Why won't the US stop the Houthis? | DW News

The Houthis, backed by Iran, are gaining ground in Yemen, capturing strategic territory and putting fresh military pressure on Saudi Arabia. But despite reports that the US president was prepared to launch airstrikes against Houthi targets, Donald Trump pulled the plug last minute. And while Washington appears reluctant to become directly involved, the UK has signalled it is prepared to provide Saudi Arabia with defensive support. So why is Washington holding back? Is Saudi Arabia increasingly being left to face the Houthis alone? And what does America's caution tell us about the balance of power in the Middle East? To break all of this down, joining me now is Megan Sutcliffe, analyst for the Middle East and Africa at Sibylline. Megan, great to have you on. First of all, just how significant are the gains that the Houthis are making right now? And what are they achieving on the ground that has Saudi Arabia so concerned? Good evening. The advances that the Houthis have made over the past few weeks in Yemen are extremely significant because essentially in several weeks what we have seen is the Houthis breaking through what have been relatively frozen boundaries in the Yemeni civil war and capturing the entirety of Yemen's Red Sea coast. This means that the group is now in control of major port facilities in cities like Mokka, but have also expanded to take control of strategic islands that are located in the Bab el-Mandeb, such as Parim Island, which essentially divides the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the globe's critical trade choke points, in half. Meaning that now this group not only has a view over the Red Sea from Yemen's coastline, but is deeply and intimately involved in the movement of vessels through this critical waterway. Essentially, on the ground, the Houthis have massively expanded their presence and their strategic leverage, not just over Saudi Arabia, but also over the global community. Now, there are reports that the Trump administration was prepared to launch strikes against the Houthis before pulling back at the last minute. What do you make of those reports and what do they tell us about how Washington is viewing this conflict? Well, it was certainly surprising for some in Washington DC to see President Trump reportedly backing down and erring on the side of restraint when it comes to Yemen. Of course, we have already seen the United States engaging in airstrike campaigns targeting the Yemen-based Houthis in early 2024, when at that point the Houthis were engaging in attacks targeting global shipping in line with their operations attempting to counter Israel during the peak of the Gaza War. And so this change of tact from the United States was surprising to some. However, if we look at this from a different angle, essentially in terms of US President Donald Trump looking forward to the US midterms and, of course, to the upcoming 2028 election, it does make more sense because Trump essentially ran his campaign for his last term on ending US engagement in the so-called forever wars in the Middle East, essentially those long term engagements that we saw in Afghanistan and Iraq. And therefore, this restraint when it comes to potentially becoming involved in a notoriously complex conflict that has, of course, afflicted the people of Yemen for over a decade, that restraint does make slightly more sense, even though, of course, we are also talking about one of the United States' closest allies in the Middle East, that being Saudi Arabia. Yeah, and that's a very good point, Megan, because, of course, you know, you're right in pointing that out, that Saudi Arabia is one of the US's closest partners in the region. So why does Washington appear so reluctant then to become directly involved? Is there something else going on perhaps? Well, there are several factors that are likely weighing in on Washington, D.C.'s decision not to become immediately involved in Saudi operations targeting the Houthis. The first is, of course, that reluctance to potentially become involved in another forever war in a very complex theatre in the Middle East that is far removed from many of the issues that US voters will be considering when it comes to the midterms on the 3rd of November. Another consideration is, of course, the dynamic with Iran, because Iran is extremely close to the Houthis. The Houthis make up part of Iran's network of proxy militant groups in the Middle East, and therefore US airstrikes targeting the Houthis would significantly increase the risk of a re-engagement with Iran, essentially on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula as well. Engaging in two separate conflicts in the Middle East would put major pressure on US military resources. And thus, before we even consider the significant strain that we've already seen on air defences and interceptor batteries across the region and indeed across the world for the United States. So essentially, this is likely the US attempting to spend its resources wisely and not become involved in conflicts that potentially would have limited impact on the domestic sphere, but that also are extremely challenging to resolve and likely will not be resolved by airstrikes alone, whether those are conducted by Saudi Arabia or by a broader coalition. I want to just move away from the US for a moment now, because at the top there, I was mentioning the UK, because they've pledged defensive support for Saudi Arabia, but they stopped short of direct military involvement. Megan, how significant is that support in practice? Well, it will be significant in terms of providing air-to-air support for the air forces as they are engaging in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, targeting Houthi-controlled territory within Yemen, as well as the potential continuation of Saudi airstrikes targeting the Houthis. And so, assistance