Russia cannot win in Ukraine: Yale historian Odd Arne Westad explains why

History teaches us that it teaches nothing. That was, in short, German philosopher Georg Hegel. Still, historians try, just like our today's guest. Odd Arne Westad is a Norwegian historian, professor at Yale University, expert on Cold War and Chinese and East Asian history. His recent book is called The Coming Storm, Power, Conflict, and Warnings from History. Professor Westad, welcome to Deutsche Welle. It's really good to be with you, Roman. Let me start with this. You have dedicated your book to your students at Yale. Are they afraid of World War III, and where do they think it could begin, in Europe or in Asia? I think my students at Yale now, and students I meet everywhere else, young people, are really afraid of war. Not just wars of the kind that we are seeing at the moment, which are terrible enough, but a global war, the kind of conflagration that none of us have seen in our own lifetimes. That's something that worries me, because I think, to some extent, they are right. Young people are better, very often, at picking up signals in terms of where things might be heading than what older people, who are used to a different kind of reality, would be. The problem at the moment, as you know, is of course that there are so many different possibilities for regional wars turning into greater clashes, that if you compare it to the past, it almost looks as if some kind of great power war would be overdetermined, in the sense that, you know, if you think about the world from Eastern Asia, through South Asia, through the Middle East, to Ukraine, you have a lot of different conflicts that easily could pull several great powers in and create the kind of setting where it would be very hard to avoid a great power war. So I share my students' concerns on this. I hope there are things we can do about it, and one of them, hopefully, is to learn from history and take the warnings from history seriously about how problematic this could become. And still, where do your students see more danger at the moment? In Europe, in Ukraine, where Russia is fighting its war for the fifth year, its full-scale war, we have to mention, or in Asia, Taiwan, for example? I think most young American students, most undergraduates in the United States, now have their sights set in terms of what they deem as being most important to Eastern Asia, rather than to Europe or any other part of the world. And I think there are several reasons for it. I mean, one is obviously the competition between the United States and China. But I think it's much more than that. It's this realization that they have, I think, much more clearly than what our generation have, that Eastern Asia now, in many ways, is the center of the world. That's where things are happening. That's where the economic transformation has been taking place. That's where new technologies are put in motion. But that's also where the highest tension is, between several of the powers in that area and outside powers. In a situation that, and it's the students telling me this, not me telling them, remind them very often about the situation with regard to Europe. Europe was at the center of human development. So I think that's where the focus is on issues like Taiwan, on issues like what would happen in the Korean peninsula, on the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. And of course, between China and India, something that one in European context very, very rarely thinks about. We are recording this podcast in Berlin, at the heart of Europe, as they used to say. So we will focus on the Russian war against Ukraine. And these days, a lot of politicians and experts here, also in Germany, mentioned that the full scale Russian war against Ukraine lasts longer than World War One. What do you think of this comparison? And what does it say? What is striking, I think, about the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is that it started on the premise that this would be a quick war. The assumption on the Russian side, and I must say the assumption among many Western analysts, was that Russia would have not a piece of victory, but that they would achieve most of the aims that they set for themselves. And then very similar, of course, to what happened in 1914. They got bogged down by the heroism of the Ukrainian people, but also by the ability of Ukraine to create a set of alliances that have made it possible for Ukraine to push Russia back. And then you get the stalemate. And that stalemate, unfortunately, in my view, is probably going to last for quite some time, unless one can get some kind of political diplomatic breakthrough that would force Russia to the negotiating table. And we could we could start real negotiations towards the ceasefire. But we are not there yet. So when you say the war could last for some time, how long do you think? I think this this war could last for a very long time. We are talking years, unless there is some development in diplomatic terms, or in political terms, that would make the Russian leadership decide that they would be better served, as they certainly are, by getting to a ceasefire in Ukraine. I think my overall sense of the war at the moment is that we are in a situation where Russia has very, very few opportunities for a battlefield breakthrough. I think Ukraine also have limited possibilities, but it depends on the extent to which in military terms, Russia actually does exhaust its shrinking resources in terms of putting people and material into the meat grinder in Eastern Ukraine. So I think if the war goes on the way that it does now, it has the potential of lasting for several years. But what I think is most important at the moment, and this I entirely agree with President Zelensky of the Ukrainian leadership, is to get a