Why Israel Is Unhappy With Trumps Iran Deal

The war with Iran has been a major setback for the United States. None of its main objectives have been achieved. The Iranian government is still in power. Its nuclear stockpile remains in place. Its missile and drone capabilities are largely intact. At the same time, Tehran has shown that it can disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz whenever it wants, giving it the ability to cause serious economic damage to its neighbors and beyond. Welcome everyone to Caspian Report, I'm your host Shirvan and today's episode is one I've been looking forward to. The Strait of Hormuz, that's the conversation everyone is having these days. This is what the situation looks like right now in real time. Ships are lining up to pay the but the number of vessels going in and out is considerably lower than before. This shows ships inbound and these are the ships outbound. Meanwhile, this is the section that's been closed off by Iran. Any commercial vessel passing through it without having talked it over with Iran will get targeted by them. Let me just filter the incidents. So, this right here shows places where ships were targeted. By the way, this interface is from our own app, DeltaSweep. It tracks AIS feeds in real time and allows you to monitor activity in the Strait of Hormuz with unmatched clarity. You can try it out for yourself at DeltaSweep.com. Anyway, tracking these ships is quite difficult. There's a lot of gray zoning here. Some ships turn off their tracking systems, others change flags and names and still others essentially transfer cargo at sea, thereby bypassing sanctions. These activities create a shadow fleet of sorts in and around the Strait of Hormuz. It's just something to keep in mind. Zooming out, you can see which countries are the most affected by the closure of the Strait and which are the least affected. Interesting, America is among the least troubled. Thanks to fracking, the United States can meet its domestic demand. This map here shows all the oil and gas fields worldwide. North America has more than enough for itself. But now, with Venezuela under its thumb, refineries in Texas can turn that Venezuelan black goo into something useful. So perhaps years from now we could see Venezuelan oil reaching European markets via the United States. But right now, with the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, some of America's allies are under stress, particularly Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and much of Europe. If these countries cannot restore stable energy flows, their stockpiles will run out in a matter of months. And so when Trump asks European and Asian allies to step up, to send warships and help open the Strait, he does make a point. Those countries need the oil and gas from the Persian Gulf more than America. But none of them want to get their hands dirty. So why then does Trump still want to open the Straits? Well, energy markets will eventually compensate. Even if America has enough oil to meet its own domestic needs, prices will surge eventually when global markets shift. Also, while Trump has used tough rhetoric towards allies, he cannot allow these allies to weaken to the point that it would affect their capabilities. This right here shows all the most important US military bases abroad. If these host nations were to decline, it's really the entire American security umbrella that would take a hit. Without those allies, we would see a downgrade in US power projection. So, in many ways, the Hormuz crisis is very much similar to the Suez Crisis of 1956, which marked the end of the British and French empires. If America continues to act recklessly, the Hormuz crisis could set in motion the end of its empire. So, Trump wants to avoid that at all costs. Which brings us to the present situation with Trump negotiating for an exit strategy. For Israel, none of that matters. Israel lives in an entirely different geopolitical plane. For the government of Netanyahu, Trump's deal with Iran creates anxiety because they would be expected to live with the consequences of a deal they did not negotiate. Not surprisingly, this is generating friction between Trump and Netanyahu. Now, that sounds like a very weird thing to say. At large, Trump has been a superb ally to Israel. Truly one of a kind. He's delivered plenty of political wins to Netanyahu. He's recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, moved the US embassy there, he's recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and continued military support to Israel overall. In fact, Trump's support for Israel has been so profound that he may be more popular in Israel than Netanyahu is. But Israel, and particularly Netanyahu's government, has many vulnerabilities and shortcomings. Mainly, none of the battlefield victories that Israel has scored in recent years have translated into political gains. None. Israel has been unable to decisively crush Iran, Hezbollah, or even Hamas, and so Netanyahu needs Trump's support now more than ever. But the