Treaty Reservations | International Law

General Principles of Law
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1 Video View·Nov 1, 2024
So in the previous lesson what we did was spend some time talking about the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, this being one of the major instruments which, as it turns out,
is itself a treaty that regulates the rules and principles and provisions which underpin the law
of treaties. It is very good, it's a very good convention that has a number of different
provisions cited therein and a number of these provisions have passed through the realm of just
being provisions within a treaty and in fact also represent customary international law.
Now one of the things that is very interesting about treaties is the idea of having reservations
to a treaty. Now we'll explain what a reservation is in a second but fundamentally the short answer
to this question is a treaty reservation is a thing that a state party wants to refrain from
being obligated to do in a treaty. So if let's say there is a treaty that is being negotiated
between two states and there are 10 provisions, the states might sign on to the treaty with certain
reservations, i.e. they might sign on to the treaty but only adhere to eight or nine of the 10
provisions and they will cite the specific provisions of which they have reservations to
and so as a result of which are not obligated to essentially be upheld or at least be
obligated to follow through with those particular parts of the treaty. The concept of treaty
reservations will be highlighted as a very important element of treaty law but it will
also be noted that there are certain conventions that do not allow for the existence of reservations
so if you're going to sign on to a treaty of this nature you have to sign it on in its entirety,
once for example this is the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, you can't sign and
ratify the Rome Statute and say we're going to have reservations in relation to Article 6 which
is of course genocide or Article 7 which is of course crimes against humanity, you have to
adhere to its entirety. We'll also highlight a very important ICJ case on the issue of reservations
and we'll also talk about how the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties examines and
underpins their understanding of reservations as well. So we already really know what a reservation
is, I've already explained it, but essentially states have the right to sign on to treaties with
the acceptance of certain reservations, i.e. disagreeing with certain parts of the treaty
and essentially removing any obligation that they may have to follow for those specific parts of the
It ties to the idea that fundamentally treaties are formulated under the consent of the states
and so the result here is that fundamentally if the states are going to consent to negotiate a
treaty they should also have the ability, if they so choose, to be able under their own state consent
to have reservations on certain treaties. The view that states have consent to enter into
negotiations but that they also do not have any kind of rights to have reservations, they have to
accept the treaty in their entirety, would sort of fundamentally negate this idea of state consent
in the first place and so the result here is that fundamentally treaties are formulated under state
consent and so states can also have an agreement where they do not agree to every single part of
the treaty. This is the case in most treaties. Most treaties allow for the acceptance of
reservations. Some of them allow for the acceptance of reservations for any part of the treaty. Others
may allow for the acceptance of reservations in certain elements of the treaties. Maybe
there are certain provisions which you are allowed to have a reservation for but for the most part,
for example, there might be some fundamental elements of the treaties that you can't really
have a reservation against. So then there are other treaties where there is no reservations
allowed. This is an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in 1951,
the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Now, as we know, the Genocide Convention was entered into force in 1948
and the Genocide Convention today represents not only customary international law in its almost in
this entirety, but for the most part, but those parts that are representative of customary
international law also represent what are known as Jus Cogens obligations. They're obligations for
which there can be no reservations and for which any treaty which attempts to violate them are
immediately and even post hoc described as void. But this was a question that the ICJ had in 1951.
They have the 48 Convention being entered into force where it's been created, it's been passed,
people are, states are signing on to the Convention and then the ICJ is asked the question,
could you have a reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide? Could you say, for example, that we don't want to sign on to Article 3 of the
Convention which cites the criminal acts that constitute genocide or even we will accept the
preventions of the Genocide Convention, all of them except for Article 2 which actually
defines genocide itself. Could you do this? The ICJ came to the rescue to try and
try and answer this question. So it was bought when a number of states were looking essentially
to sign on and ratify the Convention but they wanted to do so with the view that they would be
able to accept a number of reservations to the treaty. They didn't necessarily, in all cases,
say that they were going to accept the treaty with reservations and cite the specific reservations
in question. The advisory opinion that was asked was, could you accept any reservation? Could anybody
or any state sign on and ratify the Genocide Convention with any reservations or are
reservations completely out of the question for this particular Convention? Well, the most
contentious issue was whether or not states would want to be bound to Article 9 of the Convention.
This was a provision which related to settlements and the ICJ recognised a number of
principles. Firstly, they recognised that an understanding is reached within the UN General
Assembly that reservations can be reached by states in the signing of the Convention.
But the question for the court was whether or not this power of reservation is an unlimited power
and applies to literally any treaty. So the question for the court in this advisory opinion
was whether or not the authority of reservations was unlimited. It could apply to
any treaty and so when we cite the Genocide Convention as an example, the Genocide Convention
is obviously a Convention which you would expect not to accept reservations and so this was really
the challenge of the question. The ICJ say the following in their advisory opinion. They say,
quote, the origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations
to condemn and punish genocide as a crime under international law involving a denial of the right
of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results
in great loss to humanity and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations. So, fundamentally, this is just giving a citation to what the Genocide Convention does
and the kind of severity of the crime of genocide in this particular
understanding and but then it goes on to suggest that in such a Convention the contracting states
do not have any interests of their own. They merely have one and all a common interest,
namely the accomplishment of those high purposes for which are the raison d'etre of the Convention.
