LIVE: Vance Hosts the White House Press Briefing

All right. Good morning, everybody. Nothing to talk about. Slow news day here in Washington, D.C. So let me just say a couple of things off the bat. First of all, I think the president's peace plan in Iran is already bearing real fruits for the American people. Last night, 12.5 million barrels of oil went through the Strait of Hormuz. That is a high since the beginning of the conflict. Oil prices are down nearly at their level from the pre-war conflict. Gas prices dropped below $4 a gallon today for the first time since the conflict. And importantly, they're going to keep falling further given how low oil prices are. On the military side, the Iranians, for the second night in a row, did not shoot at any ships in the Strait of Hormuz so far. They are honoring their end of the commitment. And on the blockade, CENTCOM has allowed north of a dozen ships to go through our naval blockade, and so we're also honoring our end of the early part of the agreement. On the military side, a couple of things that are still true and will be true whether the Iranians comply with the rest of the deal or not. Number one, their nuclear program has been completely destroyed. Their capacity for enrichment, the facilities at which they were using to develop enrichment and develop a potential nuclear weapon, those facilities are still destroyed. Their conventional military is still destroyed. Their capacity to threaten their neighbors is still largely gone. And now we see whether they are willing to comply with the next step of the president's peace plan. As you all know, the part of the peace plan, the part of this MOU that I think have been most misrepresented by certain parts of the media is the idea that the Iranians get all these benefits. You will hear things about $300 billion or $24 billion or this or that number of money or amount of money. And the simple fact is that the only way the Iranians get any of those resources, not a single penny, by the way, from the United States of America under any circumstances, but the only way that they would ever get any benefit of the bargain is if they comply fully and change their behavior. And so you really have a win-win situation for the United States of America. If the Iranians don't change their behavior, their military and their nuclear program is still destroyed. If they do change their behavior, then they are going to have a transformative relationship with the Middle East and the Middle East will have a transformative relationship with the people of Iran. That's a win for the American people and for the president of the United States, regardless of which option the Iranians ultimately choose. We obviously want them to choose the right option. The interesting thing about their system, and I think it's important for the American people to appreciate this point in particular, is that there are real divisions within their country about how exactly to proceed. And what we've seen over the last couple of months is that the pragmatists within the Iranian system, the people who really do want to transform their relationship with the Middle East and with the world, those people are winning the argument. The United States wants those people to win the argument. The United States wants to have a better relationship, but in order for that to happen, the Iranians have to perform. And if they don't perform, as we've said before, they don't get any of the benefits of the bargain. So what I'd ask all of you is just to report honestly that the United States isn't giving up a cent of money to Iran, and even the economic benefits, the sanctions relief and so forth that comes along with this bargain only happens if the Iranians perform. So with that, I want to say thanks to all of you. It's good to be with you this morning, and I'll kick it over to questions. Let's start right over here to the right. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. I wanted to ask a follow-up on something you just mentioned. You talked about the possibility of the current Iranian leadership fundamentally changing their behavior. Do you think that the current Iranian leadership recognizes the leverage that the U.S. holds over itself economically and militarily enough to actually go forth with fundamentally changing their behavior over the long term and going about things differently? So I certainly think they recognize the leverage that the United States has over them. We've seen that in a number of our conversations. We've seen that just in their behavior over the last couple of days. They certainly recognize that the United States has great leverage. Will that ultimately lead to a change in behavior? I don't know. I've seen skeptics of the deal. People say the Iranians will never change their behavior. Well, maybe that's true, and if so, they don't get any of the benefits of the bargain. But isn't it worth trying? Isn't it worth seeing whether this incredibly weakened position that the President of the United States has put the Iranians under, whether that motivates them to change their behavior, not just vis-a-vis the West, but vis-a-vis the Middle East? One of the interesting things about this is the technical details of this we can, of course, get into. There are going to be any number of opinions about the negotiation, about where it's ultimately going to go. But I tend to think that you should trust the people who know the Iranians the best and who have the most to lose. What are the Gulf Arab states saying about this deal? What are they saying about this deal compared to the JCPOA in 2015? This is the nuclear deal. Well, back then, they hated that deal. They felt like it empowered the Iranians to be bad actors across the region. Of course, that's exactly what happened. They were right about that. What are they saying about the President's peace deal? They're saying this is an amazingly transformative thing for the region because either way, we and the broader region win. Iran is weakened, their nuclear program destroyed, their economy in desperate straits. If they change their behavior, big things are going to happen for Iran and for the world. If they don't, no skin off our backs. Either way, we win, and that's the way the President has set up this deal and this negotiation. Thank you, Mr. President. Just