two have wildly different interests, and those discrepancies are steadily surfacing as we're now entering the endgame phase. The real test is now the Iran-US negotiations, and how they're moving toward a memorandum of understanding. And based on what we know from open source intelligence, the new deal with Iran will be perceived by Israeli policy makers, including Netanyahu and his political opponents, as a lose-lose. This graph shows the main talking points, the points of contention. The black dots represent US positions, while the red ones illustrate Iran's. The staking points range from Iran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, to sanctions relief and security guarantees, but also ceasefire in Lebanon, and war reparations. The deal Trump is working on will have the Iranian theocracy and the IRGC remain in place. In fact, the post-war government in Tehran will be even more hard-lined than before, and there will be no conditions for regime change down the line. What's more, the Iranian government is now more cohesive than ever before, and above all, they've set a precedent by withstanding a major US attack, and while doing so, coming up with a new weapon of deterrence, namely the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. Equally important, despite the massive US bombing campaign, Iran has shown that no country can impose serious restrictions on its nuclear infrastructure, only quickly enable the nuclear sites. So, Natanz, for instance, which is here, was bombed quite heavily, but it's already showing signs of restoration. Meanwhile, Pekax Mountain, which is to its south, is believed to hold the missing 400 kilos of enriched uranium. 60% enriched to be exact, which is very close to weapons-grade in technical terms. With just a little more refining, Iran will have enough material to make about a dozen bombs. But Pekax Mountain is too deep for even the most sophisticated bunker buster, so it was largely left intact. Anyway, the fact that Iran survived months of unseen levels of bombardment has set an important precedent. What we have now is an Iran that is more confident than before, more willing to take risks, less fearful. And in the years to come, as the country regains access to its frozen assets, we will see an Iran that is way stronger than today. Every dollar released today could be tomorrow's drone, proxy operative, or missile. And after rebuilding and expanding its conventional capabilities and asymmetric capabilities, we will see an Iran that is somewhat untouchable. That is to say that the cost of fighting Iran will vastly outweigh the benefits. So a war with Iran will become highly improbable in years from now. And once that happens, inevitably, Iran will go nuclear. Check this. These are the missiles in Iran's arsenal. Some go as far as 2500 kilometers. But this one in particular, the Khorramshahr, has a massive payload capacity. If any of Iran's missiles are going to carry nuclear warheads, it will be this one. The point is that Iran already has the missiles and fissile material. And it also has the know-how and capability to produce even more. And that's precisely why America insists on a complete end to its nuclear enrichment program and that the 400 kilos of enriched uranium be handed over, while Iran's ballistic missile program be subject to severe restrictions. Iran, however, isn't having any of it. Iranian officials argue that nuclear energy is a sovereign right and thus non-negotiable. They are willing to temporarily limit some aspects of the program in exchange for sanctions relief and economic normalization. As this graph shows, the talking points are extremely complex. And with zero trust between the parties, it is simply impossible to bridge the gaps in a matter of weeks. Addressing each and every sticking point is going to take time. Lots of time. What Iran is lacking currently is deterrence. But with Trump's deal and the lifting of the sanctions, Iran will rebuild its economy, infrastructure and, of course, deterrence. It will take time, yes. But what is a decade or two in the grand scheme of things, really? For Israel, this is a nightmare. It's a pyrrhic victory. Meaning they've technically won, but at such a high cost that it is essentially defeat in the long term. And that's precisely what Netanyahu is trying to undo or prevent. But while Netanyahu may have had key influence up to this point, especially in initiating the US-Iran war, he has little to say as to how or when the conflict ends. The negotiations are primarily between Washington and Tehran. Israel is not driving the process. And this feed, right here, confirms as much. If the memorandum of understanding is signed and it plays out exactly or as fluently as agreed upon, hostilities between the United States and Iran will gradually cease. This then creates space for a new round of negotiations, focusing on all the other complications, such as opening the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of US sanctions, etc. If everything goes flawlessly, then eventually the process will