Xi Jinping's Last Months | Elite Politics

The final reckoning of Xi Jinping is coming, soon-ish. We finally know the date of the 4th plenary session, which is happening in October this year, pretty delayed but it's still expected as we previously covered that it's one of the possible dates of it happening and now officially they announced it's for October this year. And with that announcement, we know that China's economy is going to continue to sink, there is no rescue plan, and nothing is changing on their part to lead China out of deflation, out of all of its troubles. Traditionally, the 4th plenary session or plenum happens two years after the party congress. Now the party congress happened in October of 2022, so two years after that should be 2024, October or September, when this next 4th plenum will happen. But because the 3rd plenum was delayed, it happened last summer, the 4th one happens this year, and because of that, the 5th one and 6th one will both be delayed as well. Technically, they could have squeezed it in last year, but they just didn't do it. So the fact that it's delayed in itself is already abnormal. And the 4th plenum usually focuses on political affairs, ideology, how to run the party government apparatus, even talking about some major government political changes, etc. Rarely does it talk about the economy, but based on the latest announcement, it seems like the 4th plenum that is going to happen is going to be a big focus of it being the economy. Obviously, we know it's not doing well. But traditionally, it's things like how to run the country. And the 5th plenum is the one where they talk about the 5-year plan. But because it's expiring this year because of the delay and everything, this 4th plenum will also talk about the 15th 5-year plan. Now obviously, the 5-year plan is what the Soviet style of centrally planned government functions and they adopted it to the CCP. And so after the Cultural Revolution, this also tells us that this whole reform and opening up, it's part of the planning, not some spontaneous decision that they made up. And so because it's expiring next year, they have to do it at this 4th plenum instead of the 5th. Now, obviously, the announcement makes no mention of personnel changes, which is the one we're looking for, whether Xi Jinping will step down or not. But it doesn't mean this won't happen, right? The CCP doesn't function like, oh, by the way, we're going to announce to you that so-and-so is going to step down or there will be a big change in our upcoming meeting, right? They're not going to announce it to us. So these kind of things will still happen. It's just it won't be part of the major announcement. But it does mean that whether there will be reshuffling or people going out or in, from now on until October, Xi Jinping's titles or his positions as the general secretary, as the chair of the military, these won't change, right? Because the CCP doesn't want to have a sudden, shocking change for the country, for its people, but also for the world to see. They rather things are smooth in its transition. Even if there is a shuffle in power, they want that to carry out smoothly as if nothing happened. So there's not going to be any public drama. But in the 4th plenum, the four scenarios that Xi Jinping could or what could happen to Xi Jinping is that first, he retains his titles. Again, title and power are two different things in the CCP. They're mutually exclusive, actually. And the second is he retires his military role, which is obviously signals that he has given up real power, because in China, the military is the real power. And the third one is he retires to the second line of leadership. It's essentially him still giving up power, but more in the excuse that he's getting older, he needs to retire some of the duties that he has. And the fourth one, of course, is he just fully retires, right? He just steps down from everything. So until then, his titles and the way that he's going to represent the CCP will remain the same. And before we go into the details of the analysis, I'll be heading to four city in Malaysia to investigate the fall of the four city, a mega project from Chinese developers that was abandoned during the pandemic now has become a dystopian ghost town. It's the only opportunity for me outside of going to China that I can experience what is like to be in the middle of a ghost city, abandoned mega infrastructure projects so ambitious yet fall so quickly. And I need your support to help us contribute to covering the expenses for the trip. Your donation will empower our journalism and exposure of the CCP's deceptions. By donating a certain amount, you will receive curated keepsakes from the journey ahead. And it can be done anonymously. It's also tax deductible. All you need to do is leave us an email so that we can give you the unique merchandise after the trip. Check out the Zephyr link in the description and help us achieve this goal today. Now, compared to this plenum to the fourth plenum in 2019, so the last iteration of it, you see there's a world of differences. This one revives the ideological lineage, which is Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory. Three represents scientific development and Xi Jinping thought. Now, it's a dense slogan, yes, but it's one where it's necessary. We see that this is a continuation of the CCP's so-called leadership principles. It signals continuity, but the 2019 version skipped this entirely. This time, it also mentions something called a two unwavering principles and boosting various types of business entities. So this is language straight from the Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao era, and it ties to reform and opening up. This is the language of the late 2000s, early 2010s. That's very striking. Xi Jinping rarely mentions Hu Jintao's principles and values because those contradict his own beliefs, but also it's a sign of power, right? Remember, Hu Jintao is the guy that Xi Jinping removed from the 20th Party Congress in front of all those cameras to see. The other time he mentioned this was in March of this year, when he actually wrote a commentary that was published at the time, which he supported this same principle. So that's a shift that's very worth noting. And tone-wise, it's also completely different. I'll read you this excerpt from the one in 2019, okay? It says, our party has led the people in creating a miracle of economic development and political stability rarely seen in the world, and the Chinese nation has made a great leap forward from standing up, becoming prosperous, and becoming strong. The Chinese nation, with a civilization history of over 5,000 years, achieves of the two centenary goals and ultimately realizes its great rejuvenation. The world today is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century, and my country