a quick housekeeping question. I think you've answered in your topper, but did the 60-day period officially begin yesterday? I would say the 60-day period officially started today. It was signed late, and it may have even been signed technically because of the time shift. I think it's signed technically today, Iran time. Yes, the deal started yesterday. We're going to start the 60-day clock today. Can you help us understand President Trump's shift on his stance for Iran's ballistic missile program? Initially, it was a key objective to dismantle it. Yesterday, he said it would only be fair if they had some, if the countries around Iran also had some. When and why did that change? Will the final agreement have any restrictions on these missiles? We destroyed a substantial number of their ballistic missile launchers themselves. It's not just the bullets, but it's the actual gun. That's what we were extremely effective at in destroying during the last three months of the campaign. All the President said yesterday is that, of course, countries don't give up the right of self-defense. Israel doesn't give up the right of self-defense if Hezbollah fires rockets or drones at Israel. The Iranians don't give up the right of self-defense in their country, but we do expect that as part of the final deal, they are not going to be able to build the kind of missiles that can broadly threaten the entire world. That's what the President of the United States said yesterday. Look, it's very simple. You can't tell a country, whether Israel or Iran, they're not allowed to have any self-defense. That's not what the President has asked. That's not what the President has requested. But as part of the final deal, what we want to see is Iran not funding regional instability, funding regional terrorism, and of course, try to rebuild their nuclear weapons program. That's the main thing. The nuclear weapons program is destroyed. It is gone. If the Iranians decided tomorrow to build a nuclear weapon, they simply don't have the capacity in order to do that. What we're trying to ensure is they don't rebuild that capacity, not just a year from now, two years from now, but many, many years from now, so that our children never have to worry about a state sponsor of terrorism having a nuclear weapon. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. You were just saying that you're hoping this deal would prevent Iran in the future from getting a nuclear weapon. But from what's been put out there of the MOU, I'm curious, how does the MOU reflect that in the future Iran will not, in fact, get a nuclear weapon? What's stopping them from down the road, to your point, rebuilding and restarting from where we were pre-the war? Well, number one, they would have to get a lot of money in order to rebuild the nuclear program. You're talking about billions and billions of nuclear infrastructure that the United States destroyed. In order for them to rebuild that program, they would have to get a lot of money. And we have them in an economic chokehold right now that we're not going to release until they fundamentally change their behavior. What would that look like? That would mean a real inspections regime. That would mean a real enforcement regime. As the MOU contemplates, that would mean the destruction of their enriched stockpile. All of these things are the sorts of steps you're going to take if you're serious about ending your nuclear weapons program. And that, again, is why I go back to this fundamental trade that's built into the deal. They need money to do anything. Their economy is in absolute dire straits. But in order for them to get any integration into the world economy, they're going to have to show us and verify for us that they are changing their behavior. And that's why the deal is set up in the way that it is. President Trump said yesterday that he was going to blame you if the talks of the round go sideways. Are you worried that he's going to make you the fall guy? No, not at all. I mean, I think the president was joking, as he often does. But no, I think the entire team has worked very well on this. And we've got this thing to a very good place for the American people. Now, I have seen some progressive criticisms of me personally saying, what experience does the vice president of the United States have with hostile high stakes negotiations? And I would point those progressive critics to the fact that just two days ago, I spent over an hour on The View. So I actually have a great experience in very hostile negotiations. And I've used that. I mean, look, Joy Behar is way tougher than the Iranians. And she and I are best friends now. So we're going to get to a good place here. We're going to get to a good place. We're already at a good place. It's just a question of whether we can really get the icing on the top of fundamentally transforming Iran's relationship with the world. A couple of just timing questions. How soon, as the MOU lays out, can Iran start selling any of its oil that has sort of been impounded, right, with the blockade? And two, can you sort of explain the Lebanon component to the MOU and how that front works and the enforceability of it? Yeah. So the Lebanon component, this is about regional peace, right? This is about regional peace. And what that means is we expect Hezbollah is not going to be firing rockets and firing drones at the Israelis. And we also expect that the Israelis are not going to be going wild in Lebanon, right? Both sides have to honor their end of the deal. Now, as you guys know, sometimes these ceasefires are a little messy. The president of the United States said this a couple of weeks ago that a ceasefire in that region of the world just means they're shooting a little bit less at each other than they were before. What you've seen is radical progress in Lebanon, less shooting, less firing, but you're still going to have these little flare-ups from time to time. And that's just the sort of thing that we're going to have to manage through the diplomatic process. Secretary Rubio has been sort of the person on point. It's actually worked out extraordinarily well because we do have substantially less shooting, but it's going to be something we have to manage. And eventually what we want to see is the Lebanese government, the elected representatives of the people of Lebanon who are able to police Southern Lebanon so that Hezbollah has not taken over the country. The Israelis are not threatened. And then consequently, the Israelis are not attacking Southern Lebanon or Beirut either. That's the plan there. You asked about the Iranian oil. Look, one of the interesting things that you've seen is that the Iranians have been completely unable to sell oil, not because of sanctions, but because of the blockade. Fundamentally, the thing that we have done here, the original, what we give, what they give, is that we said, we're going to lift the blockade. We're going to allow you to sell some of your oil and they're going to open the Strait of Hormuz. We see that process starting to work already. It's going to take a little time before it picks up fully, but that's where we are today. