LIVE: State Department Briefing With Matthew Miller 2024-06-17 19:25

Since you started with Ukraine, you might as well go first with Ukraine. The NATO Secretary General is in town and gave a speech this morning to the Wilson Center. He specifically called on NATO and nations to impose a cost on China for its support to Russia in the war in Ukraine. I've seen, obviously, the G7 statements and things like that, but what can the United States do more against China to follow that message, if you agree with it, which I think you do, and what are you prepared to do more? Let me start by saying, first of all, the responsibility is on China to stop the actions of Chinese companies that are helping Russia rebuild its defense industrial base. We have made it quite clear to China and our European partners, including a number of NATO members, have made it quite clear to China that it is China's responsibility. That said, if China doesn't act, we've also made clear that we will, and you have seen us act already. You have seen us impose sanctions on a number of companies for taking action to rebuild Russia's defense industrial base. We have been coordinating with our allies and partners in Europe about actions that they can take, and I think it's fair to say you can expect to see additional actions coming in the future. I'm not going to get into those here, but if China is not willing to take action to stop its companies from sending microelectronics and optical sensors and other pieces of equipment that Russia can use to manufacture military equipment that are posing an enormous threat, not just to Ukraine, but to European security, then we're going to have to work with our European partners to take action ourselves. So you don't want to preview any potential actions? No, I'm not. As always, I'm not going to do so from here, but you have seen us already take a number of actions, including since the Secretary's trip to China, and I think it's safe to say you will see others in the future. I'm just wondering if there's been any progress on the ceasefire talks. Has there been any progress on the workables and not-so-workables of the Hamas counter-proposal since last week? We continue to have conversations with the government of Israel, the governments of Egypt, and the government of Qatar, but I'm not going to get into the status of those conversations or any detail about those conversations from here. We do want to bridge the differences where we can. As you heard the Secretary say and as the President say, there are a number of things that we just think are non-starters and shouldn't have been in the response, go beyond what Hamas demanded previously, and hopefully those are demands that Hamas will back down from, because we don't think that they're workable. But there are a number of areas where we think we can find agreement. Doesn't mean we will, because it takes two parties to come to an agreement, but we think it's possible to come to agreement, so we're going to continue to work on that. Right. And has there been anything since last week that makes you a little bit more hopeful, like any incremental progress on any of the things that you say can be pushable? I just don't want to offer an assessment from here. Our bottom line of this is that, this is what the Secretary said when he was in the region last week, based on the differences between the two parties, we should be able to reach an agreement. If you just look at, let's take out some of the things that Hamas put in that are completely unworkable and that go beyond positions it has previously taken, because we don't think that's a good faith action to have an agreement or at least have accepted terms and then move the terms. Take out some of those areas. If you look at the remaining areas, we do think it should be possible to come to an agreement. Doesn't mean we will, but the benefits to the region, the people of Gaza, the people of Israel are so significant that we're going to continue to work to try to reach such an agreement. Right. I'm also staying with Netanyahu, I believe. Any more word from that meeting that lowers your level of concern about an escalation up north with Hezbollah? I will let the White House speak to Amos Hochstein's travel, because he's a White House employee, not a State Department employee, but I'll say our level of concern hasn't really changed. It continues to be something that we're worried about. It's not a new concern, obviously. We've been worried about escalation in the north and the possibility of a full-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah since the very early days after October 7th. You've seen us work over the past eight months to try to prevent that conflict from breaking out. You have seen Hezbollah escalate in the past few weeks with the number of strikes across the border, the number of drones, and you've seen fires breaking out in Israeli villages. These are strikes Hezbollah is conducting against civilian targets. You have seen escalation that should stop, that we think they should refrain from, but our assessment of the situation continues to be that the best way to get a diplomatic resolution in the north, which we think all sides ultimately prefer, is to reach a ceasefire in Gaza. The two are related. It doesn't mean you can't say with 100% certainty that you wouldn't be able to get a ceasefire in the north without resolution in Gaza, but certainly having a ceasefire in Gaza makes a resolution in the north much, much easier. And given the ceasefire will remain elusive, in the meantime, is the message to Israel, don't do anything in the north? We have made clear we don't want to see escalation at all in the north. We've made that clear directly to the government of Israel. Now look, there is, as