"Life Is Better Now, So Shut Up" – How This Line Controls Millions | Digging into China
In this video, we unpack one of the Chinese Communist Party’s most effective narratives: “Life is better now, so stop complaining.” From empty bowls to highways and high-speed rail, the material gains are real — but that’s exactly what makes the story so seductive.
I explore how the CCP cleverly takes credit for the hard work, sacrifices, and market freedoms of the Chinese people while burying uncomfortable questions about costs, rights, distribution, and alternative paths. Why were people starving under earlier policies? Who really paid for those shiny roads? And why does having meat on the table supposedly cancel out the need for freedom and security?
From grandparents rationalizing past suffering to young people shaped by information control, this narrative crosses generations. It doesn’t just defend power — it reshapes how millions think about gratitude, rights, and reality itself.
If you’ve ever heard “You have it better than before,” this one’s for you.
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. Today, let's talk about why the Chinese
Communist Party's narrative of material progress is so effective at brainwashing people.
When you criticize the CCP, a lot of folks hit you with a very familiar set of questions.
Look at China. Decades ago, people couldn't even afford meat, and now we've got it on the table
every day. Back then, the roads in the countryside were all mud pits. Now just about every family has
a car, and paved roads reach every doorstep. Hasn't the CCP made your life visibly better
over these past few decades? Hasn't it made you more comfortable? You used to have nothing,
now you have everything. Aren't you satisfied? You still think the Communist Party is no good?
Then there is another common line. I'm doing just fine living in China, so why would I want to leave?
Is the government stopping you from traveling abroad? Is it stopping you from spending money
overseas? What's the big deal with the capital controls? You are making a mountain out of a
molehill. How much money do you even have anyway? These aren't things for little people like us to
worry about. We are ordinary folks. We can't change anything. These lines sound plain, down-to-earth,
and backed by real-life experience. They are not the stiff slogans from propaganda videos,
or the abstract language in political documents. They grow out of family chats,
dinner tables with relatives, comments under short videos, and everyday feelings of regular people.
And that's exactly why they are so powerful. They reach the elderly, middle-aged folks,
people with limited sources of information, educated people, and even a lot of young
kids who absorb this logic early on from school, family, and the online world.
But the success of this rhetoric isn't as simple as people get brainwashed. More accurately,
it's a composite mechanism made up of real changes, a selectively presented information
environment, psychological defenses, cultural habits, and calculations of real-world risks.
It taps into China's most sensitive experiences, poverty, hunger, turmoil,
backwardness, and insecurity. At the same time, it obscures some even more critical issues,
cause and effect, costs, distribution, points of comparison, alternative paths,
and people's rights. The genius of this narrative isn't that it tells outright lies.
Its real power lies in taking a portion of real changes and using them to cover up the big
structural problems of the CCP regime. First, why does it grab people's hearts? Because
it's not completely fake. We have to start by acknowledging a basic fact.
After reform and opening up, Chinese people's lives really did change dramatically,
especially since Deng Xiaoping pushed reform and opening in 1978.
China made very obvious progress in infrastructure, industrialization,
urbanization, and the rising consumption power. Using the World Bank's International Extreme
Poverty Line, nearly 800 million Chinese people have been lifted out of extreme poverty over the
few decades. That's about a 75 percent of the global total reduction in poverty during the
same period. Per capita meat consumption jumped from about 4 kilograms in 1962 to around 70
kilograms in 2022, an almost 18-fold increase. Highways, high-speed rail, urban construction,
private cars, household appliances, these things enter the lives of millions of ordinary people.
China's expressways grew from about 100 kilometers in 1988 to over 180,000 kilometers by 2023.
High-speed rail operating mileage exceeds 50,000 kilometers, the longest in the world.
These aren't just abstract numbers, they are real-life changes that generations lived through.
A lot of elderly people still remember the Great Leap Forward and the famine from 1959 to 61,
a nationwide disaster caused by the ultra-left policies under Mao Zedong
and the CCP that killed between 15 and 55 million people. Many remember the people's communes,
ration tickets, the era of big pot meals and shortages, only having meat during the New Year,
walking on muddy roads in the rain. Many middle-aged folks lived through the shift from
bicycles to motorcycles, motorcycles to cars, from simple houses to apartment buildings,
from no phones to smartphones. So when they say life is much better now, that's not a completely
false feeling. The problem isn't there. The real issue is that while the improvements are real,
crediting all of them to the CCP is where it goes wrong. The key trick in this narrative
is to take the wealth that the people created once the system loosened up, markets opened,
and a global division of labor kicked in, and repackage it as a gift from the party. It doesn't
deny the changes you see, it just explains every single one of them as the credit of power.