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. The MOU, just on the Strait, the MOU guarantees these 60 days of toll-free passage. But after that, it is of course led to a regional dialogue with Oman and Iran deciding the future governance of the Strait. A senior US official told us yesterday that they expect Iran to push aggressively on this, but also that Gulf States won't allow any kind of tolls. How strenuously will the US fight to keep tolls out of the Strait and keep any fees away from the future Strait commercial traffic? And are you going to leave it to the Gulf States to kind of fight this battle? Well, first of all, we believe international waterways should be free of tolls, and that's been our position. That's what you see, of course, in the 60 days of the MOU. And when you say it leaves it open, it doesn't really leave it open, except in the sense that, of course, the final negotiation is going to set the terms of what comes afterwards, right? You said, I think that it's the Omanis and the Iranians, but it's actually the MOU contemplates that the Omanis, the Iranians, and the Gulf Coast Coalition together will figure out a proper security framework for the Straits in the future. And what I mean by that is that we don't ever want this to happen again. That's not about tolling. That's about ensuring that the Straits are never used as a choke point for the global economy ever again. It's frankly not what the Iranians want. It's not what the Omanis want. It's not what the GCC wants either. So what we're going to do, of course, working with our allies in the region is to ensure that that is reflected in the final deal. And if that's not reflected in the final deal, there's not going to be a final deal. And that is, I keep coming back to this fundamental structural point of this negotiation, which is that we have all the cards. If the Iranians want the benefits of the bargain, they have to give us the things that are necessary to get those benefits. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. We'll do both. Okay. Both of you guys. There's one of the white and then one in, you know, orange, I think. What about the pink? I'm sorry? Okay. Maybe I'm colorblind. It looks more orange to me. I don't want to have a debate about that. Orange, pinkish. You go first, and then in front of you, you can go second. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. How does the points about granting some immediate waivers on sanctions, especially from the Treasury Department, how does that square with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act? And are you planning on briefing Congress on this portion? Yeah. So I talked to James Braid, our head of OLA. We do plan to brief Congress very soon. I believe that they got the formal copy of the signed document this morning, and if not, they're going to get it at some point later today. We are planning a briefing. I believe right now the House is out of session. The Senate is in session, though maybe I've reversed that. But we're going to ensure that the team briefs Congress, of course, answers their questions. We've been doing that informally, of course, talking to a number of people in Congress just over the last week. We'll keep on doing that, and we'll have a formal briefing. I won't say exactly when that will be because it depends a little bit about session schedule. Your point about the sanctions is, I'll go back to what I said earlier, which is really the choke point on Iranian oil was never the sanctions. We didn't see that as a major concession to the Iranians. Frankly, the Iranians didn't see that as a concession to them because what prevented them from selling oil was not the sanctions. They were selling plenty of oil without any discount because the sanctions were just fundamentally ineffective at that point. What the sanctions did do is move the Iranian financial system to sort of the shadow banking system. By lifting the blockade, that's the significant thing that has changed. By lifting the sanctions, we're actually going to be able to see a little bit where their financial system actually sends money and receives money. That's a real benefit to the American people. That's really the only thing that has changed by the change in sanctions. Does that require Congress? Sorry, yeah. Sorry, I forgot that part of the question. No, we don't think so. We actually have an opinion from OLC we feel quite confident about. There are certain things that require congressional approval. There are certain things that don't require congressional approval. We feel quite confident that we can temporarily lift those sanctions without going to Congress and seeking their approval on that. Apparently, there's been reports coming out of Israel that Iran is already funneling oil money to Hezbollah even before this particular MOU was signed. How exactly is the US looking at this? If we're talking about behavior on part of Iran, I mean, October 7th happened. If there's concern that perhaps Hezbollah could end up doing some sort of hack on that scale, then how exactly are we talking about the reaction to the United States if you're talking about perhaps a humongous scale attack that actually could happen? Are we waiting for that type of attack? I mean, what exactly is a scale here? Sorry, you said what exactly is a scale? Yeah. Well, I mean, what type of attack would it take to actually get a reaction from the United States to say, okay, now we're actually going to start dropping bombs