The Praetorian Guard: Rome's Deep State?

On his deathbed, the Roman Emperor Septimius Severus is said to have advised his sons and joint heirs Caracalla and Geta to be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and spurn all others. This possibly apocryphal statement illustrated just how far the former Republic of Rome had fallen into the grips of militaristic monarchy. By the time of Severus, the only constituency one needed in order to take and keep power was the military. The legions had already made and unmade scores of emperors with reckless abandon, tending to back any claimant that promised them a heftier payday. Though he certainly spurned all others, Caracalla failed to live up to the other advice from his father. For starters, he murdered his own brother to secure his claim to the throne, and though he went out of his way to placate the army, his actions weren't enough to secure the loyalty of the Praetorians, the elite private bodyguards of the Roman Emperors. Macrinus, the Praetorian Prefect, orchestrated a conspiracy that left Caracalla dead and Macrinus on the throne. Macrinus wasn't the first Praetorian to kill an emperor, and unfortunately he wouldn't be the last, but the boldness of his conspiracy reflected the absurd heights to which the imperial bodyguard had risen, and the entitlement it felt after centuries of influence at the very heart of the Roman state. While previous Praetorians had handed power to other members of the imperial family, or auctioned off the throne to wealthy aristocrats, Macrinus saw fit to make himself emperor, despite his relatively modest background as a member of the equestrian class. And crowning their own prefect as the first non-senatorial emperor, the Praetorians had arguably reached the apex of their power and influence, but a backlash was brewing. The origins of the Praetorian Guard can be traced back to the Republic, when prominent generals such as Scipio Aemilianus enlisted elite hand-picked troops as bodyguards to protect the Praetorium, or General's Tent. However, the institution was not formally codified until the reign of Augustus, as he sought to solidify his principate regime and suffocate the last embers of the Republic. Julius Caesar had disbanded his own private bodyguard prior to the Ides of March, and his adopted son swore not to make the same mistake. He knew that his unprecedented position as princeps had the potential to generate enemies, and his rule was founded on the ability to rapidly call upon more troops than any rival. To achieve this, he violated core Republican tenets, and stationed troops in Rome itself. This private army was answerable only to the princeps, and consisted of nine cohorts of approximately 500 men each. As the founder of the Roman imperial state, Augustus was limited in how openly he could display his new powers, and was forced to veil many of the reforms he was making to placate the Roman people. As a result, the regime was never based on a solid written legal code, but on precedent and the force of personality that each successive ruler could muster. Much like his inability to firmly define the principles of succession, Augustus' indulgence of the Praetorians was a policy that was politically expedient when it was devised, but would have disastrous consequences for the empire as a whole, as the Praetorians quickly became less interested in protecting the emperor than they were in the throne on which he sat. Only an emperor could authorize the massive payments to which they quickly became accustomed, and they didn't really care who that emperor was so long as the checks cleared. The specter of Praetorian sedition first reared its head during the reign of Tiberius, Augustus' successor. Tiberius' Praetorian prefect, Sedianus, heightened the emperor's already existing paranoia to isolate him and convince him that he was the only person in the empire who wasn't plotting against him. This was so successful that Tiberius even executed his son based on evidence from Sedianus. All the while, however, it was in fact Sedianus that was using the emperor to clear out his own political enemies as he made a play for the throne himself, but this was discovered and Sedianus was executed, along with his entire family. Despite what should have been an obvious warning about the dangers of unchecked Praetorian influence, nonetheless the guard's power grew steadily with each emperor. The functions of the Praetorian guard were no longer limited to providing security for the emperor and his family, but had also grown to encompass myriad administrative duties. Caligula, the third emperor, has the unfortunate distinction of being the first of thirteen emperors to be assassinated by the members of his own Praetorian guard. In the chaos that followed, Caligula's supposedly unwilling uncle Claudius was hailed as emperor by the guard as they sought a new paymaster from within the Julio-Claudian dynasty. According to the loose rules of the system of succession in place at the time, the senate should have been consulted, but the guards made their choice known, no senator was willing to cross them, and Claudius' rise was a fate accompli. The lack of a clear and stable system of succession, which dated back to Augustus' reign as first princeps, greatly increased the guard's power to influence the accession of any potential emperor to the throne. While securing the loyalty of the legions at large through donations and stipends was a priority, the first order of business for any claimant was to win over the Praetorians, or he wouldn't live to see a single sunset as emperor. The most successful emperors, such as Claudius, Trajan, and Hadrian, were all able to form positive relationships with the Praetorians, treating the guards with the respect they felt they deserved while also granting them high pay and regular bonuses on important occasions, such as the emperor's birthday, or the anniversary of his accession. It's no accident that the emperors who had the most stable and successful reigns were the ones who presided during times of economic abundance and widespread prosperity, for they were able to leverage the fruits of Rome's empire of exploitation to secure the