This step is subtle and incredibly effective. Ordinary people most easily believe what they
can see with their own eyes. Talk to them about fiscal policy, property rights, globalization,
marketization, or institutional costs, and it feels distant. Tell them, hey, can you eat meat
now? And they feel it immediately. So this rhetoric doesn't start with theory, it starts by
triggering life memories. It turns life improvements into political gratitude,
people's hard work into the party's benevolence, and the release of productivity after market
loosening up into the great achievements of CCP leadership. That's the first layer of
why it spreads so widely. Second, the first question it makes people
overlook. Why was China so poor decades ago? A lot of people say we couldn't afford meat before,
now we have it every day, so we should thank the Communist Party. The problem with that line is it
skips a more fundamental question. Why were we so poor that we couldn't even afford meat? Sure,
modern China wasn't wealthy to begin with. Wars, turmoil, weak industrial base, rural poverty,
all that historical baggage existed. We can't pretend pre-1949 China was some already rich
country. But we also can't blame all the long-term shortages, inefficiency, and poverty after the
CCP took power in 1949 entirely on that historical burden. The CCP launched the Great Leap Forward,
and the people's communes from 1958 to 1962, which directly caused the famine and tens of
millions of deaths. After that, they kept pushing planned economy, household registration, class
struggle until 1978, when even the CCP couldn't keep going and had to loosen control somewhat.
Chinese people are hardworking, value family and education, and have strong abilities in
production and business. China is a big population country and agricultural giant,
with land, labor, and market traditions. So why did such a society fall into shortage,
hunger, restricted movement, and high productivity for so long under CCP rule?
Why wouldn't farmers freely decide what to produce? Why couldn't ordinary people freely migrate,
do business or trade? Why did the CCP once label markets as capitalist tales,
crack down on private enterprise, and keep productivity locked up for decades?
Once you ask these questions, the logic of, we have meat now, so thank the CCP for support.
The real question isn't, the CCP lifted you from poor to rich, why aren't you grateful?
It's why a society was kept so poor, closed, and inefficient by CCP control for so long?
And why, when they just loosened some of the controls and let people farm, work, do business,
start companies, move to cities, and engage in foreign trade, why did society unleash
such enormous productivity? And why was the wealth people created then repackaged by the CCP
as their own gift? It's like a guy who's had his hands and feet tied for years,
then they loosen the ropes a bit so he can finally go out and earn money, and the guy who tied him
up says, see, you are making money, now you should thank me. That logic is obviously flawed.
But in the CCP's political narrative, it's made to sound completely natural.
Third, life getting better doesn't automatically make the rulers great. Sure,
rising living standards in a society is an important fact, but the rising living standards
don't automatically prove the CCP is inherently great. In most countries around the world,
as long as there weren't prolonged wars, extreme isolation, total suppression of markets,
or complete locking down of people's movement and trade, living standards usually improve
over decades. The modern world itself is progressing. Agricultural tech advances,
medicine improves, transportation gets better, communications leap forward,
industrial efficiency rises, international trade expands, education spreads, skills accumulate.
China's changes were huge, of course, but they didn't happen in a vacuum. They came from
generations of Chinese leaving the countryside for factories, migrant workers building cities
brick by brick, ordinary families saving for years and investing in their kids' education,
small entrepreneurs and private businesses scrapping by in the cracks, and foreign investment,
technology, supply chains, and global markets flowing into China. So the fact that China
developed can't be simplified into the CCP bestowed this on the people. Chinese families
long suppressed their own consumption to maintain high savings and heavy investment in education.
If you only emphasize CCP leadership, you erase the real creators of that wealth,
the migrant workers, factory laborers, private enterprises, ordinary families
pinching pennies for decades, global trade, and industrial shifts. All that's left is this lofty
CCP saying, look, I gave you all this. That's not a complete historical explanation. It's a
highly filtered political one. Fourth, the roads got built,
but where did the money come from, and who bore the costs? The line about muddy country roads
turning into paved ones reaching every door has a basis in reality. China's infrastructure build-out
has been massive, and transportation conditions in many rural and urban areas improved enormously.
But the thing is, these projects didn't fall from the sky, and they weren't personal gifts
from the CCP using their own money. They came from taxes, land finance, local government debt,
bank loans, massive rural land expropriations, workers' long-term low wages, the conversation
of national savings into investment, and the long-term burdens ordinary families
carried through high housing prices and all kinds of fees and taxes.
