The U.S. and Iran Have Reached a "Deal". Will It Last?

Nothing is ever as it seems anymore, and even simple declarations bring deeper intrigue, which we are now going to have to spend today unpacking. As is likely clear, I am referring to the Iran deal, circa June 2026. Now, I thought I knew what to do when I heard its announcement. Sure, it seems like we have been here 67 times before. But this time, they assure me it is real. Third parties seem to be indicating as much, and there will be a signing ceremony on Friday. Anyway, we could simply look at the terms and have a nice early retrospective on the war and where it situates the US political and military positions for the next handful of years. Easy as that. Well, the thumbnail for this video said, What's in the deal? You might have read that as a question that this video would answer. But no, that is an ongoing question, and that is actually a more interesting point. Hence, we need to spend most of today unpacking the drama surrounding that, with a side of discussion on how to ensure compliance with whatever deal forms, paired with a tasteful amount of lines on maps. Trump announced that a deal had been reached late Sunday afternoon in a Truth Social post, which limited the details to toll-free passage through the Strait of Hormuz and the end of the US blockade. Further details were less forthcoming, as Trump was then preoccupied with cage fighting on the White House lawn, and then immediately departed for the G7 summit in France. No doubt Iranian politics will dominate the discussions there. For further details, we have to scrape a bit further. About an hour before Trump's post, Iranian state media published an article discussing a 14-point plan. English-language outlets have picked up on it and treated it like Iran's version of the deal, which is probably not the right interpretation, unless you take those words literally, Iran's version of the deal, rather than Iran describing what is in the deal. It reads like a typical publication from the last, say, two months. A lot of talk about what Iran wants, but no claim that this is the actual deal that the parties agreed to. Let this serve as a general reminder that whenever you see a news account on social media claim that Source X said Z, but it does not actually link to Source X, you might want to actually find the original article and make sure that they actually said Z. Well, I have taken that step for you, and whatever it is worth, here are the main points from the Iranian media source. Point one, Iran and Oman have a right to collect fees in exchange for providing, quote, safety, navigation, and security services along the strait, and it will, quote, remain unchanged under any further agreement. Note that this already contradicts the U.S. version of the deal, which should raise some red flags. Point two, the war will cease on all fronts, including Israel and Lebanon, and the United States will guarantee that Israel follows through. Israel has already said no thanks to that, so good luck with any of this staying in force. As you have likely already noticed due to how much it has warped the U.S. political environment, the White House has significant levers that it can pull to coerce Israel into ending the Lebanon war, most notably withdrawing U.S. military aid. It is unclear whether Trump wants to do that, though reporting suggests that Netanyahu has also gotten on his nerves. Point three, the U.S. blockade must end within 30 days. Hooray, something finally consistent between the two parties. Point number four, a $300 billion development and reconstruction fund is proposed. Something to that effect may very well eventually happen, though it would be difficult to imagine that the money would come from anywhere other than frozen Iranian assets. Basically, this would release Iranian money that is otherwise stuck in an account somewhere in a Western country. If this is true, Iran will certainly describe this as reparations payments, but I think that understanding where exactly the money is coming from is an important part of the story. Also, in describing the general release of frozen assets, Iranian state media says that Iran considers this one of the most important achievements of the first phase and remains committed to securing it. Let me emphasize that endpoint from the quote, remains committed to securing it. As in, this is not a deal that is actually in place, but negotiations are still ongoing. So, again, treat this accordingly. Point five, the United States has committed to lifting primary sanctions against Iran. Okay, this clearly shows that the alleged Iranian version of the agreement has no sense of political realities in Washington, which makes me further skeptical that Iran's summary of the agreement is accurate and that this is not just an Iranian policymaker trying to, and succeeding in, drawing headlines. One of the things that Iran complained about with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action back in 2015 is that the deal only resulted in Obama issuing temporary sanctions waivers, and specifically waivers on secondary sanctions that targeted purchasers of Iranian products. Iran is claiming that primary sanctions will end, meaning sanctions on Iran itself. And it also suggests that the sanctioning will be fully done with, not just temporarily relieved via sanctions waiver. Now, you might be wondering how sanctions can actually end. Well, the answer in the short run is only through an act of Congress. In turn, you might wonder what Congress thinks about the subject. I am glad you asked. In December 2016, Congress extended the Iran Sanctions Act for 10 years on a 419 to 1 vote in the House and a 99 to 0 vote in the Senate. Obama let it sit on his desk for 10 days without taking action, allowing it to become law, without Congress having to waste time to formally override a presidential veto. I will discuss this whole sanctioning thing again in a minute, but Trump cannot promise what Iran is saying is on the table. That is nuance that will escape public opinion, which again leads me to believe that the article is an Iranian attempt to influence the information space, rather than an accurate report of what is happening with negotiations. Point six. Further negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program are limited to highly enriched uranium. Or at least that is the first thing that it says. A couple of paragraphs later, it also says that Iran commits to not building a nuclear weapon. Control over highly enriched uranium ought to imply the second, but I think that is worth noting. To be resolved is what to do with Iran's collection of 60% enriched uranium, which Iranian media says will be dictated via, a formula proposed by Tehran. If that sentence did not make sense to you, the issue needs to be resolved, but Tehran decides what it wants to do, then you are not alone. Anyway, the whole future negotiations framing of this means that we ought to stop our own conversation about this being a deal, and instead shift it to a conversation about future negotiations. Now, if anything like what Trump or Iranian media suggest is happening, it may very well reflect an improvement upon the status quo, especially for oil markets. No doubt that consumers around the world will appreciate more freely flowing oil, but this is hardly a deal in the sense that it has been advertised