from a major ally like the UK will be significant in terms of what that does to Houthi capabilities. But it's highly unlikely that that specific form of limited support to Saudi Arabia is going to shift the balance here, is going to shift the trajectory of the conflict within Yemen. Essentially, it's an addition to Saudi capabilities, but not necessarily one that is going to be a deciding factor when it comes to the outcome of this conflict that at present does not seem to be showing any signs of slowing down. Now, back to the, if we just focus on the Houthis, because they've been careful, we'll say, to signal that US ships aren't their target. Is avoiding direct confrontation then with the US enough to keep Washington on the sidelines? For now, it would appear that refraining from attacking US-linked ships or indeed US ships themselves within the Red Sea has been enough to push Washington DC away from intervening in this conflict. But it's not guaranteed that that would necessarily continue to be the case. If the conflict were to stay within the boundaries that have already been established, essentially where the majority of clashes are seen in Yemen between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government, and there are periodic engagements between the Houthis and the Saudis, then we can expect Washington DC to continue refraining from engaging. However, if we were to see the conflict significantly escalate to the extent that it was potentially impacting US shipping in the Red Sea, if we were to see sustained disruption to Saudi oil exports via the East-West pipeline in conjunction with the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, all of that would combine to maximize economic pressure on major US allies such as Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States itself. That's the point at which we will potentially see Washington DC shifting its logic and erring more towards providing direct support to Saudi Arabia, potentially stopping short of direct engagement with the Houthis, but certainly attempting to bolster their major allies' capabilities and prospects for potentially emerging victorious from what is again such a complex conflict. Could we see Riyadh increasing pressure on Washington for support, or has Saudi Arabia essentially accepted that it might need to look for other partners? I think right now we are going to continue seeing Saudi efforts to secure greater US support for operations in Yemen. But of course, this is not a short-term relationship. This is a relationship that has existed for many decades and exists on multiple planes, whether we're talking about diplomatic engagement, military cooperation, or economic engagement between Riyadh and Washington DC. So I wouldn't discount the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US for now. Indeed, those efforts to broaden cooperation and secure additional support are highly likely to persist. But again, that won't necessarily be at the detriment to Saudi Arabia engaging with its other partners in the region, such as the parties to the Mecca defence pact, namely Turkey and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia will likely look to branch out to engage with middle powers in the region to again bolster and diversify the types of operations that it can engage with when it comes to the Houthis and indeed improve its resilience as a state that is now of course major threats to its security, as we saw over the weekend with the Houthis firing ballistic missiles towards the capital, Riyadh. Megan, you mentioned Turkey and Pakistan, and they recently signed defence agreements with Saudi Arabia. But they don't seem too eager, we'll say, to become directly involved. Can you sort of explain why that is? Absolutely. Well, the Mecca defence pact is a relatively new development. It was only signed on the 7th of August, so it's only been in play for several weeks. And it is now clearly being stress tested by the developments that we're seeing between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. But right now, we haven't seen Turkey or Pakistan deploying their security forces to engage in this conflict. This is likely a mixture of factors, partially stemming from logistical concerns, logistical restraints. Essentially, these types of systems take a very long time to deploy, and it can take several weeks, if not several months, to see that type of active engagement emerging. The second is, of course, a similar consideration that we'll be seeing in Ankara and in Islamabad, which comes down to the network of cooperative agreements and defence pacts that both states have, essentially ensuring that any intervention in Yemen would not violate any other terms of defence pacts that those countries have, as well as, of course, considering whether or not an intervention in Yemen would necessarily reflect the longer term interests of Pakistan and of Turkey. Essentially, what we're seeing now is the Mecca Defence Pact engaging in a rapid baptism of fire, attempting to work through all of those teething issues that negotiators likely assessed they had several years to work through. That doesn't necessarily mean that the pact will fall apart. However, if we don't see some kind of increase in support from Turkey and from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia at this point in time, whether that is direct or indirect support, that would mark a major failure on the part of the pact and would undermine its prospects for success in the long term. Megan, why are the Houthis so effective on the battlefield? That's a very, very good question. I'm sure one that many in Riyadh will be asking themselves once again. Essentially, the Houthis are an extremely resilient militant group. They are a group that was essentially founded and nurtured in the mountainous areas of Yemen. And so their capacity to fight, their resilience as a