What you see are the new highways, high-speed rail, and shiny cities. What you don't see
as clearly are the losses from demolitions, the environmental costs, the heavy debt burdens,
mortgage pressure, education rat race, healthcare anxiety, and pension uncertainty.
A normal government using public resources to build infrastructure is simply doing its public
duty. Because public finances come from society, not from the rulers themselves.
There is a crucial difference in perspective here. The subject mindset tends to think,
the government built me a road, I should be grateful. The citizen mindset keeps asking,
where did the money come from? Was it spent effectively? Was there waste or corruption?
Who ultimately bears the debt? How are the benefits distributed? Is power effectively
supervised? Acknowledging infrastructure improvements doesn't mean you have to accept
the CCP's benevolence explanation. A mature discussion asks about the real costs,
benefit distribution, and sustainability of these projects.
Fifth, the comparison is deliberately selective. This material progress narrative loves vertical
comparisons, how poor we were before, how good we are now. That comparison has some value,
but it's incomplete because it always makes you compare today's China to the poorest,
most closed, most shortage-ridden China of decades ago. Of course, it looks good that way.
It rarely invites you to compare with other societies that went through modernization.
Take Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore. These East Asian societies also went through poverty,
war shadows, authoritarian phases, industrialization, and export-led growth.
Their historical conditions, population sizes, and international environments weren't identical.
So we can't just copy-paste comparisons. But they at least show one thing. There isn't just
one path to modernization, and life improvements don't have to mean long-term suppression of
citizens' rights by the ruling party. China has its own scale, starting point,
and historical burdens. We have to acknowledge that. But acknowledging complexity doesn't
mean comparisons are off-limits. The real questions are, could Chinese people have
improved their lives earlier? Could they have paid less of a price in political campaigns
and institutional turmoil? Could development have happened under more secure property rights,
freer information flow, and a more normal rule of law? Could these have been both economic growth
and more social trust and citizen rights? This is a counterfactual comparison. A lot of people
end the discussion with, the past was so bitter, now it's much better. But the truly important
question is, without the CCP's mistaken policies and long-term control, couldn't Chinese people
have achieved good lives earlier, faster, and with more dignity? It's like someone locks you
in the basement for years, then opens the door halfway so you can see sunlight and says,
see, you are getting sun now, aren't you grateful? You can admit it's better than before, but you also
have the right to ask, was I supposed to be locked up in the first place?
Material improvements can't offset the lack of power. Having meat to eat, cars to drive,
and roads to travel, these things matter. No one should dismiss material progress.
But a person's life isn't made up only of meat, cars, and roads. People also need dignity,
freedom, property security, the right to speak, the right to choose, an environment where kids
aren't shaped by a single narrative, the security that their labor won't be arbitrarily taken,
and basic legal protection when facing power. Do you have the freedom to speak the truth?
Do you have certainty in protecting your property? Can your kids access diverse information? Can you
freely allocate your money? Will your house, land, business, or accounts suddenly lose security
because of a policy change? Can you legally defend your interests? Can you criticize public
policy without being intimidated? These are the deeper parts of the quality of life.
The most effective part of the CCP's material progress narrative is how it shrinks human needs
down to just eating your fill and wearing warm clothes. It tells you, you couldn't eat enough
before, now you can. What more do you want? No roads before, now there are roads. What more do
you want? No cars before, now you have one. What more do you want? The problem with this logic is
it doesn't let people move from survival needs to rights needs. It allows gratitude but discourages
questioning. It allows consumption but discourages organizing. It allows making money but doesn't
necessarily guarantee you truly control your own destiny. So the real issue isn't whether
China has gotten better. The real issue is whether, after life improved, people gain the
rights and protections that match that improved life. If a society only allows improvements in
consumption ability but doesn't allow stable rights boundaries, then that improvement is incomplete.
Seventh, why does this narrative work across age groups? This rhetoric works across generations
because it hits different psychological needs for different groups. For the elderly, it satisfies
rationalizing suffering. Many old people really were poor, hungry, and endured hardship in their
youth, the famine, shortages in the commune era, turmoil during the cultural revolution.
For them, admitting today's improvement is easy. But admitting that a big part of past suffering
was caused by CCP policies is very painful. It would mean much of the endurance in their lifetime
wasn't necessarily for today's good days. It might have been wasted by the party's mistakes.
