Podcast In Focus | Is the far-right populist movement truly entering a period of global decline?

Global Focus
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4 Video Views·Nov 12, 2026
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis discussion analyzes the global rise of national populism, driven by socioeconomic anxiety, identity politics, and systemic failures. It examines how leaders like Trump, Orbán, and Modi leverage grievances to undermine democratic norms, while warning that electoral setbacks for the right do not resolve the underlying crises of housing, wealth inequality, and the erosion of truth.
Personas will change, the problems will remain,
till that they by themselves see, as you say,
through the lies of the populists. But that's very difficult.
I wonder, is this more of a problem with the system then,
rather than the leaders themselves?
There's no question that a particular leader at a particular time
Sort of
can alter politics in a way that makes it very hard to go back to.
And I agree with Christophe.
I think there are red lines that have been crossed over here.
You know, you can't have a demotic system
that works democratically if you don't have
a rule of law that makes sure that elections are free and fair.
Hello and welcome to the In Focus Parley podcast.
Over the past few months,
the world has seen some major political shifts.
From Romania to Hungary to Serbia, right-wing leaders
or parties have faced at least eight national election setbacks.
The most recent example is the U.S. midterms, where Democrats gained
a majority, delivering a major blow to Donald Trump's Republican Party.
The blue wave came just days after Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
defeated far-right candidate Flavio Bolsonaro.
Even in India, youth-led protests against the
ruling Narendra Modi government are attempting
to loosen the right-wing administration's grip
on the world's biggest democracy. Many are viewing these victories
as a signal that change is on the horizon.
And that is what we are discussing today.
Has the populist far-right finally entered
a period of decline globally?
Joining me today is Christophe Jaffrelot,
Chair of the French Political Science Association and
the British Association for South Asian Studies,
and Irfan Noordin, the Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Professor of Indian Politics in the School
of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Thank you so much for joining me today.
I want to start with the US. Donald Trump's rise was
Something of a catalyst that normalized
the strongman style of populist politics.
Do you think he was the product of a global shift towards
the right? Or do you think that
this was something that was already underway
and he was just caught in that movement?
Irfan, I'll start with you. Thank you, Sonika. Donald Trump
was a very lucky guy in 2016 because he came at a time
when in the United States the backlash
against the first African-American president had galvanized
a particular I'm going to call it racist
but let's say you know prejudice among white American voters
who I think were experiencing
I'm going to sing a real...
grievance against what they understood
to be a diminution of their status. He also had probably
in Hillary Clinton, the one candidate on the Democratic side,
that he had a serious shot of
beating because while she was a very impressive candidate,
she carried a lot of baggage with her.
So I want to contextualize that not to take away
from the seriousness of the moment,
but to recognize that but for maybe a few
you know idiosyncrasies of history
the democrats nominate somebody else for instance coming out of
that primary campaign maybe we don't go through
the last 10 years that we have in the
United States, but I think 2016
also marked a high water of global concerns about
You know, the impacts of free trade,
the impacts of the post-financial crisis economies that had
hit the world, the rise of China, you know,
really seen now as sort of inexorable as opposed to,
hey, this is a nice story about a massive growth
with a lot of sort of benefits to American
businesses. Suddenly the story had shifted post-financial crisis
to this is not just a
Major competitor, but actually something that's eating our lunch.
And Trump was able to play
that grievance politics very, very powerfully.
And, you know, around the world, we saw similar versions,
maybe not the same song, but let's say sort of rhymes, if you would.
Right. And so immigration and the scapegoating of immigration and of
immigrants took on a completely new resonance in the context of a.
of countries that were really wondering how they
were going to compete with China,
what they were going to do to rebuild
their economies after the financial crisis,
and all of that. So I do think
that Trump normalizes a particular brashness,
a particular arrogance to it, and the fact that the United States,
which has never been a perfect
champion of democracy by any means,
suddenly was led by someone who openly disdained.
The principles of liberalism, the principles of, you know,
minority rights, of basic due process, I think empowered leaders around
the world to say, you know, we're not going to get our wrists slapped
if we do this in the way that maybe previous American presidents,
however hypocritically, would have done it, right?
It was sort of a sanction to go do what you want.
And as long as you count out Trump personally
and frankly, as long as you were willing to cut
him and his family into particular deals,
you seem to get carte blanche over there.
So I think there's a ripple effect that then gets exacerbated
by the uniqueness of COVID and the,
you know, the challenges of it.
So we've lived through something that has been quite
unprecedented in my lifetime anyway,
in terms of this confluence of major crises,
the global financial crisis, 10 years later COVID.