loyalty and cooperation of the guard, while also using them as a source of legitimacy and authority to ward off any challenges. But while the Praetorians were strong allies during times of plenty, as the empire drifted into a sustained period of crisis, the Praetorians became a destabilizing force that ultimately undermined imperial authority and prolonged the state of emergency. As the contradictions inherent in the structure of Roman society began to compound, the empire faced a series of military, economic, and social crises. These catastrophes for the Roman world were a positive boon to the guard, as it enthusiastically took on the responsibility of making and unmaking emperors. After ending the Nerva-Antonine dynasty in 192 by assassinating Marcus Aurelius's son, Commodus, the Praetorians killed his just three months later for the unforgivable crime of not meeting their pay expectations and attempting to impose military discipline on what was ostensibly an elite legionary unit. As if murdering two emperors in the span of mere weeks wasn't enough, the Praetorians then openly auctioned off the office of emperor to whoever promised to provide them the best compensation. Didius Julianus won the bidding, and his generous support managed to secure him a full 66 days on the throne, for the brazen display of Praetorian corruption had incensed traditionalists across the empire and led Septimus Severus to claim the throne. His battle-hardened Pannonian legions made short work of the lax and ill-disciplined Praetorians, more accomplished in extortion than in combat. And while Severus did dismiss all Praetorians in service, he did not abolish the institution altogether. Instead, he simply appointed troops known for exceptional loyalty to the most desired posts in the empire. His unwillingness to commit to the abolition of the Guard would lead to the future assassination of his son Caracalla, as well as other emperors such as Elagabalus and Aurelian. After a century of Roman blood being spilled due in no small part to the machinations of the Praetorians, the Guard's power was finally curtailed in 284 by the Emperor Diocletian, who reformed the administration and the military of the empire through the launch of his Tetrarchy system, which was designed to ensure stable succession. Diocletian severely reduced the prominence of the Praetorian Guard and replaced it with a new system of Imperial Guards, consisting of several units of elite soldiers drawn from different regions and ethnic groups of the empire. These units were loyal to the Emperor, but not exclusively attached to him. They were rotated regularly to prevent them from developing political ambitions or connections. The Praetorians would finally be abolished entirely by Constantine, after they sided with his rival, Maxentius, in the Battle of the Milvian Bridge. When he seized sole power in Rome, Constantine made an intentional public display of the destruction of the Castra Praetoria, the well-fortified Praetorian encampment that had been the hated group's base of operations for centuries. It was a seismic shift in the history of Rome, but the citizens who marveled at Constantine's destruction of the Praetorian barracks could scarcely have guessed just how much further Constantine would go in altering the fabric of the empire. Within 20 years, he would found a city in his honor, Constantinopolis, and declare it a new Rome. Ultimately, it's difficult to imagine a more malignant force in Roman history than the Praetorian Guard, a group so focused on securing wealth, influence, and prestige for itself that they undermine the authority and legitimacy of the emperors they profess to serve, igniting disastrous civil wars simply to enhance their own positions. But not only did the short-sighted Praetorians sow chaos and destruction throughout the empire, they also directly intervened to assassinate strong rulers like Pertinax and Aurelian, preventing them from navigating the empire out of crisis. As long as the Guard held sway over the Emperor, the man wearing the purple was never guaranteed to be the best man for the job, but rather the one who offered the Praetorians the best bribes. Modern democracies are often riven with the idea of an alleged deep state, a secret network of powerful and unelected actors who manipulate the government to advance their own interests. The term has been used on all sides of the political spectrum to refer to different institutions such as the military-industrial complex, the intelligence agencies, financial elites, the state department, bureaucrats, and the media who transcend party affiliation and seemingly outlast any changes in government or electoral results. When vocalized today, this is often little more than a conspiracy theory, and a particularly elastic one, which tends to obscure the real sources of power and domination in society and ultimately serves to justify and reinforce the status quo. However, the Romans likely wouldn't have been so averse to using deep state language to describe the destabilizing and intractable influence of the Praetorians on imperial politics. No matter who the Emperor was, the Praetorians didn't seem to be going anywhere. In fact, it was often the first task of any new Emperor to strengthen their position and influence. The chief difference with any modern deep state analogy is that the Praetorians operated openly and brazenly, soliciting outlandish bribes from the Emperor for their continued loyalty and flaunting their privileged status. The Praetorians call to mind a famous maxim that is said to have originated with the tyrannical dictator Sulla, no better friend, no worse enemy. To an Emperor, the Praetorians were a necessary evil, and one that he knew could either protect his life or end it. The history of the Praetorian Guard is a cautionary tale about the compromises that must be made to wield power, and how swiftly and brutally an arrangement of convenience can devolve in the absence of checks and balances. The Praetorians, long gone though they may be, remind us that for all their power, no autocrat is ever a free man, because he knows he's surrounded by men who are every bit his match in ambition and in amorality.