China’s Tofu-Dreg Nightmare: Roads Collapse Like Quake, Roofs Slide Like Waterfall!

China's infrastructure miracle turns into a nightmare. Tofu dreg projects everywhere roads collapse, like a 10-magnitude quake roofs slide like a waterfall. China's $28 billion Three Gorges Dam. Tofu dreg project risks catastrophic collapse. Dongguan's electronics empire crumbles factories close and workers face. Wage cuts once bustling city, now silent like death. China's live-streaming industry plagued by chaos. Underage girls being lured with fake pay and fame. Financial white gloves purged CCP bank executives fall in intensive wave. Welcome to China Revealed where we provide timely analysis and grounded perspectives on the stories defining today's China. China's infrastructure miracle turns into a nightmare. Tofu dreg projects everywhere roads collapse, like a 10-magnitude quake roofs slide like a waterfall. Recently, a video showed tiles suddenly sliding off a building at a scenic spot in Haidan Hebei and smashing into cars parked below. Local officials said no one was hurt. The same day in Yiliang County, Yunnan, a newly finished road linking the city center to the Yizhou Expressway cracked and sank over several hundred meters. The section had opened less than two years earlier. In Bohao Town, Hainan, a key provincial road under construction collapsed in February, exposing loose soil and rubble beneath a thin layer of asphalt. The project had not even been inspected yet. These incidents are not rare. Across China roads, bridges, embankments, and buildings are falling apart soon after completion. In hazy Shandong, a river embankment finished last year already showed wide cracks and sections of collapse by March. In Guizhou's Miao Autonomous Prefecture, a road surface looked like dragon scales full of dangerous bumps. In Heilongjiang, workers on a new road simply laid dried grass under the concrete. In Xi'an, villagers filmed cracks running down the middle of recently paved roads. In Lishui, Zhejiang, a new asphalt road had no proper base. People could dig out the sand and gravel underneath with their hands. The problems reach inside homes and public spaces. In Fuzhou, Fujian, plastic manhole covers in one residential complex broke easily underfoot, with nothing but water below. In Datong, Shaanxi, a woman woke at 1 a.m. when chunks of ceiling cement fell on her bed. She needed four stitches in her lip and now fears staying home alone. In Wuhan, diners watched in shock as part of a restaurant ceiling gave way and a worker's leg came through. In another city, a ceiling collapsed while people were eating below. Even high-profile developers like Vanki have delivered buildings with crumbling beams and walls that fall apart when touched. These tofu dreg projects, the Chinese term for shoddy construction, appear from first-tier cities to small towns. Developers cut corners on materials, skip proper foundations, and rush work to meet deadlines. When problems surface, homeowners who paid millions often face refusals for repairs or replacements. In Nanchang, Jiangxi, residents discovered large ceiling holes filled with substandard cement. The developer tried patching instead of replacing units and told them they had no authority to swap apartments because the buildings were resettlement housing handed over to the government. Rights protection efforts are routinely blocked. In Chengdu, villagers who waited seven years for resettlement housing protested after finding serious defects. In Zhengzhou, police loaded homeowners onto buses to stop complaints. In Pingtan, Fujian, around 200 villagers demonstrated after 11 years of waiting only to receive buildings with suspended columns, cracked ceilings, and leaking walls. Many still refuse to move in. Authorities often respond with force or silence rather than fixes. The Chinese Communist Party has long promoted massive infrastructure and housing programs, yet quality control remains weak. Cost-cutting subcontracting, delayed payments to suppliers, and pressure to finish quickly have become standard. When disasters happen from collapsing schools in the 2008 earthquake to today's failing roads and ceilings, victims are often left to fight alone while officials protect the projects and their own records. People note that the same pattern repeats tofu-dreg construction, ignored complaints, and suppressed protests. A 2025 survey put housing delivery satisfaction at only 46.8 points, with quality the top complaint. An industry manager said firms under financial stress cut material costs to deliver on time, and suppliers leave if unpaid. Protests over shoddy resettlement housing have been frequent but often suppressed. In March, two Chinese men posted a video calling on media to focus more on people's real livelihood issues, including food safety, left-behind children, tofu-dreg construction, and elderly people in their 70s and 80s still working in the fields. The post resonated widely. On X, users commented that there is no shortage of journalists reporting injustice, only a lack of outlets willing to publish. One wrote, In China, the country is not for the people. Since 1949, Chinese people have no homeland, only the CCP state. The biggest enemy of the people is the Chinese Communist Party, not Japan or the United States. Others added that only by completely overthrowing the CCP can China's social problems be sustainably solved, and that most disasters in China are systemic disasters. The pattern of failure shows deep problems in China's construction sector, where financial pressures and lack of accountability continue to put ordinary people at risk long after projects are declared complete. China's $28 billion Three Gorges Dam, tofu-dreg