you've heard us say before, there's a situation that is untenable for Israel and it's untenable for Lebanese families too, tens of thousands of which who have been forced to leave their homes and have been gone for over eight months now and can't return to their homes because of the conflict there. So it is a situation that has to be resolved, but our preference is that it be resolved diplomatically. And that has been Israel's preference too, as they stated it publicly, as they stated it privately. Matt, do you have any comment on the dissolution of the war cabinet? I don't. That's ultimately an internal matter for the government. Do you anticipate this will make conversations with the Israeli government more challenging, easier, particularly around the ceasefire? I'm just not going to offer any type of assessment about what it might mean. Ultimately, those decisions are decisions for the government of Israel and for the people of Israel. We will deal with whatever government is in place in Israel, as we have since the beginning of this administration, as the United States has going back a number of administrations and over a number of different governments of Israel. It doesn't change our fundamental strategic interest. It doesn't change our fundamental assessment of the situation. We'll continue to have the very direct and candid conversations with members of the Israeli government, as we have for some time. And the Israeli government over the weekend announced these tactical pauses that they say is meant to increase the amount of aid that's going around Gaza. Aid groups say they haven't seen any impact at this point. What's the U.S. read on this? So that is a step that we very much welcome. It's something that we have been encouraging for some time. Our special envoy for Middle East humanitarian issues, Lise Grande, has been directly advocating for these pauses in her conversation with Israeli officials. And she's been doing that because of her work on the ground, meeting with UN relief agencies and other relief agencies about what they need to be able to deliver humanitarian assistance inside Gaza. We continue to have a tough situation where there is now a fair amount of aid that's making it to Karam Shalom, but then not always being distributed from Karam Shalom to the inside of Gaza. Some of that is because of the conflict in Rafa. Some of that is the instability in the security situation on the ground, where you see trucks that are in some instances attacked by private parties, by looters and criminals. This removes one of those obstacles. Now, look, it'll probably take a few days to see how it's actually implemented for people to adjust to this new reality. But we think it's a step that's very positive that ought to improve the distribution situation inside Gaza. And how does the U.S. intend to hold Israel accountable for honoring these tactical pauses? If, I mean, we've seen a number of instances where they said that areas were protected, that humanitarians would be protected, and then ultimately the results on the ground don't bear that out. So ultimately, we judge Israel by the results. And when it comes to either, it's not just a question of humanitarian pauses, it's to the question of how much aid gets delivered. The pause ultimately is only a means to an end. The humanitarian pause is to ensure that, number one, aid can get delivered where it needs to go. And number two, relief workers have certainty that they can carry out their jobs without being hit by an airstrike or by tank fire or by any other kind of ordnance. So it's important that Israel has put this step in place. And we'll watch how it's implemented. And if there are changes that need to be made, we, of course, won't hesitate to make that clear. Can I ask one thing on that? You said we will judge Israel by the results. So it was April the 4th, President Biden basically said, well, threatened Israel to put conditions on aid if it wouldn't do a better job of protecting civilians and if more humanitarian aid wouldn't go into Gaza. It's been more than two months. U.S. government has taken no action and also has not basically made an assessment on how well or not Israel has done. So I don't quite understand the judgment part. So it's because we have seen them take steps that have been productive, not always perfect in every instance, but let me just go through some of them. So we saw after that phone call and after the president made clear that our policy would be dependent on the results, we saw the opening of Zikom, we saw the opening of Erez Crossing, we saw the opening of Ashdod for deliveries to come in, we saw the opening of the Jordan route, so you now have trucks that are coming from directly from Jordan, crossing through Israel, in some cases crossing through the U.S. bank and going directly to the north. It's a significant improvement. Now, we also saw in the south initially an increase in the number of trucks in, but then barriers since the beginning of the RAFA operation. So what we judge by, Israel by, is now that we have somewhat stabilized, not by any chance gotten the north to where it needs to be, but at least stabilized the situation of where it was two months ago. How do we improve the situation in the north in the wake of, or I'm sorry, in the south in the wake of the RAFA operation? The humanitarian pause is one step that we wanted to see them do to help improve that situation. There are others that we continue to work with. But Matt, aid groups say in the north it's gotten just as bad as it was before. So we have seen, so we don't have people on the ground to make an assessment. We will look to the groups that make assessments to tell us what the actual situation is, but you have seen a significant increase in