ceasefire. And then from a ceasefire, hopefully we could have a more stable situation over time, including changes in Russia that would allow a restitution of the Ukrainian state to take place. We will continue talking about that in a moment. To finish that question about comparing World War One and the current Russian war against Ukraine, what do you think would be a correct historic comparison? Is it the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which lasted 10 years? It's very hard to find an immediate parallel for the war in Ukraine. I mean, the way it looks, although, you know, on the battlefield, it looks very much like World War One, that you have a situation where the forces on either side have dug themselves in and where the movements are very limited. In political terms, it starts to look a little bit like the latter phases of the American and Chinese war in Korea, for instance, or the situation with regard to the Soviet war in Afghanistan that you mentioned, or the latter stages of the war in Vietnam, where unless there is some kind of diplomatic political breakthrough, then very few changes on the battlefield will actually take place. And I think it's in that category of wars that Ukraine war seems to be in at the moment. A great power that has enormous resources, but is depleting those resources and the political will to fight by a strategy that obviously is not working. You're speaking about a stalemate, but here in Europe, but also in the academia circles in the United States, some experts are speaking about a turning point with Ukraine striking deep inside Russia more and more. So do you see a turning point? Is it coming? I don't think a military turning point is coming in the sense that either of these two sides, for pure military reasons, are going to go through some kind of breakdown in terms of their ability to fight. I think there has been a turn in the direction of Ukraine making use of its opportunities, which will increase, I think, also in the future of striking much deeper inside Russia than what has been the case up to now. But I don't think that will change the overall balance in the world. What decides that is what actually happens on the battlefield. And on that, I see very, very little opportunities from both sides of having a significant military breakthrough. Speaking about opportunities for Moscow, what do you think Russia would do next or could do next? Would Vladimir Putin, Russian president, mobilize like he did in 2022? Or would he negotiate maybe sometime later this year? It's very hard to speculate on this, but my sense that I get from inside of Russia is that Putin will probably try to do both. I think he will try to get more resources available of the meager resources that Russia now have, both in terms of men and material, to achieve some kind of breakthrough in Ukraine. And when it's clear that he will not be able to do that, he will run up against trouble both in terms of mobilization and in terms of the battlefield effects of that. Then I think there is the possibility that he would turn at least to seemingly being willing to negotiate about the ceasefire. Now, from that point, it would still, I think, and this is what is so tragic for Russia and for Ukraine, it would take some time to get to an actual ceasefire. And I think that could easily, as we've seen in many other wars, be a lot of back and forth before that ceasefire is actually agreed to, with tremendous loss of life in the meantime. But I think that's the most likely sequence of things, that Putin will first make a push to try to win the war. And then when it becomes clear that that is impossible, then at some point, he or any Russian leader would have to turn to negotiations. In the past weeks here in Europe, there was or seemed to be some kind of hope that the European leaders could get a place at the negotiations table with Russia. So far, the negotiations took place between Russia, Ukraine and the United States, with the United States being kind of mediator, not a supporter of Ukraine. That could be changing now. We could talk about that as well. Still, speaking about Europe, it looks like Europe is hesitating. It's not clear who could represent it during a potential meeting with Vladimir Putin. What do you think? Does it make sense for Europe to talk to Putin directly now? Yes, I do think it makes sense. And I think it's important to have those kinds of conversations without either side trying to impose some kind of rigorous context to it. I think it would be good if Europe were able to agree on people or European leaders who would meet with Putin, who would discuss the situation in Ukraine with him, not to negotiate with Putin. Any serious negotiations here will have to take place between the two fighting parties, between Russia and Ukraine. And that's obvious for everyone. But also to develop, I think, I'm not a great believer, even with your worst enemy, in the principle of non-contact. I think it's a really good idea to meet with Putin, meet with the Russian leadership, try to develop some kind of framework. I think one of the things that is really important that Putin and his pseudo allies, first and foremost China, realize in this matter is European determination to continue to support Ukraine up to a ceasefire has been signed and after a ceasefire has been signed. I mean, that's the next step in this conflict is, of course, what happened after a ceasefire actually comes into being. And for the Russians to have realistic assumptions of what that would lead to, I mean, it wouldn't lead to a normalization in the relationship between Europe and Russia. It wouldn't lead to the end of all sanctions or shouldn't. It shouldn't lead to the end of travel bans. It shouldn't lead to a normalization in terms of security guarantees for Russia coming from Europe or