China’s Fiscal Crisis: How Beijing Is Reaching Into Private Wealth

Hello. Hi. Hi, everyone. All right. Welcome to Ladies World Talk. All right. Thursday night. It's been a while since I last talked about China's economy, not because nothing is happening, but because what's happening is getting almost impossible to quantify. The numbers don't tell the full story anymore. The signals are buried in policy language, in subtle shifts, in what's said and what's not said. But I feel like it's time to give you an update. Let me first by telling you about this Politburo meeting on April the 28th, which Xi Jinping chaired, and the economy was front and center. On the surface, it looked routine. But if you slow down and read it line by line, this meeting reveals something much deeper. The Chinese economy is under multiple structural pressures at the same time. It's not a single problem. It's a system trying to hold itself together, with several key pillars falling simultaneously. So in simple terms, Beijing is running out of money. In response, it's starting to change how it operates. So today, I'm going to do two things. First, I'll break down what this meeting actually tells us about the economy. And in the second half, I'll walk you through four recent policy shifts, or four recent policies the regime is rolling out to deal with this financial crisis. And I have to warn you, what they are doing, what I'm about to tell you, is shocking. Because even I was shocked. All right, so let's first talk about the Politburo meeting. Let's start with the most visible signal. So the meeting explicitly emphasized building something. And let me show you. Today's talk will be a great opportunity to learn Chinese. Here we go. I did some slides just to show you CCP's own jargons and narratives. Okay, so this meeting explicitly emphasized building water networks, power grids, computing infrastructure, next generation communications, underground urban systems, and logistics networks. And according to estimates from the National Development and Reform Commission, investment in these areas could exceed 7 trillion yuan this year alone. Now, pause here. This is not just policy language. This is a signal. Because when Beijing starts talking about massive infrastructure again, it means they're going back to the old playbook. When growth slows, invest. When demand weakens, build. When confidence drops, inject capital. But here's the problem. This model worked maybe 15, 20 years ago. Today, it's running into hard limits because much of China's infrastructure is already built, and in many places, overly built. And with a rapid declining population and already excessive manufacturing capacity, more infrastructure doesn't solve the problem. It risks making it worse. And in reality, these projects increasingly feed inefficiency and corruption. This is the breeding ground for corruption, and it's no longer growth. So that's the maintenance of growth through increasingly meaningless investment, seems to be CCP's strategy number one. Or it seems to be the message that we get from this... It seems to be the first message we got from this Politburo meeting. Now, the meeting also emphasized something else, manufacturing. In China, manufacturing is the backbone of employment, the backbone of exports, the backbone of supply chain security. But here's where reality kicks in. There's a deeper problem inside manufacturing itself. Years of heavy investment, severe overcapacity, intense involution-style competition, falling profits, chronic lack of orders. And the Politburo directly acknowledged this problem by calling for this. I thought it's interesting. It's called comprehensively clean up, involution-style competition. Let me translate that into plain language. It means too many companies fighting for too little demand, destroying each other's margins, and bringing down the entire industry. And this is not a healthy industrial system. This is what happens when supply massively exceeds demand. And here's an uncomfortable truth. You cannot regulate your way out of overcapacity. That's not going to happen. Now let's move to what might be the most serious issue of all, real estate. Because real estate in China is no longer just about housing. It's about local government finance, banking stability, household wealth. And the data here is brutal. So according to the Ministry of Finance, land sale revenue in Q1 was down 24.4% year over year. And look at the trend. Last quarter, Q1 2025 was already down 16%. And then all of 2025 was down 15%. And now in the first quarter of 2026, it's 24%. So the decline is accelerating. And frankly, the real decline may be even worse. Because think about it. Developers are all struggling with cash flow. Demand is falling. Supply is overflowing. So who is still buying land? In many cases, I think it's local governments themselves selling land from the right hand to the left hand, creating the false appearance of transactions without real demand behind them. Now here's why this matters so much. Local governments depend heavily on land sales. Land sales make up about 25% to 35% of total revenue for the local governments. But if you compare land sales to tax revenue, the dependence looks much more serious. In many years, land sales equates to 80% to 120% of tax revenue. So it's almost the same. And in some cases, it's even more than tax revenue. And the most important perspective should