assistance going into the north. Before that phone, hold on, just before that phone call, there wasn't a large amount of assistance that was going in. Everyone knows those stories very well. We have now seen assistance going in. Now look, when we see reports from humanitarian groups, say the IPC that issues reports from time to time, we will take a look at those. And if there are things that need to change, we won't hesitate to be direct with Israel about how they need to make those changes. But we have seen an improvement in the aid situation going in in the north, and we have seen somewhat of a stagnation in the south, and that's what we want to see reversed. But that improvement in the steps didn't actually translate into results, because you just said that the distribution hasn't improved, and that has a lot to do, especially in the south, with the start of the RAFA operation. Okay, it's not the major, you guys don't call it the major military operation, but in the end, it basically obstructed the aid, the delivery of aid. And that was an action taken by Israel. So the point I made, it's not just the RAFA operation. There has also been attacks on trucks, attacks on humanitarian convoys coming in by common criminals and looters. That isn't an action taken by the government of Israel, but it's something that we're looking to work with Israel and our UN partners and others to try to resolve and try to find an answer to. Okay, final thing on this, is the US government actually going to give itself a certain timeframe on when to deliver or make an assessment on what the president said on April the 4th? It is an ongoing assessment every day. It is every day we are looking at seeing if there are improvements being made, if there are actions that the government of Israel is taking that are sufficient, and it is something that is ongoing. And I said this at the time, you shouldn't look for a magic date where we're going to look and go, okay, everything's fine now. We are going to look at this all the time and make sure that if assistance isn't going in at the level it needs to, that we push the government of Israel to take action to get humanitarian assistance in. If there are things that the UN agencies need to do to further resolve logistical hurdles, we want to work with them to try to resolve those logistical hurdles because ultimately our goal is to get as much humanitarian assistance in as possible. I should say, however, that we've been going over this for months because of the inherent difficulty of delivering humanitarian assistance in the middle of a conflict. The best way to resolve this and to surge humanitarian assistance in and get through a number of these logistical hurdles and security hurdles would be a ceasefire. It's why we continue to push to try to get a ceasefire agreement because not every one of these issues, but a number of these issues that are presented by trying to deliver aid in the middle of an ongoing conflict would be at least mitigated if not fully resolved. Yeah. You talked about the dissolution of the Israeli war cabinet and said this was an internal matter, but it's not an internal matter if it affects who is in the direct line of decision making of the use of U.S. military assistance and U.S. weapons, particularly in relation to this war. We know it seems very likely now that the ministers for national security and finance will be a far more significant part of that decision making process. Does that concern you? We ultimately judge the decisions that the government of Israel makes, as we do with other governments, on the policy outcomes those decisions produce, not on the people making them. That's true. No matter who is in the government, it will continue to be true. These are people you've repeatedly criticized for destabilizing rhetoric or what are their values. One is a convicted supporter of terrorism. Another is openly called the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. These people are now in a direct line of decision making over the war in Gaza. Those are people who have always been in the cabinet and we have made clear when they take actions that we disagree with. We've made that clear publicly and I can tell you we've had some very direct conversations privately as well with the senior members of the government of Israel about those policies that we think are unproductive, not only to the plight of the Palestinian people but to Israel's security. Ultimately, though, it is not for us to pass judgment on who ought to be in the government of Israel or who ought to not be in the government of Israel or into the cabinet. That's just not a decision for the United States to make. We don't decide who is in the cabinet of any other country. That is a decision for the people of Israel to make. Ultimately, what our job is is to interact with whatever government they choose and make clear what we think the policies they should pursue that are in their best interest and the best interest of the region. We're going to do that whoever is in the government. Now, that said, when we see decisions with which we disagree, we will not hesitate to make those disagreements known. That has been true before the dissolution of the war cabinet and it will continue to be true. No one's asking you to decide who's in the cabinet, but you frequently have views on members of other governments and this is one of your closest allies. Based on the policy decisions that they take. That's what I'm trying to speak to. When members of that government have made policy decisions with which we disagree, we speak out and that will continue to be the case. That was the case before the war cabinet. It was the case when the war cabinet decided things that we didn't agree with. That will be our guiding