NGỪNG XUẤT KHẨU NĂNG LƯỢNG, PHÂN BÓN, TRUNG QUỐC TUNG CHIÊU ĐỘC VỚI LÁNG GIỀNG

Welcome back, dear viewers, to the show "I AM LÊ MÌNH." Ladies and gentlemen, on March 31, Beijing just released a figure that stunned the entire world, The manufacturing PMI index reached 50.4, the highest level in the past year. At first glance, it seems like a brilliant sign of revival, But for Southeast Asian neighboring countries, this marked the beginning of a nightmare. Why does the recovery of the global factory system make Vietnam fearful of flight cutbacks? causing Malaysia and Indonesia to be greatly unsettled due to fertilizer shortages? The answer lies in an harsh truth. Amid the storm of war, Iran disrupts global supply hubs. China has chosen to turn its back on the promise of win-win cooperation. to absolutely prioritize the instinct for domestic survival. And today's program, let's uncover the truth together with us. Behind those dazzling figures and Beijing's cold, calculated defense strategies. On March 31, media reported that China prioritizes domestic energy needs. It is cooperation amid the Middle East war causing disruptions to supply chains. Other reports also stated that China's production activities have recovered and increased. Back to expansion at the fastest pace in a year, with the official manufacturing PMI index In March, it rose to 50.4 from 49.0 in February, the highest level in nearly a year. Actually, those two pieces of information do not contradict each other at all; rather, they complement each other. And when placed side by side, they revealed the true nature of the issue. China is not entering a phase of comfortable recovery, but rather struggling to maintain stability. That rhythm of recovery, while clearly feeling the external pressure of energy advancing threw itself into the industrial machinery of its own economy. For a economy that simultaneously pulled in factories Returning to the expanded area will become increasingly sensitive to oil, gas, input costs, and transportation prices. PMI rose to 50.4, a positive signal, but Reuters itself emphasized that the recovery is taking place against the backdrop of Middle East war risks, rising energy prices, and costs Raw material costs going up. That is, the brighter part of the picture indicates better factory performance. As for the dark part, it is intended to prevent the machine from running out of breath. Beijing must tightly control the energy supply. quantity for itself. In other words, producing to restore it does not make China confident in sharing. The more they try to suppress it, the more they are forced to defend themselves. And this is precisely the crucial point. China has long been regarded as a central hub for imports. the mouth, filtering, and large-scale redistribution of energy in Asia. They purchase in very large quantities crude oil from outside, especially from sources under price pressure such as Iran and Russia Then they refine it into diesel, aviation fuel, and petrochemical products. Then sell it back to the region. During the Ping era, this model created something for Beijing. a very special kind of soft power, not power derived from oil, but power derived from a transit, refining, and dispatching hub for energy flows. But when war broke out in Central In winter, what is first challenged is not the promise of cooperation, but the instinct for survival. the essence of that system. And China reacted precisely according to that instinct. They retained for themselves the containment. If looked at more broadly, we will see that this is not a temporary reaction, but rather the result of the entire an economic structure. Beijing is not merely a global energy consumer, They have become an energy agent in Asia, where crude oil is purchased. recycled into new value and sold in various forms, as we have just analyzed. This model generates profit, of course. But more importantly, it creates impact. A country supplying diesel affects logistics and transportation. A country supplying fuel Airplanes affect air transport, tourism, and commerce. A country supplying fertilizers then directly impact agriculture and food security. When one holds so many critical links in the chain, China doesn't just sell products; it sells also the rhythm of regional economic operations. The issue is that such a model is sustainable only when the market remains stable. While energy prices are... The crisis has not yet erupted, the Strait of Hormuz has not been threatened, and global supply chains are still functioning. In a normal way, China can both make profits and tell the story of mutually beneficial cooperation. Cooperation for mutual victory. But Iran's war has stripped away that outer layer, exposing the bare truth beneath. When regional supply is disrupted, when crude oil prices rise, when governments in Southeast Asia jointly The turmoil is exerting pressure to urge China to lift the ban on fuel and fertilizers. Instead, Beijing's response was not to open its reserves to stabilize the market. Reuters said they only made vague statements and did not publicly acknowledge the ban. and mainly focused on protecting their own economy from the impact of war. This is a very important detail, because it shows the difference between the two roles: one is a major country bearing responsibility toward the region, and secondly, a state that prioritizes internal stability, Beijing clearly chose the second role without hesitation. From this perspective, the Iran conflict has revealed a very profound truth about the actual state of health. of China's economy. An economy truly with ample room for maneuver, Being truly confident in one's resilience often means they will seize the crisis to expand. impact, opening the warehouse at the right time, rescuing the market at the right moment, and thereby forcing the region to recognize its leadership role mine. However, China today is acting in a different manner. They do not wish to trade security for anything. domestically to gain additional