Three Common Misconceptions About China's Economy | China Truths

China Truths
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Welcome to China Truths. In this episode, we will bring you the following stories:
Three Common Misconceptions About China's Economy
China's Economic Chaos: Gao Shanwen's Speech Goes Viral Online
Now, let’s dive into the details
00:00 - Introduction
00:18 - Three Common Misconceptions About China's Economy
00:18 - China's Economic Chaos: Gao Shanwen's Speech Goes Viral Online
#china #chinatruths #chinanews
Welcome to China Truths. In this episode, we will bring you the following stories.
3 Common Misconceptions About China's Economy
China's economic chaos, Gao Shanwen's speech goes viral online.
Now, let's dive into the details. It's all covered in today's China Truths.
3 Common Misconceptions About China's Economy
Common misconceptions about China's economy include the ideas that one should never bet
against China, that new industries will drive China's growth, and that a massive stimulus
plan could resolve its economic issues. However, a former Beijing political advisor
suggests these beliefs are deeply flawed. On Monday, December 2, Desmond Shum, author of
Red Roulette and a former member of the Beijing Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
or CPPCC, outlined these misconceptions on the social media platform X.
Misconception 1 – Never Bet Against China
This notion has gained traction over the years as China's rapid economic growth seemed to defy
skeptics. Shum argues that this belief assumes that past trends guarantee future outcomes,
ignoring fundamental shifts in China's economy, politics, and global environment.
He writes,
Betting against China during the era of reform and opening up, when favorable demographics,
global economic integration, and easy gains were available, is vastly different from doing so today,
as many tailwinds have turned into headwinds. He adds,
The assumption that history progresses in a straight line is entirely misguided.
Misconception 2 – New Industries Will Sustain Strong Growth
Beijing has frequently touted the so-called New Three Industries – electric vehicles,
EVs, lithium-ion batteries, and solar panels – as proof of China's innovation and future growth.
While these sectors have grown impressively, Shum points out they still represent only a
small fraction of China's economy, accounting for less than 10 percent of its GDP. Meanwhile,
broader economic indicators are less promising. Two of China's three growth engines – investment
and domestic consumption – are shrinking, he notes. He argues that it's wishful thinking to
believe these emerging industries can offset the structural decline in real estate and its
associated wealth effects. The math simply doesn't add up.
Misconception 3 – A Large-Scale Stimulus Plan Can Save China's Economy
This belief stems from memories of Beijing's massive stimulus plan in 2008-2009,
which helped China weather the global financial crisis.
But the current circumstances are vastly different. China's growth model – built
on continuous investment, cheap labor, and export dominance – has reached its limits,
Shum explains. Domestically, China is overinvested, overleveraged, and constrained
by Xi Jinping's return to centralized control, which evokes the Mao era. Internationally,
the geopolitical environment has changed, with previously favorable conditions like
unrestricted access to Western markets and global supply chains no longer guaranteed, he writes.
Shum highlights stark figures. China counts for about one-third of global manufacturing
and 14 percent of global exports, while the U.S., the second-largest manufacturer,
produces 16 percent of global goods and 7 percent of exports.
However, China's export-driven model is facing mounting global resistance.
As global demand weakens and Western nations actively diversify supply chains,
China's manufacturing sector is struggling. Stimulus measures may provide temporary relief
but cannot resolve structural challenges, Shum warns. These misconceptions persist because they
allow observers to believe China's economic juggernaut will continue indefinitely,
much like the past few decades. But reality is more complex and sobering,
Shum concludes. China's economic challenges are structural and deeply rooted,
and oversimplified narratives are often misleading.
China's Economic Chaos
Gao Shanwen's speech goes viral online. An economist has publicly highlighted the chaos
in China's economy, noting that massive unemployment has caused young people in
Data indicates that provinces with younger populations are experiencing slower consumption
growth, while those with older populations are seeing faster growth.
Gao Shanwen, chief economist at Guotaijin and Securities,
shared his analysis of provincial data during an investor conference in Shenzhen on Tuesday,
December 3. He revealed that a cumulative total of 47 million Chinese workers nationwide are
unable to find regular employment. According to calculations by Bloomberg using official
statistics, this equates to 10% of China's urban workforce in 2023.