principle going forward, no matter who is in the government, going one way or the other. Do you have any policies or protocols on convicted terrorism supporters being a key part of the decision making over a war being conducted by your ally in using US military assistance? Ultimately, we expect governments that receive US military assistance to operate in line with international humanitarian law. That will continue to be our expectation of Israel and everybody else. I have a couple of questions. One on Amos's team. Are there any new ideas or proposals that he's taking to the region during this visit? As I said, and I think it was in response to Humera's question, it might have been Jenny, I apologize if so. I'm going to let the White House speak to Amos Hoxton's travel, just because he's a White House employee. I don't typically speak to the travel and meetings of other employees of other agencies or other offices within the government from here. That said, ultimately, there is a diplomatic framework that we believe is reachable that would resolve this conflict without a full on war. I'm not going to get into details of that from here, but it's something that we have been in discussions with the various parties with for some time. It's something we're going to continue to push for, but it is something we believe will be much easier to achieve should we get a ceasefire. You heard the President speak to that when he laid out the proposal Israel had put forward, I think, over two weeks ago now, and that continues to be our assessment. One on Libya. Two Russian warships are visiting a military base in eastern Libya. Do you have any comment on that? Let me take that back and get you a comment. Finally, on Sudan, any new updates on U.S. efforts to stop the war, and especially the Secretary talked today to the Saudi foreign minister? I will say that, as you heard from us before, the war in Sudan is catastrophic. The humanitarian situation demands more regional and international attention and response. We are deeply alarmed by the reports of ongoing atrocities, including ethnic-based killings. We are demanding an end to the fighting in al-Fashr and that all parties protect civilians, as indicated by our work to pass a UN Security Council resolution last week on June 13th. We continue to call on the SAF and the RSF to engage in direct negotiations to immediately end the fighting, to adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and to take immediate steps to improve humanitarian access to meet the emergency needs of civilians. And yes, the Secretary did have a conversation with the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia about this very thing earlier today, something that he has been discussing with the foreign minister going back months, as well as, of course, other leaders in the region. We continue to urge both parties to return to talks and find a way to resolve this situation, because we think there is ultimately no way to win this conflict militarily. So one question first on administrative detention. So you've discussed how civilians shouldn't be held as leverage with regards to, of course, the Israeli hostages. Israel has held thousands of Palestinians in administrative detention for months, with no trial or charge. Our colleagues at CNN and the New York Times, of course, recently reported on a prison camp where thousands were rounded up and allegedly abused, tied up, assaulted, stripped, kept away from legal support and the Red Cross. And of course, Israel has said they're moving away from that specific camp. But what's being done to ensure this kind of thing doesn't happen again? What consequences are there? And then what about this larger issue of detention, where thousands of Palestinians are just rounded up with apparently no legal or judicial accountability? So we have made clear to the government of Israel on a number of occasions that they need to respect the human rights of Palestinians in both Gaza and in the West Bank, and that whenever anyone is detained, there needs to be full due process for those individuals, and they need to be treated in strict compliance with international humanitarian law. Okay, so will there be any sort of material response to this specific camp beyond just, of course, this one shutting down? I can't speak to this specific one. Ultimately, our expectation is that they ought to give people due process. They ought to treat them with full respect for their human rights and in full accordance with international humanitarian law. And then on your mention of the West Bank parts, a newspaper reported recently on Israeli snipers killing seven innocent bystanders in the Jenin refugee camp, which is, of course, to say not Gaza. The dead included two teenagers and reportedly the director of the government hospital surgical ward. So these are soldiers putting seven people into their lines, sniping them to have the moment to see who these people are. It's in the West Bank. What's the explanation for this? So I can't give you a good explanation. You should ask the government of Israel for an explanation. I would say that in any kind of incident like that, what ought to happen is that there ought to be an investigation. Israel ought to conduct an investigation of its IDF soldiers. The IDF ought to conduct the investigation of its INP. It ought to be the INP that conducts an investigation. If they find wrongdoing, there ought to be full accountability and full transparency. Has the U.S. communicated with Israel on this issue at all? I'd have to check to see if we've raised a specific incident, but that is our broad expectation when it comes to any of these types of incidents. And then just one quick question on Ukraine. When exactly, was the ban on arms transfers