strategic goodwill abroad. This means that even as the factory is recovering If the recovery is disrupted, Beijing still fears that the energy shock could quickly erode that recovery. through input costs, transportation, production prices, profit margins, and market psychology. A government that chooses to shut off the valve rather than win the region's trust is still playing defense. weak, not yet truly capable of launching a strong offensive. And this is precisely the moment when we need to view China not as not just an economy, but a model of power. For many years, Beijing has built establishing its influence in Asia is not merely about infrastructure, credit, or trade-based utilization but also through energy and products associated with energy. This has led many countries to squander resources. Duyen felt that China was an indispensable link in their growth strategy. But the current shock is demonstrating that this is a form of conditional dependence. The condition is that as long as China can talk about sharing only if its domestic energy security is still ensured. Yet when they themselves feel insecure, the promise of cooperation will be pushed aside in favor of the need for domestic stability. Because they are in the process of recovering production, they are even less willing to allow the machine to be damaged by a shock. new supply source. Precisely because the factory had just risen slightly, they had to tighten control over inputs even more. And precisely because they This recovery remains fragile, so they dare even less to treat energy as a gift. politics for the region. In recent days, China's regional partners have been shouting about this The issue is that China is required to respect the previously agreed-upon energy supply and distribution arrangements. But Beijing The forest is dense and shows no reaction. This indicates that they are not only protecting the domestic market not only their own territory, but also inadvertently expose the true limitations of the so-called regional cooperation they have promoted for many years now. Because a reliable partner is not judged by pretty statements When the market is calm, a reliable partner is not recognized; it is only during the outbreak of a crisis that they are truly evaluated. When goods become scarce, when prices surge suddenly, when neighboring countries need to be kept stable fall into chaos, will he still keep his promise? And at this juncture, China left a very bad signal, a very bad impression. They didn't directly say they were canceling the commitment. but they did not openly and fully acknowledge the bans. But in reality, they had locked down the the crucial flow of fuel and fertilizers, despite many neighboring countries having struggled with precisely that crisis. First of all, diesel and refined fuels. As Reuters reported, China immediately ordered a ban on the export of diesel fuel and aviation fuel. Not in March for the shipments that have not yet completed customs clearance. This is not a matter of choice. Minor technical adjustment, but rather a deliberate action of closing the valve to prevent the risk of inadequate suction in the water. It occurred precisely at a time when the Asian market was short of supplies due to the war in Iran disrupting shipments. supply and caused prices to skyrocket. This means instead of using its central role as a refining hub To calm the regional market, China chose to withdraw its goods from the regional market. to protect themselves. From a commercial standpoint, this is their right, but from a strategic perspective, it signifies one point is that in times of difficulty, Beijing is willing to place domestic interests above all else The expected cooperation had been promoted earlier. What is noteworthy is that China is not the one that has not... have the capability. Publicly available communications data indicates that by early 2026, they continued to accumulate oil at a significant rate. strong, with crude oil storage surplus reaching approximately 1.24 million barrels per day in January and February. The amount held The crude oil volume is already counted as exceeding 1.2 billion barrels. At the same time, independent oil refineries In Shandong, companies are still striving to maintain production capacity to take advantage of price discrepancies. As for Sinopec and Sinochem, they are adjusting their operations. adjust operations to compensate for the shortfall in medium-grade oil supply. That is, Beijing does not act as a They are completely helpless. They have warehouses, inventory, production capacity, and a network for purchasing oil at discounted prices. From Iran and Russia, but they still did not choose to significantly increase supply sources to stabilize the region. Aircraft fuel, for jet aircraft, has an even clearer impact. Vietnam is an example. most directly. Reuters reported that Vietnam imports more than two-thirds of its aviation fuel requirements from abroad. Outside, and about 60% come from China and Thailand. When China and Thailand jointly tighten measures on In exports, Vietnam had to prepare for the budget cut reducing flights starting in April. Reuters later reported that Vietnam Airlines must plan to cut 23 flights per week on various routes. Domestic flights were suspended starting April 1st due to a lack of fuel. This reveals a very harsh truth. In peacetime, China may be a nearby, convenient, and cost-effective source of supply. But in wartime or crisis, this dependence immediately turns into a vulnerability capable of paralyzing the rhythm the operation of an economy. Aviation is not just about transportation. It is related to tourism, commerce, fast transportation, regional connectivity, and market psychology. When a country can cause another country's internet to contract merely by issuing a single valve shutdown order, That impact has gone far beyond the scope of mere merchandise. Malaysia, on the other hand, reveals a second aspect of the shock: fertilizers and heavy industry