Why Did The Jin Dynasty Not Unify China Like The Qing Dynasty?

China is a highly developed civilization. At their peak, they became a leading global empire. Yet, despite their strength, the Han have feared northern enemies for millennia. These nomadic tribes were always dismissed by the Chinese as barbarians. Among them, we must mention the Jurchen. The ethnic group that founded both the Jin and Qing dynasties. What can we observe here? The Jin, a formidable force, captured both Song emperors. But never truly unified China. The Qing, however, ruled the Han for nearly 300 years. So, where does the difference lie? Weren't both founded by the Jurchen, yet ended so differently? Let's find out in today's video. Welcome to Baduk Rai, Chinese History, The Similarities. Before analyzing the causes, we must look at their similarities. Both the Jin and Qing were founded by the Jurchen people. In reality, feudal Chinese dynasties faced multiple enemies, distracting them from the Jurchen. The Song dealt with the Liao, the Ming faced domestic rebellions, as well as northern Yuan remnants and Japanese pirates. In this climate, this tribe rose to threaten the Han empire. Furthermore, many early rulers of the Jin and Qing were brilliant, talented leaders. Both the Jin and Qing began as small tribes facing formidable neighbors. Before founding the Jin, the Jurchen were weaker than Goryeo, let alone the Liao or Song. The later Jin, the precursor to the Qing, was weaker than the northern Yuan, let alone the Ming. Yet, their leaders achieved glorious victories, defeating much stronger foes despite being outnumbered. Aguda launched a night raid on the Liao, then declared himself emperor of the great Jin. Nurhaci was just as bold, daring to strike directly at the Ming borders. With 60,000 troops, he defeated 100,000 Ming soldiers at the famous battle of Saru. Both used smaller forces to overcome larger ones, etching their names into history. When these founding Jurchen emperors passed, their descendants carried on their visions. Both the Jin and the Qing dynasties consistently produced capable rulers who ensured prosperity. After Emperor Taizong, Emperor Taizong inherited the mission of pursuing hegemony. During his reign, the Song suffered the humiliating Jingkong incident. The will of Nurhaci was similarly inherited by Hong Taiji. After Hong Taiji passed, and while the Xuanji Emperor was still young, his legacy was carried on by Dorgon, paving the way for the Qing conquest. Yet, certain differences prevented the Jin from unifying China. Unlike the later Qing dynasty, these differences lay in the enemies the Jin and Qing faced, while similar in name. They were, in fact, entirely different. The Song appeared weak, yet proved difficult to crush. And the Ming seemed mighty, yet rotted from within. We shall now analyze further the differences between Song and Ming. Mentioning the Song, we think of a cowardly era, feeble, trading land for peace. While true, that is not the whole story. For if that were all, the Song would have fallen to the Jin long ago. While the Ming failed to stop Li Zicheng, allowing him to reach Beijing, the Song effectively quelled both the Liangshan and Fenglao rebellions. Minor uprisings were suppressed by local troops, despite their limited martial strength. What, then, was the actual cause? In truth, despite flawed military judgment, we must admit the Song were masters of economy. The Song dynasty reached an economic peak, unmatched by any in history. Song commerce flourished. It wasn't the only dynasty to do so, but the only one where commercial tax surpassed land tax. Circulation tax was 3%, value tax 2%. Commodity trade thrived, allowing landless peasants to work in cities. Life was often better than farming, so land-grabbing wasn't a severe crisis for them. The Song dynasty had highly developed social welfare, arguably better than any era before or since. During disasters, most dynasties simply provided relief or tax breaks, unable to do much more. The Song, however, organized a force known as the Xuanbing to handle logistics and aid. They weren't sent to fight, as they were no match for regular troops. This made the Song court a lifeline for refugees, as no other dynasty would grant official status to the displaced. Furthermore, Song taxation was arguably perfectly equitable. For the first time in feudal history, the court taxed those who owned large tracts of land directly. Or put simply, it targeted the landlord class. The Song tax system focused directly on the landlords. Anyone holding land was required to pay taxes. The more land held, the higher the tax burden. Those without land paid nothing. This significantly impacted the incentive for land accumulation. Overall, life for the Song people was quite good, at least by feudal standards. Any discontent was generally local in nature. Song peasants, despite losing land or facing disaster, were rarely pushed to the brink. Tax burdens remained manageable. Even with corrupt officials in the Song court and fearful emperors, the people remained largely loyal to the dynasty. Because of this, uprisings during the Song were mostly local and confined in nature. Furthermore, the Song intellectual class was exceptionally well-treated. Those serving as officials, even minor ones, enjoyed a very high quality of life. The income of Song officials was indeed the highest of any dynasty. Consequently, very few had any intention of joining dissatisfied rebels against the court. Lacking military expertise, a mob of disgruntled peasants unable to read classics or understand strategy with limited resources could never defeat the imperial army long term. Thus, while Song uprisings were not uncommon, they were local and quickly suppressed. Even the most dangerous uprising before northern Song fell, Fang LAs, was crushed. They could never ignite a widespread movement like Li Zicheng's during the Ming. Thus, the Song always had a stable rear to retreat