to the Azov Brigade lifted? I'll have to come back and get to that. I know we've spoken to this before, but I don't have it at my fingertips. Okay, thank you. Regarding Russian President Putin's visit to North Korea today, Korea time, what are the United States' concerns about the meeting between Putin and Kim Jong-un and their cooperation? So it's not just that these are concerns of the United States. We believe that deepening cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is something that should be of great concern to anyone that is interested in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, upholding the global non-proliferation regime, abiding by UN Security Council resolutions, and of course supporting the people of Ukraine as they defend their freedom against Russia's invasion. We've seen, it's not just the United States, we've seen other countries express concern about this deepening security partnership. We have seen over the past few months the DPRK unlawfully transfer dozens of ballistic missiles and over 11,000 containers of munitions to aid Russia's war effort. We have seen those munitions show up on the battlefield in Ukraine, so we know that they are using DPRK ammunition to threaten Ukraine and kill Ukrainians. And so we will continue to make clear our concerns. We don't believe any country should support this deepening relationship, and we will continue to call for Russia to respect all UN Security Council resolutions with respect to non-proliferation, including ones that they voted for. One more quick. Commander of the U.S. and ROK, combined forces, General Paul La Camera said that he said to put the brake on the South Korean government loudspeaker broadcast against North Korea. Why should South Korea stop taking legitimate countermeasures against North Korea's treacherous drone provocation? You know, I didn't see that comment. I would refer to the Pentagon just to speak to it in detail. On North Korea and Russia, has the State Department observed any transfer of military intelligence from Russia to North Korea at this point, and is that still a concern? I don't have an assessment to offer on that from here. And then can you say if the timing of this visit right now, Vladimir Putin's visit, is there any concern that he could be seeking more arms to break past the stalemate in Ukraine and launch another offensive? Oh, I think it is quite certain that he is continuing to look for arms to support his war against Ukraine. We have seen him get incredibly desperate over the past few months and look to Iran to re-bolster the military equipment that he has lost in Ukraine, to look to North Korea to rearm himself. And so I'm quite certain that that is what he's up to. All I can say is that we will continue to work with our allies and partners to support Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression. If I were judging partnerships, I would look to the leading democracies and leading economies of the world as a much more reliable partner than North Korea and Iran. And last one, just Russia and China's interference in existing resolutions in the United Nations and also rejecting new limits on Pyongyang. Can you say if that has impacted the U.S. ability to monitor the exchange of weapons between Russia and North Korea at all? Certainly it has had an impact. It's why we were disappointed that the Russians vetoed the ongoing monitoring mechanism that was in place several months ago. That said, we're going to continue to work with our allies and partners to monitor such proliferation and to try to respond to it as effectively as possible. Can I follow up on a question I asked you last week on Syria and Hoda Muthana? Why isn't the U.S. working to at least repatriate her son? I understand the court rulings around her citizenship, but at the time of his birth, my understanding is she was still a citizen, still a passport holder. Let me just say this. Repatriation usually is something that is reserved for U.S. citizens or the direct family members of U.S. citizens. We do sometimes resettle others who are non-U.S. citizens. It's something we've done with people from the detention camps in northeastern Syria. We encourage other countries to repatriate citizens and resettle citizens because ultimately we think it's important that we reduce the size of these detention camps. I can't speak to this individual case. I rarely can speak to individual cases here from the podium, but I will say that repatriation has been a priority for us and will continue to be. Can you say if there's any discussion about repatriating him or her? She has offered to stand trial here in the United States. She's expressed remorse. I just can't speak for all the reasons I think you can imagine. I just can't speak to the details of this type of case publicly, but repatriation and resettlement is something that we continue to support. Now that said, there are often a lot of times, lots of times very sticky issues that we have to work through to make it happen, but it is something that we continue to pursue. And then on Evan Grishkovich, our understanding is this will be a closed trial. What is the U.S. comment on this? Are you concerned that this is going to be conducted in secrecy? So certainly we have a concern about that. We are going to attempt to attend the trial. Don't know if that will be possible. We have continued to have consular access to Evan at times. We will try to attend the trial as we try to attend the trial of any American citizens who are detained in Russia. But ultimately, I don't have an answer for you yet whether that's going to be possible. It will be a high priority for us to do so because the safety and security of American citizens is our highest priority. Ultimately, we're going to try