How Pep Won The League With His Weakest Tactics - Man City 2023-24 Tactical Analysis

One of the marks of a great team is the ability to achieve incredible highs that make them almost unplayable when they're on form. But an even greater marker is a team who even when nowhere near their best are still difficult to compete with. Guardiola's 23-24 Manchester City side is nowhere near one of his finest iterations and yet the Citizens walked away with another league title but lost unexpectedly in the FA Cup final. But as Premier League teams have tried to figure him out, Guardiola has once again had to change tactically to stay one step ahead. City's transfer incomings looked great on the surface, with the Blues spending big on high profile players who would have varying impacts on the side. But the loss of several key components of Guardiola's team tempered fans' expectations. But the two biggest losses came from the midfield, as Ilkay Gundogan, who had already proven himself to be one of the Premier League's finest, departed while the gravity of losing a future star was just as big a blow. The devastation to last season's XI only got worse as John Stones spent the first seven league matches unavailable and when De Bruyne went down in the first match of the season with a severe injury, it was shaping up to be a difficult season for the Blues. But Guardiola was ready for the challenge. Initially, despite the turnover in the prior season, Guardiola had looked to maintain the same general tactical principles but it was now Manuel Akanji instead of John Stones who would Stones had long been considered one of the silkiest centre backs around and had less of a step up to play effectively in the midfield, but Akanji was very much a more traditional centre back, raising concerns on how he would cope. He was helped by having the Premier defensive midfielder in Rodri alongside him, as when the City centre backs put their foot on the ball to draw in the opposition into a press, Rodri would, as much as possible, look to take on as much of could, receiving the first pass under pressure, then often looking for the bounce pass into Akanji who could now receive the ball, while facing the rest of the play. Akanji has done an admirable job in filling in, but when opposition sides are pressing City much higher, Akanji struggles to turn when he has his back to goal, often defaulting to a safe pass back to the centre backs. This hints at one of City's biggest tactical problems this season. The reason they haven't looked anywhere near as smooth and had several halves where they struggled to create a single high quality opportunity, and it is a problem that Pep has spent almost the entire season looking to solve. City could deal with the drop off between having Akanji in the midfield instead of Stones when Rodri was playing, but the games he missed through suspension showed just how important he was to the side. Pep attempted to replace Rodri in these games by having two dedicated midfielders operate as a double pivot, or Rico Lewis inverting from right back rather than getting a centre back to push up. The hope was that by doing this, City would be so effective at retaining possession that these men wouldn't be asked to do as much defending. But even with great retainers of possession like a Kovacic and Bernardo duo, they lacked the penetration of Rodri in possession, and the consistent switches into the wingers. Out of possession matters were worse, lacking the physicality of Rodri and making it much easier for sides to penetrate right through the centre of the team. But even when Rodri was in the first 11, teams were beginning to figure out how to defend against Manchester City. City failed to create 1.5xg or more on 10 occasions this season, and 10 of those came before the turn of the year. But what had teams figured out that gave City so many struggles? More and more of their opposition looked to protect the centre at all costs. If they could cut out City's ability to get into the midfield line, it would become infinitely harder for the Blues to create more danger up top. This was constant, whether teams were playing with one forward, who would see the wingers operating uber narrow. But more and more teams out of possession lined up in a super narrow 4-4-2. Just as importantly, the opposition front two would not be baited into the press, no matter how much the likes of Diaz and Akanji put their foot on the ball at centre back. City's midfield box had often been so effective in unlocking teams, but now it was teams' defensive midfield boxes that were turning the tide. Guardiola was in problem solver mode, but his early season adaptations caused more problems than solutions. Particularly when Silva was playing as one of the high 10s, he would look to drop wide outside these narrow blocks to receive the ball, instead of the tied up pivots. The downside of course, would be one less attacking number up front to create problems. This was not helped by the fact that Alvarez, while a great player, got plenty of minutes as one of the 10s rather than a centre forward. This would mean that when his fellow 10 dropped deep, he would be entrusted to carry the creative burden, something which he just could not do. On the rare occasions Kovacic was used as a higher 10 by Pep, despite being a silky, press-resistant midfielder, creativity and playing with his back-to-goal high up are not his strong suits, so he too would find himself dropping deep. This lack of central play high up the pitch meant that there was less and less service going into their big man Haaland, who often wasn't contributing much outside of goal scoring. This wasn't helped by the fact that where last season, from matchday 1 he was finishing like a freak, comfortably outperforming his xG, now not only was he finishing at the level of a regular forward, often he was finishing below average. So the fewer quantity of chances that City were making, were being finished at a worse rate. Not that it stopped him from winning another golden boot. But Pep was just getting warmed up. He got his wide centre backs to play extremely wide, almost as traditional fallbacks, with the aim of either having a potential 2v1 in the wide region, or drawing a defender away from the compact central block to create more passing lanes in that difficult to access centre. And this did provide City with some joy, as they looked to create more room for their pivots. Because the solo centre