project risks catastrophic collapse. The Three Gorges Dam, long promoted by the Chinese Communist Party as a triumph over nature, now stands as a symbol of rushed construction and hidden dangers. During the rainy season, it becomes even more dangerous than ever. On July 1, 2019, satellite images sparked online debate when they appeared to show deformation in the massive structure. Experts who worked on or inspected the project have since described serious quality flaws that were downplayed or suppressed from the start. Dr. Wang Weiluo, a water conservancy expert, told the Epoch Times that early construction on the right bank had many cavities beneath the foundation. Poor mixing and inadequate temperature control during concrete pouring caused thermal expansion and contraction, creating fractures and leaks inside the dam body. An engineer named Liu, who supervised construction quality, confirmed serious problems during concrete pouring. These issues were hidden by the Three Gorges Project Leadership Group under the state council. Zhang Guangdu, a leader of the quality inspection team, wrote to Guo Xuyin, deputy director of the state council's Three Gorges Project Construction Committee, that the team's report was quite reserved, mainly for fear of criticism. He added, The quality is mediocre, this should be clear. It's not as bad as tofu-dregs, but it's not very good either. The key issue is that the construction pace was rushed. Chen Zhengying, another inspection leader, mentioned in a 2002 speech that the team had issued a yellow card warning for the permanent shiplock due to surface defects and overflow phase problems. She said she carried a red card in her pocket ready to halt work if defects were not fixed. Pan Jiazheng, head of the technical evaluation group, outlined five major quality issues in a 2003 speech to the state council acceptance group. One involved cavities found in 2002 by drilling into the shiplock concrete at the bottom, including in areas supporting 800-ton gates. Instead of proper remediation, leaders chose to apply a chemical coating to fractured parts to stop leaks. Pan also raised concerns about the stability of the high-side slopes of the shiplock, which involved deep trenches cut into granite. These shortcuts came at a cost. The Hoover Dam in the United States poured 2.5 million cubic meters of concrete over 21 months with proper ice water mixing and cooling pipes. The Three Gorges Project poured 5.5 million cubic meters in 2000 alone, more than two Hoover Dams in one year after abandoning temperature controls to set a world record. A 2009 report from the Third Engineering Bureau of China Hydropower confirmed defects in the shiplock concrete by 2006. Surveys found 4,688 meters of leaking fractures across 733 instances in the north-south line shiplocks. The dam has also altered the regional climate in dangerous ways. After impoundment began in 2003 areas north of the reservoir in northeastern Sichuan, and Chongqing saw a sharp rise in extreme torrential rains. Fan Xiao, a geological expert, noted that Dazhou historically drought-prone experienced catastrophic floods unseen in centuries starting in 2004. Between 2004 and 2014, at least 32 such events caused direct economic losses of nearly 30 billion RMB and at least 198 deaths in cases with data. NASA satellite analysis confirmed the reservoir increased precipitation in surrounding mountainous areas while reducing it closer to the dam with overall warming trends and no summer cooling effect. Instead of addressing root problems, the Chinese Communist Party has poured more money into follow-on projects. A 57.8-kilometer over-dam highway and ports to bypass the shiplock cost us at least 4 billion RMB. Upstream dams on the Jinsha River were built partly to store floodwater and trap sediment. But they create new risks if any dam in the cascade fails, the sudden release could overwhelm the Three Gorges structure itself. The Yangtze to Wuhan River Water Diversion Project started in 2022 with nearly 60 billion RMB investment adds another flood-release option, but diverts water that would otherwise reach Wuhan. Opposition to the project was silenced early. Hu Suiyu and Ma Shijun, leaders of the Ecological Impact Assessment, concluded that disadvantages outweighed advantages and refused to sign the final report. Hu died of illness in 1991 at age 79. Ma died in a car accident the same year at age 76 with circumstances still unclear. After their deaths, Pan Zhejiang changed the report's conclusion to describe impacts as widespread and profound rather than net negative. This set a pattern. Once leaders decide on a project, experts must prove it feasible rather than assess it honestly. The Three Gorges Dam was sold as a solution to floods, power shortages, and navigation. In practice, it has brought cavities and leaks in critical structures, altered weather patterns that worsen downstream flooding, and required billions more in fixes that introduce fresh dangers. The Chinese Communist Party's rush to claim engineering glory overrode warnings from its own experts. The result is a structure whose long-term safety remains an open question, with ordinary people downstream left to live under the shadow of potential disaster. Dongguan's electronics empire crumbles factories close and workers face. Wage cuts once bustling city, now silent like death. Wuzhou Electronics Technology, a major printed circuit board maker that had run factories in Dongguan for 16 years, halted production on May 28 and closed for good. The company cited shifting market conditions and failed investment strategies. It promised only to pay final wages by June 6, with no word on severance or relocation help. Local residents noticed