to bring him home and we're going to try to bring Paul Whelan home and that continues to be our overriding goal. Do you know if Evan's been moved from Moscow yet? I don't. I don't. Yeah. Thanks so much. A couple of follow-ups starting from Evan. There were hopes in this building that the fact that they prolonged the pre-trial detention for more than a year would open up some window for negotiation. Is that hope deflated? I'm just never going to make that kind of assessment from here. A few things I will say about the case. Number one, he should never have been arrested in the first place. Charges against him are completely bogus as we have made clear and we believe the Russian government knows that they are completely bogus. That said, we are going to continue to try to bring him home. There was a significant offer that we put on the table for the return of both Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan several months ago and we will continue to try to pursue their release but I'm not going to get into the details of that. But the fact that they went further to schedule the first trial, what does it say about how serious they are? I'm just not going to make that kind of assessment. He shouldn't have been released. He shouldn't have been arrested in the first place. That obviously was a very serious breach of international norms and so everything that follows from that is just one more action piled on top of actions that shouldn't have taken. So all that said, it shouldn't have been taken in the first place. All that said, we're going to continue to try to bring both Evan and Paul Whelan home. I just don't have any update on a wrongful detention determination, but you heard the President say that she ought to be released and that remains our position. He said that because he believes that it is wrong. He said that because he believes she should be released. And his Department of State does not recognize... We believe that she should be released. I can't speak to a formal determination at this time, but we've been pretty clear about the status of our case and what we think about it. Thank you. If I could go back to your quick statement on the Swiss peace summit. I know you spoke about launchables previously, but what do you make of the fact that some of the countries, 10 countries, including Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, India, and others, did not sign the final communique, which highlighted what you just said was about territorial integrity of Ukraine. In this stage of the war, third year of the war, you say that I am neutral when it comes to territorial integrity. How doable is that? So every country has to speak for itself and every country has to decide for itself. But if you look at the support that Ukraine got, you had over 90 countries that attended this peace summit. You had over 80 countries and international organizations that signed on to the final communique. We think both of those numbers represent a very significant show of support for Ukraine and for not just peace, but a just and lasting peace, something that we have always made clear is important. We're going to continue to work to make sure Ukraine has what it needs to defend itself now, but we are going to continue to work to try to secure a just and lasting peace, and we welcome the support from dozens and dozens of other countries around the world in that regard. Thank you. A final topic for me, ahead of tomorrow's talks with NATO Secretary General, the other response to Russia's comments on, you know, his initial comments that NATO is discussing bringing nuclear weapons into combat weapons. So I would just, sorry, I would just say with respect to those comments from Russia, look, it is Russia that initiated this conflict. It is Russia that has escalated this conflict every step of the way, not NATO, not the United States. Yeah, go ahead in the back. Thank you very much. Iraqi media reports that the security advisor to Prime Minister Sudan has been strongly critical of your nominee for ambassador, saying she is ignorant of Iraq's current situation, is interfering in Iraq's internal affairs, and is disrespectful to neighbors. What is your comment? As you know, Theresa, at the Senate just talked about militia roles, who they attacked U.S. friends last weekend. So I'm not going to respond specifically other than to say that the President has put forward a very capable, qualified nominee for ambassador to Iraq, and we urge a swift confirmation. And another question is, last week the G7, in its final communique, strongly criticized Iran, including for its nuclear program, its support for Russia against Ukraine, its destabilizing activities in the Middle East, and its human rights violations. Many of the participants have never criticized Iran in such strong terms before. Do you see this as a violation of your view, that you are right about what Iran is doing and how to respond? So we obviously welcome the G7 speaking with one united voice about the threat that Iran poses, and the threat that its destabilizing activities pose. And yes, we have seen a growing agreement on that question internationally, not just with our G7 partners, but with other countries around the world. Yeah, Alex. Has there been any change in position or stance on weapons deliveries to Israel in the past week or since the beginning of Blinken's visit? You might have noticed some unsourced and unattributed news reports saying that they promised to release all restrictions. Blinken told Netanyahu that. Yeah, I did see those reports. So two things. Number one, no, I don't have any updates to give. But number two, just as a general matter, when you see reports in the Israeli media of things that the Secretary supposedly said in his meetings