be this. Local governments don't fully control tax revenue, because they have to share part of that with the central government. But land sales, that's their own cash money. That's their own cash flow. They control 100% of it. So in terms of controllable income or usable income for the local governments, land sales can make up 40% to 60%, or sometimes even more. In some regions, it's over 60%. So when land sales collapse, local revenue disappears, budgets tighten, and debt pressure rises. So the entire system comes under stress when land sales evaporates. So what this tells us is very simple. The old model of land finance, investment, growth is no longer sustainable. The model is broken. Now let's talk about debt, because this is where everything starts to connect. According to official data, central government debt is 41 trillion yuan. Local government debt is 55 trillion, and total is about 96 trillion. But that's just the explicit debt. It does not include all hidden liabilities. And there's a company, a data analytics company from Canada. The name is called Visual Capitalist. They show that China's government debt reached 18.7 trillion dollars in 2025. And when I convert it, that's about 135 trillion renminbi. And that estimate already assumes about 39 trillion renminbi in hidden liabilities, which is very low. The local government financing vehicle itself was between 66 trillion to maybe 85 trillion. And that doesn't include the hidden debt held by the central government. So 39 trillion yuan in hidden liabilities is very low. But even so, the Canadian company presented a key number. They say that at the number that they had, 18.7 trillion dollars, or 135 trillion yuan, that number means China's debt expanded 16 times in 17 years. Could you imagine growing your debt 16 times in 17 years? And that's not normal growth. It's scale up fast. So now you have a system where growth is slowing, revenue is declining, but debt is quickly rising, which generates a dangerous dynamic. The system needs more debt just to maintain the same level of growth. But there isn't any. Now here's one line from the meeting that most people will overlook. And I'll share that with you. That's this line. It says solve the problem of overdue corporate payments. That sounds technical, but it actually is a warning sign. Because it means companies are not getting paid on time. And that tells you cash flow is tightening. Businesses are under stress. Supply chains are starting to strain. This is how real crises begin. Not with a sudden collapse, but with delays, payment problems, liquidity pressure, a slow squeeze. Now listen to this line from the meeting. I'm just giving you highlights from the meeting so that you get an idea what the real concerns are. This one says we must stabilize and strengthen confidence in capital markets. Whenever a government starts talking about confidence, it usually means confidence is lacking or seriously lacking. And here's the deeper problem. The more administrative power you use to force confidence, the faster it collapses. Because confidence doesn't work that way. It's earned, not commanded. So what's really happening underneath? Investors are cautious. Businesses are uncertain. Capital is hesitant. And this is not just an economic issue. It's a psychological one. And once confidence breaks, it's very hard to rebuild. Now the meeting also said this. We need a coordinated response to external shocks and challenges, blah, blah, blah. This is widely interpreted as a reference to the impact of the Iran war, because China's economy is deeply dependent on energy imports, global trade routes, external demand. So now Beijing is facing a double pressure, internal slowdown or internal meltdown, I should say, and external pressure. At the same time, there's no big stimulus. And that's the real sign. The meeting did not mention, and I think that may be the most important takeaway from this entire meeting. There's no sign of major stimulus. Instead, what you see is fine tunings, more adjustments. And that tells you something critical. Beijing is strained. What you're really looking at is a system trying to balance everything with very little room to maneuver. So now let's step back and connect all the dots. The Politburo meeting from two days ago didn't just outline policy. It reviews the system under pressure. You have a growth model that has become wasteful and inefficient, a debt structure that's quickly expanding, a fiscal hole growing as large as the real estate bubble, a private sector that's increasingly constrained, and confidence that hasn't really recovered since the COVID years. So Beijing is trying to manage all of this at the same time, and it's running out of options. Now the question becomes, if they cannot grow their way out, and they cannot borrow their way out, then what's left? The answer is extract more from society. And that's what we're seeing in 2026. The regime is moving toward systemic extraction. So now let me talk about Beijing's solutions. The problem didn't start now. For a couple of years, Beijing authorities have been telling all levels of government to do this. More Chinese words. This is hilarious because it's too colloquial and funny to be called a government policy. Tighten the belt and live frugally. But let's be honest, it is the official policy language. When you look at what's actually happening on the ground, there are even extreme