on Iran for having bad behavior? Well, we don't want a scale of any attack. Any attack, whatever its scale, is unacceptable under this agreement. Now, you asked the question saying that oil money was flowing to Hezbollah before the MOU was signed. It's one of the reasons why we are actually engaged in this process is to ensure that no money is flowing to Hezbollah. So it's interesting where people will say that the MOU is bad because the MOU produces consequences that were actually happening well before the MOU was signed. That's not a reflection on the MOU. That's a reflection of why we need the MOU to ensure that we have the regional peace and stability that we need. Now, what I would say to some of the critics of the deal that I've heard that will say, well, Iran's going to get all this benefit. I'll repeat what I've said, and I'm probably going to have to repeat it a number of times, is what is the benefit that the Iranians get that they didn't have before? And the answer is nothing. They don't get anything unless they change their behavior. If they change their behavior, that is a thing to celebrate. That's going to transform the Middle East for a generation. If they don't change their behavior, they don't get the benefit of the bargain. And I think, I got to be honest, I think fundamentally, this idea that, and it's a misrepresentation of the MOU, this idea that the Iranians get all these benefits before the deal is actually consummated. The idea that they get benefits before they change their behavior is fundamentally a talking point that is issued by people who want the conflict to continue indefinitely, despite the fact that that's not good for the American people, and it's not good for the region. All the way in the back. All the way back in the red. Thank you so much, Mr. Vice President. Red here, you mean? We'll do. Okay, sorry. Thank you. I'm wearing bright red. So many people are wearing red. You can go first, Cara, right? Okay, and then next after that. Okay, great. Could you highlight the major differences between this deal and President Obama's deal in 2015, and why the administration believes that this deal is superior? And second, Mr. Vice President, President Trump has been vocal lately about his disapproval for Bibi Netanyahu's attacks on Lebanon. Has the administration spoken to Bibi Netanyahu directly about the president's concerns recently, and what is the feedback from Israel? Yeah, so we speak to Bibi, or speak to somebody in the Israeli government, just as we speak to the Gulf Coast Coalition, our regional partners, pretty much every day, at least at some high level of our government. Look, the president has been very clear. He does not withdraw from Israel. No one could withdraw from another country the right of self-defense. Israel has the right to defend itself. But fundamentally, the Israelis, just like everybody else, have to respect this peace process that is fundamentally good for them and good for the entire region. What the president has grown frustrated sometimes is that we seem to be right on the cusp of a major breakthrough in the agreement, and then all of a sudden, there's a major explosion that goes off in a civilian population center in Beirut, and a lot of people who have nothing to do with Hezbollah lose their lives. That's not acceptable. That's the sort of thing that we've asked for closer coordination so that we ensure it doesn't happen. And our message to the Israelis, just as our message to everybody else, is fundamentally, we want this peace process to be good for you. We do not want Hezbollah attacking Israel, but in order to ensure that that happens, we have got to actually build the kind of framework that can cut off the money to Hezbollah, cut off Iranian support for Hezbollah, and also ensure that Lebanon's territorial sovereignty is respected by all parties. And the difference between the two agreements. So first of all, the two big differences are not even in the substance of the deal itself, but something I said earlier, are number one, the Gulf Coast Coalition loves this deal because they think that it makes Iran weaker. They hated the Obama deal because they thought that it made Iran stronger. They know more about this and they have more to lose than anybody, including the United States of America. So I trust their judgment. The second thing is where the deal came from. You have to remember in 2015, Iran had built a sophisticated nuclear weapons program with a nuclear weapons stockpile. So the perspective that we came at as the United States was, you already have a really nice nuclear program. We're going to bribe you with American money in order to stop it. Our perspective and where we're coming at it is we already destroyed your nuclear program. And so if you promise and show verifiable pathways to not rebuild it, then we're willing to give you some sanctions relief and things like that. So it's a fundamentally different perspective. Now there are all these substantive differences as well. The Obama nuclear deal allowed enrichment. Ours will not. The Obama deal allowed the accumulation of stockpiled weapons grade material. Ours is actually leading to the destruction of that stockpile of enriched material. So there are many differences. The Obama deal gave them over a billion dollars of American money. This deal gives them $0 of American money. So a lot of substantive differences, but I think the most important differences are where we're coming at it from a position of and the fact that our Gulf Coast partners love this deal. The president has said that if Iran doesn't behave themselves, we're going to resume military action. So what is the red line for what Iran can do before they cross that red line and we do resume the military action? Well, it's just, it's going to be a holistic approach where we look at their behavior. Are they funding terrorism? Are they leading to attacks of other people? Are they trying to get centrifuges to redevelop their nuclear weapons program? There are all these questions that we're going to ask about whether they've actually changed their behavior. Do they allow the inspectors in as they have promised that they would do, or do they refuse to allow those inspectors in? A whole host of things we're going to see. We're working towards a very successful resolution of this