And in between that, I think a person who
was able to seize a moment, seize a particular politics,
but blow it up to be much greater than
I think the sum of the parts were.
That of course is the genius of Donald Trump,
to take a very small opening and blow it open, wide open.
And just to foreshadow something,
I'm going to want to talk about it a bit.
I think the narrative that this window has
been closed completely is premature. And so to the extent that Trump
I don't think it's just symptom.
I think Trump did cause a lot of what it is, but he didn't
invent it. And the root causes that enable Trump haven't gone away.
And I think we've got to deal
with those headfirst. Right.
Okay, Christophe, if you can respond, and also, I think, comment a bit
on how other world leaders were able to kind
of get away with the way that they wanted to rule.
Yes, because indeed, Trump was part of a wave, and the wave preceded.
The rise to power of Trump in 2016.
Think about Viktor Orbán, Netanyahu, Erdogan.
Modi, who won a couple of years before him,
Duterte in the Philippines, Rajapaksa in
Sri Lanka.
So by the early 2010s, by 2010 itself for Orban,
and Orban is a role model for Trump,
never forget that, there was a new wave that had started already,
a wave of what I call,
what people call national populists.
They are populists. They relate to their people
the most direct way, using social media,
using emotions, fear, anxiety, anger.
And they do this in a style that is really plebeian
in many senses of the word.
You know, the vulgarity is part of it.
It's not only direct, it's also vulgar.
And it makes a point to speak like the people,
which is incidentally something
that was introduced even before by Silvio Berlusconi.
If we look for the pioneer of this style,
We have to go back to Berlusconi who used the media,
at that time it was television,
but then it became social media.
So we had this populism that was in place
and that took this form that we call national populism because
Most of the time, these people claimed that they were strong men in a
position to defend the sons of the soil of the countries they were in.
They defended against all kinds of threats.
Migrants, of course, Orbán served on this,
but, well, minorities, minorities.
As posing a threat? Yes, very much so.
And of course, Israel is a case in point.
India is a case in point.
There are so many others.
Globalization, another threat that is very much there also in Europe
because in Europe it is the EU as a transnational
or if you want supranational entity that is under attack.
So against these threats,
they claim that they defend the nation, but the nation in the
majoritarian definition of the word.
It's not every citizen, it's only the citizens who are,
yes, the sons of the soil. You can't say other things.
It's true of each and every country.
You know, Sinhalese against Tamils.
Muslims against Kurds in Turkey, of course,
Hindus against Muslims and, of course, Pakistan
and, evidently,
Jews against Muslims and the periphery.
Now, what is very interesting is also to see that,
yes, national populists were dominant
and we could add Bolsonaro, I forgot Bolsonaro,
but he is in the same league, of course.
But we need to look beyond the national populist
and look at the populist at large.
You know, that's an interesting way to relativize
the role of nationalism in this story.
Because at the same time, we've had populist of the left,
populist of the left, well, Chavez in the first place,
who was there for a long time.
And it was...
Inheriting the legacy of Perón, because populism was born in Latin
America and was born on the left before migrating to the right.
And what I want to emphasize there is that in Europe,
we still have this.
Podemos was in Spain, Beppe Grillo,
the Five Star Movement was there in Italy.
And in France, we have a populist of the left.
Who is, well, number two in the opinion polls
for the next presidential elections.
So they are not fighting for the people
who are made of the sons of the soil.
They are fighting for the people at large when they are on the left.
But the rest is very similar.
The rest is very similar against globalization,
against anything affecting the nation state,
you know. So you have to look at this wave,
at this phase of global politics in a larger
perspective probably.
People are anxious and need security.
And in fact, when you look at the Pew Research Center surveys,
you realize that they are prepared
to abandon some of their liberty for security.
And security can be because of the Islamist threat,
because of the migrant threat,
but also because of the socioeconomic threat they are affected by.
You know, we are in a world where
the new generation knows that they will not have
A good life. I mean, a life as good as their parents.
And in the West, it makes a big difference
because it gives a sense of vulnerability and all the populists,
all the demagogues on the left or
on the right can surf on that.
Now, when they reach power, they certainly indulge in authoritarianism,
but they don't deliver. They don't deliver because they cannot deliver.
And we may return to that in
the conversation, but this is probably why we have reached
A kind of turning point, after many years,
people are bold enough to send Orban back to a position,
to send Netanyahu back to a position,
because identity politics doesn't deliver.
Well, to your point on the fact that,
you know, so many young people now
know that they're not going to live a life as,
you know, easy, so to say, as their parents.