with Israeli government, you should not always assume that those reports are entirely accurate. Do you see the comments from China's president over the weekend claiming that various US shows of support for Taiwan, including military exercises in the region and congressional delegations, relate to a general desire by the Biden administration for China to invade Taiwan? It's certainly not accurate. We have made clear, including directly to senior members of the Chinese government, that our one China policy has not changed. It will not change. And we continue to urge calm and stability across the Taiwan Strait. And one quick second one. A few minutes ago, you described the persons or groups that have been attacking some of the aid trucks at some of the Gaza crossings as, I think, criminals and looters, for your words. Has there been any sort of internal discussions within the State Department about determining whether this is like an organized action against aid trucks or whether this is truly some sort of disorganized band of criminals? And if you have had those discussions, has the US raised any of these concerns about aid trucks being attacked with the Israeli government? So the answer to the second question, yes, we have raised it with the Israeli government. It's been a topic of discussion with our UN partners as well. This isn't anything that's new. It's an issue that has kind of gone up and down over time. There have been times before where aid trucks were being attacked by criminals, and then you've seen the aid diverted and sold on the black market. At times, it's less of a problem. And it recently has been an issue again that has limited the distribution of some of the humanitarian assistance inside Gaza. So it is something that we have worked with, not just Israel, but with UN organizations as well. As to whether it's systemic, it's not something I can speak to. Yeah, go ahead. Now that the Rafah crossing is closed, aid workers now have to go through Care and Shalom, but the Israelis are putting more restrictions on them. I'm just wondering what your message to the Israeli government is about that. So two things. First of all, that we need to reopen Rafah crossing, and that's something we've been working on with the government of Israel and the government of Egypt to try to find a way to safely reopen Rafah crossing in a way that can allow humanitarian workers to leave in the way that they were doing before the crossing was closed and in a way that would allow humanitarian assistance to come in. So that is ultimately our goal, to try to get Rafah back open. In the meantime, yes, we have worked to try to facilitate the rotation of humanitarian workers through Care and Shalom. So aid workers that are in Gaza for some period of time that need to come out to rest, to see their families and be replaced by others so that can happen. There has been some rotation of aid workers through Care and Shalom, and we continue to try to work to get additional rotations because it's important that humanitarian workers both be able to go in and be able to come out so they can do their jobs. It is vital life-saving work that they need to do, and it's something we continue to work through with the government of Israel. They say the Israelis are making them stay longer though, which makes it hard to find people to do it. Is there specific reasons that the Israelis are giving you about that? I just can't get into that level of detail from here. I can tell you that it's something, Lise Grande, our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues, has been focused on how to get humanitarian workers in, get enough of them in and get them out to rest, as I said. How long they stay is not something that is not a level of detail I can get into, but I know it's been a high priority and something that she interfaces with the aid organizations directly on and then with the Israeli government to try to solve. Ultimately, as I said, the solution needs to be to get Rafa back open, but in the interim, doing nothing is not a sufficient outcome either. At the very moment, the United States and Saudi Arabia are very close for a defense deal. There are reports, unconfirmed reports, that Saudi Arabia is not going to renew a $32 deal with the United States. So, any confirmation by your side? That Saudi Arabia is not going to what? $32 agreement that took place 50 years back. I'm just not going to speak to those reports at all. So, secondly, the United States House Foreign Affairs Committee concluded brief hearings on U.S. prisoners that are detained on foreign soils. Now, some lawmakers are suggesting sanctions against Pakistan with the context of U.S. citizens in Pakistan, those who are supporting Imran Khan's PTI party specifically. So, in this context, there are also reports that the United States asked Pakistan to remove the name of a U.S. citizen, Saudi Arabia, from the exit control list. So, how seriously the United States is taking this matter? Let me take that question and get you a detailed answer to it. On Ukraine, GDC is reporting today about these so-called conscription squads and some reportedly developing a bit of a fearsome reputation of pulling people off buses and trains and taking them to enlistment centers. And the reporting reflects, I think it's fair to say, some divisions within the Ukrainian society about this new conscription drive. And I was just interested on the wider issue about, are you concerned about the issue of enlistment and what it says more broadly about the issue of manpower? So, the Secretary did speak to this when we were in Ukraine. I know you were with us and saw his speech that Ukraine did take a very difficult decision to increase conscription. So, they had sufficient manpower to fight the