So the ICJ is sort of saying here that the Convention isn't really for you states,
there isn't really a, you don't benefit as a state to sign on to the Genocide Convention.
Who does benefit? Well, those who have the common interest, the common interest for which every
single state ought to have which is, of course, the prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide. So the raison d'etre, the justification, the motivation for the Genocide Convention isn't
to enshrine rights or to give anything positive to states, that's not what the point is. The point
is to prevent and punish instances of the crime of genocide and so for this reason there is no
interest in states being able to have reservations to the Convention on the prevention and punishment
of the crime of genocide. It implies that there can be limitations on the concept of a treaty
reservation when it was levied at international treaties of this kind of nature, treaties of such
a kind of such like the Genocide Convention. Now there are additional elements that you have to
think about when we think about the sources of international law, even if reservations would
be allowed for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, certain provisions of the
Genocide Convention are already not only customary rules of international law but also represent
It seems to suggest in this case that states are unable to sign onto the Genocide Convention
but put in place reservations that allow them to commit genocide freely.
This would not only go against the spirit of the Genocide Convention but would act
fundamentally in contravention of the raison d'etre of the Genocide Convention itself.
So how does the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties deal with the idea of reservations? Well
Article 19 says the following, this is the regulation of the concept of treaty reservations,
it says quote a state may when signing accepting approving or ascending to a treaty formulate
reservations, a reservation, unless and then these are the reasons why. Now this gives us a negative
set of obligations here, so what it is saying is that except in these circumstances where
you're not allowed to sign on, you're not allowed a reservation, reservations are allowed. This
gives a a negative list of the instances where reservations aren't allowed rather than a positive
list of where reservations are allowed, if that makes sense. So unless one the reservation is
prohibited by the treaty, one such example of this is the International Criminal Court Statute,
the Rome Statute, the ICC Statute, they prohibit any reservation in the treaty. The treaty provided
that only specified reservations which do not include the reservation in question may be made,
so not only are there some treaties where all reservations in their entirety are prohibited
like the ICC Statute, but there are also some treaties that exist where they have the acceptance
of reservations but only certain reservations, okay, you can have reservations against provisions
1, 4, 7 and 9, but you can't have reservations against all the rest of the provisions for
example, that would also be a limitation of the concept of reservations. And then it also says
that in cases falling under subparagraphs A and B, the ones we've just cited, the reservation
is incompatible with the objects and purpose of the treaty. This is the one that is the furthest
in terms of a broad scope, okay, what do we mean when we talk about the object and purpose of the
or we can refer back in fact to the advisory opinion on reservations for the Genocide Convention,
because fundamentally the ICJ, in the statements that I've made, had essentially positioned their
understanding and they positioned their ruling as suggesting that any reservation against the
Genocide Convention would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty,
the raison d'etre is the phrase that they used. So there are a number of treaties, like I've said,
that do not accept treaty reservations, the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court, specifically article 120 of the Rome Statute states that
no reservations can be made within the ratification of the Rome Statute. Finally then, article 20
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says the following, it says quote,
So what this is suggesting
here is that we're going to just essentially is talking a little bit more in a little bit
more detail about article 19c. Article 19c is telling us, for example, that it is the object
and purpose of the treaty that really is one of the ways in which we can disallow the existence
of a reservation. If the object to the purpose of the treaty does not allow for the existence
of reservations, then it should be the case that there should be no reservations to this treaty.
Only this can be negated in circumstances where all of the parties to the treaty accept the
existence of a reservation. So for example, let's say there is a treaty whose object and purpose
doesn't really allow for the existence of reservations. Let's say a state like the
US comes along and they say, well we're happy to sign on to the treaty but we want reservations.
The only way this would be allowed is if all the other states go,
well fine, you can have your reservations. Have your reservations for this and the consent
of all the parties are allowed a reservation requiring acceptance by all the parties.
So again, this not only does this limit the extent to which reservations can be issued
for treaties where the object and purpose is of a particular type, but it also keeps and
maintains this view that we have in public international law. This view in public international
law that states have to sign on to treaties, that states exist and that is state consent that allows
for the existence of certain circumstances throughout the world and throughout treaty
regulation. So a reservation could be accepted by all parties with the consent of all parties.
Part three says when a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization
and unless it otherwise provides a reservation required the acceptance
of the competent organ of that organization. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs
and unless the treaty otherwise provides, acceptance by another contracting state of a reservation
constitutes the reserving state a party to the treaty in relation to that of the other state or
when the treaty is enforced for those states. An objection by another contracting state to a
reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting
reserving states unless a contrary intention is definitively expressed by the objecting states
and then finally an act expressing a state's consent to be bound by the treaty and
containing reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting state is accepted
the reservation. This is a bit more procedural in terms of the ways and the times in which
reservations become binding or become valid and the treaty becomes entered into force.