You know, young people in the U.S.
took that fact and decided to vote for Democrats
but then when you look at Europe that's not really
the case right we still have these far-right leaders
that are gaining popularity um you know
in France and Germany for example
so can you kind of explain what the predominant factors are here
and how things are different because
when you look at it ultimately cost of living right is
probably the number one issue globally at this point
um Christoph, you can start, and then Stefan
Well, Europe comes late in this process,
so we are now trying what others have tried already.
We will be disappointed the same way,
but we have tried everything, the right, the left, the center,
and now, well, to fix the problems,
you turn to far-right parties,
AfD, RN, Vox, Meloni,
Thank you so much for joining me.
Well, knowing fully well, I mean for me,
that they don't have the solution.
Now, the youth is very divided,
so far as at least France is concerned.
The young boys, the young men, turn to far-right parties.
Women? Women don't.
Women, girls are very much on the left, the young girls.
You know, we are back to gender as a very important variable
for explaining voting patterns.
That was not the case anymore.
No, there were two variables that had no role to play in elections
till recently, age and gender.
They are back.
They are back in a big way.
You have now a youth vote and you have a young woman vote.
And a young man vote.
That's why I emphasize the idea of the populist of the left,
because French young women will vote massively
for populist of the left, for instance.
Now, whether that will be a wave across Europe remains to be seen.
The European scene is still very, very fragmented.
And, you know.
When they reach power in Europe,
except Orbán was a very specific case,
but when they reach power in Europe,
they tend to dilute their original agenda.
Look at Meloni. Meloni was very much on the far right.
She was really inheriting the legacy of Italian fascism.
She's not a centrist,
but she's not as far on the right as many other parties.
And we see this in the European Parliament, where there are two groups,
and one of the groups is not as much on the right as others.
So it's a very complete, complex and fluid scene.
But to respond, the short answer to your question is,
we have not tried them yet.
And that's why maybe the cycle is just starting here.
Just to piggyback on Kristof's superb analysis,
I mean, I want to separate a couple of things.
One is cost of living for sure, but it's really the cost of housing.
And I think one of the things that we really struggle
to articulate is what does the future
look like for our cities, for small towns,
populations around the world grow, but cities
like Bombay and Delhi and Calcutta,
but even Paris, New York, Washington, D.C.
impossible to own property
and if you are a young 20s something person imagining the future
of your life, right? And I think we, part of this,
I'm not a sociologist, so I'm not going to try and
pretend to be one, but my colleagues
who are sociologists point out that part of what we're,
Christophe and I are describing over here,
is sort of a challenge to the basic rites of passage.
that young people go through, right?
At some point you get married, you own a house,
you imagine your children someday.
And when we can't imagine that, we delay those, right? So
it became more normal compared to my parents' generation
that we got married more in our 30s
and in our 20s, our children are born later,
etc. But at some point, biology kicks in and life,
you want to imagine that what the future is.
And so a generation of 28-year-olds
Who can't imagine passing any of the rites
of passage in the next decade and being able
to afford that.
has an anxiety about sort of what it means to be a man,
what it means to be a woman, what it means
to be an adult, in a way that I don't think we
have articulated effectively in our social science
discourse around this. I think sociologists are doing it,
anthropologists of particular
communities are doing it, but it's a dislocation of really who we are,
right, of what it means to be a
human adult that we have to begin
to articulate. And that's just, you know,
You know, those are very bipartisan, it requires that we rethink
In India, we talk about tier two, tier three,
tier four cities, right, as opposed to these
massive agglomerations, etc.
So that's one set of issues worth thinking about.
The other, which in the language of populism is sort of neither,
none of us have mentioned
yet, is the incredible growth of oligarchic capitalism.
And I think, you know,
this language of globalization becomes a catch-all.
for a lot of the challenges and weaknesses
of the contemporary capitalist system, but the single one
is sort of the world, the concentration of power
and wealth in a small handful, relatively small
handful of individuals and companies.
And there's a backlash against that that sort of becomes a bit
diffused, right? It becomes again sort of,
you know, we're angry about the lack of jobs,
They're angry about jobs.
They're angry about trade, etc.
But the role of sort of an Elon Musk.
Right. In the U.S. elections,
this is much a galvanizing force on the left.
Right. And a sort of a backlash against that, the sense that this can't
be really what we were promised or what we were supposed to talk about.
But those guys are very deep in the pockets of this populist right.
Right. And I think sort of to think about Trump without
his billionaire backers is to miss a significant part of the analysis.
Right. He is enabled by a crony capitalism.
And that is not...
unique to the United States, that is around the world, right?