Russian military. And we know that was a difficult decision. We recognize all the reasons why it always is in any country. Ultimately, that is a decision that the Ukrainian government, the elected Ukrainian government, has to make on behalf of its people. The only thing I would say about it is that you have consistently seen people underestimate both the ability and the willingness, mostly the ability, of the Ukrainian people to fight and defend their homeland since before this war even began. And every time people have had those doubts, they've seen the Ukrainians put those doubts to rest, and we fully expect that to be the case. I have a question about Europe. Are there any concerns from the State Department about the populist wave that won the European election in terms of help towards Ukraine for the future? And the second question would be that Italy won a lot of consents for the European Parliament, so it's kind of leading also after the G7. So, what a state like Italy can do more to support the United States in foreign policy looking at Gaza and China? So, with respect to the first question, everyone in the room is going to roll their eyes when I say this, but we're not going to comment on elections in Europe or anywhere else. But that said, we have been heartened that one of the things we have seen over the past two years is a wide range of governments in Europe from across the political spectrum, sometimes even after elections that resulted in a change of government, continue to support Ukraine in its defense against Russia, and we expect that to continue. Look, obviously elections have consequences and elections have results, but when we have seen changes in government in Europe, we have sometimes, to the surprise to some of the kind of political prognosticators, seen these countries continue to support Ukraine despite expectations to the contrary, and we believe that will continue because we believe the vast majority of Europeans recognize the threat that unchecked Russian aggression represents to all of European security. And then with respect to your second question, Italy has been an extraordinary partner for the United States. They were a great host for the G7. You heard the President speak to that directly when he was there, and we look forward to continuing to work with them on all of these issues. And anything else that can be improved in foreign policy to support the United States or Gaza or China, since Italy is now is going to be leading in the European Parliament? So I'll just say we will continue to work with them to advance our shared concerns on all of these issues. Thank you. Just one other question on what you said earlier related to the issues of aid access, and one issue being, of course, connection to folks on the ground in the north. What in the north? Folks on the ground in the north in terms of aid distribution. Of course, one pivotal group that's operated there is, of course, UNRWA, a group that has had issues from the Israeli government in accessing and operating there, and one in which, of course, the U.S. is also withdrawing funding. So I'm wondering, have you interfaced with the government of Israel on specifically UNRWA's ability to access and operate? And then secondarily, what is the future of the U.S. support for UNRWA? I know it's been months of this ongoing open investigation. So with respect to the first question, yes, it's something that we have communicated directly with the Israeli government, and we have made clear that UNRWA plays a vital role in the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Gaza, and that work should not be in any way obstructed because they are, in many cases, the only means of delivering humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. And we've seen them continue to do that despite the controversy around UNRWA, despite some of the rhetoric you hear out of the Israeli government. UNRWA has continued to play that role over the eight months of this conflict. Second, with respect to the U.S. posture, there's a law that passed by Congress, and so we are now restricted from providing direct budget support to UNRWA. We don't have the ability to. That said, the investigation that the UN has conducted, you saw one of them that finished. There's another investigation that's ongoing. We wait to see the results of that. But ultimately, we have to follow the law that's passed by the Congress, and the law right now says that we cannot provide any direct budget support to UNRWA. Go ahead, and then we'll wrap up here. What happened between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea? I think according to the Chinese Coast Guard, a Philippine supply ship approached a Chinese ship, resulting in a collusion. Do you have any reaction for that? What happened? Yeah, a few things about that. Number one, as you have heard us say before, we stand by our Philippine allies and commend the escalatory and irresponsible actions by the PRC to deny the Philippines from executing a lawful maritime operation in the South China Sea to deliver supplies to service members that are stationed at the Sierra Madre. The PRC vessel's dangerous and deliberate use of water cannons, ramming, blocking maneuvers, and towing damaged Philippine vessels endanger the lives of Philippine service members. It's reckless, and it threatens regional peace and stability. And finally, this escalatory incident is the latest in a series of provocations by the PRC to impede critically needed supplies from reaching service members stationed at the Sierra Madre, and those actions reflect consistent disregard for the safety of Filipino lives and for international law in the South China Sea. And with that, I think we'll wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.