The Military Threatens If Xi Comes Here We Will 800 Officials 200 Generals Purged

A single leaked sentence from within the military was enough to send a chill through Zhongnanhai. If Xi Jinping comes to our unit, we will kill him with our own hands. Behind that threat lies an atmosphere of waiting for the right moment, silent, taught, as a drawn bowstring. While Xi keeps shouting on the front pages of the military press about unifying thought and unifying action, reality tells a very different story. Orders are delayed, responses are half-hearted, some commands simply vanish without a trace. It's not only military officers who remain silent. Civilian officials are evasive as well. The Politburo itself speaks with no single voice. And amid this storm, one figure has emerged as a pivotal chess piece. Someone who may be Xi's shield today, yet could just as easily become the spark that overturns the table tomorrow. Who is this person? Let's break it down in today's program. Is Xi standing alone? Both the Politburo and the military officials oppose Xi. On February 3rd, Radio Free Asia interviewed a Beijing-based scholar surnamed Liu and reported that the Xi Jinping authorities had published articles in the military newspaper for three consecutive days to criticize John. However, the tone had clearly shifted toward what could be described as principled mobilization language. According to Liu, this shift only further exposes the authorities' anxiety over how the military might respond. He noted that if this were merely a routine anti-corruption campaign, there would be no need to repeatedly emphasize on the front page of the military newspaper, day after day, the need to unify thinking and unify action. Such wording reads more like a reminder, or even a form of pressure, urging the military to speak up and take a clear stance. This in itself reveals a stark reality gap. The political campaign launched by the Central Military Commission has not been smoothly implemented across the armed forces, nor has it produced the expected response within the military. Otherwise, there would have been no need to keep shouting through repeated front page articles. The report also quoted at least two people familiar with internal military affairs who revealed that after Zhang Youxia came under investigation, during the period from January 24 to January 30, the Central Military Commission, both on the administrative and command sides, issued multiple directives to the five theater commands, as well as to branches such as the Rocket Force and the Navy. These directives required relevant units to issue coordinated statements expressing support and compliance. Yet in implementation, these orders repeatedly ran into delays, resistance, and perfunctory responses. Some units offered only formalistic replies, with no sign of substantive follow through. The report added that certain directives at the theater command and service branch level were repeatedly sent back for further consultation, and then returned through procedural channels, essentially sent straight back up the chain. In some cases, there was no response at all for an extended period, like stones thrown into the sea. According to insiders, such a situation was extremely rare in the past. Previously, orders from the Central Military Commission, the supreme command authority, were typically transmitted straight down the chain. It was highly unusual to see this kind of repeated back and forth. Now, however, reports are being pushed upward layer by layer, moving sluggishly and failing to translate into action on the ground. Fum, a source well-versed in internal CCP dynamics, also told the Epoch Times that today, even mentioning unified command is enough to provoke a strong reaction within the military. It is not only the military officer corps that is uncooperative, the civilian bureaucracy has likewise fallen silent. The John Yoshiya case has delivered the most severe shock to the armed forces in more than 70 years, and even within the Politburo, no unified position has emerged. Some members have neither expressed public support nor taken the initiative to engage in related discussions. Is the military waiting to strike Xi? On February 2nd, Du Wen, a former insider within the system, cited military sources saying that more than 60% of rank-and-file soldiers and over 80% of generals in the Chinese communist military now sympathize with and support John Yoshiya and Liu Zhenli. Xi Jinping, however, has been forcing them to pledge loyalty to him, requiring written commitments, declarations of resolve, and ideological reports. To protect themselves, internal denunciations and mutual accusations have emerged, with a level of brutality that is hard to imagine. On the surface, Xi Jinping appears to have tightly locked down the military, but in reality, the level of danger is steadily rising. Under a mentality of everyone is afraid and when pushed to a dead end, people gamble with their lives, a mutual destruction mindset is spreading within the armed forces. That commander also said that in China, launching an armed mutiny is extremely difficult. First, there are very few troops one can directly mobilize. Any attempt to move large forces would have to pass through multiple layers of command and would be easily exposed. Second, the military operates under a system that separates guns from ammunition. Even if one has weapons in hand, ammunition must be allocated across provinces and theater commands. Even so, the commander issued an extraordinarily blunt threat. All it takes is one opportunity. If Xi Jinping were to visit our unit tomorrow, I can guarantee he would not live to see the sun set. I could kill him with my own hands. How many people in the military harbor such a mindset? Over the decades, how many generals, field grade, and company grade officers were directly or indirectly promoted by Jiang Yuxia? After Jiang's purge, it is likely that few of these people can escape the same fate. When death seems inevitable anyway, will they resort to desperate, unthinkable actions? Also on February 2nd, the US journal Foreign Affairs published an article co-authored by Jonathan Sin, a former CIA China analyst, now at the Brookings Institution's China Center, and Carl Ford, a former senior CIA intelligence officer. The article was titled Xi the Destroyer, directly labeling Xi as a destroyer, a striking new epithet that also fits his image as the chief accelerator. Since the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has taken down nearly 800 officials at the vice central level or above, including 10 to 15 national and vice national level officials, hundreds of ministerial level cadres, and nearly 200 military generals. What has most shocked the outside world is that after purging wave after wave of senior leaders, Xi even ruthlessly eliminated a decades-long close associate like Jiang Yuxia, revealing a cold and merciless nature. Jiang Yuxia's arrest directly reflects Xi Jinping's profound distrust