More and more voices in the US and Europe say it’s time to push Ukraine into a peace deal. With the diesel deal and Trump’s talk of easing sanctions on Russia, the pressure is growing. But the argument rests on the assumption that there is a deal on the table that Ukraine could take if it wanted to — and there isn't.
In this video, I describe what the two sides actually say their conditions for peace are, and why it's so hard to see any peace deal coming out of the negotiations.
00:00 The pressure on Ukraine to make a deal 00:56 Ukraine’s war aims 03:34 Russia’s war aims 05:25 Russia’s demands on NATO 06:30 The two positions side by side 08:30 Just a negotiation tactic? 09:24 Who is negotiating with whom? 11:45 How the war will continue
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Video Summary
AI Generated
The video analyzes the disconnect between Western perceptions of a potential peace deal in Ukraine and the actual war aims of both parties. It argues that while Ukraine has become more flexible regarding territorial losses in exchange for security, Russia's demands extend far beyond land, seeking regime change in Ukraine and a total restructuring of European security and NATO.
Recently, we've heard more voices in Western countries saying
that it's time for Ukraine to make a deal.
They argue that it's becoming unsustainable
to keep supporting Ukraine in what they consider a hopeless war.
And sometimes they also argue that it's actually in Ukraine's best
interest to end the war now instead of getting a worse deal later.
This has been the logic we've heard
from the American side in connection with the diesel deal
and Trump's talk about easing sanctions on Russia,
but it's also been voiced by strong
politicians and pundits in European countries.
The logic is built on the assumption that there
is a deal on the table that Ukraine could take if it wanted to.
So if we apply pressure on Ukraine,
then maybe the Ukrainians will be motivated to do it.
Unfortunately, that is not the case, but to understand why,
then it's necessary to have a discussion about what
the two sides' war aims are and where they stand
on the issue of negotiations and making compromises.
So, let's talk about it.
Many people seem to think that Ukraine's position
is that they will not stop the war until all the
occupied territories are liberated and the 1991 borders are restored.
And they also think that
Putin's war aims are to take the rest of the Donbas region
and then he'll be ready to make peace.
This makes it sound as if Russia is really close
to achieving its goals, whereas Ukraine is
very far from achieving their goals.
It also makes it sound as if the Russians
are the reasonable ones here
and the Ukrainians have unrealistic expectations.
The problem is that it's actually the other way around.
When the full-scale invasion happened in 2022,
then Ukraine's position was indeed that the war could only end
when the Russians were pushed out entirely.
And that continued to be the ambition throughout 2023
when Ukraine had the big counteroffensive that didn't really work out.
But then in the aftermath of that failed counteroffensive,
when the situation was being evaluated,
in 2024, then there was a notable shift in rhetoric
and it culminated at the end of 2024
when Zelensky clearly stated that Ukraine was ready
to accept a situation where the war could
end while part of the country was still occupied.
Ukraine was not ready to accept that these
territories are now formally a part of Russia.
From a Ukrainian perspective, that's just an
impossible proposition.
But they could accept stopping the fighting while these territories
remain under Russian control.
And therefore, de facto, they would accept that Ukraine
is not going to get these territories back.
And this has now been the Ukrainian position for the last two years.
That's also why the Ukrainians were very quick to agree
to Donald Trump's plan for a ceasefire along the current front line
when he made that suggestion in 2025.
Because this plays well into Ukraine's idea of freezing the front line
and just start negotiations from the point
of departure that things are the way they are now.
This is also why it's kind of strange that again and again journalists
will ask Zelensky whether Ukraine would be willing to accept a deal.
That means that they won't get all the territory back.
And then when he says yes,
then that gets reported as a kind of major new development.
But the reality is that this has been Ukraine's position
for about two years now, and there's nothing new about it.
But the thing is that from the Ukrainian perspective, the question...
of accepting territorial loss is closely related
to the question of security guarantees for the
rest of Ukraine. So they will know that this will be the final war,
that they will have to fight
with Russia and that the Russians won't come back in a few years.
So that's why Ukraine wants
ironclad security guarantees as part of this deal.
And if the security guarantees are not there,
then Ukraine cannot stop the war.
The Russian perspective is quite different.
It is often assumed in the West that what Putin wants
is the rest of the Donbass region,
and then he will be willing to make a peace deal.
The thing is, Putin has never said that.
What Putin has said is that if Ukraine gives Russia
the remaining part of Donbass, then
Russia will be willing to have a ceasefire
while there are negotiations about the rest
of Russia's demands for a peace deal.
So getting the rest of the Donbass is just the first step.
In order to turn the ceasefire into a permanent settlement,
Ukraine will also have to give
Russia a range of other things.
The Russians have actually been quite consistent
in their explanations about what these things are.
Both Putin and Lavrov and other high-ranking Russian
officials keep referring to a speech that Putin gave
in June of 2024 at a session at Russia's foreign ministry.
And there he outlined a list of demands, not only about the concessions
that Ukraine needs to make, but also about the changes that need
to happen in the broader security architecture in Europe.
about NATO's role in Eastern Europe.
So these demands include that Ukraine needs to give up the rest of,
not just Donbass, but also the Zaporizhia region
and the Kherson region,
which Russia have also formally annexed according to its constitution.
But also Ukraine needs to be a neutral country with...
No security guarantees from abroad.
Ukraine needs to go through a process
of demilitarization and denazification.
And these things in Russian terminology mean
that there would be limits to the size of
the Ukrainian military
and also that there would need to be a new pro-Russian government
in Ukraine.