to when Jin forces invaded or to concentrate their efforts. One might ask, didn't the Song fight rebels alongside the Jin? How was their rear considered stable? We must note that like Liang Shan or Fang La, southern Song rebellions were quelled immediately. They failed to form a widespread threat, despite the chaos after the north fell to the Jurchens. As a trade-heavy society, the retreat south to a fertile region kept their economy booming. Despite losing the Yellow River, their economic strengths sustained public support, allowing them to resist the Jin. Next, let us analyze the Song military. Despite being portrayed as a weak military force, the reality was not as it appeared. The Song military was not specialized in offense, but focused on defense with remarkable endurance. Making them difficult to defeat in war. This was further supported by strong logistics. As a wealthy state, the Song fully supported their troops. The salaries for officers and soldiers were very high. Logistical forces, often recruited from disaster refugees, were more cost-effective than standard conscription. Even if suppressed by civil officials, military officers received excellent treatment. Winning a single battle against the Song was possible, but wiping them out entirely was extremely difficult. The Mongol Empire later required a very long time to destroy the southern Song, suffering heavy losses. In fact, were it not for the extreme emphasis on civil over military affairs and poor tactical decisions, the Jin might have been pushed back north. The dynasty could have been an empire rivaling the Tang, rather than being confined to the south. As for the Ming, we must clarify, they fell to Li Zicheng, not the Qin. When the emperor hanged himself, the eight banners were still beyond the Great Wall. If Wu Sangui hadn't opened Shanghai Pass, Li Zicheng might have established his Shun dynasty to rule China instead of the Manchus. If the Ming had suppressed Li Zicheng's rebellions like the Song dealt with Feng La or the Liangshan rebels, the Qin would have struggled to capture the capital. Wu Sangui wouldn't have dared open Shanghai Pass, but the Ming failed due to flawed economic policies. It can be said that while the Song made many military mistakes, they were extremely sagacious regarding their economy, giving the southern Song a chance to survive. Conversely, the Ming made fatal errors in both economy and military, leading to the collapse of the entire nation. As analyzed, Song farmers could still survive despite land loss or natural disasters. Therefore, they would never risk their families' lives to rebel. In contrast, Ming citizens lacked this opportunity. Although the Chongzhen Emperor tried his best to revive the legacy, the ruin left by previous monarchs was simply too vast. This contrasts with the Song, whose economy thrived across many generations, right up until their destruction by the Mongols. By the late Ming, isolationist policies were lifted. However, trade could not rescue the crisis-stricken Ming state. Commercial taxes could not replace land taxes. Despite the nascent emergence of capitalism, Ming peasants faced the constant threat of land dispossession. The Ming failed to tax landowners effectively as the Song had done. This allowed the elite to relentlessly seize peasant farmland. Impoverished citizens lacked state support during disasters, and relief was often embezzled. This caused Ming uprisings to spread easily, unlike the localized ones under the Song. Next, let us analyze the military situation. Unlike the Song military, the Ming lacked adequate resources. Was the Ming military weak? The answer is no. Their military strength remained quite formidable, even at the point of collapse. Was not Wu Sangui, a Ming general, once a massive threat? One that Emperor Kangxi struggled to suppress? Xiong Qinggang even led troops to reclaim Taiwan from the Dutch. However, taken as a whole, it was a total mess. This can be traced back to 1570. The decay of the Weisuo system forced the Ming to shift to a mercenary recruitment system. Under this system, local mercenaries were recruited to boost combat capability and ease local military burdens. As soldiers held low social status, most recruits were from the lower classes, including bandits or drifters, resulting in inconsistent discipline and combat effectiveness. Moreover, these forces were prone to rebellion. The Wuchang Mutiny of 1632-1633 is a prime example. When Commander Yuan Chonghuan arbitrarily executed General Mao Wenlong in 1629, it incited Mao's troops to mutiny and defect to the later Jin. Consequently, soldiers became loyal to their generals rather than the emperor, leading to dire future consequences. Let us now analyze the Southern Ming regime. There were many reasons why it failed to survive like the Southern Song. Notably, the Southern Ming lacked brilliant generals like Yufei or Han Shizhong. While the dynasty had many heroes, none possessed the genius required to save the empire. Unlike the stable, prosperous Southern Song, the Southern Ming lacked this advantage. Furthermore, Ming princes constantly vied for power. Many lived in decadence, incapable of resisting the encroaching Qing forces. In conclusion, the Jin were unlucky to face the Song at their economic peak. Despite losing the north, the Song's southern wealth allowed them to regroup. The Song, despite military failures, remained a powerful, driving state overall. Conversely, the Qing faced a Ming dynasty already in deep decline. Not to mention Li Zicheng, who ultimately toppled the Ming. The Qing military's combat efficiency far surpassed that of the Jin. These factors explain why the Jin failed to unify China like the Qing. Even though both were founded by the Jurchens. What are your thoughts on this topic? Please share your opinions in the comments below. If you enjoyed this, remember to like, share, and hit the notification bell. For now, goodbye and see you next time.