anywhere else until there is a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia going much beyond what has been agreed to in a ceasefire. And it's very important for Russia to understand that. And the only way to do it really is through conversations with Putin, who is at the moment the one who makes the decisions. The European signal to President Putin has been so far, we will continue supporting Ukraine as long as necessary, as long as it takes, as the German Chancellor Friedrich Maas is also saying. But it looks like Vladimir Putin is just waiting. He's waiting for political changes in Europe, for far-right parties in major European countries to take over the power. We are having presidential elections in France in 2027. In Germany, the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland, Alternative for Germany is heading in the polls now. So maybe Putin has a point. He just needs to wait a few years and then he can do what he wants. I don't think he has much of a point. I think this is a dangerous policy from a Russian perspective, because what Putin is doing, as he has increasingly been doing indeed in the 2020s, is to put the fate of Russia in the hands of what happens elsewhere, whether it would be the Chinese support for Russia in the war, whether it was the hope that Donald Trump would be elected, re-elected American president, and therefore that would serve Russia's interest in Ukraine. And after that, as you now can hear very often if you follow the Russian press, the hope that Europe would turn in another direction politically. I mean, the chances of this happening in a way that would serve Russia's interest with regard to the war over in Ukraine are minuscule. I mean, they're really, really very limited. And I very often think that presenting this, particularly presenting it to the Russian public through political statements, through discussions in Russian media, not least Russian television, is holding out in terms of a hope of political changes, dramatic political changes elsewhere, coming in and saving the Russian position. Historically, these hopes have usually come to nothing. And I think that will also be the case here. Could you please elaborate in more details, why do you think that the chances of Russia winning this war are very limited? So, the three main reasons. The most important reason by far what's happening in the battlefield, I mean, Russia would have to dramatically increase what they do in terms of military capability in order to have a breakthrough. I don't think using the kinds of weapons that Russia is using now that they have the opportunity for doing that. Secondly, I don't think European and for that matter, American support, I mean, in terms of weapons to Ukraine would completely go away. I continue to defend itself at the level that it does now. And then thirdly, this idea that political changes elsewhere, some kind of collapse in democratic processes in Europe, or in the United States, would come in to save Russia from itself in a way with regard to this war. I think that is a pipe dream. And even if, I mean, on the European side, even if these political changes, or some of them, were to take place, if we get a change in terms of political leadership in some key European countries, I think the chances that that would serve Putin's overall purposes are relatively limited. Because it would soon, I think, dawn on whoever would be in power, say, you know, in France, or for that matter, in other European countries, that go into a position that would allow to non-support for Ukraine, Putin to get into a position where he not only dominates Ukraine, but increasingly dominates Eastern Europe, is unacceptable from a European perspective. So I think the chances of that happening are very, very slim. Let's talk about Donald Trump, the US President. Are we witnessing a change? Well, we are witnessing it constantly. But still, we are talking in summer of 2026. Are we witnessing a change in Washington's attitude towards the Russian war in Ukraine? And is Donald Trump now more supportive of Ukraine that he has been in the past year? I think the best way of putting this, Roman, is that he is far less interested in putting much emphasis on doing some kind of deal with Putin. Look, I mean, Trump is exasperated with Putin. He had expected that when he came back into office, he would be able to set up some kind of arrangement whereby Putin would join him in moving towards an end to this war very, very quickly. That didn't happen. And the kind of language, the kind of phrasing that Putin has been using, both what we know from his own one-on-one meetings with Trump, but also, perhaps more importantly at this stage in public, I think for Trump and some of the people working closely with the President, provides the impression that Putin is not taking Trump and the United States seriously, that they are being played. And if there is one thing this President doesn't like, it is the sense of being played by domestic opponents or by foreign leaders. And this has led to a change. I mean, I see this when I'm in Washington and talking to people on the US side. A change not in any increased love, I think, for Ukraine or stepping up of the American perception of the significance of the war in Ukraine, but a definite increase in the distaste for Putin and what Russia stands for. So I think that is a significant change in terms of American perceptions. Let's talk about World War I and comparison to the Russian war against Ukraine. In your book, you compare today's Russian war and Austria in World War I. So what's the similarity? Both of them, both Russia today and Austria-Hungary or the Habsburg monarchy or whatever you want to call it before 1914, were significant great powers in decline. And that decline had lasted for some time when you get to the