Asymmetric cyberwarfare: 'States increasingly use cyberattacks in support of their other objectives'

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5 Video Views·Nov 10, 2026
Well, now, as a reminder, then Europe has seen two major cyber
attacks targeting supermarket refrigerators over the past two months.
Back in October, temperatures of refrigeration units
in hundreds of supermarkets across France
and the Netherlands as well rose to up to 50 degrees Celsius,
causing several fires and massive quantities of food waste.
Now, despite those attacks targeting known vulnerabilities,
a second similar wave of attacks targeted supermarkets in eight.
Other nations, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Estonia and Finland,
those attacks then bearing
the same signatures and the same consequences.
That's to say temperatures reaching 50 degrees Celsius,
spoiling food, causing small fires.
Now, there had been little information about possible culprits
until Monday when French officials then officially accused Iran.
They've now threatened, as you heard
Clovis saying there, a harsh response.
Tehran still rejecting the accusations as baseless.
For more on this, we're going to speak now to Rafe Pilling.
He's a senior director of threat intelligence
at the cyber security firm Sophos.
Thank you very much for joining us today, Rafe.
So we've now heard the French foreign minister moments ago saying
that he's sure that Iran is behind these attacks.
How solid then is the evidence linking Tehran to these cyber attacks?
So the announcements that we've made
so far are presumably based on intelligence that the multiple
French intelligence agencies have collected and compiled a report
and produced this political attribution assessment.
There will be a process.
The level of technical information that has been released involving the
details behind that process is still fairly high level and superficial.
But what we have seen does fit with the details of other...
Iranian-linked attacks on industrial control systems that we have seen
in the past and it fits their MO and potentially further details will
be forthcoming. We'll just have to wait and see.
Now, you were quoted in a Guardian piece, Rafe, earlier this month,
warning that finding the culprit in these attacks would be hard
because there was no trace of a weapon,
so to speak, at the scene of the crime.
You had compared it to wearing rubber gloves and messing with switches.
So why do you think the evidence
that France has publicly pointed to now
was hard to decipher until this week?
I think the, yeah, as I mentioned before,
The nature of this attack is essentially finding
a website on the internet using default credentials,
so credentials that are published in manuals by the vendors
or other weak credentials that
the attackers can decipher,
and gaining access to these consoles, which are then used to
control these refrigeration systems.
And they change the settings,
and that results in the impact we've seen.
So there's not a huge amount of...
malicious software
or other tooling that is linked directly to the attackers.
However, it's likely the case
that French agencies were able to use their
capabilities to trace the attackers path back across
the Internet and along the
way perhaps identify systems that had
Traces of the attackers and so like Farsi language artifacts are noted
along with some scripts used to enumerate industrial control systems.
Now, on the security angle of this, Rafe, these attacks are said
to have exploited known vulnerabilities in these refrigeration systems
and ones that were theoretically pretty easy to fix.
So is it surprising to you that they weren't addressed
in the month between these two incidents,
also knowing that similar incidents targeted supermarkets
in the United States as well earlier this past summer?
So it does look like in between the two different waves,
and certainly recently, there's been a reduction in the number
of these systems available or accessible, visible via the Internet.
So presumably some organizations have taken action to remove
the accessibility of these consoles from the Internet.
But, I mean, the fundamental problem with securing industrial
control systems is things do tend to move slowly, changes slow,
patching is slow, because ultimately they want to make sure
that the physical process, whatever it's manufacturing or refrigeration
or whatever it might be, is maintained consistently 24/7.
And, yeah, the general problem we see with industrial control systems
is this lagging of security controls that are necessary.
Now, I spoke to a cybersecurity expert several days ago
who said that the fact that these systems are connected to the Internet
obviously makes them vulnerable to hacking and remote access.
Is there any reason for refrigeration systems
to be connected to the Internet?
I mean, at this stage,
does that potentially bring more risk than benefit?
Absolutely brings more risk than benefit.
So the reason will be as simple as enabling a remote support company
to be able to connect in and make changes to these devices without,
you know, traveling to a to a location.
