Did the First Triumvirate Destroy the Roman Republic?

In Ernest Hemingway's landmark 1926 novel, The Sun Also Rises, one character asks another, how did you go bankrupt? The response, two ways, gradually and then suddenly, is vintage Hemingway. There is a parallel here to the collapse of the Roman Republic and the emergence of the Principate. Norms and practices slowly eroded over several decades of crisis, and then, all of a sudden, Caesar stood triumphant over his optimate rivals, and there was no political power base capable of openly opposing one-man rule. The primacy of causes for the decades of Republican crisis is as fiercely debated among historians as the eventual collapse of the Western Empire itself, but one factor that is often painted as a driving force behind the end of the Republic is the emergence of the First Triumvirate, an alliance between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus that historians from ancient to modern portray as flagrantly contradicting Republican ideals and the mores of the Mos Maiorum, Rome's unwritten constitution. The supposed tyranny of these three men is one of the most well-known aspects of Roman history, with the First and Second Triumvirates making it into even the broadest history courses beginning at the high school level. However, despite the popular dominance of this view, it's clear to anyone willing to look at all the evidence in its context that the biased efforts to cast the alliance as an unprecedented breach of political decorum are overly simplistic. The coalition was no different from other political alliances of its day, it was just particularly successful over two distinct periods of activity. The fact that these two periods of success are separated by five years makes it look as though it was a sustained partnership, when in reality, far from operating with a unified vision to undermine the Republic, the three men were just as frequently working against each other. The inability to understand the alliance between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus for what it really was begins with its very name. No one alive at the time, and certainly not the members themselves, referred to the pact as the Triumvirate. That name was interposed by later writers who were consciously seeking to draw a connection to the agreement between Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus, which has widely become known as the Second Triumvirate, even though it was the first to openly use the name Triumvirate. This second alliance was unquestionably counter to Republican values, as its first act was to drop a list of public enemies, such as Cicero, who were to be executed. In stark contrast, the agreement between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus always sought to influence politics through existing Republican systems. Yes, it engaged in bribery and rabble-rousing to shore up support, but these were time-honored political tactics in the late Republic that the opponents of the Triumvirate engaged in with equal zeal. Because the commonly accepted term Triumvirate is itself deeply anachronistic and highly prejudicial, I'll be referring to the agreement as the Triple Amicita. This is Latin for friendship, but it was also the recognized term for political alliances between members of the nobility and their clients. Leading nobles entering into an Amicita, often through marriage alliances or adoption, was the most common way for important families in the Roman Republic to form power blocks that they could utilize to influence politics. It is critical to emphasize that an alliance like this was not an exception to the rule. It was the rule. Roman politics would have been incomprehensible without them. In fact, the old Optimate families that formed the opposition to the Triple Amicita were engaged in a network of Amicita alliances themselves. Why, then, is the Triple Amicita singled out by historians? The alliance was innovative and unique because it took in three men as equal partners, with each agreeing to take no action opposed by any other. Despite claims to the contrary, the addition of a third member was a difference in degree not a difference in kind. To the famously proud Roman nobility, a two-sided Amicita was already very difficult to maintain because each man was obsessed with furthering his dignitas and autoritas. Their intensely hierarchical society of patronage and clientship created a political world where no man could stomach an equal. But a true Amicita required one. The tension inherent in any relationship among the most powerful families meant that most Amicitas were short-lived by their very nature, which is why familial bonds had to be factored in for any hope of true longevity. A sustained Amicita was incredibly difficult to maintain, and the addition of a third partner with true veto power on the actions of the others made it exponentially more untenable than the typical Amicita. An alliance which sought to overturn the institution of Roman republican government could scarcely have chosen a less efficient arrangement. However, Caesar was not only able to forge the triple alliance, he was able to do so with Crassus and Pompey, not just the two most powerful men in Rome, but two men who completely despised each other. Caesar was able to miraculously thread the needle between the two because he was able to convince them that only he could give them the legislative outcomes that each desired after being stymied by the Optimate faction in the Senate, a select clique which was utterly unwilling to allow crucial political wins for Pompey and Crassus lest the latter two's political prestige grow. Though Pompey and Crassus were doubtless the two most powerful individuals in the state, their personal animosity meant that they were outweighed by a partisan clique that acted in concert to block them at every turn. Strangely, this strident unity among the ruling elite meant to prevent the implementation of sound legislation that had massive popular backing is never presented as anti-republican. Ever the political opportunist, Caesar saw his opening to break the deadlock and secure his own political fortunes in the process. As part of his campaign for the consulship, Caesar was able to win over both men not just to his cause but to each other's as well. If I could have the transcript for any conversation in ancient Rome, this would be at top of my list. I'll never stop wondering how Caesar was able to convince the two to work together. He knew that the