of the military. He no longer trusts anyone. The article points out that Jiang's removal illustrates Xi's cruelty. It is one thing to show no mercy to enemies, but quite another to show no mercy even to friends. This exposes a defining feature of Xi's rule—no one is safe, not even those with deep personal ties to him. Add the title chief accelerator to the new nickname the destroyer, and it seems Xi Jinping truly is the chosen chief accelerator of the CCP's destruction. A key chess piece that could flip the balance We've talked at length about Xi Jinping's predicament. Now let's turn to a key chess piece on Xi's side in the arrest of Jiang—one that, if a sudden twist occurs, could just as easily become the decisive card for the anti-Xi camp and help it seize the upper hand. What is it? At present, the most important figure backing Xi is Cai Qi. He is unquestionably the number two under Xi. But according to commentator Tang Jingyuan, it is highly likely that once Cai Qi has helped Xi stabilize the overall situation, Xi will then cook the dog once the rabbit is dead, discarding him when he is no longer needed. The core logic is this—even if Xi remains alive and Cai Qi never turns against him, Cai Qi would still pose an enormous threat to Xi's eventual successor after Xi's death. Why? Because Cai Qi knows Xi Jinping too well. Xi's humiliating past, every one of his weaknesses, Cai Qi knows them like the back of his hand. If Xi were ever to truly achieve a dynastic inheritance, he would have to build a personal cult around himself. In that inevitable process, Cai Qi would, in Xi's eyes, become the greatest obstacle and threat to this deification, precisely because he knows Xi's true bottom. There is another reason as well. Tang Jingyuan notes that during the Deng Zhenghu era, many retired party elders still wielded enormous influence, effectively acting as regents, to a certain degree. This is one reason why Hu Jintao spent ten years as a figurehead emperor, without violent, bloody clashes erupting between successors and elders. A key factor was that Deng Xiaoping had established a relatively complete set of institutional safeguards—collective leadership, term limits, rule by red descendants, and strict limits on how far internal party struggles could go. These mechanisms genuinely constrained conflicts between old ministers of the previous reign and successors of the next, keeping them within certain bounds. Factional infighting could be covert or even overt, but it rarely escalated to total annihilation. This time, however, Xi Jinping has personally destroyed all of that. It can therefore be said that the CCP has effectively entered a new era. Whoever is more ruthless, whoever dares to strike harder, wins power and holds power. Xi Jinping has completely rewritten the rules of the game. And the inevitable consequence is this. Xi cannot smash the rules to seize power and then demand that those who helped him, people like Cai Qi, suddenly return to playing by the rules. That is a contradiction. You cannot break the rules yourself and then force others to obey them. Therefore, if Xi truly regains the upper hand and stabilizes the situation, and if he wants to ensure the safety of his family and his chosen successor, the only path left is to purge everyone who once helped him break the rules. This is the CCP's structurally self-destructive mechanism. From the day it was founded, it has never stopped. Xi Jinping is not the first to play this game. Mao Zedong played it the same way. For Cai Qi, however, the real danger is not only that he may be dealt with after helping Xi stabilize the situation. There is an even more serious and urgent risk. If the anti-Xi camp truly wakes up, stops hesitating out of fear of collapsing the party, and begins applying real pressure on Xi Jinping, then Cai Qi is very likely to become the first sacrificial pawn someone Xi Jinping would throw under the bus. There are already reports circulating through unofficial media channels from the anti-Xi camp claiming that a major settlement plan is on the table. If Xi Jinping is willing to hand over Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and others to take full responsibility for the arrest and killing of Zhang, then Xi could be allowed a soft landing under a Hua Guofeng model, a safe and orderly retirement. Of course, such disclosures can never be verified, nor can they be conclusively refuted. We can only continue to observe. But in terms of political logic, the idea is entirely sound. If both central authorities within the CCP truly do not want to fight to the point of capsizing the boat and drowning everyone, then the only way forward is for both sides to return to a shared framework of rules. That, in turn, necessitates one unavoidable step. Xi Jinping must offer up scapegoats, figures like Cai Qi, to provide an explanation to the entire party and to make clear what happens to those who break the gang rules. Without this, there would be no deterrence, no demonstration of the authority of party discipline. The rules of the game, the underworld rules, cannot be broken at will. Once they are broken, a price must be paid. Seen from this angle, the current bloodletting between the two major camps is, in essence, a clash between two sets of gang rules, the CCP's traditional rules and Xi Jinping's personal rules. As for Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and others like them, they have in fact shown a profound lack of judgment. They helped Xi arrest Jiang, believing that this would protect themselves and allow them to gain even greater power and privilege. What they fail to understand is that by doing so, they are actually accelerating the countdown to a major calamity for themselves. In other words, figures like Cai Qi and Wang, no matter which path they choose, you will ultimately find that it leads to a dead end. Why has the situation come to this? Because they backed the wrong man and pledged loyalty to the wrong master. No matter which faction ultimately prevails, neither will tolerate them. They have boxed themselves into a corner with no escape. Unless they act first, unless they take the initiative to overturn Xi, turning Xi Jinping himself into a letter of surrender to be presented to the party elders, they have no real chance of survival. Only then might they regain trust and still be of use. At the very least, they could preserve their lives and their family wealth. That much would still be possible. After all, figures like Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, or Wang Yang still have limits, moral boundaries, a bottom line. That is the biggest difference between them and Xi Jinping. Will Cai Qi rethink his position and decide to flip the table? I believe that if he does, China's political landscape will change dramatically. So where will the fates of Zhang, Xi, and the party elders ultimately lead? Which camp will gain the upper hand? Let's continue to watch closely. Thank you and see you in the next program.