Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion of Southern France | Battlezone

The plan called for an allied landing on the Mediterranean French coast between Toulon and Cannes. The whole coastal area, extending from the beaches inland for about 150 miles, was thoroughly softened up for the assault troops. All three and a half months preceding the invasion date, 5,000 allied planes dropped some 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France. Early on the morning of August 15, 1944, the mounting air bombardment was supplemented by strong naval fire against the beaches. Soon after dawn on the same morning, the invasion troops prepared for the trip to shore. There was as yet no hint of enemy resistance. Spearheaded by three American divisions supplemented by French units, the U.S. 7th Army made the assault. The troops, many of them veterans of the North African and Italian campaigns, stormed ashore at 8 a.m. and met very light opposition. The landing was executed exactly as planned. The enemy was caught by surprise. The American and French assault units, once ashore, were opposed by only two German divisions spread along the coast and eight more farther inland. 7th Army troops won a 15-mile-wide beachhead with comparative ease, and the operation was considered an overwhelming success by allied field commanders. With the beachhead securely ours, the drive inland was begun without delay. The course of the advance was to be up the valley of the Rhone River. The troops started their drive toward the valley against stiffening resistance. The assault forces were helped materially by members of the French underground, as well as by French villagers encountered along the path of the advance. During the first few days of the campaign, the 7th Army and the Marquis captured more than 10,000 Nazi troops. Throughout the allied drive in southern France, the Marquis played an especially active and extremely valuable part. The southern France invasion force was to fight its way up the Rhone Valley and then swing eastward into Germany. Having overcome the Nazi defenders along the coast, the 7th Army pushed up the valley on the heels of the main body of German forces racing north toward the German frontier. The pursuit was speeded up in an attempt to trap the fleeing Nazis. The air force pounded the exposed German columns steadily. At intervals, the allied chase was slowed down. As the 7th Army troops were called upon to reduce a pocket of Nazi resistance, the G.I.s went about the job quickly and efficiently. Killed and 50,000 captured. After 10 days of fighting, the allied force reached the Rhone River itself at Mont-Saint-Laurent, a hundred miles from the landing beaches. Here, a last-ditch Nazi stand was quickly beaten down. The advancing Americans trapped one Nazi panzer division and elements of two other German divisions. The Germans lost great quantities of materiel in their unsuccessful defense at Mont-Saint-Laurent, and additional thousands of German soldiers were killed or captured in the brief but savage battle. In town after town in their victorious drive up the Rhone Valley, the G.I.s were greeted with enthusiasm by the overjoyed French townspeople. On September 11th, junction was made between the Southern France assault force and American units which had entered France from the Atlantic coast. In the Dijon area, the U.S. 7th and 3rd Army troops made contact, and Western France was sealed off. For the final push to the German frontier, the allies presented a single powerful battle line. Sparking the drive to the east was Patton's 3rd Army. Patton realized that through speed and determination, each successive advantage is more easily and economically gained than the previous one. Relentless and speedy pursuit is the most profitable action in war. But the Germans did not simply fall back. The Nazis showed every intention of fighting savagely for every mile of Eastern France still in their hands. They used all available mobile equipment in their strong effort to stem the allies' advance along the whole battle line. In a concerted attempt to stabilize their defense, the Nazis fought stubbornly, fully aware that if this stand were unsuccessful, the allies would before long penetrate into Germany itself. In their determined defense, they used their newest, most improved weapon. The allies hammered continuously at the Nazi line, which had stiffened abruptly. The allied attack was not quite strong enough. Though handicapped by lengthening supply lines, the allies kept up their attack on all sections of the front in an all-out drive toward the German frontier. The battle continued for weeks during the early autumn. Elements of Patton's Third Army advanced the allied position a little closer to the German Siegfried Line as they crossed the Meuse River. We were certain that by continuing an unremitting offensive, we would, in spite of hardship and privation, gain additional advantages over the enemy. Specifically, we were convinced that this policy would result in shortening the war and therefore in the saving of thousands of allied lives. Consequently, the fall period was to become a memorable one because of a series of bitterly contested battles, usually conducted under the most trying conditions of weather and terrain. The fighting throughout the front, from Switzerland to the mouth of the Rhine, descended during the late fall months to the dirtiest kind of infantry slugging. Advances were slow and laborious. Gains were ordinarily measured in terms of yards rather than miles. Operations became mainly a matter of endurance, stamina, and courage. Because of depletion of their infantry strength, divisions quickly exhausted themselves in action. Our offensive strength fell off markedly. During the three months beginning September 1st, I spent a great portion of my time in travel. I visited commanders in their own headquarters. Kept personal touch with problems as they arose, and above