An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, in Panel 4: Risk in Cyberspace—International Legal Dimensions, by Oksana Bulda, Legal Advisor specialized in ICT and cyber-security law, LL.M. in International Business Law, Ghent University Law School (paper jointly authored with Andrew S. Vance, Principal Researcher, Cyber Institute (USA) and Taylor Vance, Cyber Policy, Research and Education Lead, Cyber Institute (USA)).
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Researchers from the Cyber Institute and Ghent University examine the challenges of applying international law to cyberspace, the \"fifth domain\" of warfare. The study highlights a critical gap between evolving cyber threats and existing legal frameworks, advocating for international collaboration and the adaptation of current laws to ensure global security and the protection of societal rights.
I'm Andrew Vance from the Cyber Institute. My colleagues, Oksana Bolda from Denton University
and Taylor Vance from the Cyber Institute, are honored to share our research, International Law
and Cyberspace, the need for collaboration and coordination to promote international peace in
the fifth domain. Our research involved analysis from the United Nations Global Cyber Law Tracker,
the Asian School of Cyber Law's Global Cyber Law Database, and NYU Cybersecurity Center's
International Law Repository. We'd like to thank the program committee for their interest and
support of our research. Hello, my name is Taylor Vance and I am a Senior Researcher
from the Cyber Institute. According to the 2019 World Economic Forum's Global Risk Report,
the fifth greatest strategic and economic risk that nation-states report they are facing is
cyber war. With the escalation of cyber attacks, nation-states are struggling to institute effective
cyber laws. The purpose of our research was to identify the current challenges relating to
international legal framework. The fifth domain, otherwise known as cyberspace, is the newest
theater of warfare joining land, sea, air, and space. It represents an evolution of nation-state capabilities.
But unlike the other domains, the conflicts in cyber war to date have not involved military
or military conflicts. However, there is a conflict between evolving international policies.
The goal of our findings is to influence international political processes to evolve
in order to ensure collective societal protection in relation to societal values, rights, and freedoms.
Good day, my name is Oksana Buldan. I am an LLM student in International Business Law
at the Ghent University in Belgium. The main international instrument available to address
cyber attacks is the Budapest Convention. Also, certain sectoral and regional treaties taken
together provide a disjoint patchwork of regulations for cyber activities. All through this
frameworks indicate that cyberspace is not beyond the reach of international law. Our research
indicates that the sufficient internationally accepted regulatory mechanisms governing cyber
activities are still lacking. The United Nations draft articles on responsibility of states for
international wrongful acts with commentaries is one of the most widely accepted international
agreements currently being considered to adapt to cyberspace. However, it does not adequately
address cyber attacks. The U.S. cyberspace strategy identifies potential international
legal challenges and gaps as it denotes the continuous confrontation of adversaries
throughout cyberspace in order to gain operational advantage. This is in conflict with the UN
Charter which prohibits the use of force by states excepting unilateral or collective self-defense
in the case of an armed attack. The effects of a cyber attack are completely different in nature
than a military operation or other conventional uses of armed force. If international law is to be
an efficient governance structure, it must be adaptable to this new phenomenon without the
need to reinvent an entire regulation framework on each occasion. Good day, my name is Oksana Buldan.
I am an LLM student in international business law at the Ghent University in Belgium. The main
international instrument available to address cyber attacks is the Budapest Convention. Also,
certain sectoral and regional treaties taken together provide a disjoint patchwork of regulations
for cyber activities. Although these frameworks indicate that cyberspace is not beyond the reach
of international law, our research indicates that the sufficient internationally accepted
regulatory mechanisms governing cyber activities are still lacking. The United Nations draft
articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts with commentaries
is one of the most widely accepted international agreements currently being considered to adapt
to cyberspace. However, it does not adequately address cyber attacks. The US cyberspace strategy
identifies potential international legal challenges and gaps, as it denotes the
continuous confrontation of adversaries throughout cyberspace in order to gain operational advantage.
This is in conflict with the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force by states
except in unilateral or collective self-defense in the case of an armed attack. The effects of
a cyber attack are completely different in nature than a military operation or other conventional
uses of armed force. If international law is to be an efficient governance structure,
it must be adaptable to this new phenomenon without the need to reinvent an entire regulation
framework on each occasion. The problem of attribution and accountability in cyberspace
pertains to the difficulty in determining the identity or location of an attacker and hold
those accountable. The Council of Europe has set important international legal standards in this
field through its conventions on mutual assistance in criminal matters, on the prevention of terrorism
and on cyber crime. Nevertheless, serious obstacles still hamper the investigation and
prosecution of cyber offenses, particularly in the context of cross-border networks. The legal
framework for cyber security measures still has no definition of hybrid war, therefore,
the law enforcement actions are extremely limited. Building on the emerging normative convergence,
nation-states should be able to reclaim their central role in the international legislative
process. In the immediate future, nation-states should become more forthcoming in expressing
their opinion as to the interpretation of existing international law to cyber issues.
This will enable the applicable opinion jurors to consolidate and facilitate the process of
transformation of state power into obligations of customary law. Finally, there must be an iterative
process of state-appropriated norm-making to result in the adoption of comprehensive
multilateral undertakings, possibly commencing with the definitional matters to pave the way
towards future consensus building over more substantive issues. My colleagues and I would
like to thank the ninth annual Cambridge International Law Conference for allowing
us to present our research and findings.