lead to the normalization of relations between Iran and the US. Once that happens, once the memorandum is signed, the blame game will begin. Netanyahu will point the finger at Trump and argue that the US failed to achieve political objectives, while Trump will blame Israel for overreaching in Lebanon. But one thing Trump will likely be careful with is not to be baited by Netanyahu into renewing hostilities with Iran, not like last time. So, from an Israeli perspective, they need to really derail the upcoming deal between the US and Iran. There's just too much at stake. And this is why the Israelis want to resume hostilities. They believe Iran is now at its weakest, its military capacity has diminished, and its proxy forces such as Hezbollah are under pressure. At the same time, Israeli officials fear that the Trump deal may leave parts of Iran's nuclear program intact or postpone complex decisions until later negotiations. And it does look like that's the case. The nuclear sticking points are being postponed to a later date, while the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which in itself has little consequence to Israel, has taken top priority. For clarity, the Israelis do not fear a bad agreement because it ends the war. They fear a bad agreement because it could leave Iran as a threshold nuclear state and allow it to grow stronger over the years and eventually attack Israel at the time and place of its choosing. That is strategically dangerous for the state of Israel, existential even. Let's just go to the country real quick. You see, Israel has a terrible geography. At its widest point, that would be here, it is only about 110 kilometers across. But at its narrowest point, here in the north, the distance from the West Bank to the sea is only 17 kilometers. And this right here tells you everything you need to know. It is precisely for this reason that Israel will never relinquish control of the West Bank and allow for the formation of an independent Palestinian state. Without the West Bank, Israel has no strategic depth whatsoever. 17 kilometers leaves no space to withdraw, regroup and counter-attack. Strategic depth is essential for national security. It determines how much time one has to recover from an initial attack. Space and time are perhaps the two most important components to warfare. Heck, even with the West Bank, Israel only has 63 kilometers of depth. But without the West Bank, its existence becomes close to impossible. And this is also why the Israelis keep expanding settlements into the West Bank. It has no plans of relinquishing control. Here is what the situation looks like as of now. Area B is where there is civilian Palestinian control, but with Israeli security. There is no territorial cohesion to speak of. The West Bank today is just a collection of loose clusters. And that's precisely the point. When there is no geographic continuity, there cannot be an independent state. Anyway, the point is that Israel cannot tolerate defeat at its borders. A setback would only give it at most 110 kilometers in which to retreat. And this geographic vulnerability shapes just about everything in Israeli military doctrine. Since the day of its inception, Israel has had by preemptively hitting its neighbors and defeating hostile forces early in a war. The only time the Israelis were caught off guard was during the 1973 attack by Egypt and Syrians, which had been armed and coordinated by the Soviet Union. Israel was on the verge of being overrun. And the only thing that saved the country was the fact that the Egyptians, the Syrians, and the Soviets had not anticipated early success and the forces on the ground were stunned as what to do next, which gave the Israelis the necessary time to regroup and counterattack. Israel won that war, but it did not solve its strategic dilemma. The lack of strategic depth is what drives Israeli policymakers to effectively expand Israel's borders outward. Most notably right now is the Israeli push into Lebanon. The Israelis are looking to exercise control up to the Litani River, thereby limiting access to Israel itself by non-state actors such as Hezbollah. However, the problem with this is that even with the amount of territory taken as a buffer, it is still not enough to eliminate the threat posed by Hezbollah and groups like it. New weapons continue to develop. Think of hypersonic missiles, fiber-optic drones, high-energy lasers, AI-enabled systems, and much more. These weapons will stress the Israeli military to its limits. Meanwhile, the relationship between the United States and Israel is one that was really formed by the realities of the Cold War and then renewed by 9-11. But as time passes and new generations of lawmakers come into office, national interests will eventually change along with them. There is no guarantee that the United States will always be an ally of Israel. So for Netanyahu and his government, the momentum is now. A memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran right at this moment in time would cancel years of conflict