That's what denazification means.
It means regime change.
And when it comes to the question about
the broader security architecture in Europe,
that is what the Russians refer
to when they're talking about addressing the root causes of the
conflict. Essentially,
what that means is that the great powers that rule over Europe,
which the Russians see as themselves and the United States,
They need to make some kind
of agreement about how they divide the continent
and which parts of Europe belong in whose sphere of influence.
So essentially, the Russians see some process of rolling back NATO
to something that looks like what NATO looked like in the mid-1990s.
So they explain the details of what
that looks like all the way back in 2021
when they put out a list of demands that...
predates the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
but it's that list of demands that they keep coming back
to when they want to describe sort of what they consider addressing
the root causes of the conflict in Ukraine
and what types of concessions that Russia will need from NATO.
Just to summarize, this is the battlefield situation as it looks today.
Ukraine's position is that we should freeze the front line
so nothing should change on the map,
and then there needs to be a discussion about
security guarantees for the rest of Ukraine
so Russia cannot restart the war in a couple of years.
Russia's position is that the current situation is unacceptable.
Ukraine needs to give up the rest of Donbass
and the rest of the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.
There should be a pro-Russian government in Ukraine,
and the Eastern European countries need to be expelled from NATO.
I'm sure that many people watching this will say
that's crazy like that must be an exaggeration
because surely Putin doesn't actually mean
that but no this is not an exaggeration these are quite
loyal descriptions of what the two sides
are saying that their conditions are for peace in
Ukraine or maybe to put it differently yes it is crazy
but Putin actually is this crazy it's
It's a great irony, actually, that many of those...
sort of Ukraine-skeptic voices in the West
who say that we should push Ukraine into being more
reasonable. And they say that we
also need to listen to the concerns that the Russians have.
But these people have never actually spent two
minutes actually listening to what the Russians
are saying. It's not like Putin
and the Russian leadership are trying to keep their war aims a
secret. They actually want us to know why they're doing what they do.
They are very clear about the concessions that they want us to make.
So the Ukraine skeptics will say that we need to listen to Russia,
but their whole argument is actually based on the assumption
that we don't need to take seriously what the Russians say.
Actually, it's a quite condescending
and even infantilizing attitude towards the Russians
because the whole assumption is that we know better than the Russians
what they actually mean, right?
All right.
So.
Some people might say, well, it's not that bad.
Like, this is just a Russian negotiation tactic.
They don't actually expect to get everything that they demand.
So it's just something they say,
and then they can soften it up in the negotiations.
But let's play with that thought.
Like, let's imagine that being the case.
Then we need to have the discussion about, okay.
Which of these concessions do we then actually think that Ukraine
and Europe should be willing to make?
Like, what would a 50-50 solution look like?
And then in NATO, we can then have a discussion about
which countries get to stay in NATO
and which Eastern European countries get expelled, right?
And that's, of course, so, like,
on the one hand, this is a crazy discussion.
But on the other hand...
It's also wildly hypothetical,
because a peace deal would also need to be accepted by Ukraine.
It's not just up to NATO to make these decisions.
And that brings us to the core of the problem
with the negotiations that are going on.
Even if both sides, both Russia and Ukraine...
Come to these negotiations with a mindset that says,
well, let's make some compromises, let's meet halfway,
then their ideas about what halfway means are radically different,
because they don't even agree on the very basic questions
of who is negotiating with whom and about what.
For the Ukrainians,
they would see the negotiations as between them and Russia,
and they would find a middle ground between what Russia says
that it wants from Ukraine and what
Ukraine says it wants. That would probably result
in something that is pretty close to freezing the
front line as it stands today,
with Russia having occupied a part of Ukrainian territory, and then
a discussion about security guarantees
for the remaining part of Ukraine.
But the Russians don't see the negotiations
as being between them and Ukraine.
They see the negotiations as being between them and the Americans.
So the middle ground that they are looking for would be between their
position on Eastern Europe and the American position on Eastern Europe.
And this would, of course, mean that.
As a minimum, Russia gets to keep all of Ukraine, and then the real
negotiation would be about what more they will get beyond just Ukraine.
And you might say, well, that sounds crazy,
and I would agree with that,
but we need to understand that this is actually how Putin sees it.
This is what he keeps saying that he wants.
This is why he keeps sending more soldiers into battle every day.
It's not about Donbass.
It's about half of Europe.
And he expects to get it at some point in negotiations
because he doesn't expect the Western Europeans
and the Americans to have sufficient determination
and political will to keep supporting Ukraine in the long run.
And he doesn't ultimately believe
that the Europeans have any agency in this.
So he believes that the deal that he needs to make
is with the Americans and not the Europeans.
So any deal that Putin would accept would, at a minimum,
...require Ukrainian capitulation, and then some more, right?
That means that there is no deal on the table that Ukraine can take,
and it also means that the Ukrainians will
not stop fighting anytime soon.
The discussions that we can have in the United States
and in Western Europe,
it's not whether we want the war to end or to continue.
But it's about how we want the war to continue.
Are we going to keep supporting Ukraine in the war,
or are we going to abandon them and let them fight the war alone?
But when we have that discussion,
I think it's important that we remember what Putin's war aims are
and that they go well beyond Ukraine.
And it's.
Probably in our interest to make sure that we help Ukraine
so that when this war eventually ends,
it will be on terms that look a lot more like what
the Ukrainians are saying that they want than what Putin says.
Alright, I will end it here.
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