That's too heavy a conclusion. So many prefer to believe their generation's suffering was for
today's development. That's not just a political judgment. It's psychological self-protection.
For middle-aged people, it satisfies the need for security. They have mortgages, kids,
elderly parents, jobs, health care, social security, all kinds of real pressures. They've
tied their lives to this system. Houses here, kids here, parents here, work here,
connections here, savings here. If you tell them the system has fundamental risks,
it's not just theoretical. It creates real unease. They think, what about my house, my kids,
my job, my savings, my parents? What was all my effort over decades for? So many middle-aged
people aren't completely blind to the problems. They just don't want to see them too clearly.
Seeing too much is too painful and too insecure. So they choose the easiest explanation. At least,
it's better than before. Sometimes, that's not a conclusion. It's a psychological buffer.
For young people and kids, it's about the information environment and emotional training.
From school textbooks, news, short videos, family language, to public narratives, so much
information repeats the same binding. The country equates the CCP. The CCP equates the government.
The government equates order. Questioning the CCP means being unpatriotic. Criticizing the system
means smearing China. Talking about historical problems means historical nihilism. Comparing
outward means worshipping foreign things. Kids haven't learned to separate concepts before they
learn positioning reactions. They can't yet distinguish country, government, party, nation,
people, regime, society, civilization. But they've already been trained with the instinct that
criticizing the CCP means attacking China. That isn't a simple stupidity or bad character.
It's a cognitive framework shaped by long-term information environment.
Why is it so hard to truly dismantle even when people sense some things off? This narrative
doesn't just obscure one issue, it obscures many layers at once. It deliberately takes the
poverty and shortages it once created and uses them as the starting point for today's bragging.
If you start from the poverty and shortages around 1978 and say, look how much better now,
it's persuasive. But that starting point wasn't natural. It was closely tied to the CCP's earlier
policies like the Great Leap Forward, People's Communes, and the Cultural Revolution. Taking a
severely suppressed low point as the reference, then demanding gratitude for the restorative
growth afterwards, that logic itself needs questioning. It obscures distribution. China's
overall progress is real, but it's not evenly shared. Coastal vs. England, urban vs. rural,
inside system vs. outside, those close to power and resources vs. ordinary laborers.
Some gained enormously through land, finance, resources, and policy. Others carried low wages,
high housing prices, education pressure, health care burdens, and pension anxiety.
China's Gini coefficient rose quickly from low levels early in reform to nearly 0.5 at its peak,
recently falling to around 0.36. But wealth concentration and perceived unfairness remains
strong. It obscures sustainability. More meat, but food safety, chronical disease,
and environmental pressure come with it. More roads, but local debt, redundant construction,
and inefficient investment come too. By 2025, local government hidden debt is enormous.
Some high-speed rail lines run chronic losses. Cities grew bigger, but so did high housing
prices, ghost cities, land finance, and demolition costs. More cars, but congestion, emissions,
and energy dependence. High-speed rail is spectacular, but losses, maintenance costs,
and debt pressure on some lines have to be borne by someone. Growth needs to be measured not just
by scale, but by quality, efficiency, and long-term sustainability. It obscures non-material
dimensions. Freedom of speech, rule of law, civil society, privacy protection, mental health,
social trust, space for creativity, these often get sidelined in materialism. Yet they are key
to whether a society can stay healthy long-term. It also obscures power structure issues. Who
distributes the fruits? Who bears the costs? Who has information advantage, policy advantage?
Who can move assets early? Who gains resources through power? When risks come, who gets
sacrificed first? Once you unpack these, it breaks the gentle narrative that we are all getting
better together. Even when someone vaguely senses something's wrong, it's hard to dismantle because
of emotional and identity ties. Insufficient information and comparison ability, high risks
of questioning, self-reinforcing narrative frameworks, and pragmatic calculations.
From a Chinese perspective, the success of this narrative isn't just strong CCP propaganda,
it's because it fits so well with China's long-formed survival logic. Value instability,
visible performance, collective narratives, fearing chaos, loss, standing out, and facing
complex truths. It doesn't make everyone fully believe a lie. It makes many feel this story
sufficiently explains their experience and lets them live safely.
Why do defensive lines cause communication breakdowns?
When you bring up capital controls, freedom to leave the country, asset security, information
blocking, children's education, or long-term risks, many people's first reaction isn't to
enter a discussion about the system. It's psychological defense. They don't hear you
discussing power issues. They hear, are you looking down on my life now? Do you think China
is no good? Do you think you are more awake than me? Are you trying to prove all my choices over
the years were wrong? So you think you are talking about the system. They think you are
denying their life. That's where communication breaks. I'm doing well in China, why would I leave?