confrontations that took place in the period right before 1914. And in Russia's war in Ukraine today, it wasn't as if Putin was able to go to war against Ukraine because Russia was an expanding great power. I mean, Russia was in considerable decline before this happened. And the war against Ukraine has then strengthened that decline, relative decline relative to other great powers, which in effect, has made Russia for all practical purposes, was entirely dependent on China in terms of its future economic development. And this is very similar to what happened with Austria. I mean, Austria allied itself with Germany, the rapidly rising power right next door, which seemed on the way to become by far the most significant power in Europe. And then the Austrian leaderships, a little bit like Putin today, thought that they could make use of that position to fight wars against its local regional enemies, backed up by the most significant power that there was. And this is one of the things that really does worry me in terms of the longer term perspective of Russia's role, because this is not about just about Ukraine. It's also about Russia's long term relationship with Europe, because it's not only Ukraine that Russia has quarrels with on its western border. And this sense that the links between Russia and what is by far, at the moment, the most rapidly rising great power in the world, China, would empower Russia to even a much weakened Russia to act in ways that could be really destabilizing. That's one of the comparisons that I find with the situation with regard to Austria and Germany before World War One. So it's not an exact parallel, but it's a pretty good parallel to help us think about what these kinds of relationships mean. The Austrian-Hungarian Empire disintegrated after World War One. So did the Russian Empire. And there was a revolution in Russia after World War One. Do you see anything like this happening today in Putin's Russia? If Russia gets itself involved in an even bigger war than what you're seeing at the moment, I think the future of the current Russian state is really at stake. I think Russia already is at a point where it's so obvious in terms of what's happening domestically, that the war in Ukraine is moving that country not quickly, but fairly certainly towards a point where it will be at a disadvantage towards all of the rest of the world, not just Europe in a broader sense. And I think if you had an even bigger set of conflicts breaking out, that probably would mean the end of the Russian state that we see today. And I think there are many people in the circles around Putin who realise that. I mean, they realise Russia's weakness. Whether Putin is now so deluded that this doesn't get to him, or so interested in being seen as the great leader who provides a new kind of Russian glory in the future, that's hard to say. But I'm pretty sure that there are people within the power circles, as they say in Moscow, who realise that Russia now is in a position that is very weak, and that any kind of further conflict could easily lead to the kind of scenario that you saw with Austria, or for that matter, the Russian Empire, when they moved into a much greater war that they could not win. What could be a realistic end to the Russian war against Ukraine? In your book, you argue for a ceasefire, you've just mentioned it, and a neutral Ukraine, but integrated into the European Union. But basically, it's Finland before it joined NATO. But why do you think Vladimir Putin would accept such an end to this war? Because when it comes to a ceasefire, at some point, he will not have much of a choice. I mean, it is possible that you will get the ceasefire without the peace deal. I think that's entirely possible. As a result of that, Russia will weaken further. And probably at some point, it will be clear, as happened at other times in Russian history, that some kind of change, of course, would be necessary to not disadvantage Russian power further. I think that is the key issue that would come up here. So I think the most realistic scenario at the moment is that we would be moving towards a ceasefire, because at some point, all sides will realize that that is in their interest. How we get from there to a peace deal, that would also help normalize Russia's relationship with Europe, which I think will happen long term. But the question is, how long will that actually take? You know, the way things are moving, at the moment, it would take significant political changes domestically in Russia for a realistic peace deal that Ukraine and its backers would accept to happen. So I don't think we should wait for that at any point soon. The important thing, therefore, for me at the moment, as you said, is to move as quickly as we can towards a ceasefire, because I think the potential for a military breakthrough, except in the dreams of some military strategists, is close to zero. And therefore, it is important both for Ukraine, which is the party that has been attacked in this war of aggression, but also for the aggressor, for Russia to move towards a ceasefire that stops the killing, stops the killing on the battlefield and stops the increasing frequency of long range attacks, first and foremost inside Ukraine. In your book, you also argue about a fast track EU membership for Ukraine, but Europe doesn't seem to be in a hurry. Is Brussels making a mistake? What do you think? Yes, I think, of course, no one expects Ukraine to move into a EU membership proximity immediately. It takes negotiations, it takes planning, as we have seen in other cases, with regard to Eastern European countries and other countries that have joined the EU or the EC. But look, this is an emergency, right? This is also a test of what Europe is capable and willing to do. So if European leaders do not realise that they cannot