is at a critical stage in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Comprehensively grasp the great struggle, the great project, the great cause, and the great dream. To continuously meet the people's new expectations for a better life, and to overcome various risks and challenges on the road ahead. We must strengthen research on major issues, persist in reform and innovation. Now the word great gets mentioned so many times here, and you see the overall tone, it's very Xi Jinping era, everything like the whole unseen changes in the century, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nations, and all of these things, right? Very typical Xi Jinping tone. Now you go back to this new one here, the 2025 one, and it just completely shifts in tones. In this one, the word great appeared only twice, and the tone is more muted, it's more pragmatic, it's more like, yeah, we're going to mention some ideological slogans, but also we try to do things, right? So it starts with the meeting, talks about the economy, blah, blah, blah, the meeting does this, the meeting does that. It's very work-focused, right? Not a lot of this great everything, right? That's very Mao and very Xi Jinping-like. And then when we look at the one from 2008 or 2009, this one again, it's the same tone from the Hu Jintao era that's now being repeated in 2025. So for the next two weeks after this Politburo meeting, Xi Jinping and others will head to Beidaihe to officially kick off the Beidaihe meetings. It's a series of meetings, not just one. And while some people have already arrived before this, the official so-called meeting starts now. And there will be various factions and parties and private or official meetings happening. And so for the next two weeks, we might hear more rumors about what's going on. But for the time being, this is what they're going to be discussing, in my opinion. There's two issues. The first is the Chinese economy, how to deal with the U.S. trade talks. The second one is how to deal with Xi Jinping. Because the plenum announcement came out in the end of the July Politburo meeting. Every single line, 13 of them I counted, was about the economy. And that's the major issue, right? And we have to talk about what the U.S.-China trade deal actually means for the CCP at this point. This meeting happened a day after that third round of talk in Stockholm. And so we know that the two sides are thinking about a possible 90-day pause, or they try to sign a deal before August 12th. And there's just that one final line in the announcement says the other matters were discussed. We still don't know what matters were discussed, what other topics could have been talked about. Well, we always mention two names, right? The two key figures in the Chinese military, Mao Hua and Hou Weidong. Both of them are Xi Jinping's allies, Xi's faction. Yet there's been no final definitive judgment or public announcement on what's happening to them. Because that's really the signal of where power's headed. If they get publicly officially announced to be purged, then that's a huge sign that Xi Jinping has completely lost power. So let's talk about the U.S.-China trade deal, because this is very indicative of where things are going. I personally don't think that third round talk led anywhere. I think they're still back to ground zero in terms of what they want, because both sides know that they're not going to reach an agreement where they're very happy at this point. So I don't really see that they can get anything done before the August 12th deadline, which means that this another 90-day extension or pause can actually happen. And if you look up the time which it lines up from, let's pretend like yesterday or the day before on Tuesday, the talks happened and they do another 90 days. What that means is by the time the 90-day hits, it will be the end of October, which actually lines up with the end of the fourth plenum as well. So maybe that's when they will decide what to respond with for this trade talk. But by then, who knows who is signing the deal? Is it going to be Xi Jinping still or is it going to be somebody else in power? But the fundamental difference here is beyond Xi Jinping. It's a party issue, right? Trump wants China to have an open market access for the West. But right now, foreign companies are leaving China. They're not going to reverse this trend. It's not going to go back. And unless, of course, China decides that, yes, we're going to take this deal on August 12th. But by then, if they do take a deal and say we're going to open up China up, that's again another sign that Xi Jinping has lost power. Because what Xi Jinping has done during his time is he has closed China off. He has done these things like internal circulation, dual circulation. The point is he wanted to de-link or decouple from the rest of the world in case something like an invasion of Taiwan happens. He wants to be able to protect his own, or at least have a proper strategic supply chain in that area. So when it comes to the market, Xi Jinping needs tight regulations. He's done that with the private sector in China. He's doing that with foreign companies. So for China to open up its market, it's never going to happen under the Xi Jinping era. But also, if we look beyond just Xi Jinping, anybody in the CCP, they know that when they open the market up, they will completely collapse, like the CCP will collapse. Because the fundamental identity of the Chinese Communist Party is anti-America, right? So when you give America so much of its values and everything infused into your society, you're bound to lose your power and control. So if you just look at their stance, like on the Russian oil purchase thing, right? Scott Besson says, stop purchasing Russian oil, and they're like, no, we're going to do that. We have our own so-called sovereignty and whatnot. So anti-America is a set in stone thing. It's not going to change when Xi Jinping steps down. The CCP fundamentally views anti-America as this existential threat or existential goal or objective. And also, when it comes to the real science of Xi Jinping not controlling the power or have power is the military reshuffling, right? The current situation where Xi Jinping allies are being replaced by Xi Jinping or anti-Xi Jinping powers. And so that's the clear-cut science. So this is not a speculation that Xi Jinping has lost power. It is the fact that he has not yet lost his titles. And that can really come at any time. But the power part, that's a fact. All right, thank you so much for watching this episode of Elite Politics. Hope you enjoyed the content. Let me know your thoughts in the comments. Subscribe and like this video if you haven't already. And also check out our Zephyr link to consider supporting us for our upcoming trip to Malaysia. Thank you so much for watching. We'll see you next time.