, and the difference became the magistrate's income.
Everyone knew. The court knew. But no one stopped it. Because without it, how would a magistrate
run his office? Choosing integrity was not a moral question. It was a survival question.
In this system, an official who refused to participate was not a saint. He was someone
whose office could not function, and in that era, no one considered this abnormal.
For ordinary people, paying a little extra to get things done at the government office was as
natural as paying for goods at a market. For merchants, maintaining relationships with officials
was simply a cost of doing business. A shrewd merchant was not one who never paid bribes,
but one who knew exactly whom to pay and how much. For the officials themselves,
gray income was not called corruption. It was called customary fees. It had names,
standards, and professional norms, like a craft that needed to be learned. From top to bottom,
no one saw this system as something to oppose, because every participant got something they
needed. Ordinary people got access to government services, merchants got the protection to operate,
and officials got the means to survive. It was not a system imposed on people.
It was an ecosystem that everyone collectively maintained. This is also why Zhu Yuanzhang could
kill tens of thousands and change nothing. You can kill the corrupt, but you cannot kill a
consensus that everyone considers reasonable. At a deeper level, low pay gave the empire
control. When every official had gray income, every official had a vulnerability. The emperor
could investigate and remove anyone he wished under the banner of fighting corruption,
and the target could never defend himself because the corruption was real. This was the true
function of anti-corruption campaigns throughout Chinese history. They were not a cleaning
mechanism. They were a political tool. When an emperor needed to eliminate a rival, anti-corruption
was the perfect weapon, morally unimpeachable, legally documented, and applicable to virtually
anyone, because the system guaranteed that everyone was guilty.
The story of Hessian is the most extreme example. He accumulated staggering wealth during the reign
of Emperor Qianlong. The exact figures are disputed in the historical sources, but the
sheer scale is beyond question. Did Qianlong know? An emperor could not possibly be unaware
that someone beside him had grown this rich, but Qianlong allowed it because Hessian was useful
in his exercise of power. When Emperor Jiaqing took the throne, he immediately moved against
Hessian, not because he was more virtuous than Qianlong, but because he needed Hessian's wealth
to fill the treasury deficit and needed the case to establish his own authority. A folk saying
captured it perfectly, when Hessian fell, Jiaqing ate his fill. The greatest beneficiary of anti-corruption
was the treasury, not the people. Why could this cycle never be broken across 2,000 years?
Because it was not a flaw. It was a structure held up by 3 pillars. Low pay was a fiscal necessity.
Without it, the empire could not afford its bureaucracy. Grey income was an operational
requirement. Without it, local government could not function. Anti-corruption was a control mechanism.
Without universal vulnerability, the empire would lose its ultimate leverage over officials. Remove
any one of the 3 pillars and the system would collapse. Corruption was not a failure of the
system. It was one of the system's modes of operation. Emperor Yongzheng understood this.
He introduced a policy called returning meltage fees to the public treasury, formally absorbing
grey revenue into the fiscal system while creating a new stipend for officials called
Integrity Nurturing Silver. The very name was an admission. You had to pay for integrity.
But within decades, new grey spaces emerged again because institutions could be reformed,
but the basic arithmetic people faced within the system did not change. As long as formal income
fell short of actual need, informal compensation would appear on its own. Zhu Yuanzhang killed for
30 years and corruption in the Ming ended up worse than when he started. Yongzheng tried
institutional reform to turn grey into white and new shades of grey grew back almost immediately.
Everyone who tried to fix this problem eventually discovered the same thing. Corruption was not a
stain on the surface of the system. It grew inside the system's structure. When a system runs a
workforce at below the actual cost of operation, the shortfall must be covered from somewhere.
That somewhere is corruption. This logic did not belong to imperial China alone. In any era,
when an organization's official budget falls below its actual cost of operation,
informal compensation mechanisms will emerge on their own, regardless of what they are called.
The problem was never about the morality of individuals. It was about the arithmetic
of the system. When the arithmetic does not balance, morality cannot solve the problem.