all, gained a feel of the troops. All along the front, allied planes kept up the attack on Nazi defensive positions. American troops advanced yard by yard in the drive to push the enemy back within his own borders. The French First Army led the attack on the Belfort Gap and breached it within a week. Its leading troops quickly reached the Rhine. This turned the flank of the German position in the Vosges Mountains and forced a general withdrawal. We were disposed along a line which, beginning in the north on the banks of the Rhine, stretched 500 miles southward to the border of Switzerland. All our divisions were short in infantry replacements, and in total numerical strength of ground forces, the Germans still had a marked advantage. We could, on the average, deploy less than one division to each 10 miles of front. As a result of the junction with Patch's Seventh Army, a considerable number of Germans were trapped in southwestern France. These began to give themselves up by driveless, except in one instance, when 20,000 Germans surrendered in a single body. At Beaujolais on September 17th, Nazi General Erich Elster had surrendered 20,000 German troops under his command, marking the end of the Nazi army of occupation in southern France. The mass surrender was made without the loss of a single Allied soldier's life. In the north, the Allies decided to drop three parachute divisions into German-held Holland. In an operation ultimately designed to turn the Nazis' northern flank. The British 1st Airborne Division was to land farthest north, near Arnhem, while the Americans of the 82nd and 101st Airborne were dropping a bit farther south. The operation was regarded as a large gamble, but if the Nazi bridges across the Rhine in the north would be seized, the war might be shortened materially. The drops were executed as planned. The first landings by the main airborne forces were made on September 17th and continued for several days following. Initial losses were slight, but there were some. In two weeks, more than 20,000 airborne troops had dropped into Holland. Over 13,000 more landed in gliders, which had been towed across the English Channel. The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful, except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted finally in the decimation of the British Airborne Division and only a partial success in the entire operation. But the Allied airborne troops in Holland accomplished one important task. Of the bridges to be seized, one of the most vital was the Nijmegen Bridge over the Wall, a branch of the Rhine. British and American troops surprised the Nazi force guarding the bridge and captured the valuable prize before the defenders had a chance to set off the demolition already prepared. Allied ground forces moved safely across and continued the attack. During the fall months, there was, as originally planned, much to be done operation. In the north, besides capturing the approaches to Antwerp, it was desirable to make progress toward closing the Rhine because it was from this region that our heaviest attacks would be launched in the crossing of that river. Winter conditions were now approaching and Montgomery's advances were made over difficult country. Because of the extended front held by Montgomery's 21st Army Group, it was impossible at the moment to launch further strong offensives in that area. To the south of the British forces, the Americans also ran into trouble. The American First Army got involved in the Hürtgen Forest, scene of one of the most bitterly contested battles of the entire campaign. The enemy had all the advantages of strong defensive countries. The weather was abominable. The German garrison was particularly stubborn. All along the front in the Aachen sector, as winter grew near, the fighting continued heavy. But in the Hürtgen Forest, the battle was especially tough. After the battle, whenever veterans of the American 4th, 9th, and 28th Divisions referred to hard fighting, they did so in terms of comparison with the Battle of Hürtgen Forest, which they placed at the top of the list. Yankee doggedness had finally won. By mid-December, the Allies had penetrated the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line at several points. American troops were crossing the German frontier in preparation for the final phase of the war in Europe. Only six months after the Normandy beaches had been stormed, the battle for Germany was begun. The largest military offensive in the history of man required uninterrupted supply of ammunition and continuous delivery of the engines of war. and the countless necessities of a great army, was the job of the services of supply. Whatever the obstacle, their work had to be done with speed and certainty. But even the miraculously fast job the supply service was performing in Western Europe was not always fast enough. We were weeks ahead of schedule, but in the important particular of supply capacity, we were badly behind. The roads, depots, and base installations required for the maintenance of continuous forward movement were still far to the rear of the front lines. In addition, realized port facilities on the French coast were extremely limited during the first months following the invasion. Our logistic formations had been confined in a very restricted area during the entire battle of the beachhead. The repair of Cherbourg had presented many difficulties. We began using the port in July, but it did not reach volume production until the middle of August. The difficulties of supply once our columns began their forward race was a problem that required effective solution if we were to gain our full battle profits. To facilitate the unloading of supplies on the invasion beaches, the Allies had constructed two complete artificial harbors. The one in the American sector had been demolished by the hurricane two weeks after D-Day. The British artificial harbor survived and proved of inestimable value