heavy police presence outside the gates days earlier. One online commenter wrote, No wonder when I passed by a few days ago, I saw many police and special task vehicles parked outside the company. Another added, The situation was already bad last year with police paramilitary and special forces regularly stationed at the entrance. Wuzhou was no small player. It once employed over 10,000 people across bases in Dongguan Meizhou and Jiangxi, and ranked among Dongguan's top private enterprises. Its products went into communications gear cars, medical devices, and new energy vehicles. Now it joins a long list of closures. Taiwan-backed Kingpo Electronics, which had operated in Dongguan for nearly 30 years and once ranked among the city's top exporters, shut down last November and moved everything to Thailand. Canadian firm Celestica ended operations in its Dongguan plant in July 2025. Japanese-backed Zhongxian Electronics closed after 30 years in late 2023. Even smaller players like Dahong Electrical and Cooper Electronics folded under pressure from falling orders and broken supply chains. Dongguan once thrived as part of the world's factory. In Shijitou, a key electronics hub one in every 10 computers or phones produced globally once relied on parts made there. Streets like Xinyue Pedestrian Street stayed bright late into the night, with shops, food stalls, and migrant workers spending their A former worker who arrived in 2001 recalled squeezing onto the crowded street after getting his first wage. I bought a t-shirt for 15 yuan, ate fried noodles for 3 yuan and called my parents to tell them I was doing well in Dongguan. 20 years later he returned to find rolling shutters down lights out and only his footsteps echoing. What I miss is not the street itself, but the version of myself back then, pocket full of money, eyes full of light believing the future would get better. The golden years from the early 2000s to around 2018 have ended. Rising labor, environmental and land costs, plus the pull of Southeast Asia and inland China pushed orders away. Industry veteran Hu Jianbo described how small and medium factories now face falling orders, rising costs, and heavy debt from earlier expansion. Many bosses borrowed to grow when times were good. Now they cannot survive. In some areas the closure rate has hit 70%. Wages tell the same story. A worker who earned 15 yuan an hour in Dongguan in 2016 now makes only 14 yuan for the same job in 2026. Prices and rents have risen sharply, yet pay has gone backward. Has Dongguan's economy regressed, one blogger asked after posting the comparison? Foxconn. The giant that once defined the region has been quietly shrinking. One department after another closes each year, leaving long-time employees facing layoffs with little warning. Mr. Bai, a local business owner, said tax and market regulators now audit companies constantly suspecting hidden books. They always suspected you have two sets of books, he told reporters. It wasn't like this before. He described policy swings that push real estate one year, new energy the next, and now AI with little continuity or regard for existing manufacturers. The government now makes decisions on a whim, he said. Today one initiative, tomorrow another. The Chinese Communist Party's heavy-handed interventions have accelerated the damage. While officials promote high-tech shifts, traditional factories that once absorbed millions of migrant workers are left to die. The 1970s generation is retiring, the 1980s and 1990s workforces exiting, and few born after 2000 stay on assembly lines. Bus stops in Dongguan and Shenzhen sit unused. Towns that once hummed day and night now see empty streets, closed shops, and falling populations. For the workers who built these places the cost is personal stagnant, or falling wages, sudden layoffs, and the slow realization that the system that once pulled them in now offers no path forward. China's live-streaming industry plagued by chaos. Underage girls being lured with fake pay and fame? China's online live-streaming industry has turned into a hunting ground for underage rural girls. Companies post job ads promising high base salary and easily become an internet celebrity on recruitment platforms. They target girls who dropped out of school, face family hardship, or dream of quick money and fame. Once the girls sign on, the promises vanish. They face strict rules, low pay, constant monitoring, and pressure to wear revealing clothes or flirt with middle-aged male viewers. 16-year-old Mu Yao from Zhoku Henan dropped out of high school and saw an ad offering over 4,000 yuan base salary, up to more than 10,000 yuan, about $1,450 with commissions. She joined right away. The company gave her an adult-authenticated Momo account so she could stream without age checks. She was told to stream at least six hours a day for the base pay. If she fell short by even a few seconds, the whole stream counted as invalid. She also needed to stream at least 26 days a month or lose the base salary entirely. After more than two months, she left with only 2,000 yuan. Mu Yao said newcomers who stay one or two months usually get just 1,000 or 2,000 yuan. Earning real money requires pleasing top fans or big brothers, wearing more revealing outfits, and tolerating borderline content. The company monitored her both online and offline. Many girls faced the same setup. Yes, Yino, another streamer at the same company, described rules that made the work exhausting. The live room had to switch topics every 30 seconds or face fines for awkward silence. The company set fake stream locations to Jiangsu Zhejiang or Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou Shenzhen to attract richer viewers. Streamers had to call male fans, husband chat with them after going offline and agree to offline meals if asked. Yino joined in mid-April but received only a few hundred yuan in May because the company claimed her April hours were insufficient. She resigned but had her wages withheld. The company also employs girls under 16. 