ones. I would say around 2024, multiple regions, including Chongqing, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia, governments there had already set up special task forces that are called. If you speak Chinese, you would appreciate the irony of these languages. Because it's hilarious. It literally means smash the cooking pot and sell the iron. It's a very, very colloquial expression to mean do whatever you can to get by, even if you have to sell your pots and pans. Now, pause for a second. Think about what the phrase really means when it's used for a government task force. It means sell everything you can, liquidate every asset, survive at all costs. That's what the name means when it's used as a task force. According to local government documents, this is a directive that directly came from Zhou Nanhai. This style of expression carries Xi Jinping's personal signature. He would talk like this. Hence, the policy is named in a way that carries his signature. Now, fast forward to 2026, and here's the key shift. It's no longer just about selling. It's not just about selling assets, probably because there's nothing left to sell, or all the buyers are gone. No one is around to buy anything. Now, it's about reaching directly into society and taking from people. Let me walk you through four concrete moves Beijing has made recently. They're, in my opinion, shocking. First, let's start with the first one, and arguably the most consequential shift. Starting May 1st, crimes committed by employees of private companies, including executives and owners of private companies, will now be punished the same way as those committed by public officials. Here's the key detail. The threshold for criminal prosecution has been lowered from 60,000 yuan to 30,000 yuan. That's roughly from $8,500 down to $4,300. Let me give you a real-world example. If a doctor receives kickbacks totaling more than 30,000 yuan, or $85,000, that's now a criminal case. The government can prosecute him. But the real impact is not on doctors, it's on private business owners. Because in practice, many entrepreneurs don't strictly separate personal and company funds. They may temporarily use company money for investments, stock trading, or help friends with the intention of paying it back later because it's his company, it's his funds. Under the new rules, that behavior can now be classified as misappropriation of funds. Even if you are the actual owner, even if you return the money later, if it hits 30,000 yuan, you could face criminal charges. And that means fines, asset seizures, or worse. So what this is really doing is telling business owners how you're allowed to use your money. Now, here's where it gets even worse. On April 10th, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a new legal interpretation. So on the surface, it claims equal legal protection for different types of ownership. I mean, on the surface, it sounds fair. It will be equal legal protection for private ownership or public ownership. But in reality, it does the opposite. It aligns private sector offenses with public sector corruption standards. So previously, private sector crimes had higher thresholds because they did not involve public power. Now the standards are unified, which means the threshold for private sector criminal liability has been significantly lowered. And this triggered strong backlash in legal circles in China, because the logic simply doesn't hold. Corruption by officials damages public trust and public power. Misuse of funds in private companies affects internal business interests. They're fundamentally different, but now that distinction is gone and they're treated the same. And people are asking, so private companies don't get the same benefits as state-owned SOEs, but now they're being punished like government officials? That's the question people are asking. But here's the real answer. They're not treated the same. Officials are actually being protected because at the exact same time, okay, you wouldn't believe this. Let me just tell you, at the exact same time, while lowering the threshold for private sector crimes, the government raised the threshold for, quote-unquote, unexplained wealth of officials from 300,000 yuan to 3 million yuan. 300,000 yuan is $40,000. So they raised the threshold for government officials for their unexplained wealth from $40,000 to $400,000. That's 300,000 yuan to 3 million yuan. That's a 10 times increase. Can you believe it? And remember, officials in China are not required to disclose their assets. So what does that mean in practice? It means that financial irregularities under 3 million yuan become much harder to prosecute. And let's put it side by side. A private business owner moving 30,000 yuan is potentially criminal activity. Now, a government official with millions in unexplained wealth faces far less scrutiny, looser accountability for officials, and tighter control over the private sector. And honestly, I don't think the word double standard even captures it. There's nothing else like this in the world. So what does this lead to? It sends a very clear signal to the market. If you are entrepreneurial, why take the risk? Why build something? Why bother, right? If the brother watches you 24-7, and if you risk losing everything, there's no point of starting a business. So this new law or new rule does not strengthen the economy. It kills the most productive