A set of very powerful actors that
see in these right-wing populists in particular,
opportunity, and where they see the left-wing
as real threat, and therefore see a real incentive
to sort of lobby in one direction versus the
other. And because of the kind of wealth and sway that they have,
it becomes quite a dramatic
Dramatic tilting of the scales and what I was thinking about.
The gender issue, I just want to double click on that as well,
which is the gender gap in US
politics is now larger than any other gap that exists,
right, in terms of basic demographics.
The racial gap continues, and I think it's again worth noting
that for all of the secular, you know, left-wing
shift in these last elections,
white men as a group still voted majority Republican.
Right. It's much smaller, just 53 to 47 compared to the much outsized,
but it was still majority.
So these become now structural features of the politics.
Right. And I think we've got to sort of think through that.
One last point just to seed a conversation.
I think we want to think about impatience. Right.
And the challenge of democracy and the appeal of populism.
is partly because we're impatient for change.
There's all of this issue, right?
And if you're a young left-winger,
you're impatient about climate change.
You're impatient about how do we break down
corporate oligarchies, et cetera.
And then you look at the practice of...
everyday democracy and you're like man nothing's going
to change this is just so slow it is so
you know what are they doing over there it's
a bunch of old people seem seemingly talking
and now we have somebody who says I will make change
but this becomes a challenge in some sense
not just for the left and the right
as Christophe says delivering on those promises is really really
hard the system is not built for those radical changes
and so both sides end up becoming
victims of their own promises
but also the system as a whole suffers a crisis of legitimacy
which is I voted for them they couldn't deliver I voted
for these guys they couldn't deliver
to hell with it all right a pox on all their houses kind of thing
and I think one of the things again we got
to think about is sort of this
obsession with national level politics empowers
a certain national populist
And sort of, you know, a federalist politics in which cities,
as the folks who actually can think about urban housing crises
and states that can deliver services,
might be a longer term set of answers.
It goes back to older models of politics, but I think just
at the structural level, if you think about what's different about
the last 20 years compared to, say, 60 years ago,
is how powerfully centralized most national governments are,
how globalized their economies are.
And I think if you're at the bottom of that totem pole,
right, it just feels like all of
power is a long ways from you
and basically all you can do is throw stones, right? Because
everything else that you were told
and taught about how to affect politics when you were in
civics class just seems kind of pointless. I wonder is this more of
a problem with the system
then rather than the leaders themselves are people just impatient
um especially you know we have growing global instability we have
these leaders that are making
all of these promises are we just becoming less tolerant of leaders
who are making these promises
and that are then ultimately unable to deliver
on them um yeah Christoph well i don't know if it is
People or the systems at large,
but certainly the sense of frustration you are mentioning
is key for understanding this.
Thank you very much.
You say instability, yes, instability because
of terrorism, invasions by migrants, but also
instability simply because you expected things to improve
because they used to get better
and better.
And they are not.
And I would underline two very specific points there.
Think about what education gives you today
compared to what it used to give you yesterday.
You became a graduate. You got a job.
Now you are a graduate. You are jobless. If you go by
a very interesting survey by Azim Premji University for India,
you have something like
one third of the graduates below 25 who are on the dole.
Why are they on the dole? Because they don't
get the job they expected in the first place.
And they expected a good job because they have paid
I paid for fees.
In a privatized education system that...
Well, you need to pay your loans.
You have to repay your loans.
And that's new.
That's new.
Because the system used to be public.
And when you got a degree from a public university, you got a job.
So instability for me, you see, is there.
You're not secure anymore.
Similarly, and it's not an example I will take from India this time.
It's an example I would take from the US, UK, Europe at large.
You have, in all these countries, rural parts
of the landscape which have literally imploded.
Inequalities between Northern England
and Southern England has increased so much.
Inequalities between the midwest and the two coasts.
Inequalities between central France and the rest of the country.
Now these people feel insecure again for other reasons.
They've been abandoned.
They've been abandoned by what used to be a welfare state.
You had public hospitals.
You had even public post offices.
You had a state that was giving you a sense of security.
It has withdrawn.
And this is where we can make a connection between neoliberalism
and the rise of the far right and populism at large.
Because people are looking for a savior.
They are looking for quick fix.
As Yafan was saying, it takes too long.
And it's not going in the right direction anyway.
Because the state continues to withdraw,
and you have privatization of education,
privatization of everything, everything is more expensive,
and you can't make both ends meet.
You know, at the end of the day,
we are back to a rather socioeconomic explanation of
a political transformation.
Incidentally, and for me, this is the key argument there,
elites have used populism to distract people from socioeconomic issues.
Well, look at India. The moment lower caste OBCs started to rise,
well, Hindu nationalism told everyone, oh,
your enemy is not the upper caste, your enemy is the Muslim.