take the good time as they otherwise are very likely to do, in considering the full integration of Ukraine into the European Union, for very clear strategic reasons that also have connections to European core security interests, then I think they're really missing out on the opportunity of Europe for the first time in a long while really looking after its own interests first. So I think, obviously, it cannot happen immediately. But on the other hand, it's also very clear that you cannot have a long outdrawn candidacy and negotiation process, which could end up discouraging many Ukrainians in terms of their thinking about their place in Europe and European support. And for strategic reasons, not least with regard to the relationship between Europe and Russia, it's very important that that does not happen. So I'm looking, I mean, if we want to be concrete here, and I always like to be concrete, we're looking at the brief timeframe when we have gotten to a ceasefire arrangement, and I think that's important to happen first. If after two years after that has happened, if Ukraine is not fully integrated into the European Union, I think that would be a real setback for Europe's strategic position in a global sense. How worried are you that the Russian war against Ukraine might develop into a world war between great powers, which would be World War Three and something you're warning about in your book? It depends on what happens from now on. I don't think the Ukrainian war in itself has in it the seeds of a new great power war. But I do think that if the right kind of global crisis, a kind of security crisis that we cannot foresee at the moment, what some people could call a black swan event, some kind of terrorist act, some kind of clash elsewhere that gets out of hand. I think the war in Ukraine, together with the ongoing US war in Iran, and the tensions that we see elsewhere in the Middle East and in East Asia, could come together in the kind of conflagration that created great power wars in the past. So that's what I'm afraid of. I'm afraid that if we do not find battlefield settlements, meaning ceasefires, for the ongoing wars at the moment, if something were to happen that would be hard to foresee at the moment, then we could end up in a situation that these ongoing wars would make some kind of relaxation intention, some kind of stability that would move us away from a war so much harder to achieve. And that's in effect what happened in the summer of 1914, that you had a lot of pre-existing tensions, some of which were regional in conflict terms, some of which were structural, came together within a very short period of time to produce a global great power war that no one really wanted. And that's my concern for today as well. So that's the reason why I emphasize in the book that it's so important to try to get ceasefires in ongoing wars before we move on to try to stabilize the global situation further in a broader sense. In Germany, military and intelligence have been warning that Russia might attack NATO in Europe by 2030 or even earlier. There is a one book, a scenario by a German Bundeswehr professor in which Russia attacks one of the Baltic states and simultaneously China puts military pressure on Taiwan, biding the United States in the Pacific. Do you think this could happen? Not as a pre-planned war of opportunity or engagement. But I do think that if the war in Ukraine is not settled on the battlefield, it's not that there is not a ceasefire in place, then I think there certainly is the possibility that Russia at some point could get involved in military adventurism elsewhere. Look, Putin is an opportunist, first and foremost. He is looking for weakness with his opponents, wherever it is, around Russian borders. We've seen that throughout his tenure. We've seen it in Georgia. We've seen it in Moldova. We've seen it in Ukraine. We might see it elsewhere. And I think that's one thing to be concerned about with regard to this. And that's also the reason why it's so important that European unity in terms of dealing with these kinds of issues, European cohesion actually holds up. I don't think China and Russia are at the point now that if there is not already the situation where a great power war seems likely, we are just moving into that kind of situation, that they would operate jointly in terms of aggression towards others. I do not see that. But I do see a lot of potential that this could happen to either of the two powers. It could happen to China with regard to the Taiwan conflict, for instance. And it could happen either by design or by accident in Russia's relationship with its neighbouring states, particularly its smaller neighbouring states. And in that kind of situation, I think there is very little doubt, unfortunately, at the moment, that China and Russia would operate in unison. But it demands that kind of crisis first, I think, for that to happen. So far, China's policy in this war is being described as pro-Russian neutrality. Do you see any changes in that in the coming years? And what role could China play in a post-war settlement in Ukraine? Because there is this idea that this war cannot end without China. Is it so? Yes, I think that is, I think that's true. I mean, it cannot continue without China, and it cannot end without China. So China has a great deal of responsibility, which the country has tried to shirk as best it can, with regard to the situation in Ukraine. I spent a lot of time in Beijing this spring. And in discussing Ukraine, you always get the same two answers. One is that you have to look at the root causes, meaning in the Chinese book, the increasing American role and especially NATO expansion. And the second one is that China is entirely neutral and has very little to do with this war whatsoever. Both of which statements are obviously