sector of China's economy. Now, if you think the previous measure is already unfair, wait until you hear this one. And do I have any? No. Okay. There's one more. Let's talk about the newly drafted financial law. Public consultation ended on April the 19th, and it has already drawn serious criticism from legal experts. Why? Because Article 55 grants regulators extremely broad powers. First, without court approval, administrative agencies can access private communications. They can restrict property and asset rights. Second, authorities can directly impose exit bans, meaning preventing the person from leaving the country if he or she is deemed to potentially harm national security or interests. And enforcement can be carried out immediately through immigration authorities. Now, let's be clear. This is not just regulatory authority. This is quasi-judicial power without judicial oversight. And in practice, what does that mean? It opens the door to targeting private entrepreneurs, pressuring business owners, pressuring dissidents, and extending control over families. And this is not theoretical. We already have a real-life example. In March, I told you about this. The two co-founders of the AI startup company called Manus were banned from leaving China. The company was founded by a Chinese team, and then out of fear of regulatory supervision, they moved the headquarters to Singapore. And then in December, MEDA announced its plan to acquire Manus for, I think, $2 to $3 billion. But in January, China's Ministry of Commerce launched a review, and the two founders were called back to China. And now they're not allowed to leave. So if this financial law passes in its current form, private entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals could effectively become assets under state control. All right, so that's the first two measures. Now let me move to the third. This one has to do with offshore wealth, because this is where things are tightening very quickly. Since March this year, tax authorities in places like Jiangsu and Shenzhen, the wealthy provinces, have started taking coordinated action. Offshore trust holders now must fully disclose every single piece of investment income, not just totals, every detail, dividends, stock trading gains, each individual transaction. Everything must be reported clearly and fully. And this didn't start this year. Back in early 2025, Shanghai had already launched a special audit requiring full disclosure of two to three years of offshore trust activity, including overseas asset flows, Hong Kong stock dividends, equity transfers. These are exactly the types of income that are easiest to hide. And the requirement was strict. Every source must be traceable. Everything must be reported. And now here's the enforcement. According to industry insiders, some local tax authorities are already taxing offshore trust income at 20%. And if you don't comply, penalties are severe. In some cases, fines are multiple times the amount of tax owed. Of course, this hits the ultra high net worth individuals. Because in the past, many of them relied on one key argument, which is that trust assets are independent and taxes only apply upon actual distribution. That framework is now gone. But this shift didn't happen overnight. It was built up step by step. In 1980, China's individual income tax law already required taxation of global income. And then 2015, China joined the automatic exchange of financial information. So overseas income became visible. And in 2024, overseas income became a key audit focus. And 2025, the government rolled out what's called Golden Tax Phase 4. And it was fully launched. As a result, personal income tax revenue last year, I believe it's the entire year, grew 11.5%. But total tax revenue grew only 0.8%. People didn't make, I mean, total income tax revenue grew that much. What does that tell you? I do not think people's income, Chinese people's income, collectively grew last year. It's just that the government was forcing people to pay more tax. That tells you exactly where the pressure is going. And in 2026, offshore income is no longer secondary. It has become a core revenue target. Okay, fourth. Let me go to the next slide. I mentioned this in one of my previous live streams, financial institutions, the last gray zone. The CCP has long promoted this policy. It reads very funny in Chinese, but somehow the English came out okay. Actively guiding religion to adapt to socialist society. English sounds okay, but the Chinese sounds very awkward. I don't even know what the Chinese means. Anyway, so over the time, many religious venues have become increasingly commercialized. I shouldn't say haven't become, that's not even right. Religious institutions in China are all commercialized. It's not a matter of becoming increasingly, it's completely commercialized, generating significant income. For example, the downfall of the formal abbot of Shaolin Temple, the very famous Shaolin Temple where the Shaolin warrior monks are famous for their kung fu. So the formal abbot of Shaolin Temple, his name is Shi Yongxin, which is a buddy of the Xi family, of Xi Jinping. There were widespread rumors that his asset reached 3 billion US dollars. Not yuan, but dollars. And because of this, some local governments began targeting temples, even requesting temporary loans from them. But now it has gone further. And there are insiders who are saying