back would be so isolated, despite having a 2v1 in this wide region, if the opposition was narrow, City's wide centre back was unlikely to advance high. But with sides operating so narrow, it did leave the wingers with potential 1v1s. But the thing is, opposition sides knew this was one of City's few solutions, so often the winger would be forced to drop deep to receive the ball, and the opposition could be extremely aggressive to prevent the winger turning on the ball. But with the centre clogged, the wide region had to be the source of salvation. So Guardiola, one of the biggest advocates of a strict build up structure, needed some individual magic to make the difference. It would come in the shape of While Grealish has increasingly become a ball retainer with less ability to take on his man, Doku represented a risk taker, who would use his elite 1v1 dribbling to get past his fallback, and finally help City hit the byline to find the likes of Haaland. The threat of Doku was so severe that teams would commit their fallback to marking him earlier, or even double team him, creating room here for his higher midfielder to get on the ball But Doku, who looked like their solution, could also be a huge problem. Grealish retains possession, Doku tends to lose it, and with the City centre backs being this wide, they were there for the taking on the transition. The back 3 was not quick, and left to fill open gaps vertically as well as laterally, so opposition sides could counter almost at will. City again looked to pivot, instead of a narrow 3 or a super wide 3, Pep could look to be ultra aggressive with Edison being an extra centre back, thus shifting to a 4. The logic behind this is that if sides were willing to press with their front 2, or even still be narrow, City could now potentially get a man who was not the dropping midfielder into this position, outside the narrow block to progress the play, or have a more genuine 2v1. This was not a perfect solution, because firstly it would be a wide centre back, who is not as progressive as the midfielder receiving here. Secondly, as discussed, teams were so passive with their defensive shape that they would not be drawn into Edison, and even Edison would not be adventurous enough to move too high up the pitch to force them into a press. With every passing match, the team was crying out more and more for De Bruyne. De Bruyne absences are nothing new, and early in his tenure, Pep could depend on another club legend, David Silva, to step up whenever the Belgian went down. Following that, Gundogan stepped up seamlessly, thriving when Silverware was on the line. There were big boots to fill, and Foden was more than happy to do so. Much like Docu on the opposite side, when Foden played out wide, be it left or right, he had the ability to be one of the few creative sparks in the side, with the knack of gliding past his man to try and cause danger in those wide regions. But with limited central creativity, and only Haaland as a consistent goal threat, Pep Guardiola needed his star man centrally as much as possible. This led to an evolution in his tactics. Pep has almost always used his full back centrally during his time at City, whether it was inverting into the centre of the midfield, or into the back line. But as the season has progressed, he began to use them more and more traditionally, either allowing one of them to operate high to provide the width, or on rarer occasions, both men pushing on. So seeing Kawhalker, or even more frequently, Josco Guardiola in these positions has become more and more common. This firstly freed the likes of Foden to push infield and operate centrally, where he was masterful on the half turn, able to get past his opposition defensive midfield lines, to open up the potential for shots on goal, or assists. This changed the course of the season, as playing Foden central, and giving him the keys to the team, proved vital, as he went on to have his finest season thus far, winning the Premier League Player of the Season award. It also had the added benefits of freeing up a Bernardo or Kovacic to drop in to provide the numerical overload in the deeper zones, thus making progression there easier, as well as getting into the creative zones. Suddenly, City were beginning to create more and more, and looked like the better sides of seasons gone by, but there is the through line that had haunted them all season, and this change in shape was by no means a silver bullet. Manchester City, regardless of the level of opposition they're up against, still look ridiculously vulnerable on the counterattack. Playing Walker high up doesn't help, as even for a player as quick as him, it is a lot of ground to make up. This isn't helped by the fact that this season, Walker has taken a significant step back defensively in most matches. Having a Kanji in the midfield, especially when City are high up, also means they are asking a lot from the remaining centre back, so City have conceded more than double the amount of goals on the counterattack that they did last season. As the season began to near its end, City needed the strong finish that has become a trademark for them, and this pursuit was boosted by the return of De Bruyne. At 32 and coming off the back of another long term injury, there were plenty of doubts about what shape he would be in when he returned. It only took a few matches to show that he was still the same player, with 4 assists and 1 goal in his first 4 matches back. His return has boosted Haaland's stats late in the season, as their telepathic combination play was lethal as ever, with the Belgian one of the few City players who would look to immediately feed Haaland when he made a run. But despite Foden being moved back wide often, he and De Bruyne have struck up a great understanding, usually off the right, as they are able to seamlessly switch positions. The quality of each means there is a certain gravity that draws in the opposition, creating spaces for the other when it is most needed. This is before even mentioning the twin threat of the two of them when they both operate centrally. Even when they aren't at their best, Manchester City demand that their rivals be close to perfect. The slightest slip up and they're ready to pounce. It may not have been their finest iteration, but it's been effective nonetheless. But perhaps the pinnacle of Guardiola's City was 23-24. Click on screen to find out what made them so special tactically.