Optimates were playing up the division between Crassus and Pompey to keep either from achieving their ends. It's obvious in retrospect, but it likely took a lot of work to get Crassus and Pompey to see past their mutual embitterment of their shared consulship in 70 BC and accept this. There is scholarly debate about when the triple emiceta took shape, though the first movements can be traced to 60 BC after Caesar's return from his governorship in Spain as he worked to secure the consulship for 59 BC. The alliance could have begun as early as June of 60 or as late as January of 59. The debate is tied to a letter from December 59 where Caesar made overtures to Cicero to join a coalition, heavily implying that though Pompey and Crassus had both publicly backed him for consular election, he had failed to reconcile them. Some take this at face value, but it is my belief that Caesar is obfuscating here. He knew how close Cicero was to many Optimates and didn't want to give the orator the opportunity to attempt to drive a wedge in the new alliance before he knew Cicero could be trusted. How different history may have been if Caesar had been able to entice Cicero to join him, Pompey, and Crassus. Though Pompey and Crassus were known to despise one another, Caesar was actually quite close with both men. He had been a staunch supporter of Pompey in his early career, advancing initiatives that granted Pompey unprecedented power and imperium in the east and in efforts to combat piracy. The marriage between Pompey and Caesar's charming daughter Julia occurred in April of 59, which is well before the triple emiceta took shape. Caesar's relationship with Crassus was altogether different since the wealthiest man in Rome had long been Caesar's patron, funding his electoral efforts as he rose through the cursus honorum and even attained the position of Pontifex Maximus in 63. Caesar was massively in debt to a number of men, but Crassus was his chief creditor. Though this doubtless forced him to treat Crassus with a degree of obsequiousness that graded his pride, Caesar knew that his enormous debt meant that Crassus now had a vested interest in seeing Caesar succeed so that he could begin to recoup the loans. Caesar had attained high office on someone else's dime and then made that person his most powerful advocate, a true political genius. So Caesar received a consulship from the alliance, but what did the other members stand to gain? Pompey sought ratification of his eastern settlements and land for his discharged veterans. Both of these were quite reasonable requests that would benefit the state in the long term, but a die-hard conservative faction, opposed to Pompey gaining any further prestige or political power from the clientship of these settled veterans, blocked passage of the bill for years. It was quite cynical of the senate to deny thousands of veterans the land to which they were entitled through their enlistment and years of service simply because fulfilling their end of the agreement might make someone else look good. But that's Roman politics for you. Crassus, in addition to seeing Caesar placed in a powerful pro-consular command that ensured he would be able to repay his debts, used Caesar's popularity to pass legislation that reduced the amount which tax farmers in Asia Minor were due to pay the government. Cato had stood in staunch opposition to this legislation, which had been unsuccessfully pursued since the end of the Third Mithridatic War in 63 BC. Though Crassus doubtlessly had a number of equite clients he was protecting by securing the passage of this bill, it's likely that he was a silent partner in these operations as well, despite his senatorial status expressly forbidding engagement in lucrative tax collection corporations. You don't become the richest man in Rome by following all the rules. In a whirlwind of political activity in early 59, Caesar's consul, mobilized his popular base and passed monumental agrarian reform which provided for both Pompey's veterans as well as Rome's landless proletariat. He then ratified Pompey's eastern settlements and secured a reduced tax burden in Asia for the publicanae. Much needed legislation that had been languishing for years was now accomplished. Furthermore, Caesar's conservative consular colleague Bibulus had been humiliated and now refused to leave his house. The disappearance of one consul from public life would earn 59 the joking moniker, the year of Julius and Caesar. In the consular elections for 58, Caesar's father-in-law Calpurnius Piso and the staunch Pompeian Aulus Cabinius would emerge victorious. This is the narrative of unbroken success and dominance of Roman politics that is familiar to anyone who has heard of the triple emesita. But it is precisely here, when the coalition seems to have found its greatest success, that it began to falter. Just a year after its formation, this alliance was going the way of a typical emesita, breaking down after each member received what they had been after all along. Though portrayed as an alliance that dominated Rome for the better part of a decade, the scholar Eric Grunn found that the triple emesita was effective only in brief bursts, as each man had divergent interests and the shape of Roman politics prevented them from chasing anything beyond personal advancement. By the middle of 59, the alliance was fraying. Pompey and Caesar bore the brunt of the conservative backlash to the agrarian legislation and Crassus openly reveled in the public mockery of Pompey coming from Clodius, a radical popularis rabble-rouser whose connection to Crassus was something of an open secret. To make matters worse, two of the incoming praetors for 58 were staunch optimates and dedicated their time in office to repealing Caesar's agrarian reform. With Caesar away in Gaul, the triumvirate appeared even less aligned in subsequent years, with three of the four consuls for 57 and 56 taking hard stances against both Caesar and Pompey. This, more than anything, should be cause for reconsideration for anyone who views the triple emesita as possessing undue influence over Rome or turning politics into a personal fiefdom for the three most powerful men in the Republic. Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus made no direct moves against each other in the years after 59, but they also failed to rein in their hangers-on from attacking fellow members of the emesita. Clodius's harassment against Pompey can be written off to an extent because he harassed virtually everyone, well, everyone except Crassus. But Pompey took no action when his supporter, Rutilius Lupus, made a vigorous challenge to Caesar's proposed distribution of the incredibly valuable land in Campania. Only Caesar appears to have taken no direct action against the other two, but he probably only appears above the fray because he was off governing Gaul, and he also possessed a subtlety to his political tactics that would make any effort to undermine Crassus or Pompey difficult to discern across the millennia. By 56, the alliance was effectively dead. Pompey confided in Cicero that he believed Clodius was acting under orders from Crassus, and that he even feared Crassus may kill him. With Caesar gone, nothing held Pompey and Crassus together, and they were free to brood on past slights while also taking time out to provoke one another with fresh insults. The faction that had grown ever tighter in opposition to the triple emesita looked triumphant, symbolized by the consular campaign of arch reactionary Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and his efforts to replace Caesar as the governor of Gaul. Radical action was needed, and so Caesar asked Pompey and Crassus to meet him during the winter of 59 in Lucca, a city near modern Pisa at the southernmost tip in his province, as Caesar could not cross the Rubicon without relinquishing his imperium, and we know he would never do that. According to Plutarch, 200 senators also made the trek to Lucca to attend the summit. This is a testament to the extensive patronage networks possessed by Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar, though it is doubtful that any of these superfluous attendees took part in negotiations. At the Lucca conference, it was agreed that Crassus and Pompey would both seek the consulship for 55, and would then extend Caesar's campaign in Gaul for another five years, so that he was able to move from proconsulship into a second term as consul, without becoming a private citizen. After the conclusion of their consulships, Crassus would receive the governorship of Syria, and Pompey the governorship of Spain, but in an unprecedented move, Pompey would be allowed to govern in absentia through legates. This meant that he was free to stay just outside Rome's religious border, the pomerium, while also possessing imperium, and thousands of troops at his command, a sure sign that the triple emicita knew the political dangers of vacating Rome entirely. That all of this came to pass in such rapid succession after the Lucca conference is, like the initial burst of legislation in 59, a testament to just how effective the triple emicita could be when all members actually worked together towards common goals. The fact that there were only two brief moments where the alliance was able to register success on this scale is indicative of the fact that the men were not truly intent on working together over the long term. This was not a lifelong pact drawn up in blood, it was a vehicle for short-term aggrandizement. Pompey was likely selected to remain in Rome since he was the leading figure in the emicita. In fact, Cicero's letters from the period indicate that the optimates viewed Caesar and Crassus as little more than appendages of Pompey, with letters decrying his sole domination of the republic during his consulship of 55. Caesar was still the junior partner to these much older men, and though he had gained prestige from his efforts in Gaul, the conquest was not yet complete, and no living Roman had military credentials to match Pompey. Certainly not Crassus, whose leading exploit to date had been the defeat of Spartacus' rebellion. There was no glory, and certainly no riches, to be found in defeating runaway slaves, which is why Crassus so desired a command in Syria that would allow him to make war on the Parthians. Crassus' lust for military glory resulted in his death in 53 BC at the battle of Carahe, an event that is often portrayed as the chief destabilizing force in the triple emicita, which made civil war between Pompey and Caesar inevitable. But this is a misnomer, as Caesar and Pompey were still firm allies well after Crassus' death, and even after the death of Julia, Caesar's daughter and Pompey's wife. In my view, the true tragedy of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey is that it was not inevitable. In the words of Plutarch, For they had now been willing quietly to govern and enjoy what they had conquered, the greatest and best part of earth and sea was subject to them. And if they still desired to gratify their thirst for trophies and triumphs, they might have had their fill of wars with Parthians or Germans. Besides, a great task still remained in the subjugation of Scythia and India, and here their greed would have had no inglorious excuse in the civilization of barbarous peoples. And what Scythian horse or Parthian archery or Indian wealth could have checked 70,000 Romans coming up in arms under the leadership of Pompey and Caesar, whose names those nations had heard long before that of Rome, so remote and various and savage were the peoples which they had attacked and conquered. There also seems to have been genuine affection between the two men that went beyond their shared love of Julia. As the tensions of the civil war escalated, Caesar repeatedly made the request to meet Pompey in person, as he believed that their friendship could possibly win out and end the conflict before it claimed too many lives. Unfortunately, it was never to be, and their meeting in Lucca would be the last time the two men ever met face to face. The fact that two men who considered the other a dear friend would fight a war provides an illuminating portrait of the Roman concept of honor, and why an Amicita was so difficult to maintain. The fact that the triple Amicita achieved remarkable success should not blind us to the fact that it was as short-lived as the other Roman political alliances of its day. The men who entered into it were fickle, and two brief periods of legislative success do not make the triple Amicita akin to a conspiracy to undermine the Republic itself. The end of the Republic would in fact begin in 43 BC, when Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus would forge an alliance to counter Caesar's assassins. This gang of three would work to subvert what little remained of the Republic. Christening themselves Triumvirere Publicani Constituende, these men would become the first, last, and only triumvirate that the withering Republic would ever know.