And forget about positive discrimination, quotas, and so on.
And indeed, for quite some time, it did work.
Plus, of course, direct transfer, DBTs, that helped a lot.
But, but.
The state in India did not spend as much
as Manmohan Singh's government did on welfare.
It's a different kind of welfare.
So it was more a distraction than anything else.
But people are back to their sense.
And these young people in the CJP don't want everything
to be seen in the lens of communal views.
They want to be back to the basics, jobs, a decent life.
And I think this is the end of a cycle in a sense.
I couldn't agree more with all of that.
I do think the sort of very structural explanation in some ways,
you know, there's a temptation
as political scientists to look at a current moment and make it,
this reminds us of other
things, right?
That's both a power and a weakness because
there's something unique about the particular.
moment. And so if I think about what's particular about
the moment, I'd love to get Christophe's
take on this because he's written so eloquently about
so many things. I do think that the
mode of communication and the role of social media,
the role of sort of this new rise of
what in the US we came to think about
as the post-truth kind of world, right, in which
we all have these very hyper-local,
hyper-specific news feeds, complements a lot of this, right?
So, there is a certain...
It's sort of old-fashioned to talk about,
right, of the need for a public discourse,
for a civic space in which we talk to each other,
we share a certain set of principles, at least we share a set of facts.
And the ability of populists to sort of just cut
the mainstream media out of the question entirely
and go direct to consumer, if you would, right?
I can be in your social media feed, I'm using TikTok,
I'm using Facebook, I'm using Insta, I'm using Twitter.
I think really was,
is the one feature of the current moment that doesn't have an analog to
You know, the 60s, the 70s, or even the 1920s or whatever it is.
Yes, it does.
And I think that is one that, again,
it's that we don't get to put back in the box,
right? You could imagine, in a sense, a set of new leaders.
You could imagine this democratic
majority that has now been elected to Congress saying,
hey, we're going to take the housing
affordability kind of issues head on and we're going to do some
stuff that's fairly bipartisan and everything.
You could imagine some of them saying,
okay, we're going to tighten certain
enforcements against ICE. We're going to make,
you know, the kind of public immigration enforcement
less reminiscent of brown shirts marching through Berlin,
right, in the 1930s or whatever.
So, but what do we do about thinking about
the fact that everyday Americans really have
We have fundamentally different truths about what the...
You know, about vaccine policy,
about sort of the role of China in the world, about immigration,
what they contribute to the society.
And we don't have that.
So I think I don't have the answer to that either.
Right.
I mean, you're the journalist, so you
can tell us what you guys are doing.
But I think there is a certain challenge to.
Just thinking about what the conversation looks like
and how politicians break through to the other side in order
to bridge some of these divides, because the divides aren't just
in our heads, they're really in our daily lives.
And the data on this is really, really striking.
Even data on India, if you look at the time series of national surveys,
the number of young Hindus
who report having a Muslim as one of their close personal friends.
is lower today than it's ever been in survey data in the past.
Now these survey data are not a perfect time series and it's not,
but that is very much a lived experience, right?
I mean, I think the rise of sort
of very segregated housing communities once again
across Indian cities and all of that just means that
those sort of everyday interactions aren't there
and we have to think about that.
I do think the other thing is that, you know,
this is a conversation that has been heavily tilted to
the western hemisphere, right?
And I think one of the challenges is remembering that
While the populism doesn't play quite the same way,
democracy is under threat all over the world,
including in places where it doesn't actually take
the form of national populists.
For instance, I mean, the state of democracy on continental Africa
is weaker today than it has been in a while.
Some of the optimism of the 1990s has really faded.
We have got pretty consolidated autocracies, etc.
Even in South Africa, where the ANC just took
a pretty good beating in their municipal elections.
But you know, anti-immigrant rhetoric over there is huge, right?
Vigilant anti-violence against
immigrants is huge. So I think just worth positioning
this in a much more global
conversation, which is that the democratic ideas of,
you know, loyal opposition, slow, deliberate
kind of discussion,
respect for minority rights over majoritarian impulses, those are
There's nowhere that feels particularly well protected.
Yeah.
And maybe on that point,
I just want to come back to the minority versus majority.
I think it's easy in our search for something
that feels like a repudiation of Trumpism,
of, you know, Bolsonaro, et cetera, to read into that
a victory for all the good things,
right, a unity of goodness, if you will.
And I don't mean to be churlish or just, you know,
a downer, but I think we want to be careful about that.