false. And when it comes to the first one, I don't think, I think very few historians believe that it was NATO expansion per se that led Putin to attack Ukraine as an independent state and try to fold it into to Russia. And secondly, China is no neutral. China has indirectly been supporting the Russian warfare effort in Ukraine ever since the war started, or at least after the first weeks. There were some significant doubts in Beijing about the wisdom of this enterprise in the first weeks. But then Xi Jinping himself decided that it was necessary to back Russia up. Because the alternative was to give the United States some kind of victory that they didn't want to see in the American policy and in the Chinese perception of things. So one of the big questions for me in this issue is the relationship between China and Europe. Because through its policy with regard to Russia overall, and its policy with regard to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, China has moved into a situation where it increasingly has been losing Europe as a main partner, potential partner, both in economic terms, but also in the broader international setting. And I'm still amazed. I mean, this is one of the things that has surprised me with regard to this war. The degree to which Chinese leaders do not fully realize is the future consequences of that. Europe is still by far China's most important trading partner. And China is still very much dependent on its foreign exports. Its domestic economy is growing, but as we have seen recently, is not in a position to take over for foreign economic engagements. And Europe is right at the center of that. So the Chinese policy of indirect support for Russia in this war, which has been crucial for Russia's ability to wage the war in the first place, has of course, done a lot of damage, lasting damage, I believe, in China's relationship with Europe. Would you agree that the West is still more afraid of Russia losing in Ukraine than Ukraine losing because Vladimir Putin might go nuclear? I don't think so. I mean, I don't think there is that fear in a direct sense, unless, of course, something were to happen that would really threaten the stability of Russia in terms of weapons use from the side of others. I think what we will see probably even more so up towards when a ceasefire is actually agreed to, is Russian nuclear sable rattling. I mean, we see that immediately. I mean, you know, you can look at discussions going on on Russian television or Russian media every day, and you see sort of the signs of that. The chances, I think, that in the current conflict, I'm not talking about all kinds of great power constellations or wars of the future, but in the current conflict, that Russia would move in the direction of actually making use of nuclear weapons, as some, even though some of the leading experts have been threatening with. I was just listening to an interview with my old friend Sergei Karaganov the other day, who said, well, to end the war, Russia may need to use a nuclear weapon in Europe. I think the chances of that happening are close to zero, unless there are changes in the battlefield or changes within Russia that we cannot foresee at the moment. So I think European negotiators, when we get to that, and Ukrainian negotiators, would be better served not by constantly focusing on the role of Russia as a nuclear power. I think if one ties oneself up like that, I mean, think here about negotiations on the Korean War, negotiations on the Vietnam War, negotiations with regard to ending the war in Afghanistan. If the idea had always been that Russia itself is a nuclear power, and therefore has to have a special position in terms of these negotiations that could not be shared with others, you're already, you know, trying to fight for peace with with one hand tied behind your back. So one shouldn't do that. And I think it's very important to realise that unless the other constellations change entirely, Russia's nuclear saber rattling is just that it is an attempt to gain advantage. Summing up, are you more pessimistic or optimistic about the world learning the lessons of the 20th century of history and preventing World War Three? It might seem a little bit strange, given the book that I just written about warnings for history and deep, deep warnings in terms of what went wrong in the past, for me to say that I'm a moderate optimist. But I am. I'm a moderate optimist in the sense that I think if we are able to deal with the ongoing conflicts that we're having at the moment, in the sense of moving from an active phase of war fighting over at least to a ceasefire, and that we get more stability in a broader strategic sense, among the great powers, the established great powers and the rising great powers than what we have seen of late, that we could go through a period of reasonable stability in international affairs. But this has to happen now. I mean, if we do not get started on trying to deal with these conflicts now, that we do not get started on trying to improve at least the strategic communication among great powers, to a greater extent than what we've been able to do for the last decade, then I think we are in really difficult territory. And I think this is the message of the book in many ways, that the years that we're in now, 2026, 2027, will be seen in the future as crucial in terms of which direction the world is going to go in. Are we going to get the kind of stability that we didn't get before 1914? Or are we going to move in a direction that makes global war more likely? I think the decisions are really ours to make at this moment. Thank you very much, Odd Arne Vestad, Norwegian historian, professor at Yale University, author of The Coming Storm, Power, Conflict and Warnings from History. Thank you. Thank you, Roman, great to chat with you.