15-year-old Zhao Qing from a rural area dropped out of junior high and saw an MCN company ad in Jian'an saying, want to earn big money. She went alone. The rules were the same at least 6 hours a day and 27 days a month. The company supplied adult accounts. Most viewers were middle-aged men who demanded she call them, husband wear revealing clothes, dance provocatively or join PK punishments. When she refused operations staff verbally abused her. The boss once banged a chair with an iron rod to threaten her. Her daily income peaked around 71. Missing targets meant almost no salary and leaving wrist-high breach of contract penalties. These cases are not rare. Jimu News reporters posed as underage girls on recruitment apps and contacted more than 10 live streaming companies. Some did not reject minors. They asked for photos, inquired about dance backgrounds, and invited the girls for interviews and auditions. Chinese law bans platforms and companies from hiring anyone under 16 for online live streaming. Yet many firms openly bypass the rule by using adult accounts and ignoring age checks. The pattern is clear. Companies exploit rural girls' poverty and dreams of quick success. They promise easy money and fame but deliver long hours, impossible targets, withheld wages and pressure to cross personal boundaries. Girls who leave after a short time often receive almost nothing. Those who stay face mental strain from constant flirting with older men and fear of penalties. The industry's rapid growth has created a system where vulnerable teenagers become disposable labor. The Chinese Communist Party has laws on the books to protect minors but enforcement is weak. Companies continue to recruit and exploit underage girls while platforms look the other way. Behind the flashy promises of internet fame lies a harsh reality of low-pay debt and lost youth. Many of these girls end up trapped in a cycle of false hope and financial disappointment, with little recourse when the companies fail to deliver what they advertised. Financial white gloves purged CCP bank executives fall in intensive wave. In recent years, many high-level executives in China's financial system have fallen from power. In the past half-month alone, eight senior CCP financial and banking executives have been intensively purged. Commentators believe that from an economic perspective, the authorities are also looking for scapegoats for bad debts and financial risks. On June 4, the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Wei Wei, former senior expert at the China Development Bank, is suspected of serious violations of discipline and law and is currently under investigation. Two days earlier, Zhang Zhigang, former member of the China Development Bank's executive committee and former senior expert of the expert committee, was also investigated. Over the past year, several senior experts at the China Development Bank have fallen from power. American economist Davy J. Wong commented, The first is to forcibly reclaim control over fiscal power and establish absolute control over China's finances. With current fiscal exhaustion and foreign capital withdrawal facing these difficulties, the authorities no longer allow anything to exist outside the control of power. The essence of anti-corruption is further centralization of finance, forcibly concentrating the fund allocation and usage rights scattered across major banks and local financial institutions under central supervision. Notably, the China Development Bank was once the power base and interest territory of Chen Yuan, son of CCP elder Chen Yun, and a red second generation. Chen Yuan served as president of the China Development Bank, starting in 1998 and later concurrently as party secretary. After the bank's restructuring in 2008, Chen Yuan became chairman and party secretary until April 2013. U.S.-based current affairs commentator Zheng Haocheng observed China's banks are now being purged. And this is related to the overall situation. When China's economy was still relatively prosperous, all kinds of people could get a share of the pie so everyone could coexist peacefully. Now that the economy is in terrible shape, everyone from top to bottom is staring at the money bag. On May 29th this year, Xin Chiang, former deputy general manager of the credit approval department at Bank of China, Feng Hongtao, former deputy general manager of China Merchants, Capital Investment Company Limited, and Wang Hao, vice president of Bank of Communications. Financial Technology Company Limited were all announced under investigation on the same day. These bank executives and financial white gloves have also amassed astonishing wealth in the past. Now, the national stage needs to be reclaimed. Through anti-corruption, the authorities can seize and confiscate these people's massive assets, indirectly providing a blood transfusion to alleviate the urgent fiscal crisis. American economist Davy J. Wong believes that while financial anti-corruption strengthens the authorities' power control, it also causes collective lying-flat and loss of efficiency in the financial sector. Please share your views in the comments. If this content resonated with you, we invite you to share it with your network. Your continued support helps make independent high-quality journalism possible. Subscribe and like to stay up to date with China Revealed. Thank you for watching.