I think it's one thing to say that, you know,
this was a rejection of the GOP, but the counterfactual
of Trump decides not to just start some stupid war in Iran,
doesn't blow oil prices through the roof,
doesn't send the U.S. economy in a bit of a tailspin because of that.
Do we get the same repudiation of Trump
in an economy that's doing much better in which
inflation isn't as high? I think we get some of it, right?
I think some of the ICE enforcement
has been so egregious that you get a bit
of a backlash over there. I think some of the
blatant corruption of the Trump
administration gets a bit of a backlash.
But I don't see any politicians really campaigning on,
let's sort of make immigration more
easier into the United States.
I don't see any politicians on either side
campaigning on other sorts of minorities,
even in the midst of this tremendous blue wave.
US states were adopting, including liberal states,
adopting restrictions on transgender children
being able to play sports and all that sort of stuff, right?
Even in the midst of this blue wave
in California, they rejected a progressive tax.
And we can debate whether the tax was the best
idea, but the point is that there's a limit
to this and I think there's a temptation in
these moments to say, hey, you know,
old-fashioned liberalism has a victory and we're back.
And I think we've got to be a little more circumspect than that.
And I think the question of what can the left do with this mandate
and some of that requires dealing with these bread and butter issues.
But I think some of it requires having a different kind
of conversation about the value of checks and balances, the value of,
you know, minoritarian institutions, the value of deliberation.
And if that happens, then I think we can be.
much more optimistic about the future
but if not in 10 years we'll have the same conversation and
say I thought we had defeated the right, how come they're back again?
I want to ask you know
based off of a lot of the points that you made
from social media to just the way that you know
the blue wave has happened this time,
is this a question of you know the
Beginning of the end, so to speak, of the right wing or the beginning
of the end of this kind of like persona politics that we're seeing,
because so much of these, you know, right wing figures, Trump,
Bolsonaro, Modi, it is so tied to who the leader is. Right.
So is that something that, you know, people are seeing through?
And is that also maybe something that is
limiting factor for these right-wing parties.
Christophe, you can. Well, I'm afraid it goes
beyond the personas.
And I would build on what Ya Fan has just said. For me,
these entrepreneurs in identity politics could cash in on,
could capitalize on the fears,
on the anxieties, all kinds of fears and anxieties. Most of the time,
They use religion, they use race,
they use identity markers for getting support.
From people who thought that, yes, that was the problem.
And in Europe, we have this amazing phrase now, the great replacement.
You know, this idea that the white people will
be replaced by non-white people.
Britain will be a non-white country in the coming years.
And you have people who build on that.
And really,
Anyone can do that.
It's not one man in particular.
They are not all of them particularly charismatic.
They are not particularly, well, I mean, good orators and so on.
So the main problem for me is, can we regulate
the discourse, the political strategies
by returning to some rule of law?
Because if we let anyone saying anything
Using social medias, using Fox News, using
so many channels for intoxicating people with fears of the others,
then personas will change, the problems will remain.
Till, till, and that's really something I admire on the American side,
till people got so much maturity.
That they by themselves see, as you say,
through the lies of the populists.
But that's very difficult.
You know, you need a very robust civil society.
There are very few countries with such a robust civil society.
So what you need is a judiciary, an election commission drawing
the line and saying that's not fair.
You can't use these stratagems for winning elections.
The problem is that it's very difficult to get this kind of rule of law.
And as a result, when you have crossed some red lines,
it's very difficult to come back.
So imagine one day, anytime soon,
BJP loses power and Congress, a Congress-led government,
starts a new career and tries to open a new chapter.
How will they?
Return to the situation of 2013.
How do you repeal laws on cow protection, on interreligious marriages?
This is what happened in Pakistan.
Pakistan had very, very strict anti-blasphemy laws
that no one could change because this is sacred.
And you'll have always entrepreneurs in identity politics to say, hey.
This is against our creed.
You can't change this.
And what vigilante groups are doing
at the grassroots level is exactly the same.
So, beyond personas,
to make sure that ideologues cannot take you for a ride
and reach a point of no return.
You need a rule of law that makes it impossible
to use some of these arguments in politics.
And most of the time, we are not there. We are very far from that,
precisely because politicians are, of course, having the upper hand.
And that's why you have to fall back on civil societies.
And this is exactly what we saw on the Indian side.
People realizing that the state will not do the job,
the judiciary is out, Election Commission is out.
People have to do it.
People have to draw the line
and to return to what used to be a more humane,
a more multicultural society.
But that's not something every society can do.
And I just don't know whether India
is in a position to do that at the moment.
Irfan, just before you respond,
I want to also add in my next question, because I think
there's overlap here. But, you know,
are voters supporting an ideology, you know, when they're
voting for these parties?