fighting force is extremely strong. It's very, very notorious. And so that really informs part of their decision making processes, as well as their general resilience to engagement by the internationally recognized government and, of course, by Saudi Arabia itself. Another reason that the Houthis are so resilient is also due to that mountainous terrain where the Houthi heartlands really are entrenched, where they are found and are most strong. That area is extremely challenging to target with missiles, with drones and with airstrikes. And so the geography of Yemen has provided for a very long time the Houthis with a degree of protection. Another aspect of the Houthis that makes them so strong is that they have an extremely clearly defined and extremely strong command and control structure. Essentially, they have a unified command. They are battle tested and they are capable of mobilizing very quickly, as we saw with the lightning offensive targeting Mocha and Perum Island in early September. The final factor that makes the Houthis so resilient and so formidable as an enemy is their access to missiles and drone systems that are partially been provided by Iran, but that over the past three to four years have increasingly come from domestic production. Essentially, this means that the Houthis, which previously were a militant group primarily confined to mountain ranges, are now capable of operating extremely advanced weapon systems, including ballistic and cruise missiles, including those that are specifically capable of targeting ships transiting through the world's major waterways. This means that the Houthis are resilient, they are capable of rapid mobilization and they have significant weapons supplies. That's likely why we're seeing the Saudis struggling so greatly with repelling the Houthi advance and will likely continue to see that dynamic playing out over the coming weeks and over the coming months. Do you think it's too much to say that we're seeing a fundamental shift in warfare here? I wouldn't necessarily say that the re-emergence or the reactivation of conflict in Yemen is a direct cause of the reshaping of modern warfare, but I would say that it is a symptom. Essentially, the weapon systems that we're seeing the Houthis using, including drones that are broadly associated with Iran's military-industrial complex, speaks to a broader shift we're seeing in the conflict landscape, essentially one in which low-cost weapon systems mean that previously insignificant conflict actors or those that were relatively static in their mobilization capacity are now able to threaten the world's major superpowers, whether those are the United States or indeed states like Saudi Arabia. That trend is not going to change based on the outcome of the conflict in Yemen. It's something that is going to proliferate across battlefields across the world and so it does mark a concerning trend. Another aspect to focus on is also the integration of artificial intelligence into weapon systems and essentially the capacity of militant groups that previously maybe didn't have access to the most advanced technology develop those systems and then expand their capabilities. Anthropic recently published their misuse report for September in which they detailed a use case of the Houthis employing clawed AI models in order to improve their targeting and operational software for missile systems. That speaks to the dynamics at play here because not only do we have low-cost systems that can be produced domestically within combat environments like Yemen, we're also seeing the integration of artificial intelligence, essentially bringing down those barriers to entry for conflict mobilization and the capacity to target major military superpowers around the world. Megan, before we wrap all this up, could you give us a sense of the humanitarian impact of everything that we've been speaking about today? Absolutely, the humanitarian situation in Yemen is dire. Of course, although the front lines of the conflict between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government had been relatively frozen since the pathway to peace or essentially de facto ceasefire came into force between the Houthis and the Saudi officials in 2022, that didn't necessarily mean that the humanitarian situation within Yemen got any better. And so what we're looking at now is essentially conflict re-escalating in an area that has already faced a humanitarian crisis for many, many years. Accounts from civilians within Yemen indicate that essentially airstrikes are bordering on being indiscriminate, that we've seen routine targeting of civilian infrastructure, that we're seeing food security conditions deteriorate even further. And because of that, we're already seeing reports from international humanitarian groups indicating that thousands, if not tens of thousands of civilians have attempted to cross the Red Sea to enter areas like Djibouti because they believe that those are the only safe places for them to go, that they cannot remain in Yemen because of just how bad the situation has become. This is almost certainly going to get worse the longer that conflict between the Houthis, the internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia persists. And so unfortunately, we should be looking at Yemen as another epicentre of a humanitarian crisis, not only as we finish out 2026, but particularly as we head into 2027. Yeah, and that's a very important point to end on. Megan, fantastic as always getting your take and your analysis. Megan Sutcliffe, analyst for the Middle East and Africa at Sibylline. Thank you so much and hope to speak to you again soon. Thank you. All right, well that's all for now from me here in Berlin. Don't forget to leave your comments and your questions below and you can always subscribe to all our DW channels. I'm Pablo Foglia-Liaz. Thanks for watching. I'll see you again soon.