process, but again, it takes two to tango. And what the president is just saying is that we maintain economic, diplomatic, and military leverage that nobody else in the world has. So if the Iranians want to change, great, we're going to help them. If they don't change, we still got all the cards. Oh, sorry. In the, in the blue jacket. That's a Navy jacket. Should we have a debate about the difference between blue and Navy? Not that guy because you give a speech whenever you ask a question, I'm going to give her an opportunity. Guys, you're speaking over the person who's asking the question. There's been a lot of frustrations with Americans, particularly about the gas prices. You touted the fact that the coming president has gone on to social touting this, but when should they expect to see gas reach that $3 threshold? Well, I'm not an economist and I think even the economists would get this wrong, but the fact that you've seen gas come down about 65 cents a gallon on the national average, and the fact that you see oil prices that are basically close to where they were at the very beginning of the conflict, I think you're going to see a substantial reduction in gas prices. I'm not going to predict the exact price. If I was able to do that, I might be in a different business than politics, but we do think you're going to see significant relief at the pump on top of what we've already seen. You keep saying that Iran will only reap economic rewards if they comply and change their behavior, but under this deal, they are being allowed now to sell their oil freely. Again, how is that not a financial benefit? And they're being allowed to do that without making any new concrete nuclear commitments. So can you explain how is that not lopsided? Well, first of all, they've made very concrete nuclear commitments. They have committed to the destruction of the highly enriched stockpile that they have in their possession. But number two, all we've done is lift the blockade and the straits of port. We basically returned it to where it was before the conflict. The blockade is off. We put that in after the conflict started. The straits are now open. That's not a new benefit to the Iranians. They were selling oil for many, many years, well before we ever put the blockade. We opposed that blockade. They stopped selling oil. And now we've lifted the blockade in order to promote the free flow of energy across the world. A U.S. official described having secured some of these, quote unquote, gentlemen's agreements with Iran on certain aspects of the negotiation. So when it comes to highly enriched uranium, can you walk us through what's been secured, even in these kind of gentlemen's agreements, on how exactly they're going to get rid of the stockpile? Are there agreements on low-grade enrichment? How long is the moratorium on enriching uranium for Iran? And are any of these gentlemen's agreements written down anywhere? So some of them are written down, but fundamentally, whether they're written down or spoken, this is why we structured the deal that we did, because we don't trust words. We trust action, and we trust conduct. And so we're going to reward conduct, and we're not going to reward any words, whether they're written on a sheet of paper or not. There's a lot of discussion, the MOU, the gentlemen's agreements, the final deal. Words don't matter, ladies and gentlemen. We're about verification. And so what we're going to do is to say, if they do the things that they have promised to do, they have promised not to enrich. They have promised that they would allow inspectors in to destroy that highly enriched stockpile. And then, of course, it's not usable anymore. You take it somewhere else. They promised a number of things, and that's why the deal contemplates a number of benefits if they do those things. But it doesn't do anything if they don't actually meet those promises. Just to follow up on that, sir, if they don't follow through with their commitment, will the U.S. go back to imposing sanctions and the blockade, or does Iran get to keep some of the concessions that it has already secured? Well, first of all, the sanctions are still on with the exception of the oil sanctions, which I talked about were no longer effective. The purpose of the oil sanctions is to drive down how much Iran is charging for a price for a barrel of oil. Those sanctions had stopped being effective. The blockade is what's effective. And again, that's the thing that has changed in accordance with them opening the Strait of Hormuz. No sanctions will come off unless they perform the benefit of the bargain, and every sanction will come back on. Hypothetically, let's say two years down the road, they've done what we need to see on the nuclear program, and we release the sanctions as the deal contemplates. Then they decide they're going to start rebuilding the nuclear program. Then, of course, those sanctions are going to come back on. And that's why it's really kind of like a dial. As they dial up their good behavior, we can dial up the economic relief. If they dial down their good behavior, we can turn it off. It's the good thing about having the leverage, and it's a good thing about being the United States of America, where we just fundamentally have so much influence in the Thank you, Mr. Vice President. Leader Thune said it's unrealistic to get the Save America Act passed by attaching it to FISA, which is what the president's looking for. Do you believe this is possible? Why don't we try? Why don't we try and at least force people to vote against it? One of the things that sometimes frustrates me about the legislative process is that people will go into it saying, this isn't possible, therefore we're not even going to try. Well, let's actually see. Let's try it. And if it's not possible, then let the people put their name on it. This is also good for the American people. How many American senators know that the American people love the Save America Act because they believe in voter ID? But how many of those same senators don't want to vote for it because they know that the radical elements within their own party would punish them for it? Let people go on the record and actually answer to the American people, which is why I think we should do exactly as the president said. On Monday, we were told the MOU