and hard-won gains and give the initiative to Iran, which would then, in years from now, come back to haunt Israel. This is then precisely why Israeli forces are currently bombing Lebanon. The intent is to provoke the Iranians into overplaying their hands and then forcing the political talks with Trump to collapse. And it almost happened on June 8. Iran launched several waves of missiles toward military bases in central and southern Israel. It was the first such direct exchange of fire since the ceasefire in April. And the attack came in response to an Israeli strike on Beirut a day earlier, during renewed fighting with Hezbollah. After Iran's attack, Israel then retaliated with airstrikes against military targets inside Iran. And this brought the two very close to a broader confrontation. It was only after intervention by Trump that the Israelis and Iranians agreed to step back from further escalation. But the exchange highlights the nuances of the ceasefire and all the finer political interplays. Israel is trying to preserve freedom of action against Hezbollah even as the United States tries to preserve the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon and advance diplomatic talks with Iran. Meanwhile, Iran is signalling that Lebanon is part of the broader regional ceasefire and that any Israeli attack on Hezbollah would trigger an Iranian response. For weeks now, Iran has warned that Israeli attacks on Hezbollah, especially in the capital Beirut, would be seen as a violation of a larger ceasefire. Trump, however, has been trying to separate the Lebanon front from the diplomatic channels in Iran. So, by launching missiles at Israel in response to events in Lebanon, Iran is sending a clear message that the two fronts are connected. The Iranians are now trying to reinforce that idea. But this also shows us that Iran is increasingly negotiating from a position of relative strength. Now, neither Iran nor the United States want to restart hostilities. But the recent exchange shows just how quickly Israeli action in Lebanon can spill into a fight with Iran and thereby threaten the negotiations with America. But what's more, in October, possibly sooner, Israel will hold elections. So, in the next round of attacks, Netanyahu will face pressure, domestic pressure, to recalibrate more decisively and project strength ahead of the election season. Ultimately, at a fundamental level, the strategic objectives of the United States and Israel differ greatly. Netanyahu wants to weaken Iran, roll back its regional influence and eliminate nuclear risk. Trump, on the other hand, wants to end the war, stabilize the region, stabilize energy markets, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and secure a diplomatic exit, even if it is less than perfect. If that process moves forward, the fighting would then gradually give way to a diplomatic track. And this is where Israel's options become really more complicated. Israeli policymakers would then start to look for ways to undo the deal, to disrupt it, but not in a way that it openly turns against Washington. So, pressure would become very indirect. For example, Israel could amp up its intelligence campaign. It could look for evidence that Iran is hiding nuclear material or violating the terms of the understanding. Even a small violation could be used to argue that the entire process is flawed. Israel could then increase military pressure on Iranian proxies as a means of provoking Tehran into overreacting. It could take the fight to Washington DC where Israeli groups could redouble their lobbying efforts in Congress or leak intelligence to pressure American lawmakers. And it's efforts like these that could risk collapsing the diplomatic track altogether. So, while American policymakers see a deal with Iran as the end of a crisis, the Israelis see it as the beginning of something even more dangerous. Now, before we wrap up, a quick note about DeltaSweep. Everything you saw in this episode is available inside the platform. It brings together maps, live data, maritime traffic, military activity, infrastructure, and open source intelligence into one dashboard. And frankly, that's how we've been able to spot unusual developments before they're reported by the mainstream headlines. And by signing up, you can get access to the very same dashboard. If you go to the annual plan, the price is just six dollars a month. But that price will not stay there forever. As we add more tools, more data layers, and more features, the price will go up permanently. So, this is the cheapest DeltaSweep will ever be. And anyone who signs up in the next seven days will have that six dollars a month locked in for as long as their account is active. So, even in five or ten years, your price will remain the same. There is a seven-day trial at sign up, so don't overthink it. Try it and see for yourself. The value you get is insane. Go to deltasweep.com and get that early bird discount. Anyway, that's all we have for today. Thank you for watching and sticking with us until the end. And sahol.