That line itself isn't wrong. A person can choose not to leave and feel they are living fine in
China. But the issue isn't whether you want to leave today. It's whether, on the day you want to,
need to, when your kids need to, when assets need to go, or when family risks need hedging,
you have that freedom. Freedom isn't something you must use today. Freedom is that it still exists
even when you don't use it. Not wanting to sell your house today doesn't mean the government can
ban you from selling it. Not wanting a divorce today doesn't mean the law can ban divorce.
Not wanting to leave the country today doesn't mean exit freedom isn't important.
They equate I don't need it now with this right isn't important. That's classic rights awareness
deficit. Is the government stopping you from traveling abroad? Stopping you from spending
money overseas? The problem here is downgrading a systemic issue into a tourism and a consumption
issue. You are talking about whether assets can be freely transferred, children's education freely
arranged, family risks dispersed in advance, personal identity with an exit option, or
leaving a high-pressure system in extreme cases. Stay here. Do you want to go abroad for vacation,
buy luxury bags, transfer a lot of money out? It turns a serious rights issue into a consumption
one. The point of capital control isn't how much money you have today. It's whether your money is
truly and fully yours under the system. China's personal foreign exchange purchases have annual
quotas, like the common $50,000 equivalent convenience quotas, plus restrictions on use,
documentation, bank reviews, and regulatory requirements. So, nominally, it's your money.
But cross-border allocation and free use aren't completely up to you. The real question isn't
how much money do you have anyway. Why worry? It's precisely because you are an ordinary person that
you need to understand risks more. Big shots have offshore accounts, overseas identities,
corporate structures, family arrangements, inside information, and early positioning.
Ordinary people don't have those buffers. When policies tighten, assets get frozen,
exchange rates shift, kids' study abroad is blocked, or family changes happen, ordinary people
are often the first ones stuck. That doesn't mean rich people are absolutely safe. Just that
different classes have different buffers. Rich people have space to diversify. Ordinary people
often have one house, some savings, one kid, one family choice. When stuck, the whole family is
stuck. So having less money isn't a reason not to worry. It's a reason to understand the risks
in advance. We are just little people. We can't change anything. This sounds realistic on the
surface. But it easily pushes people toward giving up judgment. It swaps, I can't temporarily change
the country for I don't even need to change my own judgment. It swaps, I can't control the big
environment for I don't need to understand the big environment. It swaps, I can't change the system
for I don't need to leave a backup for myself and my family. But these aren't the same thing.
You can't change the big environment, but you can change your asset allocation. You can't change
the system, but you can protect your kid's information environment. You can't change policy,
but you can prepare an exit for your family. You can't change others, but you can first make
yourself clear-headed. Ordinary people may not change the national direction, but they can change
their own awareness, their choices, the information their kids receive, and their family's risk
preparation. You don't skip the weather forecast just because you can't change a typhoon. You don't
skip learning escape skills just because you can't stop an earthquake. You don't skip preparing an
exit just because you can't stop a flood. Similarly, you shouldn't completely ignore
systemic risk just because you can't change the system.
10. Why is it hard for them to emphasize? Many people's judgment works like this. As long as it
hasn't happened to me yet, it's not a problem. Someone gets their accounts banned. They say you
must have said something out of line. Someone can't transfer assets. They say your money must
have shady origins. Someone's kids can't leave. They say why do you have to go abroad? Someone
gets suppressed for defending rights. They say you must not know the rules. Someone gets hurt
by power. They say you must have done something wrong. This doesn't necessarily mean they lack
ability to feel pain. It means they are afraid to admit the pain is systemic. Once they admit
others' suffering is a systemic issue, they have to admit it could one day hit them too,
which shatters their sense of security. So they instinctively blame the victim. It's not the
system that's wrong. It's that person. It's not unreliable rules. It's that he was too restless.
It's not about power hurting people. It's that he wasn't honest. It's not social injustice. It's that
he didn't work hard enough. This psychological mechanism uses responsibility shifting to
maintain security. Empathy requires admitting one thing. Other people's misfortune might not be
their own fault. Some structural problem really can hurt people. But once they admit that,
many have to re-understand their own situation. So often it's not that they have zero empathy.
It's that they don't want empathy to open the door to bigger fears.