that tax authorities are now significantly intensifying audits and inspections on religious organizations. In wealthy places like Zhejiang and Fujian, religious venues are required to hand over financial records, shut down distribution channels, disclose fees for every ceremony, and report total income. And here's the key line from insiders. They say, from the central government down to local levels, finances are extremely tight. Tax authorities must sustain a massive system. Everything that was previously ignored, temples, private businesses, is now being pulled into the system. Donations, ceremony fees, offerings, everything is being dug up and investigated. So now let's step back and look at the full picture. Across all four measures, the state is expanding its reach into every layer of the economy. Private businesses, wealthy individuals, offshore assets, even religious institutions. And the logic is simple. Fiscal pressure is rising. Revenue sources are shrinking. So extraction increases. But this doesn't solve the crisis. It shifts the burden onto the most productive parts of society. Entrepreneurs, investors, and high-income earners. Over time, it will weaken the very foundation of the economy. So it will only make the crisis even harder to contain. And in my opinion, people always say, well, why would the CCP roll out these measures? Because anyone with a tiny bit of common sense will understand that it's going to kill the private sector. It's going to kill the economy. Why would the CCP still roll out these policies or measures that completely do not make sense? When they lower the threshold for quote-unquote financial irregularities in the private sector, and they increase the threshold for public officials 10 times, it just completely doesn't make sense. Why do they do that? Well, in my opinion, no CCP officials really know how to fix China's economy, because the system doesn't understand how a market economy works. Some are incapable of understanding it. Others are afraid to, because the principles of a market economy fundamentally clash with the CCP's demand for absolute control. And once that's the case, even thinking in market terms becomes politically dangerous. So no one bothers. So my conclusion is simple. Under this system, China's economy or economic problems are not fixable. It's only going to go downhill from here. All right. This is not a quantitative analysis of China's economy, but a qualitative one. Because at this point, I feel like it's impossible to do a quantitative analysis, because the numbers are too crazy. They do not make sense. But I'm glad that I'm able to pull a qualitative one for you. Okay. How do I do? All right. Yeah. Okay. Well, let me first acknowledge the people who send super stickers my way. I appreciate that. Someone, Ghoster7, question, are people trying to escape China? Like, you know, a little boats, etc. Like, you know, a little boats. Of course, people are trying to leave China, but not everyone has the chance to. And also, is the world ready to accept every Chinese who wants to leave? I think there's so many Chinese causing troubles around the world. So I don't think the world is ready to accept that many Chinese. I don't know. But like, I just saw that there's a furniture design show in Milan that banned Chinese from attending. Because in the past, they've had too many Chinese visitors who attend the trade shows with their cameras, and stealing design ideas. Some even stole the design drafts, the design blueprints. So yeah, so I just saw that they don't, I don't know how they do it. I don't know how they actually do it. But I've seen Chinese complaining that they're not allowed, or they're not able to attend the Milan furniture. I think it's called home furnishing, or I don't know the name, the original name. Furniture and home furnishing design trade show in Milan, the design capital of the world. Yeah, the Chinese are not welcomed there, because they steal design ideas, and then make these substandard products, copycats, that look the same, but are not the same in quality, or in material. So anyway, that's a long answer to your question. Lei is an island girl, probably Cuban. George Washington, 1776. I'm an island girl, probably Cuban. Okay, maybe in one of my previous lives? I know I have been a French person in one of my previous lives. I'm not so sure about being a Cuban. Anyways, well, thank you. Let me see. Oh, it's Chris tonight. Well, hi, Chris. Okay, here's Lei. You look marvelous tonight. Okay, my AI camera decides to make Lei look good tonight. Thanks to my AI camera, I have no control over its brain. It decides how I look. Anyways, let's see. I think I saw some colorful stickers flying by. Let me acknowledge them. I saw someone saying that Lei never mentions money. Yeah, I don't know how to mention money. You ask people to give you money? I'm just not very good at doing that. But I would appreciate it if you make donations to me, or give me super stickers. My donation link is in the bottom, is in the description. All right, questions? No questions. How do you say? I don't know how to say your name. Does China's economic situation mean communist China needs to invade and take over Taiwan and its economy to survive economically? I mean, I think the top leader is certainly torn. I think Xi Jinping certainly is looking in every direction trying to find a way to survive the economic crisis. Starting a war, yes, it gives him the chance to declare martial law and close down and lock down the country. But on the other hand, starting a war is also detrimental because you don't know if the military will actually follow your command. So it's also dangerous. So at this point, it's hard to say. But he is certainly looking in that direction. But whether or not he would do something as crazy as that is, I can't say for sure, at this point. Okay. Oh, yeah, here's one. Zsuzclhz. My own money for PH friend, bad time to donate. Infinite thanks, Miss Lei. Well, thank you. Your own money. All right, good. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you. Okay. Let me see, question. Oh, I have an announcement to make. I have another interesting guest that I want to interview this Sunday. Last Sunday, I interviewed David Tsai, who happens to hold the views that Xi Jinping is firmly in control. I brought him on to my show so that he can explain how he obtained the information about all these generals downfalls, all these rumors. So he can better explain to you the rumor mills, the Chinese rumor mills. He also is one of those people who believes that Xi Jinping is in full control. I know some of you don't necessarily agree with his viewpoint. I got emails from you with feedback. I appreciate that. And I agree with many of your assessments. Now, so this Sunday, I want to bring someone with a different view. Someone who has diligently followed Xi Jinping's every movement. Someone who does not rely on rumor mills to make his decision. He actually has followed Xi Jinping's movements, his speeches, and everything. And his conclusion is the opposite, that Xi Jinping is not in full control. At least he's not controlling the military. So I want to bring him onto my show this Sunday night for a lively dialogue to present you a different view. It will be Sunday night. Yeah, I hope you will join me. Lei will do a better job translating simultaneously this time. Last time it was hard because I was trying to read the comments. And then I realized he was talking. I had a better focus on what he was saying, or I won't be able to translate anything he says. So I think, yeah, I learned something from last time. I think I should do better. Anyway, it should be very interesting. And I think this person has a very, very interesting insight. So join me on Sunday. And of course, Saturday, we'll have our regular programming. Maybe Saturday, I'll give you an update on Xi Jinping's power. So that Sunday, we could continue that discussion with an expert joining us. And then you can ask him questions directly. That's the plan. Yeah, Lei is becoming interactive now. All right. Michelle or Michael Lan, Lei, did you hear China's property price is at 20 years low based on their official data, and 70% household wealth is in properties? Yeah. People say not only the property prices at 20 years low, even like food, people are saying that China's prices and also income are going back to like 20 years, 30 years ago. You spent 5 yuan for a haircut. Someone said 5 yuan a haircut or 5 yuan for a lunchbox. Those are the prices people pay. They say some like 30 years ago. So yeah, it looks like China's economy may be going back 30 years or 20 some years. It's unthinkable. All right. I already answered that question. Chris forwarded it. Okay. All right. Okay. I think you are awesome. All right. I love your name. Wow, China, China. No more super stickers. That's all. All right. Wow. Oh, my goodness. There's someone. Oh, here's one. Tio Rico, we appreciate you. As a white American after Hong Kong, what would you suggest to go to China? What do I send? I do not go to China right now. There's an outbreak going on. The hospitals are packed. And there are even claims that the funeral homes are crowded. We don't know, but it's some kind of respiratory outbreak that's happening in China right now. And it's hitting younger patients, younger people, children, in particular. So we don't know what it is. As usual, the government is covering it up. I do not recommend people to go to China right now. I generally do not recommend people to go to China before the 21st Party Congress. That's October 2027. Wait until that's over. Things are crazy before then. Okay, that's my but thank you very much for your support. I appreciate it. Oh, here's a question. Passage to Don. I had all of my product copied by Chinese who attended a trade show. Also, what about restrictions on existing old money that was earned legally and taxes paid years ago? Restrictions? Oh, I'm sorry to hear that. Yeah, the Chinese are notorious. They have no respect for intellectual properties. What about restrictions on existing old money that was earned legally and taxes years ago? In China, are you asking money you made in China? If you're still in China, unless you have kept all the documentation, unless you could prove how you made the money, and unless you have kept the documents of all your taxes, but still, that's no guarantee. They can tell you, well, our laws have changed. This is the taxes you paid back then, but now we're saying you still owe us because it's not a country governed by rule of law. It depends. It really depends. Yeah. It's still risky, in my opinion. All right. Lei, any news from Mrs. Xi? You mean Madame Xi Jinping? Oh, by the way, Xi Jinping, after four months, finally left Beijing for a change. It's because we, people like me, have been