However, we do have secure remote access systems
that would enable that same connectivity to occur,
but without exposing the the consoles to everybody on the internet.
And that is hopefully
What a lot of these organizations will put in place following
these attacks, look to lock down and reduce the access
that malicious hackers, whoever they might be, have to these systems.
Now, when we think of incidents like these ones, then who
do you think is best positioned to respond to these vulnerabilities?
I mean, is it on is it should it be the burden
of individual private companies or do you think
that government should be stepping in to impose potentially rules
to protect consumers from these types of cyber attacks?
It really requires a number of different stakeholders.
So the onus is ultimately on the private organizations that run
the systems, and certainly the impact will be on those organizations,
as we have seen with these attacks in the form of spoiled food
and merchandise that wouldn't be able to be sold now.
However, there are, you know, additionally,
they need to be supported by their vendors
who will support upgrades and changes to the way they conduct
their business practices like remote access in order to make that work.
And it might be the case that the government
or a national cyber authority needs to provide guidance or potentially
some form of regulation or legislation to strongly encourage
these organizations to make those changes in order to strengthen the.
the country's national resilience from a digital perspective.
Do you think that cybercrime laws in France specifically
or perhaps in the European Union at large are sufficient
at this stage to protect organizations, companies,
institutions from these types of cyberattacks?
I mean, especially because we've seen a host
of really detrimental cyberattacks, especially in France over
the past several months, targeting things like blood banks,
tax offices, amongst other public institutions.
Is there enough legal protection?
I mean, unfortunately, the laws themselves
don't really provide protection.
Thank you.
What is needed is for entities, for organizations,
private organizations, but also government
organizations, to ensure that they have secured
their systems to a reasonable standard and
done as much as they can to harden
and reduce the attack surface of those organizations.
So, for example, in this case,
removing remote access for these refrigeration management
systems from the internet and from general access.
So legislation can support and encourage industries to secure
their system, particularly if it means making it a level playing field,
requiring that everyone has to move to a particular standard.
But it doesn't necessarily provide that protection.
Even when we're seeing sort of privacy laws around data,
we still see a lot of data breaches.
And ultimately, it's those organizations that are storing that data,
processing that data that need to make the changes to protect our data.
How concerned do you think people should be at this stage,
given these revelations about food security specifically
in light of these attacks?
I don't think there's any cause for alarm or concern,
but I think it does underline
the disruption and the, we talk about an asymmetric attack.
So with a small amount of effort from the adversary side,
they can create a large impact,
in this case, destroying food
and producing empty shelves or empty refrigeration units
in stores.
Obviously, in this case, recovery was fairly rapid.
Stock was replaced.
But I think it highlights the fragility.
And the impact that could be had through
a cyber attack on physical systems.
As a final question for you, Rafe, how...
common are state-sponsored cyber attacks.
We obviously often hear of the same culprits,
nations like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
But do Western nations also use these methods?
And what does that look like?
I ask also, you know, in reference to what Jean-Noël Barrot,
the French foreign minister, said earlier,
which is that France hasn't eliminated the possibility
that it'll carry out its own cyber attacks against Iran in response.
So what might that look like?
Yeah, obviously cyberspace is now an area
that nations consider to conduct operations of various kinds,
and those operations are in support of the legal
and the political and military interests of those countries.
We tend to see different forms of attacks from,
say, a country like Iran,
where they are relatively...
They have a relatively low bar for using these disruptive attacks.
They've done it a number of times now
in a variety of different circumstances.
Similarly, Russia will use disruptive physical attacks
in conjunction with some of their military operations.
We've seen it in Ukraine
and Poland earlier this year with some energy attacks.
attacks, so
So, yeah, it's absolutely increasingly the case
that states will use cyber attacks in support of their...
There are other objectives,
but how they do it is very much defined by the legislative
frameworks and just how they conduct themselves
on the international stage.
Rafe Pilling, Senior Director of Threat Intelligence
at the Cybersecurity Sophos, thank you very
much for joining us today.
