A former double agent of both China and the US, with a legendary past, has revealed something shocking. In the age of social media, the Chinese Communist Party's methods to infiltrate and disrupt abroad keep getting smarter. The Tenth Bureau of the CCP’s Ministry of State Security, which targets overseas threats, has a full playbook to "hunt" social media influencers. They push them until they have no choice but to work with the CCP.
Hello everyone, welcome to my new channel Inconvenient Truths. Jennifer Zeng reports.
I am your host, Jennifer Zeng. A former double agent of both China and the U.S.
with a legendary past has revealed something shocking. In the age of social media,
the Chinese Communist Party's method to infiltrate and disrupt abroad keeps getting smarter.
The 10th Bureau of the CCP's Ministry of State Security, which targets overseas
threats, has a full playbook to hunt social media influencers. They push them until they
have no choice but to work with the CCP. The former double agent Eric posted about
the 10th Bureau is often called the Foreign Counterintelligence Bureau. Overseas,
people know it as the Foreign Security and Reconnaissance Bureau. Its main job covers
activities outside China. If we split its work into defensive and offensive tasks,
there are two main parts. First, monitor and prevent foreign-based Chinese personnel
from being recruited or defecting. Second, take offensive action. They monitor and disrupt all
anti-CCP and subversive activities overseas. They try to make the Party's eyes reach every
overseas Chinese person. The 10th Bureau can call on resources from other departments.
This includes operatives using unofficial cover from Bureau 1. It includes operatives with
official cover from Bureau 2. It can use mail and telecom interception from Bureau 14. It can
use other technical resources. The 10th Bureau also works with the CCP's United Front Work
Department and the CCP's public security bureau units, such as its first bureau.
We should note that the CCP's United Front Work, intelligence and propaganda are not sharply
separated. They often mix. United Front Work is not only by the United Front Department. The
Ministry of State Security and Public Security also carry out United Front tasks.
The State Security's 10th Bureau needs United Front Work. The 12th Bureau and the 10th Bureau
operate closely. Eric says when dealing with overseas dissidents and anti-CCP voices,
the 10th Bureau uses aggressive strategies. Besides secret human intel and tech surveillance,
they use low and dirty tricks. Some people's mail or packages go missing or arrive late.
That could be theft or tampering by the 10th Bureau. Some network attacks, information theft,
and psychological pressure happen too. The 10th Bureau may organize and plan them even if other
bureaus provide technical help. They also use local overseas Chinese communities and student
groups. They run crowd tactics and ground-level surveillance projects. Many recent arrests
and disappearances of students or dissidents who returned to China relate to this overseas
monitoring. Everyone should note this. Even though the 10th Bureau's duty is overseas,
it can access Chinese digital platform data. This includes WeChat and Douyin. It includes
more international platforms like Xiaohongshu and TikTok. Eric stresses WeChat. He says that
the CCP blocks foreign apps. This forces people inside China and overseas Chinese who need to
connect there to use WeChat. The 10th Bureau can pull WeChat data, including private chats.
When Eric talked about the 10th Bureau accessing WeChat data, including private chats,
he used three exclamation marks to stress it. All these digital platforms are part of the 10th
Bureau's intelligence and operations infrastructure. Eric quotes,
beware of all Chinese apps. He includes communication apps and even input method
software. It is not paranoid to be cautious. Eric adds that recently, the chairman of a
company called the Prince Group was accused by the US Department of Justice for scams.
Even though this group hooked up with CCP authorities for illegal stuff, it forbade
employees from using Chinese-made software. By the way, Eric once worked for that Prince
Group himself. I'll cover his wild story later. We'll talk more about this then.
Here is something I really want to highlight. Eric says the 10th Bureau also does narrative
shaping. That work includes several parts. First, block ideological contamination among
Chinese diplomats abroad. I think this means stopping diplomats from accepting Western ideas
and values. Second, the old ways, infiltrate, control and fund overseas Chinese media,
plus routine background checks on journalists. Third, in the social media era, the 10th Bureau
targets influential bloggers. They create files on them. This includes YouTube and X creators.
They profile people, they analyze personalities, they connect to weaknesses, they assess political
firmness or wavering, they judge obedience or whether suppression is needed. To reduce
exposure risk, the 10th Bureau often avoids direct recruitment. Instead, they use a leverage
strategy. They use many accounts to contact and approach targets. They guide, encourage or echo
the target. They may also stir up disputes or provoke the target. These moves push or pull
the target towards the desired goal or behavior. Then, at some stage, direct cooperation with the
CCP becomes an option or even the only way out. Honestly, when I read this, I thought of some big
Chinese-language influencers overseas. From their posts, I think many were handled and became
collaborators of the CCP. They often have large follower counts. Some followers may be the CCP's
Some were once anti-CCP. Some even had US political asylum. But after a trip back to China,
they came back speaking for the CCP. They attacked US policies. Some attacked groups
the CCP hates, like Falun Gong and Shen Yun performing arts. On the surface,
they look independent or neutral, but behind the scenes, many are already on the CCP's side.
The CCP uses these people and free speech in democracies to harm the US and attack
dissenting groups. Recently, an ex-user named Helen Maga has been doing a great job exposing
some of the influencers. One such figure she has intensively targeted is former CCP or CCTV
reporter Wang Zhi'an, who currently lives in Japan but has expressed interest in migrating to the US.
Another one she has exposed goes by the name Stone. He was granted political asylum in the US
but began attacking the US government and its policies after returning to China a while ago.
Well, due to time constraints, let's wrap up our show here today. Next episode,
we will dive into Eric's fascinating personal story, how he became a double agent for both
the CCP and the US, how he escaped China, and how he helped the CCP track down three
Chinese dissidents overseas. His life story is more breathtaking than a Hollywood thriller.
Also, because my previous channel has been heavily suppressed by YouTube,
after much painful struggle and hesitation, I've finally decided to abandon it and start
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