saying there's something wrong with Xi Jinping. He has not left Beijing for four months since last November, maybe five months now. The only time he left was to Xiong'an in March, but Xiong'an is considered suburbs of Beijing. But I think yesterday, he left for Shanghai for a change. I think he wants to prove that he's okay. He's free to travel. But as far as his wife, his wife has not left the country for two years, and that's abnormal. Xi Jinping has not taken his wife with him on international visits for the past two years. This is not normal because this man likes to show off his wife. I have not seen pictures or videos coming out of Shanghai, so I can't really tell you what's going on in Shanghai. But he did leave Beijing to go to Shanghai for a change, just to show that he can leave Beijing, or he's not afraid to leave Beijing. That's shocking. Lei, do you think the CCP is using the outbreak to do more organ harvesting? Although I do believe the CCP is doing whatever means it has to harvest more organs, but I'm not so sure if starting another outbreak is controllable enough for them to target organs. Because the way they're doing targeted organ harvesting is if they've identified someone, or normally a young person, then they assign someone, usually like a classmate or a neighbor or a friend, to monitor that person. But then they don't tell them the friend. Of course, they pay the friend or the acquaintance to do that, but the excuse is he or she has committed a crime. You need to watch him or her closely. That's how they do it, so they keep track of the target or targets. Someone asked a question forwarded by Chris. It's from vdubog2220. Can China rise by creative innovation and not replicated technology? Not under the CCP, because under the totalitarian regime, people's creativity is suppressed. Without freedom of expression, without freedom of speech, there's no true creativity. People use their creativity to copy, to be copycats. The answer is China will not rise by creative innovation under the CCP. Someone asked me, any news from Hu Deping? I have not heard anything about him, not from him. I'm not in contact with him. Probably he's in hiding with everything that's going on, with what happened to Zhang Youxia. He probably went in hiding or stayed out of trouble. Jim Burns Jr. said, I will not feel bad about you if you cannot talk about it or don't know what to say, but it's a good topic. What is it? What is the topic? Sorry. Can someone just tell me what the topic is? Oh, calling shields. Thank you. Blue soul. Do you visit China often? Oh, no. I have not visited China for a long, long time. No, I shouldn't go to China. Edgy number one. Is China the only country where smoking could actually save your life? Who says smoking can actually save your life? My guess is organ harvesters will avoid smokers. Oh, good question. I don't know enough medically to say that, but that's a good thinking. China may be the only country where smoking could save one's life. You brought up a very good point. Maybe a lot of Chinese who are aware of organ harvesting are thinking, what can I do to save my life and my family's life? They're trying to figure out something that they can do that's repulsive enough for the medical professionals, and it's not harmful enough for their own bodies. I don't know. Maybe it is smoking. All right. Good thinking. We're in the right direction. Someone said, laughing out loud. Jim Burns. Did you ask me a question? I don't know. Did I miss something? Robert Shore. Chinese citizens aren't allowed to make crypto investments, but if they do, they can report it. Crypto investments are permitted in Hong Kong. Why is crypto prohibited in China? Nothing is prohibited in China. It's prohibited for the general public, but for the elites, of course they do. Of course they invest in crypto investments. Why do you think the United States confiscated several billion dollars worth of cryptocurrency from the founder of the Prince Group, Chen Zhi? Remember that man who was indicted by the US Justice Department and he was hiding in Thailand and eventually went back to China. But the US government confiscated several billion dollars worth of cryptocurrencies. It's not his money. It's the money owned by the Chinese elites. Some people can invest in crypto and some cannot. It depends who you are. All right. Here's one. Blue Soul. Do you miss China? Which area would you visit first? Do I miss China? Of course I do. I have family and friends there and I cannot go. Actually, if I tell you a story, my high school reunion, they cannot even mention my name. They cannot mention my name. They have to give me a name because it could get them into trouble. I guess I'm pretty famous now. Where would I visit first? I will visit two cities, Shanghai and Nanjing. I grew up in Nanjing, so I spent my childhood there. I would visit that city first. I have many friends there from childhood and I would visit Shanghai because that's where my family is from. So those are the two cities I wanted to visit. They don't look good in orange. No, it doesn't. It's too fiery. I look good in jewel tones. All right. They would be arrested at the airport. Yeah, I wouldn't risk that. Okay. All right. How about that? 39 trillion, not billion. Did I say billion? Yeah, it should be trillion. Okay. Let's end it here. Join me this weekend. We have some fascinating programs coming up. All right. Bye.