production. Reuters reported that fertilizer production plants in Malaysia have had to halt operations recently due to rising costs. Input materials surged sharply due to the war and disrupted supply sources. As for Malay, international media reports based on ITC data show that last year, China accounts for about one-third of the imported fertilizers. Malaysian officials have stated plainly that China's export restrictions will worsen the limited distribution of fertilizers. especially in the oil palm industry, a strategic sector of the country. News agencies also reported that fertilizer costs could account for up to 60% of palm oil production costs in Malaysia. And in Indonesia, some input prices have increased by 100–150% in just two weeks. It means that when China tightens fertilizer controls, they don't just cause prices to rise, and they have struck at the ability to sustain profits in a key industry. And once fertilizers experience a sudden surge, Its impact will not be limited to agriculture but will spread to food, exports, and the agricultural balance of the economy. For Indonesia, the frightening thing is not a single blow, but a double blow. Reuters reported that Indonesia relies on nearly 70% of its crude oil supply from the Middle East. While this is an important raw material for producing phosphate fertilizer. At the same time, China is also the source of about one-fifth of Indonesia's imported fertilizers. Otherwise, Indonesia is being squeezed from both ends: the input for fertilizer production from the Middle East is disrupted due to war. As for the imported materials from China, they are being tightened due to Beijing's domestic stockpiling policy. When a country is squeezed at both the raw material end and the finished product end, Then it is no longer a price risk but rather a security risk—production security. Media also noted that small-scale farmers in Indonesia have begun switching to organic fertilizer as chemical fertilizer has become too expensive. When farmers are forced to change their behavior not because of green gains but because they can't afford inputs. That indicates the shock has already reached very deep levels of the economy. Thailand, on the other hand, occupies a more special position. On one hand, it used to be a source of aviation fuel for Vietnam. Therefore, this country's tightening of exports will have a greater impact on Vietnam. On the other hand, Bangkok also needs to consider the issue of preventing further disruption to its fertilizer supply from China. to the point that Thai officials, quoted by major news agencies, said diplomats would have to work with the Chinese side. to maintain the fertilizer flow if necessary. That means even a country with a developed industrial and commercial infrastructure such as Thailand, Trust in China has also been replaced by a mindset of having to exert effort to prevent them from imposing further restrictions. It is no longer a normal partnership relationship, but rather a relationship with a supply hub that all parties are well aware of. The final decision depends on Beijing's political will, not on the spirit of respecting regional stability. Overall, it can be seen that China is currently controlling at least four key strategic eyes. First is cheap crude oil from sanctioned sources, particularly Iran. Reuters reported that China purchased more than 80% of Iran's oil shipments by sea, averaging 1.38 million barrels per day. Every day in 2025. Monday is the extremely high oil refining capacity. including state-owned factories and the network of oil refineries in Shandong. Help them convert crude oil into usable products. Third is its very large storage capacity, estimated to hold over 1.2 billion barrels of crude oil. And the fourth step is the redistribution of finished products such as Diazene, Aviation fuel fertilizers released into the market contain a lot. When a country possesses all four links in this chain, it is no longer just a major energy consumer. Yet they are a strategic node for regional energy security. But precisely because they seized that position, their choice carries greater political significance. And the recent choice made by Beijing was to use that network to secure its own position first. No matter how much the surrounding partners may be lagging behind. Therefore, if stated frankly, this crisis has revealed that it is not China The country is weak, whereas they are very strong. They are strong because they have a network. The problem is that they are strong, yet they fail to create a sense of security for their partners. A truly trustworthy partner is one who can use their strength to provide stability for others. in difficult times. China, on the other hand, is demonstrating a different kind of strength—the strength to pull back shipments. Hold back, let the partner catch their breath, and then re-enter negotiations from a position of strength. That's not the kind of strength you'd expect from a trustworthy friend. Therefore, China is not an unimportant partner; they are very important. but the way they behaved during the crisis shows that they are not reliable partners. place the choice of faith in strategic strength. They can talk about regional cooperation, about the belt, food security, energy security, but when goods are scarce, prices spike, and markets are disrupted When faced with a crisis, they are ready to tear apart the very fabric of those commitments in order to protect their own interests first. That does not mean Southeast Asian countries can suddenly disentangle themselves from China. Of course, escaping China is always difficult. But it matters because from now on, Any country that still views Beijing as a stable anchor will have to wake up. China may be a major supplier, but it is not a reliable guarantor in times of crisis. Crisis. That is something perhaps many people must now realize. Here, we would like to temporarily pause today's program. We welcome your personal opinions. Goodbye and see you again!