in the transfer ashore of the supplies so vital to Allied success in the battle of Europe. But these ports were not nearly sufficient for Allied needs. These meager facilities could not support us indefinitely, and there was bound to be a line somewhere in the direction of Germany where we would be halted, if not by the action of the enemy, then because our supply lines had been strained to their elastic limit. One of the most vitally needed staples was oil. To keep a steady stream of that precious fluid pouring into France, a series of pipelines was laid between England and France, spanning the channel. The flexible pipe, wound on drums for the first time, was deposited along the floor of the channel in a unique supplied half thousand tons equal to the weight of a destroyer. From August 12th, 1944, less than 10 weeks after the Normandy beaches were invaded by the Allies, until VE day, more than 120 million gallons of gasoline flowed through the filter lines from Great Britain to the Allies on the continent. When these pipes were first laid in the channel, the destination of the gasoline was the coastal area of France, where it was pumped into storage tanks in the rear of the Allied position. The lifeblood of the Allied military organism was now ready for distribution to key sections of the front. Regardless, however, of the extraordinary efforts of the supply system, this remained our most acute difficulty. All along the front, the cry was for more gasoline. Every one of our spearheads could have gone farther and faster than they actually did. Nevertheless, we had to supply each force for its basic missions and for basic missions only. Getting the all-important supplies to the French coast was only half the problem. Delivering the goods to the men at the front was the toughest part of the job. The services of supply installed systems of truck transport by taking over main road routes in France and using most of these for one-way traffic. These were called red ball highways, on which trucks kept running continuously. Every vehicle ran at least 20 hours a day. Relief drivers were scraped up from every unit that could provide them, and the vehicles themselves were allowed to halt only for necessary loading, unloading, and servicing. The Red Ball Express began its operation on August 25th, 1944, under the Motor Transport Brigade of the Transportation Corps. Its route was quickly extended and finally covered 700 miles, the longest one-way traffic artery in the world. Since the Red Ball Express operated 24 hours each day, most of the drivers served the same kind of continuous duty that the combat troops saw in the lines. The heavy rains crippled many fronts, whose transmissions became badly worn by excessive use of the low gear and the four-wheel drive. Experience had demonstrated that each of our reinforced divisions in active operation consumed about 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day. Our maintenance arrangements had to provide for the arrival of these amounts daily. In addition, we had to build up the reserves in troops, ammunition, and supplies that would enable us, within a reasonable time, to initiate deep offensives with a certainty that these could be sustained through an extended period of decisive action. One of the most important items of supply hauled by the Red Ball Express during the crucial autumn months of 1944 was food. With our supply lines lengthening and the enemy offering strong resistance, the delivery of rations on schedule at the front was a matter of the greatest concern to commanders. Our whole offensive depended on the maintenance of that delivery. As Allied forces penetrated farther and farther eastward in Europe, the transportation of that other vital commodity, oil, to the forward areas became an even greater problem. The system of pipelines was quickly extended to keep pace with the Allied advance. Five pipelines were built on the continent to carry gasoline, oil, and lubricants to Allied forces at the front. The largest of these was some 1,500 miles long. Altogether, the network of five lines totaled more than 3,000 miles. The thoroughness of the destruction of key transport arteries, both by Allied bombings and German demolitions, greatly complicated the monumental job of the services of supply. Allied engineers were faced with the task of restoring nearly 5,000 miles of double railway track, 2,000 miles of single track. The progress in the salvaging of Western Europe's railroads for Allied use was carefully noted by Generals Eisenhower and Bradfick. The reconstruction of bridges, which, as major targets, had either been knocked out by the Allies or blown up by the retreating Nazis, was one of the most demanding jobs which fell to the overworked Army engineers. New portable bailey bridges were erected with great speed by the Allies at many points, and pre-war bridges, which had been damaged, were hastily repaired. As the Army engineers rushed repairs on bridges, a major supply problem was lessened. To reduce dependence on roads, we brought in quantities of railway rolling stock to replace that destroyed earlier in the war. To do this expeditiously, railway engineers developed a simple scheme. They merely laid railway tracks in the bottom of LSTs and simply rolled the cars out of the ships. Locomotives presented a more difficult problem, but they too were unloaded quickly, transferred without delay to the rails and ready to go into action. With the pressure from the front for additional supplies increasing, every available train was pressed into service at once. In the forward areas, the priority supplies were prepared for distribution to troop units. In the six months following D-Day, railroad development proceeded according to plan. Each train was loaded to capacity on its way to the front. Within two months after the Normandy landings, hundreds of trips had been made by American trains, and more than 30,000 tons of freight had been transported