Gao's remarks quickly gained attention on Chinese social media,
including Weibo, and became a hot topic on international platforms such as X, formerly
Twitter. Publishing this article must not have been easy, commented a Chinese mainland netizen
on a portal site about the speech. This analysis based on data is accurate,
it's an excellent report, another netizen replied. In recent years, Chinese authorities have
increasingly suppressed public skepticism of economic activity. In August 2021, the Cyberspace
Administration of China prohibited social media posts that distort and misinterpret macroeconomic
data. In some cases, economists have been directly warned not to criticize official data.
Several domestic platforms broadcast Gao's public speech, where he described post-pandemic Chinese
society in three striking phrases—thriving elders, lifeless youth, and disenchanted middle-aged.
Gao's candid remarks stand out amid a broader backdrop where analysts are pressured to align
with the government's narrative of optimism and economic growth. Since Beijing lifted COVID
restrictions in 2022, retail sales in China have remained sluggish. Consumer confidence
has been hit hard by pandemic measures and one of the country's worst real estate crises.
The economic slowdown, coupled with widespread pay cuts and layoffs, has strained household
budgets and suppressed spending. Gao noted that recent consumption trends reflect the reality
that retirees' pension incomes remain stable, while young people face bleak employment prospects.
We tend to think that post-pandemic, young people drive home-buying.
In regions where young people are less optimistic about the future,
consumption weakens, and the desire to buy homes also declines, he said.
In contrast, older adults' income expectations are not constrained,
and their sense of happiness remains strong. Gao observed that before the pandemic,
consumption growth was roughly on par with economic growth or even slightly faster.
However, post-pandemic, consumption growth has lagged significantly behind economic growth.
Based on pre-pandemic data, either consumption growth has been underestimated or economic growth
has been overestimated, as this mismatch isn't evident in other indicators, he explained.
If we trust employment data, economic growth is overstated.
Conversely, if economic growth data is reliable, employment data must be understated, Gao said.
The relationship between employment and growth has appeared highly abnormal over the past two years.
In terms of employment, Gao estimates that 47 million workers in urban areas are unable to
find jobs, according to cumulative deviations from employment trend lines. In other words,
a total of 47 million Chinese workers are effectively unable to secure regular jobs.
Based on Bloomberg's calculations using official statistics,
this equates to 10 percent of China's urban workforce last year.
This figure highlights gaps or deliberate omissions in China's official urban employment
statistics. Despite consistently stable official unemployment rates, a significant number of
workers have returned to rural hometowns or taken on gig jobs like ride-hailing,
which are excluded from official statistics. Other independent analyses also suggest that
China's job market is weaker than official data suggests. In 2023, the National Bureau
of Statistics of China stopped disclosing youth unemployment data after months of record high
rates. Subsequent indicators excluded students from the calculation but still showed persistently
high unemployment rates. Gao estimates that China's GDP growth over the past three years
may have been overstated by 10 percentage points. This conclusion is based on his analysis of
discrepancies between economic growth data and expansion in areas like consumption,
investment, and labor force. In China, the most reliable macroeconomic data is price-related,
as it's harder to manipulate through sampling. Other data is less reliable and more susceptible
to non-statistical factors, Gao noted. He suggested that adjusting China's economic
growth rate downward by three percentage points per year would align the data with reality.
Other economists have also questioned the accuracy of the Chinese government's GDP
growth figures for 2022 and 2023. Tao Jingzhou, a classmate of former Premier Li Keqiang at Peking
University, has publicly criticized the credibility of official statistics. Tao, an international
arbitrator and attorney at the French Court of Appeals, said that misleading data creates a cycle
of misinformation. In an op-ed for the Financial Times, Tao argued that Beijing's strict control
over economic data, especially annual GDP figures, undermines their credibility. He
also pointed out that the Chinese government's attempts to silence economists about GDP figures
have backfired, as jokes about GDP data have become more common in private conversations
than ever before.