as such. Even Iranian media noted that the sanctions relief in the previous point is conditional on reaching an agreement here. So, um, good luck with that? Point 7. The United States will withdraw US forces from areas surrounding Iran's borders within 30 days. That is a provision vague enough to not have any real meaning. Will the United States withdraw some of its naval assets in the region? Sure, they have been surged there for the purpose of fighting a war. Once the conflict has cooled down, there is no reason for all of them to stay. And I think that the Secretary of State believes that Cuba is pleasant this time of year. But the United States has an absurd amount of military infrastructure and bases all over the region. There is no chance that the White House is dismantling its ability to project power there. So I suppose that US forces to withdraw from areas surrounding Iran within 30 days may be technically accurate. But it is vague enough that it allows Iran to treat it as a major victory, when in fact we are just reverting to the status quo ex-ante. And that gives you 7 points. I do not know how the alleged 14-point plan divides those into more, or if there are further provisions that are not mentioned. Say, those that would be less favorable to Iran. But summing up the known terms of this alleged settlement, there is a ton of media discussion that will, in all likelihood, ultimately be for nothing. Now, was there a way to solve this problem? Yes. The White House could have released a readout of its version of the 14 points, even if it was not a verbatim copy of what will be signed on Friday. But the distraction of cage fighting, and then the ultimate fight about to happen in France, has meant that we get nothing, and we are just left here to stew in our own juices. Nonetheless, there is a general point I want to make about the enforceability of an agreement between the two parties. A separate media narrative that has persisted for months now is that it is a mystery how to get the parties to reach a deal that, mechanically, both will comply with in the long run. On Iran's end, this is a concern that Trump may one day decide that he wants a different deal. On the US end, this is a concern that Tehran may one day just start building nuclear weapons. Let me be as blunt about this as possible. It. Is. No. Mystery. This is a solved problem. It is embarrassing that the prevailing discourse treats it otherwise. We end up wasting further untold amounts of time debating the wrong things. On Iran's side, guess what? Deals involving regional or major powers are not externally enforced in international relations. It has been that way for literally hundreds of years, and yet most agreements work. And the reason is that backing out of a settlement reverts the parties to war, and war is costly. So if you want a deal to be self-enforcing, craft an agreement that matches what both parties expect to get out of a war. Then both sides will want to uphold the agreement, lest they return to fighting, which gives them roughly the same thing, but also imposes substantial costs on both parties. Okay, that was the theory. How does Iran accomplish that in practice? Breaking news! It is the Strait of Hormuz! The ability to shut down the strait gives Iran leverage. Sure, this White House, or the next White House, or the White House after that, could backtrack on the deal. But then the strait gets shut down once more, and we are back to where we are now. Something that is not great for the United States. This is also why, despite a mountain of conversation geared otherwise, it is so hard to believe that any sustainable deal would result in Iran continuing to extort ships trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. I get why Tehran wants to do this. It is a lot of money potentially at stake. But it is also a terribly inefficient outcome that the United States believes is worse than what a war could generate. Put differently, Iran seemingly wants to have its cake and eat it too. This is not possible. Either open up the Strait of Hormuz, or have an unenforceable deal. Your choice. On the US side, guess what? Deals trying to stop weapons programs require some concessions to the would-be developer. I recently discussed this at length in a lecture from my Introduction to International Relations series, so I do not want to rehash the theory. But it is a basic idea. If you do not want someone to do something, then it helps to give them something that they want in exchange. In practice here, that would most likely mean sanctions relief. And that, in turn, raises questions about Congress's willingness to go along with it. The current iteration of Iran sanctions expire at the end of the year. Thus, broad sanctions relief is not as simple as having the requisite lawmakers support another extension. If we think that Trump would want to protect his deal, and therefore veto anything to the contrary that lands on his desk, we would need supermajorities in the House and Senate to override it. The 419 to 1 and 99 to 0 votes from 10 years ago suggest that such supermajorities exist. Democrats might not be inclined to support Trump's policy because Iran is a losing political issue for the president. Republicans have traditionally been more hawkish on Iran, so they may also want to break with the president for a different reason. But Trump has a way of whipping congressional Republicans to match his preferred voting choices, so who knows? All of this strikes me as living in a bizarro world, where everything has flipped upside down. And we are now talking about Trump giving sanctions relief to Iran, after having been so critical of Obama doing the same. But the only coercive alternative here is to threaten greater military action, which seems to be what he is trying to avoid. Welcome to the next phase of our increasingly complicated world at war. Now, I do not think that how to construct effective enforcement mechanisms is a mystery to either side of the deal. When I hear either side complaining about enforcement mechanisms, I therefore do not take them literally. What I hear instead is, we want more from this deal, and we want you to think that we are worried about enforcement mechanisms, so that you will sweeten the pot. It is cheap talk 101 in international relations crisis bargaining, and we are better off if we just ignore it. But I suppose that we will have to wait the next 60 days to see if there is a bridge that can span the gap between them. So, what are our takeaway points for today? Trump claims that we have an Iran deal, which seems to be nothing more than an extension to the current ceasefire, with a relaxation of some or all of the restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz. We do not know the exact details of the deal yet, and you should be extremely cautious when you see analysis of what is supposed to be Iran's leaked version of the deal. Finally, crafting enforceable treaties is not as difficult as the parties make it out to be. But having them both agree that a deal on the table is better than continued conflict may not be easy. Meanwhile, your next view may be an easy choice. It is that introduction to arms control lecture that I mentioned earlier. Click here to check it out. And if you enjoyed today's video, then please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you tomorrow. Take care.