Or at this point, are we just seeing people going back and forth,
just voting to get the current administration out?
And that, I think, goes for many of the
examples, maybe besides Brazil, right?
Is this how the liberal pendulum kind of comes to exist?
Yeah, that's a great question
and I appreciate the addition of that into the conversation.
Evidence that voters have strict ideologies
or even coherent ideologies by which they vote
is really limited, right?
We know that party labels matter a lot, identity matters a great deal,
pocketbook politics, if you would, matters a great deal.
There is evidence that, you know,
especially on things like basic norms of fairness,
Voters do tend to react pretty badly
to when they think elites are bending the rules in
their favor.
So the language of anti-corruption carries
a great deal more weight than if you look
at exit polls coming out of the United States.
thing that voters are saying that really caused them
to want to change was because of a sense of
corruption, right? I mean,
the idea of the self-aggrandizement of certain people or maybe
that impunity. But the notion that this coheres
in an ideology in the way that, you know,
my views on this predict my views on this predict my views on that,
very little evidence over there.
But I don't think that's that, right?
I mean, I think ideology becomes a bit of a
The stronger, all of us are pretty ideological,
it gives politicians a lot of impunity because
as long as they can tell us that they're defending the ideology,
it's the same sort of drug of
I'm defending my creed and the creed
is now political ideology as opposed to this.
So there's a little bit,
one of the nice things about elections is that it's a referendum
in the moment on how well have you done
your job over the last four years and if that means
that I want to try the other side, that's good.
The other part that's implied in your question
is that there's evidence that we have a lot of
votes switching. We don't really have that evidence.
So even in this election, the best exit
poll suggests that maybe somewhere between 7
and 10 percent of the people who had voted for Mr.
Trump in 2024 switched their vote this time.
But what we have is differential turnout.
And I think we have this opportunity,
and this is where Christophe's point about the
strength of civil society and the ability to mobilise people
who have felt very disaffected
with politics to re-enter politics,
to cast a vote is a very powerful thing, because even
in countries with pretty high levels of turnout like India,
we still have 30% of the population
that doesn't vote in national elections, etc.
So we've got to think about that as, let's say,
a reserve army of voters, to borrow a
phrase.
sort of that needs to be thought about seriously
because converting people right getting someone
who's voted for the BJP for the last eight elections
to now switch is just as impossible
as getting someone who's a congress voter
for many many generations to imagine switching. So we got
a lot of those sorts of factors going
on but I think that just to go back to the original
the first question that you asked is that
Part of the reason this becomes
so challenging is that I do think these are movements,
and not just people.
The person at a particular moment gives voice to that.
But Trump didn't invent xenophobia.
He didn't invent racism, right? I mean, and neither,
and Hindu nationalism is not the creation of,
Hindutva is not the creation of this government.
And Krzysztof's incredible book on the internationalist movement
was 15, 20 years before this government came to be.
So in some sense, you know, I think trying to make it about the leader
is in some ways to give a bit of a blank slip to voters who carry
their own prejudices in their own hearts about all this stuff.
So I think we don't want to make it too much about them.
just leader, but there's no question
that a particular leader at a particular time
sort of can alter politics in a way that puts a very,
makes it very hard to go back to. And
I agree with Christophe. I think there
are red lines that have been crossed over here.
Now, in particular, where courts are concerned,
I mean, the pliancy of the judicial system,
of the Supreme Court of the United States,
to just abandon its constitutional responsibilities,
they've given Trump effectively complete immunity
for any crimes committed while he's in office.
I mean, it's an insane prospect to imagine
that there'll be a post-Trump period just by virtue
of mortality or the next election,
and there's simply no way to hold him accountable.
even conceivable for any of the things that have
been done over here because the courts
gave him that power, right.
It is the courts that gutted the Voting Rights Act that has allowed
sort of partisan gerrymandering in the United States to become
so rife. It is the courts that
have sort of made campaign finance reform an impossibility,
such that one man, Elon Musk,
could spend 500 million dollars effectively.
That was not done by Trump, that was done by the courts.
And I think if you look at India, a country that we all love, again,
what is the role of the courts in enabling some of the excesses,
not just of this government, but of previous governments?
Do we see a court that understands its constitutional responsibility
to the citizenry and taking that seriously?
And then final point, because it's in the news, I mean, the election,
the delegitimization of elections is something we haven't
talked about yet, but that's the playbook of these populists.
And maybe that's the worst legacy they leave.
Right, a world in which people don't trust
the outcome of elections or that politicians
understand that manipulating the rules
of the game, right, is permitted.