to the front. The freight cars, which had carried their precious cargo of supplies to the forward areas, soon came to be used on their return runs for the transportation of wounded back to the beaches. A tremendous strain was placed upon our supply lines. Distance alone would have been enough to stop our spearheads had we been dependent solely upon surface transport, efficient as it was. Distant and fast-moving columns were almost solely dependent upon air supply, and we kept transport planes constantly working in our supply system. They became known as flying boxcars and were never more essential to 200 miles in a spectacular advance which took them into the prize city. Possession of this port, if usable, would solve our logistic problems for the entire northern half of our front. Not only was Antwerp the greatest port in Europe, but its location well forward toward the borders of Germany would reduce our rail and truck haulage to the point where supply should no longer be a limiting factor in the prosecution of the campaign, at least in the northern sectors. On September 4th, Montgomery's armies entered Antwerp, and we were electrified to learn that the Germans had been so rapidly hustled out of the place that they had had no time to execute extensive demolition. Antwerp is an inland port connected with the sea by the great Scheldt estuary. The German defenses covering these approaches were still intact, and before we could make use of the port, we had the job of clearing out those defenses. Capture of the approaches to Antwerp was a difficult operation. The Scheldt estuary was heavily mined, and the German forces on Valkrin Island and South Beveland Island completely dominated the water routes leading to the city. The battle for Valkrin Island raged on for eight days. The amphibious assault against Valkrin was carried out against some of the strongest local resistance we met at any coastline during the European operation. Final German resistance on the island was eliminated by November 9th. Following this spectacular and gratifying operation, Antwerp quickly became the northern bulwark of our entire logistical system. The first Allied ships arrived in Antwerp, ready to unload on November 26th. The supply problem in the Allied northern area was considerably brighter. The results of the seizure of Antwerp were felt along the entire front. Germans began launching the frequently erratic V2s against the city in mid-October. More frightening, though less devastating, were the older V1 rocket bombs. The Nazis were fully aware of the importance to the Allies of the key port city, and continued their crippling rocket bomb attacks throughout the winter. Numbers of civilians and soldiers were killed, and communications and supply work were often interrupted, although usually only for brief periods. The civilian population of Antwerp sustained these attacks unflinchingly. The V1s were often intercepted and exploded before they had a chance to land. Their shrill scream acted as a warning signal for Allied forward spotters outside Antwerp. Defensive measures against the V1 soon attained a very high degree of efficiency, but even so, the threat of their arrival was always present at all hours of the day and night, and in all kinds of weather. Radar was used to great advantage. The harbor at Antwerp was the chief objective of the Nazis' rocket bomb assaults. Damage to the harbor facilities was considerable. But Europe's greatest port was soon operating at capacity levels in support of British and American armies at Germany's frontier. The Allies planned to strengthen their forces at the front in preparation for the attack. Great campaign to force the Nazis into unconditional surrender. Supplies arriving at Allied ports were unloaded and speeded on their way with not the slightest delay. All the men who contributed to the swift movement of these essential supplies to the battle line worked around the clock. High gear on the road to Berlin. The battle of supply, though not yet won, was fast turning into another outstanding Allied victory. The vital importance of air power became apparent soon after the war's beginning. In those first years, the major defensive struggle was directed against the Nazi air attack. As the aerial threat to the British Isles continued, the attention of the world was centered on the skies over England. In 1940 and 1941, the Royal Air Force battled savagely against heavy odds to ward off the Nazis' pulverizing air attacks on England. In the epic battle for Britain, everyone in England turned to and worked ceaselessly in the struggle against the powerful Nazi air offensive. Month after month, England gallantly fought for her life. Luftwaffe hammered England without letup. The RAF fought back with every plane at its command. England's unparalleled effort in the battle for Britain was all that prevented the Nazis from winning a quick and overwhelming victory in World War II. After the United States became actively allied with Great Britain, the English scene took on a new complexion. In preparation for the arrival of sizable American Air Force units, construction was rushed on airfields, housing facilities, and hangars. In the early month of 1942, it became apparent that the U.S. would have to transform part of England into a giant base for its planned air offensive against the Nazis. By mid-1942, the facilities were ready for the building up of the U.S. Air Force in England. British officials viewed the growing strength of the American air arm with mounting enthusiasm. Well aware of the powerful weapon that would soon implement the Allied attack. Beginning on July 1st, 1942, American aircraft for the new U.S. Eighth Air Force began arriving in England. During that first month, more than 400 planes returned over to the Eighth Air Force. But the flow of planes to England did not continue at the expected rate during the rest of the summer and autumn. Shipments to England were reduced