will be published within 48 hours. The president then said, after Friday, you, I think, then said by Friday, and then it ended up being read out on a briefing call yesterday. We were told the MOU had been signed electronically on Sunday. There was an Axios report that it hadn't been. There's going to be a signing ceremony on Friday, and then it signed at Versailles yesterday, last night. Is what's going on behind the scenes as chaotic as your public messaging? Well, I don't think our public messaging has been chaotic. I think dealing with a fractured Iranian system where communication isn't great is just sometimes something that we don't fully appreciate or we don't fully understand. What really happened here is that we did sign the MOU on Sunday. That locked into the terms of the deal. What the Iranians came to us and said is, we'd like not to release the text until Friday. I don't really understand that. I wanted to get the text out immediately, but in order to be accommodating to them, we said, sure, okay, we'll wait until Friday. Then what happened over Monday, Tuesday, the president was in G7, maybe foreign leaders were talking to the Iranians and encouraging them to do that. We were definitely saying to them, we understand your desire not to have the text out until Friday, but we live in a democratic system. The American people want to see the text of this deal. We would certainly like to get it out as soon as possible. They came up with having their president sign it, our president sign it, and then just releasing the text as a signed document immediately at that point. I do wonder, Rob, this is pure conjecture. I'm just guessing at this. I wonder if part of it is that they wanted to have a Persian translation, a Farsi translation that they felt good about. Then of course, once they translated into Farsi, our State Department has to confirm that the Farsi translation matches the meaning of the English. I think that is part of what was going on here, but the text is out there now. We said that we would be transparent about it, but the reason why it went back and forth a little bit about when exactly the text would be released is just we were trying to show good faith to the Iranians who, for reasons I have no idea, cared a lot about how the text itself was rolled out. Blue tie there. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President. As you know, because you were involved in this process, the MOU allows for Iran to sell its oil right away, which means that Iran can take in on a monthly basis tens of millions of dollars. Iran's economy was in tatters. How is this not essentially giving a lifeline to Iran economically, and what's to prevent Iran from using all of that money, all of those millions of dollars to prop up its proxies in the region? Well, the number one thing is that we actually see where the money moves now. Because of what we've done with the financial sanctions, we actually know where the money is going to move, and so we have great confidence that we're going to be able to see if they try to fund terrorist organizations, we're going to be able to see that. But you said that millions of dollars is a lifeline. Right now, the Iranian nation is a nation of 94 million people. Their economy is in a free fall. They have sky high inflation, and fundamentally, about a trillion dollars of damage to their industrial base was caused over the last three months. The idea that selling a few million dollars worth of oil is going to fundamentally transform the Iranian economy, that's just not true. We thought that it would be good in order to lift the blockade and open the Straits of Hormuz, to allow the free flow of energy. We felt that it was reasonable that if we're going to allow everybody else to sell their energy during this period of negotiation, we would allow everyone to sell their energy. That's all we're doing. We can slap everything right back on if the Iranians don't make the deal that we expect. Either one. Either one. Guys, how about both of you? President Trump said we'll finish one, talking about Iran, and he said then Cuba is next. Is Cuba next? And also on Colombia, Mr. Vice President, he has mentioned Colombia three times this week. Why is it so important, the election day in Colombia for President Trump? You guys have to ask Marco about Cuba. Our view, go ahead in a second, but let me just actually answer this guy's question. Fundamentally in Cuba, it is a system that hasn't worked. They can't make any money, their economy is frankly probably in worse shape than the Iranian economy. It's 90 miles from our shore, so every time that there's a crisis, you end up having desperate refugees or desperate people who can't feed their families trying to flood into our country. We want the people of Cuba to be happy and successful. We're actually talking to the Cuban government right now about how they could change their ways to change that. We're going to see what they do, and obviously if they do one thing, we're going to do something. If they make smart decisions, we're going to have a much better relationship with that island. Go ahead. Mr. Vice President, thank you so much. I know that you are still not sure if you are going to run for president in 2028, but if you do not, is there anyone in particular that you would want to see run? What's your name? Stephen Kapuska, sir. I want Stephen Kapuska to run for president in 2028. Go ahead. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. I've got two questions. Could you describe the status of your Switzerland trip? Are you definitely still going? What are your plans? Also, if we could drill down on frozen funds, there's been a lot of focus on oil sanctions, but on frozen funds, what's your understanding of how much money is frozen, how much of that is in the U.S.? A senior administration official briefed some of us reporters earlier this week that there might be small antis, is what he said, small releases of money to build trust with the Iranians early on. Can you describe that whole situation? On the frozen funds, the amount of money, I honestly don't know. I've heard numbers north of $100 billion. I've actually heard numbers north of $200 billion. Most of it is not in United States accounts. Most of it's either in the Gulf or in Europe or somewhere else, but I don't know the exact amount of money. It's a lot. It's one of the reasons why we've had such a successful chokehold on the Iranian economy, though not even close to the main reason. We're not releasing a single dollar of that money until the Iranians perform, and there are a number of ways they could perform. For example, let's say they actually take meaningful steps, and this would happen very quickly to destroy that stockpile of enriched material, then we're going to have a conversation about it, but they have to perform. I've seen some reports, I don't know where this came from, that the Qataris had released billions of dollars in Iranian assets. That's just not true. It would be impossible for the Qataris to do that without our buy-in and certainly without us seeing it. A lot of this reporting is just fundamentally wrong. They don't get a dollar of unfrozen assets, their money, not our money, but they don't get a dollar of unfrozen assets until they actually perform under the deal. You asked about Switzerland. Our plan is to go to Switzerland. I don't know exactly when. The way that we're setting up this technical negotiation is that obviously you're going to have the political leadership involved. We're going to have people on the ground actually driving the technical talks, the nuclear talks, how do you destroy this highly enriched uranium, all that stuff that you really just have to get into the nitty-gritty on. So I plan to go to Switzerland exactly when. We thought, we think these technical negotiations are going to start sometime this weekend. That's still the plan, but that could change because it's not an easy country, Iran, to get out of, and so we're trying to figure out exactly when that's going to happen. I suspect this weekend, but I'm not sure. I may, it just depends on exactly when the Iranians can get there. We're trying to figure that out as we speak, but again, I suspect it will happen this weekend. We're going to find out exactly whenever the coming days. Go ahead, babe. Thank you so much, Mr. Vice President. Just two questions for you. To follow up on an earlier question, Secretary Rubio said in March that the goal of this war was to, quote, to eliminate the threat of Iran's short-range ballistic missiles. You just said earlier that the military program is destroyed. U.S. intelligence estimates that Iran still retains roughly 70% of its pre-war ballistic and cruise missile stockpile. So when did the administration decide to abandon that part of the original mission? And then just second as well, moving forward, are you leading the U.S. team moving forward in terms of the negotiations? How involved will you be? Yeah, so I'm certainly planning to lead the U.S. negotiating team, but on the first question, you talked about an intelligence report that was anonymously leaked to a reporter, that was not with context, and that frankly is not accurate. What has changed about the Iranian ballistics missile program is it matters much less the number of missiles they have, the number of bullets. What matters much more is the number of launchers they have and importantly, the teams on the ground that have the capacity to launch those missiles. Their ability to launch missiles has been substantially degraded. Is it zero? No, but it's substantially degraded and in that sense, we haven't abandoned the mission. We've accomplished that particular part of the mission. If you look at the Gulf Arab allies and obviously the Israelis who faced a lot, the two of them together, faced a brunt of these missile attacks, each of them feels substantially safer today from the Iranian missile threat than they did before. Obviously, that is something that we would like to continue. All the president said yesterday is that you can't expect any country to give up its right of self-defense. You have to have parity and that's what the president of the United States was talking about. Go ahead. No, no, guys, guys, guys, yeah. Have you seen Pope Leo's reaction to the MOU, the Memorandum of Understanding? I haven't. What did he say? All right. Okay. Well, I'll give you the short version. Sir. Yes, sir. Okay. He said, I'll give you the short version. All right. He says he welcomes the agreement between the US and Iran. He says he hopes it will help strengthen mutual trust, security, and stability in the Middle East. And he also hopes that it's truly a solution to the war and that the war is really over. What do you say to the Pope, sir? My response to that is praise Jesus. I'm glad that the Pope has positive things to say about our MOU. I think that the Pope is fundamentally accurate and it's going to be good for the entire world, but we got to keep working at it to make sure that the Iranians honor the commitments that they've made. The thing is, there's so many people in here. I could say the red tie and then nine of you start shouting at us. The burgundy tie? The MOU calls for a US troop withdrawal from the Gulf region tied to the final deal. Can you say whether the drawdown will affect US forces past Iraq and Syria, where Americans would strongly help for the Kurdish held areas from the Iranian back militias? Okay. So the drawdown contemplated, again, this is the final deal. This is assuming that the Iranians comply, that they give us verification, that they take real substantial conduct towards this peace agreement. What we're saying is that we will withdraw troops to the pre-conflict level, meaning we're not going to keep a couple of extra aircraft carrier groups over there. The Iranians don't want that. Frankly, we don't want that either. Go ahead. Yeah. You said that the US is not going to be funding that $300 billion fund. Who exactly is funding that? Is that private companies? And I also noticed that your voice is hoarse. Are you sick? Have you been using your voice a lot? Well, I've been on a bit of a book tour the past couple of days, but I can't promote my book here in the White House press briefing room. I had a cold about a week ago. That and talking a lot about this deal and talking a lot about the book, I'm definitely a little bit hoarse. But you asked, your first question was about- Who exactly is funding that $300 billion? Oh, I see. So what's interesting about this is there is a great desire from the Arab world and from outside the Arab world to actually get involved in