11. I can jump the firewall. So I get it. It's also a common trap. There is also a group that
says I can jump the great firewall too. I know everything. It looks like progress over those
trapped in the domestic information environment. But it can create new cognitive obstacles.
Jumping the great firewall is just access, not understanding. It gets you past the technical
wall, not necessarily the cognitive one. Many who jump over the great firewall still see
sensational content, emotional short videos, conspiracy theories, low-quality flame wars,
overseas simplified Chinese junk, or just switch platforms to keep believing what they already
believed. They just swapped domestic short videos for overseas ones. The tool changed,
but the understanding framework didn't. Real information freedom requires at least
four abilities. 1. Language ability. If someone can only consume simplified Chinese content,
even after jumping the wall, they are mostly still living in the simplified Chinese world,
which isn't just a language world, but an emotional trauma-filled,
positional, and heavily polluted information world.
2. Filtering ability. They need to distinguish primary sources from secondary interpretations,
emotional venting from evidence chains, facts from opinions, propaganda from traffic-driven
contents. 3. Comparison ability. They need to put China in the same modernization framework with
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Europe, America, Southeast Asia, instead of just saying foreign
countries have bad people too, America has problems too, everywhere is the same.
4. Conceptual ability. They need to clearly separate country, government, party, nation,
people, regime, society, civilization. If they can't, they'll hear criticism of the CCP as
attacking China, discussion of the system as denying the nation, questioning power as worshiping
foreign things. So jumping the Great Firewall doesn't equal being awake. Knowing some dark
stories doesn't equal understanding the system. Following a few overseas bloggers doesn't equate
having to complete a framework. Cursing the Communist Party a few times doesn't equal
truly understanding China's problems. Many develop a knowledge illusion after jumping the Great
Firewall because they saw things blocked inside, they think they've woken up. But without systemic
learning, long-term comparison, conceptual training, and the ability to judge information
quality, they've just entered another information silo. That's also why high-quality content is
hard to truly see. It requires time, background knowledge, logical chains, data, long-term
tracking, and the ability to handle complexity. But platform algorithms prefer emotion,
conflict, conspiracy theories, labels, extremes, and quick conclusions. So many people aren't
failing to jump the wall. They are still not entering the world of high-quality information
even after they do. 12. The root of communication breakdown.
You are not discussing the same things. You are asking, do I have institutional guarantees for
my rights? Do my assets have free boundaries? Do my kids have space to choose? Do ordinary people
have exits? Will this country's rules suddenly flip? They are answering, I can still eat today,
work today, travel today, I haven't been arrested today, I still have this much in savings today.
So it's not just different views, it's different evaluation standards, reference systems,
risk perceptions, and conceptual systems. You say freedom, they hear you want China in chaos.
You say rights, they hear you are never satisfied. You say systemic risk, they hear you are bad
mouth in China. You say asset security, they hear you are showing off your money.
You say kids' future, they hear you look down on Chinese education. You say information blockade,
they hear you feel superior to them. This creates parallel conversations.
The hardest part of this rhetoric to communicate is that they are not discussing the system with
you. They are using I can still get by today to refuse discussing systemic risks.
13. The real issue isn't whether China got better. It's whether Chinese people have the power to
question. So what we need to make clear isn't whether there is more meat or more roads to build.
Those things did happen. What we really need to talk about is, why were we once so poor,
we couldn't afford meat? Why should the wealth created by the people be explained as the CCP's
achievements? Why should public finance construction be packaged as benevolence?
True clarity isn't simply saying China hasn't changed at all. True clarity is acknowledging
the changes while clearly seeing the costs behind them, the mistakes, the unequal distribution,
and the other possibilities that were deliberately obscured.
Chinese people's lives really have gotten better. But that doesn't mean Chinese people don't need
freedom. Chinese people really are richer than before, but that doesn't mean their wealth is
truly secure. China really built a lot of roads, but that doesn't mean everyone has a reliable road
to the future. The real question isn't whether you want to leave today. It's whether you can
still leave when you need to. The real question isn't how much money you have today. It's whether
that money is truly yours to freely control. The real question isn't whether you are satisfied
today. It's whether you have the power to express dissatisfaction. If a person starts asking
questions like this, they stop standing only in the position of gratitude. They start standing in
the position of rights and choice. And that's exactly what the CCP's material progress narrative
is most afraid of. Thank you so much for watching. If you find this video helpful, please
like it, drop a comment below, and hit the subscribe button right here. It really helps
YouTube suggest my video to others. I'll be back with more content soon. Until then, be well.