So in the US, this takes a form of,
you know, the stop the steal kind of thing.
Trump's already beginning to say,
does anyone really think these elections are credible?
Kind of stuff, but it's gerrymandering.
But the special intensive review, I mean,
and the fights about sort of the role and
of the chief election commissioner and of the election commission.
In many ways, the worst legacy, because once we lose,
once citizens lose faith in elections,
there's no coming back from that, right?
At least not in short term. Maybe over a generation,
you come back from it. In the short run,
that is really devastating. And I think you need a
civil society response. So for me, the cockroaches...
If nothing else, by just shining a light
that it's a non-partisan, it will be read as
partisan in some places,
but a non-partisan critique of the way the election commission
has done its job, or not done its job as it were.
I think that's a really important contribution
to the protection of democracy, but it requires
a lot of action to set right what has been done.
And just one last question for both of you.
What does a sustained decline
of the populist far right actually look like?
Because I think we can all come to a consensus
that what we're seeing now is not enough for
us to say that this is the beginning of the end, so to speak.
Christophe, you can respond first.
Well, you know, democracy and democracy has two sides.
You have, of course,
the demos that has to decide.
And the demos in its entirety,
meaning minorities have the same rights as the majorities.
That's one side.
And the other side is the rule of law and institutions,
which are in such a situation
that they make sure that elections are free and fair.
You know, you can't have a demotic system
that works democratically if you don't have
a rule of law that makes sure that elections are free and fair.
We have not invented anything better and we have to preserve it,
we have really to make it,
I would say, working sufficiently,
satisfactorily for everyone to believe in it. If not,
you have what happened to Bangladesh, people boycotting elections.
Boycotting elections
means what? People will have to go to the street for making a change.
Well, if you want to avoid this detour, that is so costly.
You return to a democratic way of organizing life
and elections in particular.
Yeah, when I teach as I am right now about democracy,
I keep telling people that my students
that elections are the most radical invention in human history, right?
I mean, the notion that everyday citizens,
no matter how rich, poor, male, female, whatever
it is, get to choose the most powerful person
in their country is an idea that prior to
to a hundred years ago.
would have been unthinkable, literally unimaginable.
So this is one of the greatest inventions and
creations of human beings and it deserves all our efforts
and great imagination to preserve it.
What does the decline look like?
I think the key words there is really the far right part of it.
I mean elections need to have alternatives.
So a world in which the Democrats win every
election for the foreseeable future
is not any healthier than one in which
Republicans win every election for the future.
What we need is alternation.
We need people to see perceived actual choices
because these are serious issues
and the ones got a monopoly on the truth.
The far part of it, right,
and the far right ideology is toxic
because as Christophe eloquently put it earlier,
the articulation of who's part of the nation,
who deserves the protections of the constitution
is an exclusive vision.
It's a vision that others, people have said, you don't belong here,
you don't have the same rights, you're less than.
And history is rife with the excesses of countries
when that kind of thinking permeates society, right?
When we come to see a particular group.
The fact of the matter is that, you know,
we can relitigate whether or not certain parts
of immigration policy could have been done more sensibly than others.
Whether we could have sort of thought differently about
the migrant crisis in Europe.
Definitely. But these are human beings
who now reside here. What are you going to do,
right? This whole send them back home, where do you send them to?
So this current moment in the United States where
the country is allowing you,
the courts have allowed you to deport a Venezuelan to Eritrea
or to Rwanda, this is inhumane.
This is intolerable, right?
I mean, so the Indian version of, you know,
go back to Pakistan.
I was like, there's no Pakistan to go back to, boss.
It's like, I'm from here, right?
So I think there's a exclusivity,
there's a sort of a, there's a cruelty
to far-right politics that cannot have a role
in modern, you know, democracy.
That's not the same as right.
And I think partly what we have to prevent
is the co-option of conservatism and of right-wing
thinking by the ultra-far right,
as if they are the people who get to speak on behalf
of that.
And so I think for all of the pushback from the left,
the real defense of this requires
that the center-right reassert itself,
that it says, look, there's an articulation of
conservative principles that have a role
in contemporary democracy, but we're not these
guys.
And just to win an election, we're not going to ally with them.
But if the right has lost its way,
I would argue in a lot of places where I think the
convenience of identity appeals as a way
of winning elections has been easier than making
a sort of principled articulation
of conservative economic principles, etc.
And so there's a lot to be fixed.
But I think the less that that far-right nativist rhetoric
It's part of the ways in which we debate politics and debate elections.
That will be the real victory.
Irfan, Christophe, thank you so much for speaking with me today.
Thank you, Sunika.
Thank you, sir.