considerably since a certain amount of new planes had to be sent to fighting fronts in other parts of the globe. But by the end of 1942, the U.S. air arm in Europe, which from humble beginnings was to grow in the next two and a half years to a force of more than 13,000 planes, was gradually assuming the proportions necessary for the all-out air war on the Nazis. Harassing the Nazis from the south were the U.S. Air Force units in the Mediterranean. The importance of Mediterranean bases for furthering our bombing campaign against central Germany was always a factor in the development of plans. On August 1st, 1943, a special bombing effort was carried out from an African base against the Bloesti oil fields, the most important single source of natural oil available to the Axis. The attack was conducted at treetop height and every crew was briefed to bomb a particular facility in the great installation. But the effort was reasonably successful. The effectiveness of the raid was later estimated at 42.5% of production wiped out. One of the two major functions of the Allied air forces in the European theater was its use as a tactical weapon. The air can be employed in a variety of ways to forward the progress of the land battle. One of these was to attack the enemy supply lines. Destruction of bridges, culverts, railways, roads, and canals by the air tends to isolate the force under attack. In several crises of the European campaign, the air flew more than 10,000 combat sorties per day as its share of the ground air battle. The other major function of the Allied air forces was its strategic use. We were most anxious to affect the destruction of German industry. The effect upon the land battle would be most profound and the eventual winning of the war would be correspondingly hastened. The British strategic bombing operations were usually begun at dusk. Their experience had driven them to bomb only at night. Otherwise, they suffered unsupportable losses. We believe that this was due to the fact that British bombers were designed for range and weight lifting at the expense of speed and defensive firepower. As a rule, British bombers flew without fighter support. Beginning soon after its victory in the Battle of Prism, the RAF launched its all-out offensive against the heart of the enemy's homeland. These attacks grew in intensity. But as the war progressed, the Germans' defense against the British night raids grew more effective. The American Air Force preferred daylight precision bombing for best results. In our mounting offensive against the Nazis' European fortress, Allied commanders plotted both night and day air attacks. What's the weather prospect today, Major? Looks like most of Germany will be pretty good, sir. But we have a warm front approaching from down here, which we do not expect to affect the base until late in the evening. How's the weather at Anklam? At Anklam, sir, we expect two to five tenths of low cloud and small amounts of midland height, not above 18,000 feet. Visibility, six to eight miles. Give me the map of Anklam and the picture of the aircraft back there. Yes, sir. We will attack Anklam with two combat wings. Shipyard. American bases in England were centers of constant activity. The daytime raids against targets deep in Germany required quick but thorough servicing of planes the night before, in addition to the loading of the all-important bombs, which would soon be dropping into German warplanes. Okay, boys, roll out. We have a mission this morning. Six and a half an hour. Captain Kirk, Captain Parsons, Lieutenant Booster, Akerson, Holloway, and Hawker scheduled to fire. Stop it up. Before each mission, the crews participating were given a final, thorough briefing on every relevant detail of the operation. Though these raids over Germany soon became an accustomed part of the airmen's routine, each mission presented new, special problems, and each briefing held the flyers' complete attention. The target for the day is Anklam. Specifically, you are to destroy the Arado factory. This plant manufactures aircraft components, principally wings and tail assemblies for the Focke-Wulf 190. The parts are then shipped to New Brandenburg. The Anklam raid was typical, in general, of an important American operation over Germany. The takeoff from eighth air force fields in England was scheduled for the early morning of October 9th, 1943. Four other combat wings of the same group were hitting Marienburg and Gdynia. Two combat wings were assigned to the Anklam attack. En route, the bombers had no fighter support. The first opposition was encountered over Denmark, where German fighters attacked in some form. Back in England, the ground crews waited for the bombers' return. As the hour for their expected arrival grew nearer, there was a perceptible tension in the air at the base. Losses were somewhat higher than usual. All six combat wings lost 28 bombers. Two wings that hit Anklam suffered most heavily. For every six planes that came back, one did not return. But the raid itself was considered successful. A major part of the Arado plant was bombed out. First order of business for the airmen immediately after landing at the base was a review of the mission with intelligence officers. Photographs of the target taken during and after the raid supplied 8th Air Force intelligence officers with data which was to prove invaluable in future raids on similar targets deep in Germany. We shared the conviction that through an overpowering air force, the Germans' defenses could be beaten down or neutralized. His communications so badly impaired as to make counter-concentration difficult and his air force swept from the sky. The growth of American air strength in Europe and the Mediterranean was stupendous. Between our entry into the war and the Germans' surrender, our fighter planes had won superiority over the Luftwaffe and our bombers had penetrated every defense which the German had raised against them.