Iran if they behave properly. So for example, let's say the United Arab Emirates, who've been a great ally over the last, not just a few months, but over the last many years, let's say that they would like to invest in building a power plant. That actually is impossible right now because of the way that US sanctions work. And so what we're saying is that if you behave and if the Emiratis themselves want to build a power plant, then we will do the sanctions relief necessary to make that possible. The good thing about that is that it actually creates integration, which is leverage. A world where the Gulf Coast Coalition has greater leverage into the Iranian economy is a world where the Iranians are going to be heavily prevented from misbehaving. So it's a lot of the Gulf Coast Coalition. Again, they see that Iran is weakened. They see there's an opportunity to build a new relationship there. And they're saying if they behave and if the United States is willing to allow this to happen, then absolutely we want to change our relationship with Iran. Well, I assume that in the United Arab Emirates, there would be private money and so forth that would be part of this. But again, this is so far in advance because it assumes a transformation in Iranian behavior. Sir. Thank you so much, Mr. Vice President. As you know, the Iranian-backed groups in the region were involved in this war and they damaged US facilities and your allies as well. How does this agreement affect Iran-backed groups across the region, especially the Iranian-backed groups in Iraq? And my second question, this agreement requires Iran to stop attacking the Kurdish opposition in Kurdistan region, which they did two days ago. So what this agreement does fundamentally is it requires Iran to behave like a normal country. And if it doesn't, as so many people think that it never will, then it doesn't get any of the economic benefits. And if they do, then that's a great thing for everybody. It's a great thing for the Kurds. It's a great thing for anybody who has been under the brunt or under the threat of Iranian-funded terrorist organizations. The expectation is that Iran will stop that. And if they don't, they don't get the benefits of the bargain. John. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. Many of the colleagues that you served with in the US Senate and Republican conference have criticized this deal over the last 24 hours. What is your message, Mr. Vice President, back to them? So I guess I would say to anybody, any of the critics is number one, have a little bit of faith in the president of the United States. The idea that he is going to strike a deal that's been bad for the American people, it's preposterous. He is the person who's had the courage to fundamentally transform our relationship with Iran and with a lot of other countries over the last year and a half. He believes in this deal. He is going to see it to completion. And if the Iranians don't comply, we still have every single tool and point of leverage that we have today. That'd be message number one, is have a little faith in the president's ability, given that he's got us this far, to take us the final step. The second thing that I would say is so many of what I've read or heard that people believe about this deal is just fundamentally untrue. It is a memorandum of understanding. It is fundamentally a principle that yes, the Straits of Hormuz are going to be open immediately, and they already are. Yes, they're going to give up their highly enriched material, but they've got to actually do it. It's about conduct. It's about rewarding good conduct and punishing bad conduct, which in some ways is what we've been doing for the last three months, vis-a-vis that country anyway. So many of the criticisms, I saw Lindsey Graham came out with a positive statement after expressing some concerns. I think that when people get to understand not just the agreement, but our negotiating posture as a country, they will realize this is an excellent thing for the American people, but that's part of our job. We've got to tell the story about what this means for Americans, how it's going to make all of us safer and more prosperous. That's why I'm here talking to everybody, and we're going to keep on telling that story in the days and weeks to come. Go ahead. Thank you, sir. Jordan Conradson with Gateway Pundit. I want to talk back to the Lebanon component. There's a report in Axios that Netanyahu's fuming over this. Israel doesn't feel bound to the MOU as it relates to Lebanon. As you mentioned, your frustration with Israel striking in Beirut, hitting apartment buildings. If that continues, could it torpedo the deal? And what would the US's response be to a broader war in Lebanon involving Israel and Hezbollah? I don't want to get into hypotheticals that could torpedo the deal, because I think the president's expectation is that all of our friends, the Israelis, the Arabs in the region, we're going to work together and actually see this deal to completion. Now, I saw the Axios report that Netanyahu is fuming. That's not reflective of the conversations that I've had with him, but maybe he's saying something to somebody else that he's not saying to me. What I will say, and this does bother me, is that you've seen people within Bibi's cabinet who have come out and attacked the deal, and in some ways, very personally, attacked the president of the United States. And I guess my message to them would be twofold. Number one, Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time. And he happens to be the head of state of the world's superpower. If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world. And the second message I would give to some of those cabinet members, Bibi, to his credit, has not gone down this path, but to some of these cabinet members in Israel who are attacking the president of the United States, the other thing that I would say is that over the last three months, two thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected your homeland have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars. The problem for Israel is not Donald J. Trump. And anybody in Israel who thinks their biggest problem is the president of the United States needs to wake up and smell the reality of the situation that country is in. Thank you all.